Education and the critique of liberal peacebuilding:

the case of South Sudan by Daoust, Gabrielle
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDUCATION AND THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING: 
 
THE CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GABRIELLE DAOUST  
 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 
SEPTEMBER 2017 
  
  
3 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
GABRIELLE DAOUST 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
EDUCATION AND THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING: 
THE CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Contemporary peacebuilding debates centre on questions of effectiveness, relevance, 
and sustainability, broadly contrasting a ‘liberal peace’ model and more ‘critical’ 
perspectives. The critical peacebuilding literature calls for a transformative approach 
addressing inequalities and systemic violence underpinning conflict, promoting ‘local’ 
engagement, and responding to ‘everyday’ priorities. Education systems play central 
roles in reproducing or challenging relations of power, privilege, and inequality 
associated with violent conflict, and represent key sites of ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ 
engagement. However, the critical literature has paid limited attention to education’s 
potential, and political, peacebuilding role. In this thesis, I explore the importance of 
education in peacebuilding and argue that peacebuilding scholarship should seriously 
engage with education. Using a case study approach and a critical cultural political 
economy framework, I explore links between education, inequality, and peacebuilding 
in South Sudan, through analysis of donor and government policies and interviews with 
217 education and peacebuilding actors. I suggest that education policies and practices 
reproduce political, economic, and cultural inequalities and violence and undermine 
peacebuilding aims in three broad ways. First, education resource and service 
distribution reproduces, justifies, and institutionalises geographic and intergroup 
disparities and grievances associated with ‘real’ and perceived inequalities. Second, 
‘local’ participation strategies based on ‘decentralised’ governance reproduce patterns 
of political exclusion, exploitation, and mistrust between ‘local’ communities and 
authorities. Third, formal education practices and informal narratives concerning 
identity and difference, in relation to inequality, conflict, and peace, reproduce colonial 
forms of oppression and violence. These findings demonstrate the complexity of 
education’s peacebuilding role, expanding critical discussions concerning inequalities, 
the ‘local’, and the ‘everyday’ and providing insight into specific sociopolitical 
processes through which these can be addressed, both analytically and ‘practically’. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Situating the Research: ‘The Problem of Peace(building)’ 
Peacebuilding, and the ‘problem of peace’, is a “critical research agenda central 
to International Relations” (Richmond, 2007a, p. 247) and a “subject of intense debate 
within contemporary [IR]” (Selby, 2013, p. 58). Recent peacebuilding debates centre on 
the effectiveness, relevance, and sustainability of contemporary approaches, broadly 
contrasting a so-called ‘liberal peace’ model and more ‘critical’ perspectives intended to 
inform just and durable peace. This critical peacebuilding literature1 suggests that 
peacebuilding analysis and interventions should adopt a transformative approach, 
addressing systems of violence and inequality underpinning conflict, promoting ‘local’ 
engagement, and responding to ‘everyday’ needs. Gaps and limitations associated with 
IR-dominated peacebuilding scholarship illustrate the importance of, and need for, 
“more interdisciplinary work in international relations and peace and conflict studies”, 
to inform “a better understanding of the variations of peace and its building blocks” 
(Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović, 2016, p. 1). 
The critical peacebuilding literature lays out key critiques of ‘liberal’ 
frameworks and identifies directions for more transformative, just, and sustainable 
peacebuilding analyses and approaches. However, I suggest that this literature has not 
gone far enough in exploring these themes, due in part to its limited (and depoliticised) 
engagement with the role of social institutions, and with education systems and 
institutions in particular. In this thesis, I explore the importance of education in 
peacebuilding and argue that IR-centred peacebuilding scholarship should seriously 
engage with education as a sociopolitical institution, using the ‘case’ of South Sudan’s 
education sector to explore and expand critical peacebuilding discussions. I locate my 
research contributions within the wider tradition of critical peacebuilding scholarship, 
and aim to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of critical perspectives on 
peacebuilding and education’s complex and political role.  
 
1.2 Critical Peacebuilding Debates and the Relevance of Education 
Discussing the limitations and problems of dominant (‘liberal’) peacebuilding 
processes, the critical peacebuilding literature draws attention to three important 
                                                
1 While acknowledging that critical peacebuilding scholars are not homogeneous, I consider this ‘critical 
literature’ as a body of literature engaging in critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ model. 
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debates, representing directions for ‘just’ and ‘sustainable’ peacebuilding. First, critical 
peacebuilding scholars contend that ‘(neo)liberal’ peacebuilding interventions ignore, 
reproduce, and widen patterns of marginalisation, exclusion, and inequality. They argue 
that peacebuilding should involve transformation of political, economic, and social 
‘drivers’ of conflict, including systems of violence, oppression, and inequality 
(Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Richmond, 2006a, 2006b, 2008b, 2009a, Newman, 2010, 2011; 
Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011; Pugh, 2011; Richmond, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013; 
Richmond, 2014; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond, 2016).  
Second, critical peacebuilding scholars claim that the ‘liberal’ model lacks 
attention to ‘local’ contexts and imposes externally defined norms, priorities, and 
definitions. They emphasise the importance of recognising ‘local’ ownership, 
knowledge, and priorities through opportunities, at multiple scales, for ‘local’ actors to 
define peacebuilding needs, strategies, and objectives (Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2006b; 
Taylor, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009a; Lidén, 2009; Richmond, 2010b; 
Mac Ginty, 2010; Autesserre, 2010; Jabri, 2010; Pugh, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011b; 
Autesserre, 2011; Newman, 2011; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011; Richmond, 2012; 
Jabri, 2013; Newman, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Mac 
Ginty and Firchow, 2016). Third, critical peacebuilding scholars suggest that externally 
driven ‘liberal’ peacebuilding fails to understand or represent individuals’ and 
communities’ day-to-day lives, activities, threats, and needs. They argue that 
peacebuilding goals can be realised through responses to populations’ ‘everyday’ needs, 
concerns, and priorities (Richmond, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c, 2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; 
Mitchell, 2011; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac 
Ginty and Firchow, 2016).  
These arguments draw attention to the transformative potential of peacebuilding, 
in terms of responding to underlying dynamics of conflict and engaging with, and 
responding to the needs and interests of, actors at multiple scales, from the ‘local’ to 
‘global’. However, I suggest that these discussions involve three broad limitations, 
based on their limited attention to: 1) specific ‘social’ mechanisms or processes through 
which these critical peacebuilding issues (inequality, the ‘local’, the ‘everyday’) can be 
addressed, moving beyond the level of abstraction toward ‘practical’ and policy 
implications; 2) processes and institutions linking international or national level 
governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres; and 3) relationships between responses to 
‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ engagement, and systems of/responses to violence and 
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inequality. I suggest that analysis of education systems can provide insight into 
mechanisms through which systems of inequality are reproduced or challenged and 
through which ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ engagement are facilitated or undermined as part 
of peacebuilding processes. This can also provide insight into relationships between 
these areas, interactions between scales of action and influence, and the ‘practical’ and 
policy relevance of critical peacebuilding debates. 
Education systems, as key social (and political) institutions, play a central role in 
reproducing and entrenching relations and structures of political, economic, and cultural 
power, privilege, inequality, and injustice that contribute to intergroup grievances and 
violent conflict. They can also play important roles in challenging these aspects of 
violence and contributing to peacebuilding efforts. A small body of critical 
peacebuilding literature considers the role of social institutions and services, presenting 
three broad explanations for their (potential) peacebuilding contributions. First, some 
critical scholars suggest that social service provision represents a form of 
socioeconomic distribution, or a means of addressing social, economic, and political 
exclusion and promoting social and economic rights as sources of peace (Pugh, 2005; 
Lidén, 2009; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Richmond, 2014). Second, they suggest 
that public service provision can address people’s ‘everyday’ needs and priorities and 
thus represents ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ forms of peace (Richmond, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c, 
2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Mitchell, 2011; Roberts, 2011b, 2012; Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2012; Newman, 2014; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). Third, they suggest that 
social service provision can contribute to state-society relations by responding to 
‘everyday’ needs and contributing to (democratic) participation and the legitimacy of 
the state and of peacebuilding interventions (Richmond, 2008b, 2009c; Mac Ginty, 
2011b; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Newman, 2014; Richmond, 2016). 
Some inroads have been made with respect to engagement with education in the 
critical peacebuilding literature, through specific references to education ‘services’ in 
some publications and the inclusion of education-focused chapters in some edited texts 
on peacebuilding. However, references to education in the critical peacebuilding 
literature are generally peripheral or vague, and do not fully consider the complexity 
and political implications of education’s role in both violence and peace. Discussions of 
education and other ‘social services’ are limited by a largely depoliticised focus on 
service ‘delivery’ or ‘provision’ (education as a service or good to be delivered, rather 
than a complex political institution), assumptions about education’s ‘positive’ 
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peacebuilding contributions, and limited attention to political, economic, and cultural 
violence and inequalities reproduced within and through education. The lack of 
engagement with education in the critical peacebuilding literature reflects wider 
disciplinary divisions, with limited consideration of education’s role and significance in 
the broader field of IR. This also reflects a view of education as largely disconnected 
from ‘political’ peacebuilding processes. Education is, however, “fundamentally a 
political matter” (Dupuy, 2008b, p. 158). Education ‘services’ “are never simply 
‘services’”; rather, they ‘serve to govern’, reflecting and expanding political control and 
power (Ferguson, 1994, p. 253). As “the most public of public policies” (Samoff, 2003, 
p. 2), education represents “a highly political process, touching upon power relations, 
access to resources and ideological predilictions [sic]” (Mkandawire, 2004, p. 11). 
Critical scholarship, including peacebuilding scholarship, requires attention to 
different scales of analysis, “to the micropolitics of context, subjectivity, and struggle, 
as well as the macropolitics of global economic and political systems and processes” 
(Mohanty, 2003, p. 501). Engagement with education, as “a principal mechanism by 
which global forces affect the daily lives of national populations” (Tikly, 2001, p. 155), 
can provide insight into processes and institutions linking international- or national-
level governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres. Education systems represent mediating sites 
between ‘local’ communities and national governments, as well sites of international 
intervention and influence. They represent “one of the most visible, far reaching forms 
of government” (Winthrop and Matsui, 2013, p. 4), “a central strategic platform for 
political actors” (Robertson, 2009, p. 542), and “one of the central… socialising 
institutions of the modern capitalist state” (Novelli, 2016, p. 849). Education systems 
are key institutions mediating, and providing insight into, relations of power operating 
from ‘intimate’ to ‘global’ levels (Peterson, 2016, p. 443). These include relations 
between the ‘public’ or ‘political’ and ‘private’ or ‘personal’, and between individuals 
and households, the state, international politics and institutions, and global political and 
economic structures, which are of central importance to understanding dynamics of 
violence, injustice, and peace (Tickner, 2001, pp. 63, 104; Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–
501; Fraser, 2013, pp. 33–4; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636). 
Education systems play central roles in transmitting and legitimising political 
ideologies that justify conflict or facilitate transitions to peace (Rappleye and Paulson, 
2007, p. 255; Smith, 2010, pp. 17–8). They also legitimise and reproduce particular 
(national and global) political and economic structures and patterns of power (Olssen, 
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2004, p. 263; Jones, 2007, p. 325; Mundy, 2007, p. 346; Robertson, 2009, p. 542; 
Moutsios, 2010, p. 128; Müller, 2011, pp. 1, 15; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 435–7). 
Education plays a critically important role in social transformation and peacebuilding, 
presenting an entry point for wider political transformation across multiple sectors 
(Dupuy, 2008b, p. 150; Smith, 2010, p. 23; Barakat et al., 2013, p. 127; Ellison, 2014, 
p. 191; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, p. 15). It can serve as a ‘weapon of 
war’ (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000, p. 11; L. Davies, 2010, p. 491) and a ‘key player’ in 
perpetuating violence (Davies, 2005, p. 358), and is “almost always complicit in 
conflict” (Buckland, 2006, p. 7). Education systems reproduce, exacerbate, and 
legitimise structures and relations of power, exclusion, and domination (Harber, 2004, 
p. 60; Dupuy, 2008a, p. 29; Brown, 2011, pp. 192–6; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 
435–7). This challenges assumptions, reflected in the critical peacebuilding literature, 
concerning education’s positive, beneficial, or neutral role. In this thesis, I attempt to 
(re)politicise education’s peacebuilding role by moving beyond explanations that 
consider it as simply a service to be delivered and drawing attention to its complex role 
in both violence and peace and its implications for critical peacebuilding debates.  
 
1.3 Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Education Through the Lens of Inequality 
Attention to multidimensional inequalities represents the entry point for my 
analysis of education’s peacebuilding role, due to their significance in violent conflict2 
and their implications for peacebuilding processes. ‘Post-conflict’ societies involve “a 
transformation of violence from large-scale warfare to other types of violence” (Cramer, 
2006, p. 245), including ‘indirect’ violence that “tyrannises life in post-conflict spaces” 
(Roberts, 2011a, p. 2540). This draws attention to changing forms of violence and 
power in peacebuilding contexts (Cooper, 2007, p. 615), including structural violence 
and inequalities affecting peacebuilding. Ignoring inequality and injustice, and 
associated grievances, leads to peace agreements and processes that “paper over deep 
                                                
2 Large multi-country quantitative studies report that intergroup and geographic socioeconomic and 
political inequalities (e.g. income, assets, representation) are associated with increased likelihood of 
armed conflict (Besançon, 2005; Regan and Norton, 2005; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Østby, 2007, 
2008b; Østby, Nordås and Rød, 2009; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 
2010; Buhaug et al., 2011; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Deiwiks, Cederman and 
Gleditsch, 2012; Bartusevičius, 2014; Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Fjelde and Østby, 2014; 
Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann, 2015). Several studies report that educational inequalities (e.g. in 
attainment) between ethnic and religious groups and subnational regions are associated with higher 
likelihood of civil war and communal conflict (Østby, 2007, 2008b, 2008a; Østby, Nordås and Rød, 2009; 
Bartusevičius, 2014; Fjelde and Østby, 2014; FHI 360 Education Policy and Data Center, 2015).  
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fissures in society, sowing the seeds for future conflict” (Keen, 2012, p. 771). Persistent 
inequalities and structural violence reproduce conflict dynamics and threaten 
peacebuilding goals (Newman, 2013, p. 318; Richmond, 2014, pp. 449–50). 
Additionally, peace interventions themselves “are disparate and divergent in their 
economic and social impacts… raising troubling questions about who they might leave 
behind” (Selby, 2008, p. 11). This illustrates the need for attention to global and internal 
inequalities between geographical regions and social groups, and their peacebuilding 
implications (Selby, 2008, pp. 18–9; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2006).  
In this research, I am interested in the ways in which inequalities and structural 
forms of violence affect peacebuilding. Rather than identifying specific causes of 
violent conflict, I am interested in understanding wider forms and mechanisms of 
inequality and (structural) violence that affect and undermine peacebuilding processes. I 
explore interrelations between different forms of inequality or injustice, the ways in 
which these are reflected, reproduced, or challenged in education contexts, and resulting 
implications for peacebuilding. I frame education’s peacebuilding role in terms of its 
contributions to a ‘positive’ peace based on addressing underlying causes of conflict, 
including structural inequality and injustice (Galtung, 1969, p. 183).  
I focus on horizontal inequalities, or systematic “severe and consistent 
economic, social, and political differences between… or groups with shared identities” 
(Stewart, 2008, p. 12). These are linked to broader aspects of structural violence 
occurring “as collective systematic processes and institutions of rule… as 
institutionalized systems of power and inequality” (Mohanty, 2015, p. 971). In 
exploring systematic inequalities as forms of violence, I consider a broad definition of 
violence involving direct as well as structural or indirect forms. These include the 
unequal distribution of power, resources, and opportunities, as well as exploitation, 
marginalisation, repression, alienation, and other forms of injustice affecting survival, 
wellbeing, and freedoms (Galtung, 1969, p. 171, 1990, pp. 292–4). I consider forms of 
violence (re)produced by structures, systems, and institutions that legitimise inequalities 
and shape material contexts in which people live (Anglin, 1998, pp. 145–7; Parsons, 
2007, p. 180). In conceptualising structural violence and inequalities, I consider 
interconnected socioeconomic, political, and cultural aspects. Socioeconomic 
dimensions include distribution of and access to material assets or resources, 
employment opportunities and income, and services (e.g. housing, health, education). 
Political dimensions include representation or participation in decision-making and 
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political processes at multiple scales. Cultural dimensions include societal recognition, 
respect, and value associated with cultural representations, practices, and identities 
(Stewart, 2000, pp. 249–50, 2008, p. 13, Fraser, 2008a, p. 14, 2013, pp. 162–97).  
Inequalities and structural violence are “experienced as injustice… at particular 
intersections of race, ethnicity, class, nationality, gender, and age” (Anglin, 1998, pp. 
145–6). Inequalities aligning with group identities (e.g. ethnic, religious, geographic), 
associated with perceived deprivation relative to others or fears of loss of power and 
privilege, can drive collective grievances and mobilisation for conflict (Stewart, 2000, 
pp. 246–8, 2008, pp. 7–12, 2009, pp. 316–7; Østby, 2013, pp. 215–6). Grievances may 
be associated with ‘actual’ (e.g. observable, ‘measurable’) inequalities or with 
perceptions of inequality and injustice (Stewart, 2000, p. 250, 2008, pp. 7–18; Stewart, 
Brown and Langer, 2008, pp. 193–4; Brown and Langer, 2010, pp. 30–1). Assessments 
of inequality and injustice involve subjective and psychological as well as ‘concrete, 
physical’ dimensions (Piketty, 2014, p. 2). 
Education systems are particularly important sites through which to analyse and 
address inequalities and structural violence, as inequalities and injustices in education 
opportunities and outcomes interact with and influence other forms of political and 
socioeconomic disadvantage and inequality (Cramer, 2003, p. 398; Stewart, 2009, pp. 
323–7). Educational inequalities play a particularly strong role in collective grievances 
and mobilisation as they are more likely to result from systematic discrimination 
(Østby, 2008b, p. 155). By reflecting and reproducing different forms of inequality, 
education systems represent mechanisms of structural violence and contribute to its 
persistence and durability over time. Some education literature examines inequalities 
reproduced within and through education systems, implications for violent conflict, and 
entry points for transformation as part of peacebuilding. These include economic 
inequalities related to education resource and service distribution, political inequalities 
related to representation in decision-making and management and opportunities for 
participation, and cultural inequalities related to identity and difference in education 
structures and content (Harber, 2004; Degu, 2005; Smith, 2005; Dupuy, 2008a, 2008b; 
L. Davies, 2010; Tikly and Barrett, 2011; Power, 2012; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and 
Smith, 2015). While these often intersect with historical patterns of marginalisation, 
oppression, and inequality, they also present possibilities for transforming systems 
underlying conflict. This can occur through the redistribution of resources and services, 
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decision-making arrangements challenging existing systems of representation, and 
recognition of identity and difference in forms and content of education. 
In exploring these multidimensional inequalities, I consider the ways in which 
political, economic, and cultural influences, systems, and processes, at multiple scales, 
intersect to shape outcomes in particular contexts. This includes attention to the ways in 
which certain discourses and practices are privileged, ‘operationalised’, and reproduced 
in particular institutions or projects across different scales and sites (Jessop and Sum, 
2001, p. 96; Jessop, 2005b, pp. 144–6; Jessop and Sum, 2010, p. 445; Jessop, 2010, pp. 
338–46; Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 12–7; Walker, 2010, pp. 225–6; Sum and Jessop, 
2013, pp. 49–51, 165–86). In relation to education, this requires attention to its ‘real’ 
politics, including links with wider political, economic, and ‘cultural’ structures and 
systems (Robertson and Dale, 2008, pp. 24–6; Dale and Robertson, 2009, pp. 1119–22). 
I do not claim that education alone can address peacebuilding challenges or fill 
gaps in the critical peacebuilding debates. Education, on its own, does not produce or 
resolve conflict. Education systems are located within complex international, national, 
and ‘local’ contexts (Dupuy, 2008a, p. 25; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008, p. 481), 
and the nature and duration of conflict, social and economic environments, and political 
settlements affect education’s peacebuilding role (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2012, pp. 
65–6; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013, p. 203). I do, however, suggest that attention to 
the role of education can expand ‘critical’ debates on responses to systems of violence 
and inequality, ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities. Detailed 
analysis of political, economic, and cultural dimensions of inequality and violence 
reproduced within and through education systems can also inform broader critical 
discussions of the nature and role of inequalities in peacebuilding. 
When discussing the significance of inequalities, I do not suggest that violent 
conflict can be reduced to inequality-related ‘grievances’. Understanding conflict causes 
and dynamics involves attention to links between grievances and ‘greed’ (or between 
political and economic motivations) (Stewart, 2000, p. 246, 2008, p. 22, Cramer, 2002, 
p. 1853, 2006, pp. 134–5; Keen, 2012, p. 771) and between collective and individual 
identities, motivations, and actions at local and ‘supralocal’ levels (Kalyvas, 2003, p. 
475). I also acknowledge the numerous factors influencing relationships between 
inequality, conflict, and peacebuilding: political conditions (e.g. state structure and 
institutions, political accommodations and opportunities, agendas of conflict actors), 
economic conditions (e.g. resource availability), and demographic factors (e.g. location 
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and size of populations, significance of intergroup ‘differences’) (Cramer, 1997, pp. 8–
9; Regan and Norton, 2005, p. 333; Stewart, 2008, pp. 19–22; Stewart, Brown and 
Langer, 2008, pp. 288–96; Brown and Langer, 2010, pp. 31–2; Østby, 2013, pp. 216–7; 
Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014, pp. 547–51). In this thesis, I use the concept of 
inequality as the ‘lens’ of analysis but acknowledge that there are other dimensions of 
conflict and peacebuilding that are not explicitly addressed.  
 
1.4 Overview of the Research: Questions, Methods, and Concepts 
In this thesis, I explore the role of education in peacebuilding, with a specific 
focus on the reproduction and transformation of inequalities. I critically engage with 
this topic on two levels. First, I engage in an empirical analysis of education’s role in 
peacebuilding in South Sudan. Education has played a central role in dynamics of 
violence in South Sudan since the colonial period, with education distribution, 
management, and content used as mechanisms of power and violence. The 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed following decades of armed conflict 
between Sudan’s north and south, called for a process that “replaces war not just with 
peace, but also with social, political and economic justice” (p. 2). However, I suggest 
that current approaches to education policy and practice reproduce political, economic, 
and cultural forms of inequality and violence and undermine peacebuilding efforts. 
Second, I engage with the critical peacebuilding literature, using empirical findings to 
make broader arguments about the role of education.  
This research addresses two central questions, the first more general and the 
second focusing on the specific case: 1) What is the role of education in 
peacebuilding, and how is this influenced by forms of inequality? 2) What role 
does education play in peacebuilding processes in South Sudan, and how is this 
influenced by forms of inequality? In addressing these central questions, I explore 
three sub-questions: 1) How are economic or resource-related inequalities reflected and 
reproduced in the education system, and what are their implications for peacebuilding? 
2) How are political inequalities reflected and reproduced in the education system, and 
what are their implications for peacebuilding? 3) How are ‘cultural’ inequalities 
reflected and reproduced in the education system, and what are their implications for 
peacebuilding? These sub-questions explore different forms of inequality (and their 
peacebuilding implications) as ‘lenses’ or entry points for understanding the complex 
education-peacebuilding relationship. I address these three broad dimensions of 
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inequality in the three empirical chapters, which focus, respectively, on the ‘economic’ 
distribution of education resources and services, ‘political’ participation and influence 
in decision-making, and ‘cultural’ engagement with identity and difference. I consider 
each of these sub-questions in relation to the case of South Sudan, and in terms of their 
implications for the critical peacebuilding literature.  
This research is based on a qualitative case study methodology involving 
primary data collection and analysis of donor and government policy documents. I 
conducted primary research in South Sudan over a 10-month period, which involved 
interviews and group discussions with 217 education and peacebuilding stakeholders. 
Critical cultural political economy, informed by a critical realist ontological perspective, 
provides a framework for examining interrelated cultural, political, and economic 
factors informing the selection, implementation, and reproduction of discourses and 
strategies in education contexts, at multiple scales, and their implications for processes 
of violence and peacebuilding. This requires attention to the perspectives, experiences, 
interests, and influences of actors within and outside the education sector, at 
international, national and subnational, and ‘local’ school and community levels, and 
the relations between them. I consider Sabaratnam’s (2011a, p. 797–8) call for “direct 
engagement with the ‘recipients’ of these [peacebuilding] interventions”, examining 
“the ways in which people and groups… have interpreted or engaged the practices and 
agents of intervention”. This draws attention to connections between the ‘political’ and 
‘personal’, between the global, national, and ‘local’, through attention to people’s 
perceptions, interpretations, experiences, and emotions concerning the politics of 
conflict and peacebuilding intervention (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 798; Sylvester, 2012, 
pp. 484–501; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 270–4; Sylvester, 2013, pp. 2–5; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 
390–6, 593–636; Ahmed, 2014, pp. 9–28).  
I examine formal and nonformal forms of education managed within South 
Sudan’s government system, focusing on primary- and secondary-level education 
(although I acknowledge that what is understood and experienced as ‘education’ varies 
widely). I examine education as an ‘ensemble’, considering collective structures, forms 
of organisation, and practices (Robertson and Dale, 2015 p. 152–7). I explore processes 
of education governance, or “the combination and coordination of activities, 
actors/agents, and scales, through which ‘education’ is constructed and delivered” 
(Robertson and Dale, 2008, p. 23; Dale and Robertson, 2009, p. 1117). This includes the 
coordination and division of responsibilities in education funding, ownership, 
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organisation, provision, regulation, and decision-making, by “a range of social forces 
and agents that operate below, around, above and beyond the nation state” (Novelli and 
Lopes Cardozo, 2008, pp. 482–3). A critical approach to the analysis of education and 
its peacebuilding implications requires moving beyond ‘actual’ practices, outcomes, and 
policy directions to focus on the ‘real’ politics of education (Dale, 2005, pp. 139–41, 
2006, p. 190, Robertson and Dale, 2008, p. 26, 2015, pp. 155–7; Dale and Robertson, 
2009, p. 1120). Instead of adopting an ‘educationalist’ approach focused on education 
(as a system, institution, or sector) in isolation, I consider its relations with wider 
political, economic, and ‘cultural’ structures, processes, and contexts (Robertson and 
Dale, 2008, pp. 24–6; Dale and Robertson, 2009, pp. 1119–22). 
I consider peacebuilding, broadly defined, as actions or interventions to support 
a transition from war to peace and prevent the recurrence of large-scale violence 
(Barnett et al., 2007, p. 36). As noted above, I adopt a ‘positive’ or ‘sustainable’ 
understanding of peace involving responses to underlying (structural) causes of conflict 
(Galtung, 1969, p. 183). I do not consider ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding as “a discrete, 
identifiable sphere of activity” or “the dominant element of… war-ending practices” 
(Selby, 2013, p. 64). I consider the ways in which peacebuilding processes are 
“structured by the specificities of war-ending processes and the strategies and power 
dynamics that accompany them” (Selby, 2013, p. 78), with attention to wider political, 
economic, cultural, and historical contexts. I also challenge the artificial distinction 
between ‘war’ and ‘peace’, which obscures forms of non-war violence embedded in 
societies and global political systems (Cramer, 2006, pp. 215–6; Cooper, 2007, p. 615). 
Considering structures of inequality, injustice, and violence complicates the question of 
“when war ends and peace begins”, through attention to “features of life before, during, 
and after the event the war usually describes” (Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 638–9). 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 In this chapter, I have provided an introduction to the aims and contributions of 
this thesis research. In Chapter 2, I present an overview of historical and contemporary 
dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan and the history and governance 
of the education sector, providing a background for subsequent empirical discussions. In 
Chapter 3, I review the critical peacebuilding literature, focusing on key areas of debate 
concerning the ‘liberal peace’ model and its existing limitations, notably its limited 
engagement with education. I also discuss the contributions of the education literature to 
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these critical peacebuilding debates. In Chapter 4, I provide an overview of my guiding 
theoretical framework, based on a critical cultural political economy approach. In 
Chapter 5, I outline the case study methodology and specific approaches to data 
collection, and reflect on ethical issues associated with this project.  
 Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the empirical findings of this research. In Chapter 6, 
I explore the ways in which educational resources and services are distributed in South 
Sudan. I examine processes, roles, and perspectives associated with resource and 
service distribution at national, subnational, and school and community levels, and 
show that the distribution of education resources and services reproduces, justifies, and 
institutionalises geographic and intergroup inequalities and associated grievances. In 
Chapter 7, I explore ‘local’ participation in education governance, focusing on the 
implications of ‘decentralised’ approaches to education and school management and 
connections to wider systems of political participation. I show that processes of ‘local’ 
participation institutionalised through ‘decentralised’ and ‘school-based’ education 
governance reproduce patterns of political oppression and exploitation. In Chapter 8, I 
explore questions of identification, difference, and ‘recognition’ within (and through) 
the education sector, focusing on education aims, content, and wider political narratives. 
I show that formal programmes and informal sector narratives reproduce colonial 
dimensions of oppression and violence. In each of these chapters, I explore, 
respectively, the implications of empirical findings for conflict and peacebuilding 
dynamics, and consider the ways in which they can expand the critical peacebuilding 
debates. In Chapter 9, I summarise and further reflect on these findings and discuss their 
wider implications for the peacebuilding literature, policy, and practice.  
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH CONTEXT: CONFLICT, PEACEBUILDING, AND 
EDUCATION IN SOUTH SUDAN 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides a broad context for specific empirical analyses described 
in subsequent chapters. First, I provide an overview of historical and current conflict 
dynamics in South Sudan, including conflict between Sudan’s north and south and 
ongoing conflict within South Sudan, followed by an overview of contemporary 
government and peacebuilding processes. I then provide an overview of the history of 
the education system in South Sudan, including its central role in violent conflict, and 
approaches to education system governance, including key policy frameworks, the 
structure of the system, and sector financing. 
 
2.2 Histories of Conflict in (South) Sudan 
An analysis of peacebuilding in South Sudan requires an understanding of 
histories of conflict linked to patterns of marginalisation, oppression, and inequality. 
While acknowledging the complex pre-colonial history of what is now the state of 
South Sudan, I focus on colonial and post-independence periods, which provide the 
clearest insight into the role of education policy and practice in political violence and 
conflict. During the pre-colonial period, the region included Islamic, Christian, and so-
called ‘pagan’ (‘indigenous’) kingdoms (Johnson, 2003, pp. 2–5; Idris, 2005, pp. 26–8). 
The Turco-Egyptian invasion of Sudan in 1820 marked the beginning of a first colonial 
regime. This period involved the exploitation of southern populations through systems 
of taxation and slavery, and the privileging of largely Muslim northern populations 
(Johnson, 2003, pp. 4–6; Idris, 2005, pp. 28–31; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 136–7). Northern 
Sudanese forces overthrew Turco-Egyptian rulers in 1885, marking the beginning of the 
Islamist ‘Mahdist’ period. This period of independence built on existing systems of 
exploitation of military and economic labour from the south, based on ‘racial’, ethnic, 
and religious categorisations (Deng and Daly, 1989, pp. 2–3; Johnson, 2003, pp. 6–7; 
Idris, 2005, pp. 31–2; Elnur, 2009, pp. 6–10; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 138–42). 
The British imposed colonial rule on Sudan in 1898, marking the beginning of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period.3 Colonial development favoured the north, 
                                                
3 The systematic exclusion of Egyptians from power sharing made Sudan ‘a de facto British colony’ 
(Sharkey, 2003, p. 6). 
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with minimal administrative presence, infrastructure, economic development, or social 
services in the south. Colonial ‘divide and rule’ strategies privileged northern elites, 
reproduced patterns of southern exploitation,4 and exacerbated and reinforced existing 
regional disparities and tensions (Johnson, 2003, pp. 10–9; Poggo, 2008, p. 25; Elnur, 
2009, pp. 10–2; Ayers, 2010, pp. 157–9; Young, 2012, pp. 2–3). Administration of the 
south involved a system of ‘indirect rule’ or ‘native administration’, based on 
‘indigenous’ or ‘tribal’ authorities and leadership structures overseen (and exploited) by 
British administrators. Populations were divided and administered along ‘tribal’ and 
geographic lines, fixing identities and linking them to access to entitlements and 
resources (Deng and Daly, 1989, pp. 168–91; Deng, 1995, pp. 79, 187; Mamdani, 1996, 
p. 140, 2009, pp. 78–81, 146–69, 2009, pp. 148–67; Johnson, 2003, pp. 11–3; Idris, 
2005, pp. 36–41; Poggo, 2008, p. 23). 
When Sudan gained independence in 1956, southerners were largely excluded 
from political processes and administration (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 22; de Waal, 2007, p. 
3; Poggo, 2008, p. 36; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 178–9; Ayers, 2010, p. 160). Sudanese 
administration reflected colonial methods (e.g. ‘native administration’) and attitudes 
toward southern ‘backwardness’ (Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, pp. 610–20). Northern 
governments attempted to enforce state control and ‘national’ identity through the 
imposition of Arabic language and Islamic religion and law. The promotion of Islamist 
and Arab nationalist ideologies were presented as nation-building projects, necessary to 
create unity around religion, language, and ‘culture’ (Johnson, 2003, pp. 30–5; Idris, 
2005, pp. 50–1; Poggo, 2008, p. 96; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 179–80; Rolandsen and 
Leonardi, 2014, p. 618). This was influenced by ties with Arab states, including Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia (de Waal, 2007, p. 4).  
Armed conflict broke out in 1955 following a rebellion by southern soldiers in 
the Equatoria region. This was driven by southern exclusion from the northern 
government, political and military repression, economic marginalisation and 
exploitation, and the imposition of northern nationalist policies5 (Deng, 1995, p. 492; 
                                                
4  For example, the Zande cotton scheme, implemented in 1926, involved the displacement and 
resettlement of nearly 50,000 people in the southern Equatorial region, to supply land and labour for 
commercial cotton and cloth production (Reinton, 1971, pp. 242–5). 
5 Conflict explanations based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences and hostilities (e.g. northern 
‘Arab’ Muslims, southern ‘African’ Christians) reflect essentialist and partial accounts. Conflict 
dynamics are shaped by legacies of colonial and postcolonial rule, geopolitical influences, and geographic 
and socioeconomic dimensions of exploitation and marginalisation (Johnson, 2003, pp. 1–2; Deng, 2005, 
p. 245; Idris, 2005, pp. 3–4; de Waal, 2007, p. 17; Ayers, 2010, p. 156). 
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Johnson, 2003, pp. 27–9; Poggo, 2008, pp. 39–45; Rolandsen, 2011a, pp. 108–11; 
Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, pp. 109–10). Violence escalated between 1955 and 1963 
(Rolandsen, 2011a, p. 105; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 610). The Anya-Nya 
movement, established in 1963, aimed to bring together different armed movements in 
the south. The Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM) later emerged as the 
most unified liberation movement, incorporating Anya-Nya elements (Kasfir, 1977, p. 
146; Poggo, 2008, pp. 61–5). The Government of Sudan (GoS) responded with violent 
counterinsurgency methods, mobilising ethnic militias and targeting civilian populations 
(Poggo, 2008, pp. 73–87; Jok, 2013, p. 5).  
In 1972, the GoS and SSLM signed the Addis Ababa agreement, resulting in the 
creation of a semi-autonomous southern region. This involved the establishment of a 
Southern Regional Assembly (SRA) with control over certain sectors (e.g. 
administration, internal security), although regional government efforts and autonomy 
were limited by a lack of funds6 and internal political divisions (Stevens, 1976, pp. 248–
50; Kasfir, 1977, pp. 143–4; Rondinelli, 1981, pp. 612–22; Johnson, 2003, pp. 39–43; 
Rolandsen, 2005, p. 25; Poggo, 2008, pp. 187–92). Large-scale fighting began again in 
1983, when the northern government revoked the agreement following the discovery of 
oil reserves in southern territories, tensions over regional borders, and the attempted 
construction of the Jonglei Canal (and extraction of southern water resources) (Duffield 
et al., 2000, p. 168; Johnson, 2003, pp. 44–9; Young, 2012, p. 46; Selby and Hoffmann, 
2014, p. 366). However, periods of ‘war’ and peace’ were not clear-cut: periods of 
‘peace’ (e.g. under the Addis Ababa agreement) involved continued violence, while 
certain areas were peaceful during periods of war. 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by John 
Garang, emerged as the leading rebel force in the 1980s. The SPLM/A was driven by 
grievances over unequal distribution of power and development, control of land and oil 
resources in the south, and a stated aim of a unified, secular ‘New Sudan’ (although 
popular discourses reflected an aim of southern nationalism and independence) 7 
                                                
6 While $225 million were allocated to the Southern Region for 1977-1983, only 45 million had been 
disbursed by 1982 (Johnson, 2003, p. 44). 
7 The SPLM/A initially reflected a Marxist orientation and rhetoric (linked to efforts to mobilise support 
from the Ethiopian Derg and wider communist bloc), but lacked a clear ideology (Schomerus and Allen, 
2010, p. 25; Young, 2012, p. 62). The post-Cold War shift to a liberal political agenda reflected 
adaptation to the changing international environment (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 427) and access to 
American state and Christian/evangelical support. 
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(Hutchinson, 2001, pp. 307–10; Johnson, 2003, pp. 61–5; Young, 2012, pp. 44–50; de 
Waal, 2013, p. 224). Fighting during the first war centred in the south, but extended to 
northern regions during the second war. By the early 1990s, the SPLM/A controlled 
roughly two-thirds of southern territories (Hutchinson, 2001, p. 308).  
The scale of internal conflicts within both north and south complicates narratives 
of ‘civil war’ in Sudan. In addition to fighting between the SPLM/A and GoS, armed 
conflict occurred between forces in the south, reflecting “a pattern of interlocking civil 
wars… fought on different levels” (Johnson, 2003, p. 127). A number of SPLM/A 
factions split in the 1990s due to disagreement over leadership and political agendas. 
Ethnic and tribal identities were politicised and mobilised, with GoS and SPLM/A 
factions mobilising and arming ‘tribal’ militias and targeting civilian populations along 
ethnic lines (Keen, 1994, pp. 222–3; Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, pp. 127–34; 
Hutchinson, 2001, pp. 317–21; Johnson, 2003, pp. 81–118, 151–2; Jok, 2005, pp. 153–
5, 2017, p. 2; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 35–8; Young, 2012, pp. 52–7). By the late 1990s, 
fatalities due to violence between southern forces exceeded those from violence by the 
GoS army (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, p. 127). 
Regional and international involvement also complicates the ‘civil war’ 
narrative. During the first war, southern movements received military and financial 
support from Kenya, Uganda, and Israel, while the United States (US), Britain, and 
West Germany as well as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia supported the GoS 
(Poggo, 2008, pp. 158–66; Ayers, 2010, p. 162). The US provided economic support to 
Sudan in the 1950s in response to the threat of communist expansion in the region, 
viewing Sudan as a strategic ‘bridge’ between the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Support was expanded to include military aid in the 1970s-1980s, with Sudan as the 
‘regional anchor’ of US foreign policy and the single largest recipient of US foreign aid 
in Africa (Yohannes, 1997, pp. 270–320; Johnson, 2003, pp. 57–60). The US-Sudan 
relationship collapsed in the 1980s due to the ‘Islamisation’ of the Sudanese regime 
under Omar al-Bashir and alliances with ‘radical’ states (e.g. Libya, Iran) during the 
Gulf War. The US later supported the SPLM/A (and allies such as Ethiopia and 
Uganda), influenced by security and counterterrorism agendas in the Horn of Africa 
region, economic interests (including oil), and evangelical Christian lobbies (Yohannes, 
1997, pp. 322–30; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 28–34; Young, 2005, pp. 103–4, 2012, pp. 37–
8, 88–9; de Waal, 2007, p. 14; Ayers, 2010, p. 162). US involvement in Sudan was later 
  
25 
influenced by the post-9/11 focus on the ‘Arabisation of violence’ and narratives of 
violence by northern ‘Arabs’ against southern ‘Africans’ (Mamdani, 2009, pp. 64–71). 
In 2005, following roughly 30 months of negotiations and decades of war during 
which an estimated 2.5 million people died and 4.6 million were displaced, the GoS (led 
by the National Congress Party, NCP) and SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). The CPA focused on power sharing, oil revenue, and security 
arrangements during a six-year transitional period prior to a southern independence 
referendum in 2011. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),8 a 
regional body that included Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and 
Sudan, led negotiations. Some viewed the CPA as “a unique and unprecedented rare 
opportunity to make ‘peace’… in the Sudanese society” (Deng, 2005, p. 244). However, 
the CPA (undemocratically) legitimised the SPLM as the ruling party in the south9 and 
the SPLA as the official army, excluding other political actors and representing a 
minority of the population (Young, 2005, pp. 101–2; Thomas, 2009, pp. 12–4; Young, 
2012, pp. 8–14, 109–16; Aalen, 2013, p. 176; Selby, 2013, pp. 73–4; Zambakari, 2013a, 
p. 19). The semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in 
2005, and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) was established 
following independence in 2011. South Sudan includes ten states: Central Equatoria, 
Eastern Equatoria, and Western Equatoria (the Equatorial region), Western Bahr el 
Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap (Greater Bahr el Ghazal region), and 
Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei (Greater Upper Nile region).10 
Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan persisted after the CPA, linked to 
border demarcation and security, oil revenues (oil is exported through Sudanese 
pipelines), cross-border population movement, and mutual accusations of support for 
opposition forces (Jok, 2013, pp. 14–5; ICG, 2016, pp. 2–4). Violent conflict has also 
                                                
8 IGAD, originally the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification, was involved in 
peace negotiations in Sudan since the early 1990s (Johnson, 2003, pp. 101–2; Rolandsen, 2005, p. 43; 
Young, 2012, pp. 82–8). 
9 52 per cent of seats in the national assembly and national executive in the Government of National 
Unity were allocated to the NCP, 28 per cent to the SPLM, 14 per cent and six per cent to other northern 
and southern political forces, respectively. In the south, 70 per cent of state-level legislative and executive 
positions were allocated to the SPLM, 10 per cent to the NCP, and 20 per cent to other southern political 
forces (CPA, 2005, pp. 20–37). 
10 In October 2015, President Salva Kiir introduced an Establishment Order dividing the 10 existing 
states into 28 new states, largely along ethnic lines (Radio Tamazuj, 2015). In December 2015 Kiir 
removed the 10 existing state governors and appointed 28 new governors and in April 2016 an internal 
decree subdivided these 28 states into new counties (Radio Tamazuj, 2016b). The 28 states have not been 
accepted by the SPLM-IO, and the decision has not been recognised by UNMISS due its incompatibility 
with the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict. In this thesis, I use the names of the 
previous 10 states (and associated counties) in place during the research period. 
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persisted within South Sudan, involving fighting between government and non-state 
(rebel) forces, and intergroup or ‘communal’ conflict. Tensions and grievances are 
linked to inequitable geographic and ethnic distribution of political power and resources 
(especially oil revenues), internal border demarcation and territorial claims, economic 
and natural resource access and control, and inadequate services and economic 
opportunities (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 14–5; Young, 2012, pp. 291–325; Jok, 
2013, p. 7; Pendle, 2014, pp. 237–40). The geography of violence has shifted since 
2005. Pre-2011 conflict events were concentrated in southern Equatorial states, shifting 
to central and northern regions (primarily Greater Upper Nile) after independence 
(ACLED, 2015, pp. 1–3; Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 38–9). This geographical shift reflects 
dynamics of power and grievances: during the second civil war, most militia groups 
were based in Greater Upper Nile, historically isolated and marginalised by both 
northern and southern authorities (Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 8). Conflict between 
SPLM/A and southern rebel forces has persisted since 2005, linked to tensions over 
inequalities in geographic and ethnic political representation and long-standing tensions 
between SPLM/A factions and other southern movements (Young, 2012, pp. 295–325; 
Sudd Institute, 2013, pp. 7–12). 
‘Local’ intergroup or ‘communal’ conflict also increased after 2005, involving 
over 100 ethnic and communal militia groups (ACLED, 2015, pp. 7–9). This includes 
conflict between ‘pastoralist’ (cattle keeping) and farming communities and between 
cattle-keeping communities, linked to disputes over local borders, resource (e.g. land, 
water) access and control, and cattle raiding and reprisal attacks (Schomerus and Allen, 
2010, pp. 20–57). Local violence is often described as occurring between ethnic groups, 
sections, or clans. There are approximately 64 main ethno-linguistic groups in South 
Sudan (and significantly more when counting subgroups such as sections or clans). The 
four largest groups (Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari) represent roughly 65 per cent of the 
population and the largest 10 groups roughly 80 per cent (Marshall, 2006, p. 15). 
However, ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ explanations of conflict are overly simplistic and 
misleading. They involve limited attention to structural violence reflected in political 
institutions and policies (including inequalities in resource distribution and political 
representation), economic (e.g. poverty, rising living costs, lack of alternative livelihood 
options) and environmental pressures (e.g. delayed rainfall), and pre- and post-CPA 
instrumentalisation and militarisation of group identities by political and military elites 
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(Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 20–5, 55–7; Saferworld and Conciliation Resources, 
2012, pp. 6–7; Jok, 2013, pp. 4–14, 2017, pp. 2–3; Sudd Institute, 2013, pp. 7–12).  
In mid-2013, President Salva Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar and 
other government and party figures, prompted by internal leadership competition within 
the SPLM. Armed violence erupted in Juba in December 2013 and quickly spread to 
Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei. While the GRSS accused Machar of attempting a coup, 
others link the spreading conflict and mobilisation to the killing of Nuer soldiers and 
civilians in Juba by members of the Presidential Guard (Mamdani, 2014, pp. 6–19; 
Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 5; Rolandsen, 2015, p. 170; Young, 2015, pp. 15–6). The 
conflict involves some ethnic dimensions, with Dinka forces largely loyal to Kiir and 
many Nuer forces joining Machar’s SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO). However, the 
conflict is largely rooted in power struggles among SPLM/A elites, poor party 
leadership and cohesion, exclusion of internal opposition, militarised government 
institutions, and longstanding divisions and factionalisation within the SPLM/A 
(Johnson, 2014a, pp. 302–7; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 6–28; Sudd Institute, 2014, pp. 2–7; 
Rolandsen, 2015, pp. 165–71; Rolandsen et al., 2015, p. 89; Young, 2015, pp. 10–6). 
Numerous armed groups are active in different states, some aligned with 
government or opposition forces and some not. Members of different ethnic groups 
have been mobilised by government and opposition forces, linked to longstanding 
frustrations over inequitable resource, service, and security provision across geographic 
areas and pre- and post-CPA militarisation of communities (Mamdani, 2014, pp. 28–9; 
Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 7; Rolandsen, 2015, p. 166; Rolandsen et al., 2015, pp. 89–92; 
Jok, 2017, pp. 2–3). Armed forces have targeted civilians (abductions, destruction of 
villages, sexual violence, and killings) on the basis of ethnic and political allegiance and 
have obstructed humanitarian activities, restricting access to certain sites and targeting 
humanitarian property, personnel, and civilians receiving assistance (Amnesty 
International, 2014; HRW, 2014, 2015; Mamdani, 2014; UNMISS, 2014; OCHA South 
Sudan, 2016). As of December 2016, approximately 1.9 million people had been 
internally displaced and over 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries (OCHA 
South Sudan, 2016, p. 4). Armed conflict was initially concentrated in oil-rich Upper 
Nile and Unity states, and spread to Central and Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el 
Ghazal in 2016 (ICG, 2016, p. 18). 
Regional and international actors have been involved in the conflict, with 
Uganda providing military support to the government and Sudan reportedly providing 
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some early assistance to the SPLM-IO (HRW, 2014, p. 21; Johnson, 2014a, p. 301; 
Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 11; Young, 2015, pp. 53–4; ICG, 2016, pp. 4–7). China has 
supported the government, including through arms sales, linked to oil interests in the 
country (Large, 2016, pp. 37–41). These same states have been heavily involved in 
IGAD-led peace negotiations. The government and SPLM-IO signed multiple ceasefire 
agreements between 2014 and 2015, although neither party adhered to these 
agreements. The failure of initial talks led to the formation of ‘IGAD Plus’: IGAD along 
with Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa, as well as the African Union, 
UN, European Union (EU), China, US, UK, Norway, and the IGAD Partners Forum. 
 
2.3 Approaches to Governance and Peacebuilding  
 As noted above, the GRSS was established upon South Sudan’s independence. 
It is effectively a one-party system (Podder, 2014, pp. 232–4), with the SPLM/A 
holding over 90 per cent of National Legislative Assembly (NLA) seats and nine of 10 
state governorships after the 2010 elections (Knopf, 2013, pp. 23–5). These elections 
consolidated the position of the (undemocratically appointed) SPLM/A in the south, and 
were characterised by restrictions, intimidation, and violence against opposition 
candidates (Young, 2012, pp. 135–62; Aalen, 2013, pp. 174, 186; Selby, 2013, p. 1974). 
The CPA focused on ending conflict and facilitating self-determination rather than 
political reform and democratisation (Young, 2012, pp. 9–10; Aalen, 2013, p. 174; de 
Waal, 2013, p. 226), with elections intended to legitimise the agreement rather than 
democratise the government (Selby, 2013, p. 77). South Sudan’s system of government 
operates, in theory, as a decentralised system. Its ten states are divided into counties, 
further divided into payams (districts) and bomas (village-level administration). Under 
the CPA and 2009 Local Government Act, government functions and authority are 
meant to be devolved to three ‘local’ levels: county, payam, and boma councils. 
The CPA focused on issues relevant to the two negotiating parties, and 
subsequent peace- and statebuilding frameworks focused on north-south conflict with 
little attention to deeper, structural roots of conflict or to conflict dynamics and 
grievances within the south (Thomas, 2009, p. 11; Aalen, 2013, pp. 174–6; Mamdani, 
2014, p. 33). It did not address human rights abuses by both parties, inequalities linked 
to conflict, or mechanisms for justice and reconciliation (Young, 2005, pp. 102–3, 2012, 
p. 9; Selby, 2013, p. 74; Zambakari, 2013a, pp. 23–5). The 2005 Joint Assessment 
Mission (JAM) Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, 
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prepared by the United Nations and World Bank in collaboration with the SPLM and 
GoS, guided CPA implementation. The 2008-2011 ‘Sustaining Peace through 
Development’ Plan developed by the GoNU and GoSS built on CPA and JAM 
priorities. In addition to security arrangements, these plans focus on strengthening 
governance through institutional reform, decentralisation, resource management, service 
delivery, and accountability. They also refer to the expansion of basic services, 
including education, to contribute to state- and peacebuilding by providing a ‘peace 
dividend’ (JAM, 2005, p. 43; GoNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 2). National peace and 
reconciliation bodies, including the (former) South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission (SSPRC) and the church-led Committee for National Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation (CNHPR), 11  have echoed these priorities, emphasising ‘good 
governance’ as well as access to education services.  
Similarly, internal conflict dynamics are largely neglected in the 2012 
Peacebuilding Support Plan guiding United Nations (UN) actions. Based on the 
Transitional Constitution and SSDP, priorities include ‘inclusive’ political settlements, 
security and justice, economic development, and basic service support (UNESC, 2012, 
pp. 9–10). The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), established in 2011 (replacing 
the 2005 UN Mission in Sudan), leads UN peacebuilding efforts. UNMISS’s original 
mandate focused on supporting peace consolidation and longer-term statebuilding, 
democratic governance and political participation, and conflict prevention, security, and 
rule of law (UNSC, 2011, pp. 3–5). Changing conflict dynamics have shifted the 
UNMISS mandate from peacebuilding to protecting civilians from physical violence 
(focusing on ‘Protection of Civilians’, PoC, sites around UN compounds), facilitating 
humanitarian assistance delivery, monitoring, investigating, and reporting on human 
rights violations, and supporting peace agreement implementation (UNMISS, 2017). 
However, UNMISS has failed to effectively respond to violence against civilians, 
including within PoC sites (CIVIC, 2016; MSF, 2016). 
                                                
11 The government established the SSPRC in 2011 as an ‘independent’ body to oversee peacebuilding 
policies and initiatives, advise national and international peacebuilding actors, and develop local 
peacebuilding capacity (Ministry of Justice, 2012; SSPRC, 2013). The CNHPR was established by 
presidential mandate in 2013, operating as an independent body to transform intergroup relations and 
‘mindsets’ and develop inclusive institutions (CNHPR, 2013). It replaced the former National 
Reconciliation Committee, led by Riek Machar. A National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation 
(NPPR) was established in 2014, involving the SSPRC, CNHPR, and Specialised Committee for Peace 
and Reconciliation (based in the NLA, responsible for overseeing peace and reconciliation legislation 
development and implementation) (NPPR, 2014). 
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In August 2015, the government and SPLM-IO signed an Agreement on the 
Resolution of the Conflict, focused on power sharing and security arrangements. This 
agreement largely replicates pre-2013 political structures, follows the CPA power-
sharing model, and does not address underlying conflict dynamics or ‘local’ conflict 
(Jok, 2015, pp. 8–9; Verjee, 2016, pp. 2–3). Both parties repeatedly broke the ceasefire, 
continuing to recruit soldiers, purchase arms, and engage in armed violence (Mamdani, 
2014, p. 36). The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) was established 
in April 2016, with Kiir as President and Machar as First Vice-President. A 30-member 
cabinet was appointed, with 16 ministries held by the SPLM/A, 10 by SPLM-IO, and 
four by other parties (Sudan Tribune, 2016). A second TGoNU was formed in July 
2016, with Taban Deng replacing Machar as First Vice-President, following the 
outbreak of fighting between government and SPLM-IO forces and the targeting of 
civilians (CIVIC, 2016; ICG, 2016).  
National and international actors, including government bodies such as the 
SSPRC, faith-based organisations such as the CNHPR and South Sudan Council of 
Churches, and UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
and UNMISS, have supported ‘local’ peacebuilding interventions in response to 
‘communal’ conflict. They have drawn on ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ approaches such 
as peace dialogues and conferences, bringing together representatives of conflicting 
communities and local government officials. However, government and international 
actors heavily influence the structure, content, and outcomes of these processes, and 
focus more on subnational government officials than communities. Peace conferences 
are often organised as ‘one-off’ events, rather than integrated into wider peacebuilding 
processes, and fail to address relevant (or structural) topics or effectively ensure 
implementation.12 Finally, international supporters often fail to consider local power 
dynamics or the role of ‘local’ governance structures in violent conflict (Agwanda and 
Harris, 2009, p. 47; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 8; Da Costa and Karlsrud, 2012, pp. 
58–61; Wilson, 2014, pp. 5–7; Jok, 2015, p. 3). 
 
2.4 Education and Violence in South Sudan 
The history of the education system in South Sudan reflects patterns of political, 
economic, and cultural marginalisation of southern populations by colonial and 
                                                
12 These critiques were also raised in interviews by some subnational government officials. 
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Sudanese authorities. This is illustrated by minimal education investment and 
development and the imposition of language and curriculum policies. Education policies 
were used to exert control over southern populations (Beshir, 1975, p. 88), and the 
unequal development of the south was “most clearly visible in the area of education” 
(Poggo, 2008, p. 26). During the British colonial period, Christian missionaries were 
largely responsible for education provision in the south. This separate education 
‘system’ reinforced existing divisions and disparities, with southern education generally 
poorly coordinated, of limited quality, highly unequal in terms of access, and reflecting 
a religious ‘civilising’ mission. Instruction was mainly in ‘local’ languages, although 
English was later identified as the ‘official’ language of instruction (Akrawi, 1960, p. 
261; Sanderson, 1963, pp. 233–4, 1980, pp. 158–67; Deng and Daly, 1989, pp. 169–70; 
Deng, 1995, pp. 83–4, 2003, p. 3; Johnson, 2003, pp. 14–5; Sommers, 2005, pp. 53–9; 
Kevlihan, 2007, p. 519; Poggo, 2008, pp. 27–9). The restriction of southern education 
services was also linked to colonial beliefs that formal education would disrupt or 
undermine ‘tribal’ customs underpinning ‘native administration’ systems (Johnson, 
2003, p. 15; Leonardi, 2013, p. 67–8). 
In the 1950s-1960s, the northern government imposed an Arabic-language, 
Islamic religious curriculum, closed or nationalised non-government schools, and 
expelled missionaries (seen as undermining government authority and representing 
foreign dominance) from the south (Sanderson, 1980, pp. 167–8; Deng, 2003, p. 4; 
Johnson, 2003, p. 30; Sommers, 2005, p. 61; Poggo, 2008, pp. 92–106; Rolandsen, 
2011a, pp. 119–20; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 618). While this was explained as 
an effort to promote national unity and ‘citizenship’ (Poggo, 2008, p. 96; Rolandsen and 
Leonardi, 2014, p. 618), it restricted southerners’ access to education and government 
employment (Hutchinson, 1996, p. 281; Poggo, 2008, pp. 95–6). Education resource 
and service inequalities contributed to feelings of frustration, resentment, alienation, and 
exclusion in the south. This was a key factor leading to the outbreak of armed conflict 
(Breidlid, 2005, pp. 257–9, 2010, pp. 565–6), with the imposition of Arabic-Islamic 
education perceived as “a declaration of war” among southern populations (Poggo, 
2008, p. 96). In the 1960s, schools were centres of political resistance, with students and 
teachers engaging in protests and joining armed groups following the disruption of 
education access (Poggo, 2008, pp. 70–100; Rolandsen, 2011b, p. 220, 2011a, p. 120). 
The SPLM manifesto (2008, p. 7) challenged the “unequal distribution of wealth… to 
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regions and peoples of Sudan” and the “skewed pattern of access to and distribution of 
the basic social services”. 
Under the Addis Ababa agreement, control over education was not formally 
transferred to the SRA, although it did exert informal authority over service provision. 
English was re-established as the southern language of instruction, although 
implementation was limited (Stevens, 1976, p. 250; Kasfir, 1977, p. 162; Sommers, 
2005, p. 62). Many new schools were opened, although a lack of funds, materials, and 
qualified teachers impeded education provision and management (Deng, 2003, p. 5; 
Sommers, 2005, p. 61; Poggo, 2008, p. 191). While access to education improved, 
inequalities between north and south intensified. Between 1960 and 1972-1973, the 
number of intermediate and secondary schools increased from 317 to 1,577 in the north 
and from 24 to 111 in the south (Oduho and Deng, 1963 and Yongo-Bure, 1993, cited in 
Deng, 2003, pp. 4–5). In 1980-1981, the enrolment rate was between 70 and 75 per cent 
in the north, compared to 11 to 20 per cent in the south (Gannon, 1965, p. 185). 
 In the 1980s-1990s, education was a site of political resistance through language 
of instruction (English or ‘local’ languages), secular curricula (drawing on Kenyan and 
Ugandan curricula), and ‘southern’ policies (Deng, 2003, p. 9; Sommers, 2005, p. 46; 
Breidlid, 2010, pp. 567–8). The SPLM/A established a Secretariat of Education as part 
of wider ‘civilian’ administration efforts and developed education policies (the 1992 
SPLM Education Policy, 1998 New Sudan Education Policy, and 2002 Education 
Policy of the New Sudan) for southern regions. Schools were established under 
SPLM/A ‘humanitarian’ wings (the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association and 
similar associations established by SPLM/A factions). Education policies and practices 
were viewed as tools against northern oppression and central to southern liberation, 
identity and unity, self-reliance, and political resistance. In 1989, John Garang (2013, p. 
150) stated that, as part of the SPLM/A’s political struggle, “we are establishing 
administrations in the areas under our control; we have established schools”. 
Implementation was, however, fragmented and limited by a lack of financial and human 
resources and administrative capacity (Joyner, 1996, pp. 70–1; Deng, 2003, pp. 9–14; 
Sommers, 2005, pp. 78–91; Kevlihan, 2007, p. 527; Breidlid, 2010, pp. 567–8, 2013, 
pp. 40–2). While conflict narratives often portray the ‘collapse’ of social institutions 
and services, and while the wars in Sudan were indeed destructive, the southern system 
of education persisted, albeit under significant constraints. This illustrates a way in 
which southern authorities maintained some autonomy after the Addis Ababa 
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agreement, with the SPLM/A taking on ‘state’ attributes such as territorial control, 
population government, service provision, and international aid agreements. 
Given constraints on SPLM/A service provision, international actors were 
heavily involved in service delivery. From 1989 to 2003, international support was 
coordinated through the UNICEF-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). This UN-NGO 
consortium (an agreement between the UN, GoS, and SPLM/A) was established in 
response to famine in Bahr el Ghazal, with an Education Coordination Committee 
established in 1993. Aid delivery, including education support, involved collaboration 
between international agencies and the SPLM/A, resulting in a degree of international 
recognition. However, system-level support to education was limited, with few NGOs 
addressing education (due in part to the short-term emergency focus). Services were 
fragmented, unevenly distributed (concentrated in ‘stable’ areas), poorly coordinated, 
and lacked attention to southern socioeconomic realities. International aid also served as 
a means of advancing the political objectives of the SPLM/A, who controlled movement 
and aid distribution in areas under their control. SPLM/A factions diverted supplies 
through their relief wings, and targeted relief centres and distributions (Joyner, 1996, p. 
71; Karim et al., 1996, pp. 5–8; Duffield et al., 2000, pp. 43–9, 181–207; Deng, 2003, 
p. 6; Johnson, 2003, pp. 150–4; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 49–53; Sommers, 2005, pp. 67–9; 
Young, 2012, pp. 71–3; Podder, 2014, pp. 229–30). Subsequent donor initiatives, 
focused on education access and enrolment, included USAID’s Sudan Basic Education 
Programme, launched in 2002, and UNICEF’s Go-to-School initiative, launched in 
2006 (Sommers, 2005, pp. 82–9; Kim et al., 2011, pp. 285–6).  
Under the CPA, the GoSS, through the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (MoEST), was identified as the southern education authority. A southern 
primary curriculum was introduced in 2007, followed by a new secondary syllabus 
(GoNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 53; Barakat et al., 2013, p. 136). English was identified as 
the official language of instruction, linked to efforts to establish ‘southern’ identity and 
autonomy (Kevlihan, 2007, pp. 514–35; Breidlid, 2010, p. 570). Between 2005 and 
2013, primary enrolment increased from roughly 700,000 to over 1.3 million and 
secondary enrolment increased from 17,000 to nearly 47,000 (World Bank, 2012, p. 2; 
MoEST, 2014a, pp. 18, 23). However, decades of conflict resulted in high numbers of 
out-of-school children and youth: prior to the 2013 conflict, one to 1.3 million primary 
school-aged children were out of school (World Bank, 2012, p. 4; Watkins, 2013, p. v).  
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After the CPA, improved access to services, including education, was identified 
as a key expectation and indicator of peace (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 71; 
Leonardi, 2011, pp. 232–5; Mayai, 2012, pp. 1–4). Population surveys identified 
education as one of the most important priorities and daily concerns (along with food 
security, water, and health) (IRI, 2011, p. 16; Roberts, 2013, pp. 79–80). However, 
populations report low satisfaction with government provision of education (IRI, 2013, 
p. 25). South Sudan faces significant education provision challenges, with access 
indicators well below international averages. In 2013, 42 per cent of primary-aged 
children and two per cent of secondary-aged children were enrolled in education, 
compared to 75 and 37, respectively, in fragile/conflict-affected countries, 80 and 32 in 
low-income countries, and 96 and 90 in high-income countries (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 
26–7). Education access has worsened in recent years. The number of students in 
primary and alternative education dropped by four to five per cent between 2009 and 
2013. Gross and net enrolment rates13 dropped by 14 per cent at primary level and by 18 
and 37 per cent, respectively, at secondary level (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 26–7). This 
decrease began prior to 2013, during a period of relative stability, drawing attention to 
factors beyond conflict shaping educational outcomes and inequalities. Post-CPA 
challenges, intensified due to the current conflict, include budget, infrastructure, 
material, and teacher shortages, low educational retention and progression, and gaps 
between policy formulation and implementation (Ratcliffe and Perry, 2008, pp. 91–4; 
UNICEF, 2008, pp. 29–46; Kim et al., 2011, p. 286; MoEST, 2015b, p. 12).  
Despite efforts to expand education services, data analyses reveal clear 
inequalities in educational access, resources, and outcomes across states and counties 
and between rural and urban areas (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 25–39). Geographic 
inequalities reflect intergroup inequalities, as administrative borders tend to reflect 
ethnic, ‘tribal’, and sectional ‘boundaries’ (Deng, 1995, p. 187; Johnson, 2010, p. 81; 
Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 40–1; Leonardi, 2011, p. 217; Zambakari, 2013b, pp. 
15–6). Education and conflict data also reveal correlations between education 
inequalities and conflict: states with the lowest education resource (infrastructure, 
teachers) provision and poorer education outcomes (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have 
the highest occurrence of conflict since 2011 (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 37–40). The 
                                                
13 The difference between gross and net enrolment (all students enrolled versus school-aged enrolment) 
indicates a significant proportion of overage students. Most enrolled students are significantly older than 
official school ages (6 to 13 for primary, 14 to 17 for secondary). In 2013, 87 per cent of primary students 
and 91 per cent of secondary students were over-age (MoEST, 2014a, pp. 9–10, 44, 73).  
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mobilisation of armed groups is linked to longstanding frustrations over inequitable 
resources and service provision across geographic areas (Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 7). 
The ongoing conflict has heavily affected the education sector. As of December 
2016, over 30 per cent of schools had experienced attacks by armed forces, 70 per cent 
of schools in Greater Upper Nile were non-functional, over 17,000 children and 
adolescents had been recruited or abducted by government or opposition forces, and 
nearly 1.2 million had lost access to education due to conflict and displacement 
(UNICEF South Sudan, 2015, p. 1, 2016, p. 9; OCHA South Sudan, 2016, p. 5). 
Primary enrolment dropped by nearly 25 per cent between 2013 and 2015 (Novelli et 
al., 2016, p. 18). Government resources have been diverted from education to security 
sectors and donor resources from development to humanitarian response, affecting the 
amount and type of support to education. 
 
2.5 Governance of the Education System 
South Sudan’s education system is guided by policies and strategies centred on 
the 2012 General Education Act and 2012-2017 General Education Strategic Plan 
(GESP). These policies were developed within a broader national legal and policy 
context based on the 2011 Transitional Constitution, Vision 2040 national planning 
strategy, and 2011-2013 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), and within a global 
policy context based on Education for All (EFA) and former Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Transitional 
Constitution and Education Act ‘guarantee’ access to free primary education and 
equitable services free from discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, 
religion, or ability (GoSS, 2011, p. 9; MoGEI, 2012, p. 51; MoEST, 2015b, p. 10). The 
GESP was developed with support from UNICEF and UNESCO. It draws on Vision 
2040 and SSDP objectives, focusing on education access and quality, gender equity, 
learning outcomes, infrastructure and curriculum development, teacher recruitment and 
development, and leadership and management (MoGEI, 2012). A new General 
Education Sector Policy Framework is being developed and a new curriculum 
framework was launched in 2015, managed through the Global Partnership for 
Education (GPE) and supported by UNICEF and the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID). Its objectives include promoting national pride and identity, 
commitment to democracy, and unity, peace, and reconciliation (MoEST, 2015a, pp. 5–
8). It builds on the Education Act, which identifies the goals of education as including 
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national unity and cohesion and individual and national social, political, economic, and 
cultural development (p. 2). 
South Sudan’s education system includes primary education (eight years), 
secondary education (four years), technical and vocational education and training 
(TVET), and the Alternative Education System (AES). The MoEST14 is responsible for 
education service development, management, and provision. It includes seven 
directorates and one secretariat: Directorates of Planning and Budgeting, Administration 
and Finance, General Education, Alternative Education Systems, Technical and 
Vocational Education, Quality Promotion and Innovation (including Departments of 
Curriculum Development, Teacher Education and Training, and National Languages), 
and Gender Equity and Social Change (including Departments of Girls’ Education and 
Inclusive Education), and the Secretariat of Examinations.15 
South Sudan’s education system is meant to be decentralised (although this is 
not necessarily the case in practice) and includes a central MoEST, state education 
ministries, county education departments (CEDs), and payam education offices. The 
central MoEST is responsible for overall sector leadership and strategic planning, 
formulation of national education policies, standards, curricula, and examinations, 
annual budget development, and management of teacher training institutions and 
national secondary schools. State ministries are responsible for state-level service 
delivery (secondary education), resource distribution and financial management, teacher 
recruitment and deployment, policy dissemination, and county-level inspection. CEDs 
are responsible for county-level budget management, primary and alternative education 
delivery, and supervision of teachers and infrastructure (in collaboration with payam 
inspectors). School governing bodies are responsible for day-to-day school 
management. Each school is meant to have a parent-teacher association (PTA) and a 
school management committee (primary schools) or board of governors (secondary 
schools), responsible for school planning and budgeting (RSS, 2012, pp. 4–9; MoEST, 
2014c, p. 5; MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, pp. 4–8). (See Appendix 1 for a detailed 
outline of roles and responsibilities.)  
                                                
14 The post-CPA MoEST became the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI) in 2011, 
and was restructured as the MoEST in 2013. Under the 2015 Agreement, the ministry was renamed as the 
MoGEI. I refer to the terms and structures of the ministry in place during the research period. 
15 A proposed MoEST restructuring includes three new secretariats: National Curriculum, National and 
Foreign Languages, and Teaching Service, Training and Management. 
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There are clear links between pre-CPA and contemporary education 
management (discussed in Chapter 7), although donors leading post-CPA development 
efforts often neglect the significance of historical systems and influences. In addition, 
political bargaining and settlements influence education sector management. 16  For 
example, the NCP was responsible for the post-CPA southern MoEST. Under the first 
independent government, the former United Sudan African Party was responsible for 
the MoGEI while the SPLM controlled key ministries of cabinet affairs, national 
security, defence, foreign affairs, and finance (Africa Confidential, 2011; Stephen, 
2010), which have the highest budgets. The limited power and resources accorded to the 
education ministry may mean that it is more likely to be ‘given’ to opposition parties, 
affecting resource allocation and perceived authority and legitimacy. Under the 
TGoNU, however, the education minister is from the SPLM/A (Sudan Tribune, 2016). 
Since 2006, education sector allocations have accounted for five to eight per 
cent of total government expenditure. This is lower than in neighbouring countries 
(World Bank, 2013b, p. 10) and the GPE benchmark of 20 per cent of government 
budgets (MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). Allocations, as a proportion of the overall 
government budget, have dropped in recent years, from roughly seven per cent in 2009 
to five per cent.17 In 2014-2015, five per cent of the national budget was allocated to 
education (SSP 603,643,900; USD 203,933,750),18 compared to 49 per cent to rule-of-
law and security sectors (MoFEP, 2014). In the 2016-2017 draft budget, nearly 50 per 
cent of funds were allocated to the security sector and four per cent to education (Radio 
Tamazuj, 2016d). Security sectors have been allocated the majority of government 
funds since 2006, primarily for armed forces salaries. In 2013-2014, actual security 
sector spending was nearly 20 per cent higher than allocated (MoFEP, 2014), while 
post-CPA education budgets have been under-spent (World Bank, 2013b, pp. 11–2; 
MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). While education allocations are minimal, an even 
                                                
16 Formal and informal political bargaining and settlement between political elites determines how power 
and authority is held and exercised and how resources are distributed, including the allocation (or 
‘trading’) of government ministries. Ruling parties and elites often seek control of key ministries (e.g. 
foreign affairs, defence, national security), with opposition groups receiving less influential ministries (in 
terms of both power and resources) (Di John and Putzel, 2009, pp. 15–6; Cheeseman, 2011, p. 350). This 
shapes the form and roles of institutions and resource allocation.  
17 Current allocations are also lower than in previous decades. Education accounted for 13 per cent of 
public spending in Sudan in 1970, dropping to eight per cent in 2000 (Elnur, 2009, p. 87). 
18 USD amounts are calculated using the official exchange rate of SSP 2.96, from the 2014-2015 Budget 
Book (MoFEP, 2014, p. 8). The informal exchange rate reached 65 SSP in August 2016 and 100 SSP in 
November 2016, representing an inflation rate increase of over 800 per cent (Radio Tamazuj, 2016a, 
2016c).  
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smaller proportion is actually disbursed (less than 60 per cent in 2013-2014) (MoFEP, 
2014, p. 143).  
Education spending is focused on primary education, which accounts for 47 per 
cent of the education budget (compared to 14 per cent to secondary and 
technical/vocational education, 26 per cent to higher/tertiary education, one per cent to 
alternative education, and 12 per cent to policy and systems development, capacity 
strengthening and quality assurance, and support systems). Nearly all education funds 
(85 per cent in 2014-2015) are allocated to recurrent costs, including salaries and 
operations (MoFEP, 2014). Primary-level per-student spending was roughly SSP 233.9 
(USD 79) in 2014-2015 (Novelli et al., 2016, p. 45), well below the regional average 
(World Bank, 2013b, p. 10; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). There are limited funds 
available for ‘development’ efforts, including responses to inequalities, legacies of 
conflict, and peacebuilding needs.  
Education financing is affected by broader economic challenges. South Sudan’s 
economy is dependent on oil revenues, representing roughly 98 per cent of national 
budgets between 2006 and 2010. Revenues dropped due to the global financial crisis in 
2009 and oil production halted in 2012 following transit fee disputes with Sudan. 
Austerity budgets significantly reduced education sector allocations and while oil 
production resumed in 2013 following African Union-mediated agreements, revenue 
and financing pressures persisted due to reduced production and low global oil prices. 
Economic pressures have intensified due to the ongoing conflict, limited economic 
diversification, budget overspending (particularly in the security sector), and corruption 
and theft of public funds (including oil revenues) (Young, 2012, p. 325; World Bank, 
2013b, pp. 3–7; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 39–40; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). Armed 
clashes in oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states further disrupted oil production. 
However, oil revenues were identified as the source of 80 per cent of government funds 
in 2014-2015, compared to 11 per cent from non-oil revenue (e.g. taxes, fees, customs) 
and eight per cent from loan financing (MoFEP, 2014, p. 18). South Sudan’s GDP 
decreased by six per cent between 2013 and 2015-2016, while annual inflation 
increased by 700 to 800 per cent by 2016 (Radio Tamazuj, 2016a; World Bank, 2016).  
The education sector relies heavily on international donors, who support nearly 
all development activities. In 2013-2014, external aid accounted for roughly 30 per cent 
of all education funding, focused primarily on basic education (accounting for 75 of 
funds). Bilateral donors provided roughly 67 per cent of external funds, including 55 per 
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cent from the UK (DFID), 38 per cent from the US (US Agency for International 
Development, USAID), and the remainder from Norway, Canada, and France (MoFEP, 
2013). DFID is funding Girls’ Education South Sudan (GESS), a five-year programme 
promoting girls’ education and school development through capitation grants and cash 
transfers (DFID-GESS, 2015). USAID is funding Room to Learn, involving the 
establishment of community-based schools. In 2013-2014, multilateral donors provided 
31 per cent of education funds (92 per cent from UNICEF, nine per cent from the 
European Union), with another two per cent from the Common Humanitarian Fund 
(MoFEP, 2013). UNICEF’s education programmes include the GPE19 (involving policy 
advocacy, curriculum development, school construction, and girls’ education), the 
(former) Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy programme (PBEA, involving life 
skills and peacebuilding education and policy advocacy), and Education in 
Emergencies. The EU is funding the Improved Management of Education Delivery 
(IMED) programme, supporting planning and management capacity development of 
central and state ministries. 
The education sector, however, receives only a small proportion of international 
development and humanitarian funds. In 2013-2014, only six per cent of donor aid to 
South Sudan was allocated to education (MoFEP, 2013).20 While humanitarian aid to 
South Sudan roughly doubled to USD 1.3 billion between 2011 and 2015 (MoEST and 
UNESCO-IIEP, 2016), education funding accounted for under four per cent of 
requested funds in the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan (OCHA South Sudan, 2016, 
p. 3). National and subnational education resource and service distribution, and 
implications for violence and peacebuilding, are discussed in Chapter 6. 
  
                                                
19 South Sudan is a member of the GPE, managed by UNICEF and coordinated by UNESCO and 
USAID. A USD 36 million grant for 2013-2016 supports GESP implementation, including strengthening 
national systems, school construction and rehabilitation, curriculum development, and girls’ education 
(Watkins, 2013; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016, p. 1). 
20	Education accounts for a small share of total overseas development assistance (ODA) from major 
donors: eight per cent of ODA from the UK, seven per cent from the World Bank, three per cent from EU 
institutions, and two per cent from the US in 2011 (UNICEF, 2015, p. 52).	
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CHAPTER 3. PEACEBUILDING AND EDUCATION: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE  
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature on peacebuilding and 
explore the ways in which the critical peacebuilding literature, in particular, engages 
with education. This chapter is intended to articulate (and justify) the relevance of this 
thesis research, to identify entry points for understanding the role of education and 
inequality in conflict and peacebuilding, and to provide a context for subsequent 
empirical contributions. I argue that while the critical peacebuilding literature addresses, 
to some extent, the role of ‘social services’, these discussions are vague and pay limited 
attention to the complexity of education’s role in supporting and undermining 
peacebuilding. I suggest that analysis of political, economic, and cultural dimensions of 
inequality and violence in education contexts can inform deeper engagement with some 
key critical peacebuilding debates and directions. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide a general overview of the 
peacebuilding literature, focusing on debates concerning the ‘liberal peace’ model and 
broad themes emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature. Second, I examine the 
ways in which the critical peacebuilding literature deals with education, considering 
existing perspectives, gaps, and limitations. Third, I explore the ways in which the 
education literature addresses conflict and peacebuilding, in terms of inequalities 
reproduced or challenged in and through education, and identify entry points for 
bringing education into critical peacebuilding discussions. 
 
3.2 ‘Liberal’ and ‘Critical’ Peacebuilding Perspectives 
In this section, I provide a general overview of dominant perspectives and 
debates in the peacebuilding literature. I first provide an overview of the ‘liberal peace’ 
model. I then discuss broad themes articulated in the critical peacebuilding literature, 
exploring the main critiques of ‘liberal’ models and directions identified in the critical 
peacebuilding literature, notably responses to systems of violence and inequality, 
promotion of ‘local’ engagement, and responses to ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities.  
Recent debates in the peacebuilding literature centre on the concept of the 
‘liberal peace’, considered by proponents and critics as the dominant framework 
guiding contemporary peacebuilding processes. The liberal peace discourse emerged in 
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a post-Cold War context characterised by “a reawakening of liberal internationalist 
ideals” informing engagement with ‘post-colonial’ states (Heathershaw, 2008, p. 599; 
Miklian, 2014, p. 495). The ‘liberal peace thesis’ suggests that liberal democratic and 
market-oriented economic structures and processes are the most effective means of 
creating peace within and between countries (Paris, 1997, p. 56, 2004, p. 42, 2006, p. 
425, 2010, pp. 339–41, Doyle, 2005, p. 463, 2012, p. 2; Miklian, 2014, p. 495). This is 
based on assumptions about ‘universal’ rights, individual and institutional ‘rationality’ 
and ‘reformability’, and international interdependence and cooperation (Paris, 1997, p. 
59; Doyle, 2005, p. 463; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 26; Doyle, 2012, pp. 4–5; Mac Ginty, 
2012, p. 170; Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 366). This model centres on the 
promotion of democratic political structures and processes (e.g. elections, ‘good 
governance’, institution-building), (neo)liberal economic reforms (e.g. market 
deregulation, economic growth, privatisation), rule of law and security sector reform, 
and individual rights and freedoms.  
The UN articulated key liberal principles in the 1992 Agenda for Peace 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992), and these priorities are echoed in later UN peacebuilding 
documents (Annan, 1998, 2000; Ban, 2009; UN PBSO, 2010b) and other international 
and regional frameworks. The peacebuilding literature highlights the role and influence 
of external actors in national-level processes, referring to a ‘transnational peace-
building class’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 567) and an international or global peacebuilding 
‘architecture’ (Zaum, 2012, p. 121; Newman, 2013, p. 311). Key actors include UN 
agencies, international financial institutions (e.g. World Bank), regional bodies (e.g. 
African Union), donors, and international and national NGOs.21 These actors shape the 
content and aims of peace agreements and peacebuilding strategies, provide technical 
and financial support for negotiation and implementation, impose aid conditions (e.g. 
specific policy reforms), and ‘legitimise’ peace agreements and interventions (Paris, 
2002, pp. 642–5; Newman, 2013, pp. 312–4; Selby, 2013, p. 72). The study of 
peacebuilding processes requires attention to “cross-cutting governance networks 
involving state and non-state actors from the supranational to the local” and their roles, 
interests, and priorities (Duffield, 2001, p. 8). 
                                                
21	The institutionalisation of peacebuilding objectives is reflected in the establishment of peacebuilding 
offices or programmes by many international and regional donors and institutions and the establishment 
of the UN’s new ‘peacebuilding architecture’ in 2006, consisting of the intergovernmental Peacebuilding 
Commission, multi-donor Peacebuilding Fund, and coordinating Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) 
(UN PBSO, 2010a).	
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The critical literature critiques the ‘liberal’ peacebuilding model for its failure to 
attain key peacebuilding objectives, including poor political and economic outcomes 
(e.g. limited democratisation and human rights) and continued violence and insecurity 
following ‘liberal’ interventions (Pugh, 2005; Autesserre, 2010; Campbell, Chandler 
and Sabaratnam, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Newman, 2011; Zürcher, 2011; Mac Ginty 
and Sanghera, 2012; Zaum, 2012; Newman, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Nadarajah and 
Rampton, 2015). Critical scholars argue that ‘liberal’ models involve restrictive, 
normative understandings of ‘progress’ and peace and technical, depoliticised 
approaches that reproduce systems of inequality and injustice, and represent hegemonic 
power relations and interests with insufficient attention to ‘local’ contexts and priorities. 
Before exploring these themes, it is important to critically consider the concept 
of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding itself. This model is often framed as near universal, embedded 
in most post-Cold War peace agreements and interventions. It is described as a global 
‘peacebuilding consensus’ (Richmond, 2006a, p. 370, 2006b, p. 298), a “universal set of 
peacebuilding measures” (Lidén, 2009, p. 617), a standard peacebuilding ‘template’ 
(Miklian, 2014, pp. 498–9), and “the dominant form of internationally-supported 
peacemaking” (Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 20). However, both proponents and critics 
overstate the degree of liberalism and consensus in contemporary peacebuilding. In 
defining it as an essentially liberal project, they fail to consider peacebuilding as a 
strategic, context-specific process, often involving illiberal, non-democratic aims and 
outcomes (Selby, 2013, pp. 74–6). Critical peacebuilding scholars use ‘liberalism’ to 
explain different (and often contradictory) peacebuilding approaches and outcomes 
(Chandler, 2010b, pp. 137, 145; Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p. 243; Chandler, 2017, pp. 30–
1), focusing on the ‘liberalism’ of interveners rather than empirical analysis of 
interventions (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, 2011, p. 3). This illustrates the need 
for “contextualised analysis of concrete peacemaking practices” (Selby, 2013, p. 59), 
involving attention to historical and contemporary factors influencing the 
implementation of peacebuilding interventions and their social and political outcomes 
(Tschirgi, 2010, p. 1; Hameiri, 2011, p. 192; Sending, 2011, p. 62; Sabaratnam, 2013, 
pp. 270–4; Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 864–5; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 174).  
The first broad theme emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature 
concerns responses to systems of violence and inequality. Critical scholars contend 
that ‘liberal’ peacebuilding ignores and reproduces systems of marginalisation, 
exclusion, oppression, and inequality. Neoliberal interventions (e.g. economic 
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liberalisation, marketisation, privatisation) tolerate, maintain, and widen distributional 
inequalities (both ‘local’ and global) through a focus on ‘productive’ competition and 
self-reliance while reducing public sector expenditures and weakening welfare systems 
(Duffield, 2001, p. 51; Richmond, 2008b, p. 295, 2009a, pp. 562–6; Duffield, 2010b, 
pp. 65–6; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2006; Newman, 2011, pp. 1743–4; Pugh, 
2011, pp. 312–3; Richmond, 2012, pp. 359–68, 2014, pp. 450–64; Howarth, 2014, pp. 
261, 295). This involves the reduction and delegitimisation of state attention to public 
services, including education (Richmond, 2009c, pp. 151–9; Pugh, 2010, pp. 262–3; 
Richmond, 2014, p. 458). Critics argue that ‘liberal’ responses to inequality and 
exclusion aim to integrate populations into existing structures rather than working for 
structural transformation (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 566–8, 2010b, p. 667; Mac Ginty, 
2012, pp. 170–1). As Mac Ginty (2012, p. 171) argues, “routes… recommended by the 
liberal peace do not allow for any radical revision of power relations”.  
This is linked in part to the prioritisation, in ‘liberal’ interventions, of security 
and order over social transformation (Jabri, 2010, p. 49; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 42). The 
critical literature describes ‘liberal’ peacebuilding as a ‘problem solving’ project, 
focused on improving policy and implementation rather than challenging systemic 
injustice and underlying causes of conflict (Pugh, 2004, pp. 39–40; Heathershaw, 2008, 
pp. 602–3; Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 146; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, pp. 391–3; 
Lidén, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2009, p. 592; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 42, 2012, p. 171; 
Pugh, 2013, pp. 14–22; Howarth, 2014, p. 269). Paris (1997, p. 58, 2004, pp. 179–207, 
2006, pp. 426–7), for example, acknowledges the liberal model’s limitations but argues 
that failures are linked to problems of implementation rather than principles of 
liberalisation. This is echoed, to some degree, in discussions of statebuilding as a 
‘foundation’ or component of peacebuilding, involving the establishment of effective, 
‘legitimate’, and authoritative government (e.g. security, judicial, legislative, financial) 
institutions (Call, 2008b, pp. 2–3, 2008a, pp. 60–1; Paris and Sisk, 2009, pp. 1–15; 
Campbell and Peterson, 2013, pp. 336–7).22 ‘Statebuilding’ also focuses on legal, 
administrative, and bureaucratic processes “rather than engaging with populations with 
programmes of social and economic inclusion” (Chandler, 2017, p. 90) 
This is linked to the assumption that immediate ‘stability’ and security should 
take priority over political transformation or that political transformation could 
                                                
22	This advances a particular version of ‘statehood’, without considering ‘degrees of statehood’ (Clapham, 
1998, p. 143) existing across different contexts.	
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undermine stability (Call and Cousens, 2008, p. 4; Grimm and Leininger, 2012, pp. 
392–407). According to Duffield (2001, p. 34), “the ultimate goal of liberal peace is 
stability”. This stabilisation-oriented, ‘security first’ approach maintains the status quo 
rather than addressing social, economic, and political inequalities (Newman, 2010, p. 
307, 2011, pp. 1741–5; Zaum, 2012, p. 126; Curtis, 2013, p. 84), and limits attention to 
the role of social institutions, including education. The critical peacebuilding literature 
argues that depoliticised, security-oriented interventions pay little attention to political 
origins or dimensions of conflict, including underlying power relations and structural 
violence (Duffield, 2001, pp. 95–7; Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 107; Pugh, 2005, pp. 31–
2; Cooper, 2007, pp. 614–5; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 1–3, 2008a, p. 394; 
Duffield, 2010b, p. 56; Newman, 2010, p. 318, 2011, p. 1741; Roberts, 2011b, p. 420; 
Newman, 2013, p. 320; Jabri, 2013, pp. 11–6). These approaches frame the causes of 
conflict and instability as internal or domestic failings and suppress arguments about 
wider (global) inequalities (Duffield, 2001, pp. 27–8). Interventions therefore aim to 
integrate states into a fundamentally unjust and unequal global system, maintaining and 
entrenching global (e.g. ‘north’/‘south’) inequalities (Duffield, 2001, pp. 3–7, 2010b, 
pp. 56–66; Novelli, 2016, p. 848).  
In contrast, some critical literature argues that peacebuilding should involve 
transformation of political, economic, and social ‘drivers’ of conflict, including systems 
of violence, oppression, and inequality (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Richmond, 2006a, 
2006b, 2009a, 2014, 2016; Newman, 2010; Sabaratnam, 2013; Richmond and Mac 
Ginty, 2015). This involves “fundamental institutional changes” (Heathershaw, 2008, p. 
602), a “radical restructuring of representation across political, social, professional, and 
economic spheres” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 570), and responses to “an array of local and 
global inequalities that cause direct and structural violence” (Richmond, 2014, p. 463). 
As Richmond (2014, p. 449) explains, inequality, from local to global scales, “weakens 
the links between… social justice, human rights and democracy”. Persistent inequalities 
reproduce conflict dynamics and threaten broader peacebuilding goals (Newman, 2013, 
p. 318; Richmond, 2014, p. 450). 
Critical scholars refer to three broad aspects of, and responses to, inequality. 
First is the (re)distribution of economic or material resources and benefits, responding 
to socioeconomic inequalities in income, ownership, and opportunities (Pugh, Cooper 
and Turner, 2008a, p. 396; Richmond, 2008b, p. 290; Mac Ginty, 2013, pp. 4–5; 
Richmond, 2014, pp. 458–63, 2016, pp. 5, 180; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 315). 
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Second is the (re)distribution of political power and representation at multiple scales, 
responding to marginalisation and power inequalities in political institutions and 
processes (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, p. 391; 
Richmond, 2010a, p. 30, 2013, pp. 279–82, 2016, p. 5; Mac Ginty, 2013, p. 5). Third is 
the recognition of different forms of (collective) identity and attention to political 
dimensions of identity and boundaries of difference, as well as questions of ‘plurality’ 
and understanding (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Richmond, 2013, p. 282, 2016, pp. 5, 
33). In general, this critical literature does not explore in great detail specific 
dimensions or mechanisms of inequality, or associated responses and implications for 
peacebuilding. In a critique of ‘critical’ peacebuilding literature, Sabaratnam (2013, pp. 
272–4) calls for a ‘repoliticised’ analysis of political, material, and epistemic 
dimensions of violence and impacts of peacebuilding interventions.  
The second broad theme emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature 
concerns the promotion of ‘local’ 23 participation and representation in 
peacebuilding processes. This literature argues that the ‘liberal’ model lacks attention 
to ‘local’ contexts and priorities. It imposes externally defined, ‘Western’ norms, 
priorities, and definitions of ‘peace’ through standardised interventions: a “flat-pack 
peace made from standardized components” (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145). Critics describe 
such interventions as reflecting interests of ‘global north’ states and international 
organisations and as irrelevant, coercive, or alienating, undermining peacebuilding 
objectives and exacerbating conflict (Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2006b; Taylor, 2007; Mac 
Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009a, 2010b; Mac Ginty, 2010; Autesserre, 2010; Jabri, 2010; 
Pugh, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Autesserre, 2011; Newman, 2011; Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2011; Sending, 2011; Richmond, 2012; Jabri, 2013; Newman, 2013; Millar, 
van der Lijn and Verkoren, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; 
Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016).  
Building on this critique, some critical literature describes ‘liberal’ 
peacebuilding as (neo)colonial and imperialist in orientation, reproducing historical 
systems of power and domination over ‘non-Western’ populations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 
31–2; Heathershaw, 2008, p. 620; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 565–8; Darby, 2010, pp. 701–
5; Taylor, 2010, p. 156; Pugh, 2011, p. 314; Jabri, 2013, p. 8; Richmond and Mac 
                                                
23 ‘Local’ is placed in inverted commas “to emphasize not only its construction through practices of 
representation but also the floating significations and ambiguity of the term in scholarly and practical 
use” (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 435). 
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Ginty, 2015, p. 176; Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 136–41). Interventions are “structured by 
and operating through a contemporary global colonial matrix of power” (Sabaratnam, 
2017, p. 137), ‘ordering’ populations and expanding (Western) social and political 
projects, institutions, and rule (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, pp. 414–6). This draws 
attention to ‘non-territorial’ dimensions of neo-colonial/imperial power, including the 
‘civilising’ aims of peacebuilding projects focused on democratisation, good 
governance, human rights, and neoliberal market mechanisms (Wai, 2014, pp. 488–93). 
Paris (2002, pp. 637–8, 2010, p. 348), for examples, refers to a ‘mission civilisatrice’ 
transmitting standards of ‘appropriate’ or ‘civilised’ behaviour to states and populations.  
The critical peacebuilding literature emphasises the importance of engaging with 
‘local’ actors and recognising ‘local’ ownership, choice, knowledge, and priorities. This 
is intended to enhance the legitimacy and contextual sensitivity, appropriateness, and 
sustainability of interventions. The critical literature defines participation or 
engagement in terms of opportunities, at all levels of peacebuilding projects, for ‘local’ 
actors to define peacebuilding needs, strategies, and objectives. This includes the 
establishment of ‘grounded’ institutions and recognition of and engagement with ‘local’ 
(e.g. ‘grassroots’, ‘indigenous’, ‘traditional’) political and peacebuilding norms, 
practices, and initiatives (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 149; Lidén, 2009, p. 628; Autesserre, 
2010, pp. 248–70; Mac Ginty, 2011b, pp. 47–67; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012, p. 6; 
Richmond, 2012, pp. 355–73, 2013, p. 271; Jabri, 2013, p. 5; Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 840). 
This also involves attention to agency, power, resistance, and influence in response to 
external interventions, including open or implicit rejection, obstruction, renegotiation, 
co-optation or appropriation of resources or processes, and initiation of ‘local’ efforts 
without external support (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145, 2011a, p. 214, 2011b, pp. 6–7, 2015, 
p. 848; Richmond, 2010b, pp. 669, 685–6; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011, pp. 326–7, 
339; Sending, 2011, p. 55; Chandler, 2013, p. 31; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 270–2; 
Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 864–5). 
Recent UN peacebuilding strategies stress the importance of ‘local’ and/or 
national ownership (Ban, 2009, para. 7, 2012, para. 44, UN PBSO, 2010b, pp. 6, 16, 
2010a, p. 1; UN PBC, 2012, para. 3). However, the critical peacebuilding literature 
acknowledges problematic aspects of ‘local’ debates. First, the peacebuilding literature 
often presents a binary, essentialist, and Eurocentric distinction between the ‘local’, 
’non-liberal’, non-Western ‘other’ and the ‘international’ or ‘liberal’. Barriers to peace 
are linked to assumed political, economic, and cultural differences, rather than structural 
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factors (Chandler, 2010b, p. 146, 2010a, pp. 373–7, 2017, p. 144; Campbell, Chandler 
and Sabaratnam, 2011, p. 4; Jabri, 2013, p. 13; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 266–7, 2017, p. 
28; Selby, 2013, p. 63; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 423; Nadarajah and Rampton, 
2015, p. 57; Paffenholz, 2015, p. 862). Second, authority and resources often remain 
with external actors, leading to ‘local’ participation in external interventions or 
instrumentalisation of ‘local’ actors and mechanisms to fit external priorities rather than 
‘genuine’ ownership and self-determination (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 561–75, 2012, pp. 
354–62, 2013, p. 282, Mac Ginty, 2010, pp. 355–6, 2011b, pp. 45–62, 2015, pp. 846–7; 
Jabri, 2013, p. 11). Third, there is a danger in essentialising or romanticising ‘local’ 
actors and ‘traditional’ approaches as inherently peaceful and participatory, as ‘local’ 
dynamics may reproduce systems of power, oppression, and violence (Richmond, 
2006a, p. 380; Mac Ginty, 2008, pp. 149–50; Richmond, 2009c, p. 153; Lidén, 2009, p. 
594; Richmond, 2010b, p. 669; Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 360, 2011b, pp. 51–3; Richmond, 
2013, p. 282; Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 847; Hughes, Öjendal and Schierenbeck, 2015, pp. 
820–1). A focus on ‘local agency’ can also overlook involuntary non-participation 
resulting from discriminatory policies or practices (Mac Ginty, 2012, pp. 173–7) and 
reify the ‘power/resistance’ binary (Chandler, 2017, p. 161). 
The critical peacebuilding literature generally defines the ‘local’ (who is and 
who represents the ‘local’) in vague terms. Various actors are identified as ‘local’ 
agents or representatives: national or subnational state authorities, traditional or 
customary authorities, civil society or ‘grassroots’ actors, or ‘marginalised’ populations. 
The ‘local’ can be defined in relation to national and global scales, as a spatial or 
geographic location or bounded territory, a community associated with particular 
relationships and practices, or a sphere or action and relationships (Richmond, 2010b, p. 
670; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, pp. 423–4; Hughes, Öjendal and Schierenbeck, 
2015, p. 818; Mac Ginty, 2015, pp. 850–1). Definitions of the ‘local’ are not neutral or 
apolitical, illustrating the need to examine “how representations of the local relate to 
political agendas in peacebuilding” (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 422). 
The third broad theme emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature 
concerns responses to ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities. This literature suggests that 
peacebuilding goals can be realised through ‘everyday’ practices and responses to 
populations’ ‘everyday’ needs, priorities, expectations, and understandings of peace 
(Richmond, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c, 2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Mitchell, 2011; Newman, 
2011; Roberts, 2011b; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). 
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This is presented in contrast to externally driven, ‘liberal’ peacebuilding that “elevates 
elites and institutions over societies and everyday life” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 568) and 
fails to understand or represent individuals’ and communities’ day-to-day lives, 
activities, threats, and needs (e.g. poverty, shelter, basic services, economic 
opportunities). Liberal interventions are characterised by “the omission of everyday life, 
including its welfare aspects” (Richmond, 2010a, p. 30), with (neo)liberal concerns 
outweighing and displacing ‘everyday’ and welfare-related concerns (Richmond, 2009c, 
p. 152; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 6). According to Newman (2011, p. 1737), a 
lack of attention to such needs “can jeopardise overall peacebuilding objectives [and] 
obstruct the consolidation of peace”. 
The ‘everyday’ is described as the day-to-day spaces, routines, practices, and 
strategies used by individuals and communities to manage life challenges, risks, and 
needs and enhance quality of life within particular ‘local’ (e.g. collective, material) 
environments (Richmond, 2010b, p. 670; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1624–8; Roberts, 2011b, 
pp. 412–3, 2012, p. 369). These include “the everyday and familial social practices that 
constitute life” (Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 552), “routine mechanics of existence that… reveal 
what people prioritise and how they organise the realisation of their aspirations” 
(Roberts, 2011a, pp. 2542–3), and ways in which people “manage the gaps between 
constraints and aspirations” and “make their lives the best they can” (Roberts, 2011b, 
pp. 412–3, 2012, p. 369). Some critical scholars frame the ‘everyday’ in terms of 
‘welfare’, referring to “individual and community-fostered well-being” (Pugh, 2010, p. 
264), “optimising the life potential” of individuals and communities, and the means 
through which this is realised (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, p. 6; Cooper, Turner 
and Pugh, 2011, p. 2005) 
Attention to the ‘everyday’ is said to contribute to a ‘popular’, ‘emancipatory’ 
peace (Richmond, 2006b, p. 301, 2009a, p. 561, Roberts, 2011a, pp. 2542–3, 2011b, p. 
415) that prioritises and responds to needs defined and determined by ‘local’ 
populations. Such peace is concerned with “impact on the lives of… inhabitants of the 
state” (Richmond, 2007a, p. 265) and is “relevant… and legitimate to the everyday and 
to the majority of everyday lives” (Roberts, 2011a, p. 2542). Attending to the 
‘everyday’ involves context-specific responses to individual and community lives, 
experiences, and wellbeing, and associated social and economic needs and rights, as 
sources of peace (Lidén, 2009, p. 621; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 558–62, 2010a, p. 30; 
Roberts, 2011b, pp. 412–4; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 337; Newman, 2013, p. 
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318; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 308–14). The concept of the ‘everyday’ draws 
attention to ‘social’ spheres of life, and enables analysis of different aspects of power 
and responsibility, interactions, structural or discursive forms of violence, and forms of 
agency and resistance (Richmond, 2009b, p. 326, 2010b, p. 669; Mac Ginty, 2014, pp. 
550–2). Meeting ‘everyday’ or ‘welfare’ needs is linked to responses to inequality, 
involving “mechanisms of redistribution… and positive discrimination” (Pugh, Cooper 
and Turner, 2008b, p. 6). 
‘Bottom-up’, ‘everyday’ peacebuilding narratives and indicators may differ from 
those of international (or national) actors (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 308). 
Participation and ownership are central, and necessary, to the ‘everyday’, with ‘local’ 
(rather than external) actors defining what the ‘everyday’ means and entails (Roberts, 
2011a, p. 2538). ‘Local’ participation and ownership enables a focus on ‘everyday’ 
needs, inequalities, and ‘welfare’ issues central to peacebuilding processes (Richmond, 
2009c, pp. 166–7, 2012, p. 373). This illustrates the links between ‘local’ participation 
and ‘everyday’ concerns, with participation as a means for encouraging and enabling 
responses to ‘everyday’ priorities. However, this raises questions about who defines 
‘everyday’ issues, and the social and cultural assumptions and political and economic 
contexts shaping these definitions (Richmond, 2009c, p. 156). As discussed below, 
responses to ‘everyday’ concerns can be used to justify intervention, involving 
strategies of power and control by external actors (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624). However, 
the concept of the ‘everyday’ may depoliticise or ‘banalise’ ‘local’ spheres and 
dynamics as “contrasted to the space of power” (Sabaratnam, 2011b, p. 797). 
Some critical literature discusses responses to ‘everyday’ needs (and responses 
to inequalities) in human security terms. Development efforts serve security interests 
(managing threats to national and global stability and security) by addressing 
inequalities, basic needs, and individual and community wellbeing (Duffield, 2001, pp. 
22–38, 2002, p. 1067, Pugh, 2004, p. 49, 2005, p. 24; Jabri, 2010, pp. 49–51; Newman, 
2010, p. 313, 2011, pp. 1737–51). Some critical scholars claim that the human security 
perspective draws attention to context-specific concerns and oppression (Richmond, 
2007b, pp. 460–1; Begby and Burgess, 2009, p. 97; Newman, 2010, p. 316, 2011, pp. 
1748–51; Tadjbakhsh, 2010, pp. 120–3). Others criticise its focus on ‘policing’ or 
‘governing’ individuals and communities (Richmond, 2007b, p. 470; Jabri, 2013, pp. 8, 
10) and its justification for external intervention (Duffield, 2001, p. 42, 2002, pp. 1052–
4; Willett, 2005, p. 585; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, pp. 393–4; Newman, 2010, p. 
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317). Certain populations are framed as threats requiring ‘stabilisation’ and 
transformation to fit (liberal) norms and expectations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 36–8; 
Richmond, 2007b, p. 462; Begby and Burgess, 2009, p. 96; Chandler, 2010a, pp. 373–7; 
Newman, 2010, p. 313, 2011, pp. 1737–49). 
The critical peacebuilding literature draws attention to important and complex 
issues central to ‘just’, ‘sustainable’ peacebuilding: the transformation of systems of 
violence and inequality, ‘local’ participation and influence, and engagement with and 
responses to ‘everyday’ priorities and concerns. However, these discussions involve 
limited attention to: 1) specific ‘social’ mechanisms or processes through which these 
critical peacebuilding issues can be addressed, with implications for ‘practical’ 
application and policy relevance; 2) relationships between responses to ‘everyday’ 
concerns, ‘local’ participation, and systems of/responses to violence and inequality; and 
3) processes and institutions linking international- or national-level governance and 
‘grassroots’ spheres. I suggest that analysis of education systems can provide insight 
into mechanisms through which systems of inequality are reproduced or challenged and 
through which ‘local’ participation and ‘everyday’ responses are facilitated or 
undermined as part of peacebuilding processes, as well as the relationships between 
them and interactions between scales of action and influence. 
 
3.3 ‘Critical’ Peacebuilding and Education: A Gap in the Literature 
Having outlined the three main themes presented in the critical peacebuilding 
literature, I now examine the ways in which this literature has considered the role or 
contributions of education and of social institutions and systems more broadly. In this 
section, I examine existing perspectives on ‘social services’ in the critical peacebuilding 
literature, the significance of the limited attention to education, and potential reasons for 
this limited attention. While some critical literature acknowledges the potential 
peacebuilding roles or contributions of ‘social services’, broadly speaking, I argue that 
the lack of attention to education represents a gap in this literature.  
The small body of critical peacebuilding literature that considers the role of 
social institutions and services presents three broad explanations concerning their 
peacebuilding role: service delivery as a form of socioeconomic (re)distribution, a 
response to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities, and a contributor to state-society relations. 
Before exploring these points in detail, it is important to address the language used in 
these discussions. Critical peacebuilding scholars generally refer to ‘service delivery’ or 
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‘service provision’ (and to ‘basic needs’ or ‘welfare needs’). This largely frames 
education as simply a service or good to be delivered to meet particular needs. 
However, the delivery/provision of education services is highly political, and much 
more complicated, involving both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ dimensions. It both reflects 
and reproduces dynamics of violence, inequalities, and power relations, which are 
neglected in the depoliticised language of ‘service delivery/provision’. 
The first broad narrative describes social service provision as a form of 
socioeconomic distribution, providing a means of addressing social, economic, and 
political exclusion and promoting social and economic rights as sources of peace 
(Lidén, 2009, p. 621; Newman, 2011, p. 1750). Some critical scholars suggest that basic 
service provision (including education) represents a starting point for more sustainable 
and ‘inclusive’ peacebuilding (Newman, 2011, p. 1738; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 415–7) and 
an ‘alternative’ way to address social needs and inequalities (Pugh, 2005, p. 33; 
Newman, 2011, p. 1738). Some acknowledge challenges associated with institutional 
capacity, effectiveness, and disparities in public service provision (Lemay-Hébert, 2009, 
pp. 23–4; Campbell and Peterson, 2013, pp. 341–2). Richmond (2009a, p. 567) 
acknowledges that peacebuilding contributions require the “provision of… resources 
sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local, everyday, constituencies”. The 
failure of the state (as the expected service provider) to respond to public expectations 
can thus result in disappointment and dissatisfaction among populations, affecting 
peacebuilding contributions (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 319–20). 
Education systems are particularly important sites through which to address 
different forms of inequality, although this is not clearly acknowledged in the critical 
peacebuilding literature. Education systems are “one of the most important institutions 
through which social inequalities along class, gender, ethnic, religious or other lines are 
created and maintained” (Brown, 2011, p. 192). Inequalities in education opportunities 
and outcomes interact with and influence other forms of disadvantage, in economic 
opportunities and income, living standards, political representation, and so on (Cramer, 
2003, p. 398; Stewart, 2009, pp. 323–7). Inequalities associated with conflict are linked 
to the ways in which politically powerful actors allocate resources and opportunities 
(Fjelde and Østby, 2014, pp. 743–4), and educational inequalities play a particularly 
strong role in collective group grievances as they “are more likely to result from 
systematic group discrimination” (Østby, 2008b, p. 155). Dominant groups may, for 
example, use education policies to discriminate against certain populations or secure 
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advantages for privileged groups. This has implications for conflict, when education 
inequalities intersecting with group identities drive collective grievances and 
mobilisation. By reflecting and reproducing different forms of inequality, education 
systems contribute to their persistence and durability over time. This illustrates the 
importance of attention not only to education delivery, but also to how resources and 
services are distributed and delivered and the ways in which this reproduces and 
entrenches (not only ‘addresses’) inequalities.  
The second broad narrative suggests that public service provision can address 
populations’ ‘everyday’ needs and priorities, representing ‘local’ or ’everyday’ forms 
of peace (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 567–80, 2009c, p. 158, 2010a, p. 30; Mac Ginty, 
2011b, pp. 81, 180; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1626; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 414–6; Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2012, p. 6; Newman, 2014, p. 193; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 308–9). 
Some critical scholars suggest that engagement with the ‘everyday’ involves attention to 
“the organization and mobilization of effective state delivery of public needs” (Roberts, 
2011b, p. 414), with peace formation involving “a range of services necessary for 
everyday life” (Richmond, 2016, p. 135). ‘Welfare’ policies responding to ‘everyday 
life’ include the provision of (free) schooling (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158) 
and of public goods and services by government institutions, non-state (e.g. 
international) providers, and other formal and non-formal institutions (Pugh, 2010, p. 
263; Roberts, 2011a, pp. 2542–3, 2012, p. 369).  
Discussions of the ‘everyday’ raise questions about who defines ‘everyday’ 
needs and how this is used to justify intervention. The identification of “material 
welfare, modern education, or integration in national and international political 
processes as primary sources of peace” may illustrate externally- rather than locally-
driven approaches (Lidén, 2009, pp. 620–2). ‘Welfare’-oriented interventions often 
reflect the visions of international interveners (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 268–9). By 
supporting social service provision and addressing ‘everyday’ needs, international 
actors can advance particular models of peace and extend ‘liberal’ values, norms, and 
objectives (Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 84; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1640; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416). 
The integration of social services into peacebuilding plans might “lead to even more 
interventionary strategies by international sponsors of peacebuilding… to exert further 
influence and conditionality” (Richmond, 2008b, p. 299). Responses to ‘everyday’ 
needs can serve as means through which external actors exert power and control at the 
‘local’ level (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624). 
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The third main narrative suggests that social service provision can contribute 
to state-society relations by responding to ‘everyday’ needs, providing opportunities 
for (democratic) participation, and contributing to the internal or ‘local’ legitimacy of 
the state and of peacebuilding interventions (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158; 
Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 137; Newman, 2011, pp. 1737–50; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416; 
Newman, 2014, p. 193). As Richmond (2016, p. 106) explains, the political legitimacy 
of the state is perceived as connected to service access and opportunities. The provision 
of (free) schooling and other public services is described in terms of “welfare policies 
necessary to… lead to democratic politics” (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158). 
Such policies, in theory, enable individual and collective relationships with government 
institutions and the state (Richmond, 2010a, p. 30). ‘Social welfare’ and ‘basic needs’ 
provisions thus contribute to a ‘social contract’ between society and state (Richmond, 
2006b, pp. 311, 327–31, 2008b, p. 291; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, p. 6; 
Richmond, 2010a, p. 34; Pugh, 2010, p. 264; Roberts, 2011a, p. 2543). 
The focus on state-society relations and a ‘social contract’ through service 
provision reflects a broader ‘paradox of liberalism’ in the critical peacebuilding 
literature. Critics identify ‘liberal’ priorities and approaches as sources of oppression, 
while presenting alternatives based on liberal principles (Begby and Burgess, 2009, p. 
93; Paris, 2010, pp. 354–6, 2011, pp. 159–60; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416; Sabaratnam, 
2013, pp. 262–3; Newman, 2014, p. 193). Sabaratnam (2013, pp. 268–9) argues that the 
focus on a ‘liberal’ social contract and state-led ‘welfare’ and service provision presents 
a vision of peacebuilding “based on a particular [Western European] conception of 
state-led social democracy” and reinforces the rationale for intervention despite being 
presented as part of an ‘alternative’ model.  
When discussing state-society relations and ‘local’ participation, the 
peacebuilding literature tends to focus on international- or national-level governance or 
on the ‘grassroots’ level, with less attention to processes and institutions linking them. 
Education systems are “one of the most visible, far reaching forms of government” 
(Winthrop and Matsui, 2013, p. 4) and key sites of contact between communities and 
state authority (Dupuy, 2008a, p. 65). This illustrates the central role that education can 
play in shaping relations between state and society and between the global, national and 
‘local’. However, the critical peacebuilding literature pays limited attention to the 
complexity of these processes, the specific means through which they occur, and their 
potential for reproducing or transforming relations of power at multiple scales. 
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While the critical peacebuilding literature acknowledges some of the 
contributions of ‘service delivery’ to peacebuilding, references to education are 
generally peripheral or vague. With few exceptions, this literature has paid only 
superficial or abstract attention to education’s peacebuilding roles or contributions. 
These are addressed specifically and in detail in only a small number of publications. 
For example, Mac Ginty and Firchow (2016) identify the provision of basic public 
services such as education as an ‘everyday indicator’ of peace, while Richmond (2008b, 
p. 291, 2009c, p. 158) describes the provision of (free) schooling in relation to ‘welfare’ 
policies responding to ‘everyday life’. Some edited texts on peacebuilding include 
education-focused chapters, such as Maulden (2013) in Mac Ginty’s Routledge 
Handbook of Peacebuilding and Pherali (2016) in Richmond et al.’s Palgrave 
Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace. However, critical 
peacebuilding scholars themselves have demonstrated limited engagement with 
education. When education is mentioned, they generally present education 
provision/delivery as necessarily positive or beneficial or, at least, neutral. They do not 
explore the ways in which education systems intersect with, reproduce, and entrench 
patterns of inequality and structural violence and undermine peacebuilding aims.  
I suggest that this represents a gap in the critical peacebuilding literature. 
Education systems play unique and critically important roles in reproducing, and thus 
transforming, political, economic, and cultural inequalities and structural violence. They 
represent mediating sites between ‘local’ communities and national governments, as 
well sites of international intervention and influence. Engagement with education’s 
complex roles can provide important insights into dynamics of inequality and ‘drivers’ 
of conflict, ‘local’ participation, and ‘everyday’ concerns prioritised in the critical 
peacebuilding literature. This can also facilitate understandings of the mechanisms 
through which these processes might occur.  
 Having discussed the lack of explicit attention to education within the critical 
peacebuilding scholarship, I now explore some potential reasons for this. First, the 
critical peacebuilding literature is IR-dominated and reflects wider disciplinary 
divisions. The field of IR, more broadly, does not seriously consider the role and 
significance of education. Education is described as “a marginal topic in international 
relations” (Müller, 2011, p. 1) and “ignored by IR scholarship in general” (Hartmann, 
2015, p. 89). This is reflected in the peacebuilding literature (both ‘mainstream’ and 
‘critical’). Discussions of education’s ‘international’ role are generally framed in 
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narrow, instrumentalist terms. These focus, for example, on education as an instrument 
of foreign policy (as a source or form of ‘soft power’), as promoting particular political 
and economic policy goals (Wojciuk, Michałek and Stormowska, 2015, pp. 298–314), 
and as transmitting hegemonic norms, values, and standards and contributing to global 
or transnational integration (Hartmann, 2015, pp. 90–8). 
The second potential reason concerns the critical peacebuilding literature’s focus 
on and analysis of peacebuilding as a neoliberal project. Neoliberal agendas neglect 
‘liberal’ aspects of (government-led) ‘public services and welfare activities’ and public 
‘interest’ or ‘good’, focusing instead of aspects of ‘behaviour’ and ‘effectiveness’ of 
state institutions (Olssen, 2010, pp. 8, 14–5). The “adoption of neoliberalisation as a key 
framework for the liberal peace” (Richmond, 2010a, p. 27) informs critiques (of 
political and economic liberalisation) and discussions of ‘alternative’ peacebuilding 
directions. Finally, the peacebuilding literature appears to view education as largely 
disconnected from ‘political’ peacebuilding processes, reflected in the language of 
‘service delivery/provision’. While acknowledging education’s potential contributions 
to political processes (e.g. democratisation), this literature does not explicitly 
acknowledge the political nature of education institutions and processes. Literature on 
the relationship between education, conflict, and peacebuilding draws attention to these 
political (as well as economic and cultural) dynamics. 
 
3.4 Education Literature: Insights for Critical Peacebuilding  
Having summarised the critical peacebuilding debates and explored existing 
gaps, I now examine the ways in which the education literature addresses issues of 
conflict and peacebuilding. This education literature contributes to the critical (IR-
centred) peacebuilding debates in two main ways: by complicating and expanding 
explanations and assumptions concerning the role of education, and by providing 
insight into specific mechanisms through which to address inequalities (as underlying 
causes of conflict), ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ concerns within and through a 
specific sector. I argue that education should be brought into peacebuilding analyses and 
debates, and explore how this might occur. I examine three dimensions of inequality 
addressed by the education literature in relation to conflict and peacebuilding: the 
distribution of education resources and services, representation in decision-making and 
management, and recognition of identity and difference in education systems and 
content. These provide entry points for deepening arguments about education’s 
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peacebuilding role, drawing attention to mechanisms through which forms of inequality 
(and dynamics of violence) are reproduced or challenged in education systems.  
A growing body of literature argues that while education systems are affected by 
violent conflict, they also play a role in fuelling or exacerbating conflict – as well as 
contributing to or undermining peacebuilding processes. Education is a ‘key player’ in 
conflict and violence (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000, p. 11; Davies, 2005, p. 358; Buckland, 
2006, p. 7; L. Davies, 2010, p. 491), challenging the assumption that “education is 
necessarily and inherently a good thing” (Harber, 2004, p. 7). Explanations of the 
peacebuilding role of ‘social services’ in the critical peacebuilding literature generally 
present the provision of such services as positive, beneficial, or neutral. The literature 
described in this section provides a more nuanced understanding of education’s 
complex role in both violence and peace.  
The education literature frames education’s peacebuilding contributions in 
different ways: as fulfilling a ‘basic right’, as ‘peace education’ (focused on changing 
attitudes and behaviours), as contributing to security (e.g. reintegration of ex-
combatants) or poverty reduction, and through a focus on the implications of, and 
responses to, inequalities in education. I focus on the last area, which deals not only 
with education’s peacebuilding potential but also its contributions to conflict. Education 
intersects with multiple sociocultural, economic, and political dimensions of violence, 
and reproduces, exacerbates, and legitimises structures and relations of power, 
privilege, exclusion, and domination (Harber, 2004, p. 60; Dupuy, 2008a, p. 29; Brown, 
2011, pp. 192–6; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 435–7). Understanding education’s 
peacebuilding role requires attention to interconnected economic, political, and cultural 
dimensions of inequality. These include resource distribution, political representation, 
and recognition of identity and difference, as well as historical injustices affecting 
relations between social groups and between communities and governments (Tikly and 
Barrett, 2011; Power, 2012; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015; Novelli, 2016).  
The first dimension of inequality addressed by the education literature concerns 
the distribution of education resources and services. Some education literature 
argues that resource and service distribution provides a tangible ‘peace dividend’, 
addressing conflict-related grievances. It also identifies state service provision as a 
means of responding to population needs and (re)establishing state legitimacy and 
public trust in government (Thyne, 2006, p. 750; Dupuy, 2008b, p. 156, 2008a, pp. 36, 
84; Davies, 2011, pp. 161–2; Ellison, 2014, p. 191). However, the ways in which 
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resources (e.g. funds, infrastructure, materials, teachers) and services are distributed can 
reproduce inequalities in education access and outcomes between social groups and 
geographical regions, reinforcing historical patterns of marginalisation and exclusion. 
Peacebuilding analyses and efforts should therefore attend to the ‘politics of 
redistribution’, including the ways in which education resource and service allocation 
across different populations and regions intersect with, and respond to, existing 
inequalities (Degu, 2005, pp. 138–143; Smith, 2005, p. 379; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 28–38, 
84–7, 2008b, p. 159; Tikly and Barrett, 2011, pp. 9–12; Power, 2012, pp. 476–87; 
Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, pp. 12–7).  
Education’s peacebuilding role is affected by the ways in which resources are 
managed by actors at multiple scales, from the school to government level. Inequalities 
and grievances can be reinforced by resource misappropriation or diversion and political 
influence or nepotism in the distribution of services and opportunities (Smith, 2005, p. 
379; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 38–9; L. Davies, 2010, pp. 492–3; Davies, 2011, p. 163). 
Education interventions may therefore focus on ‘good governance’, transparency, and 
accountability in sector management (e.g. planning, budgeting, expenditure) (Smith, 
2010, p. 5; Davies, 2011, p. 164). However, such interventions generally reflect a 
technical focus on individual actions or organisational systems, rather than underlying 
dimensions of power, authority, and incentives (Davies, 2011, pp. 165–72).  
The second dimension of inequality addressed by the education literature 
involves representation in decision-making and management concerning resource 
distribution, content, and service provision. This includes opportunities (for students, 
teachers, households, communities, and local authorities) to participate in and influence 
decision-making, from the school to national level (Tikly and Barrett, 2011, pp. 9–12; 
Power, 2012, pp. 476–87; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, pp. 12–7). 
Education settings represent important sites of community participation in decision-
making, which can challenge and transform dominant power relations (Shizha, 2005, p. 
75). Education management reforms are identified as mechanisms for strengthening 
‘local’ ownership and choice, responsiveness to ‘local’ needs, community-government 
relations, and transparency and accountability in service delivery. Key reforms include 
decentralisation (deconcentration, delegation, or devolution) of financing, 
administration, and decision-making to subnational levels as well as ‘participatory’ 
school-based management processes (Astiz, Wiseman and Baker, 2002, p. 70; Dupuy, 
2008b, pp. 159–60, 2008a, pp. 58–88; Fuller, 2009, pp. 856–8).  
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While providing some opportunities for participation, these reforms can 
reinforce power structures and inequalities when decision-making processes exclude 
‘marginalised’ (e.g. ethnic, geographic, socioeconomic) populations (Smith, 2005, p. 
379; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 61–4; Brown, 2011, pp. 198–200). Management practices also 
communicate and legitimise particular norms, values, attitudes, and behaviours. For 
example, school and government practices can normalise forms of violence including 
unequal power and gender relations and militarised and authoritarian teaching, 
management, and disciplinary approaches (Harber, 2004, pp. 24–130; Seitz, 2004, pp. 
26–7; Davies, 2005, pp. 360–3, 2006, p. 13, 2011, p. 162; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 44–56; 
Smith, 2010, pp. 15–6). The ‘devolution’ of responsibilities from state to subnational 
authorities and communities can increase the burden on populations (and non-state 
actors) to provide financial, material, and human resources (Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 62–5, 
89; Brown, 2011, pp. 198–200). This is associated with neoliberal privatisation and 
commodification of education services, and can exclude lower-income groups, fragment 
or segregate education, and reproduce inequalities and grievances between communities 
(Rizvi and Lingard, 2000, p. 421; Tikly, 2001, p. 161; Harber, 2004, pp. 34–5; 
Robertson, 2007, p. 144, 2011, p. 286; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 436–7). 
Education governance arrangements have wider political implications, as they 
reflect and reproduce broader political structures and hierarchies of power and 
representation. Education reforms thus present an entry point for political 
transformation across multiple sectors (Dupuy, 2008b, p. 150; Smith, 2010, p. 23; 
Barakat et al., 2013, p. 127; Ellison, 2014, p. 191; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 
2015, p. 15). Education systems can support political transformation by contributing to 
civic or political participation and ‘democratic’ values and practices. This involves, for 
example, civic and citizenship education promoting understandings of citizenship, 
citizens’ rights, responsibilities, and relationship to the state, and ‘democratic’ 
governance and institutions (Davies, 2004, pp. 239–42, 2006, p. 13, 2011, p. 170; 
Olssen, 2004, p. 263; Seitz, 2004, p. 81; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 76–7, 2008b, p. 160; Smith, 
2010, p. 15). However, as discussed below, education systems can reproduce 
exclusionary or repressive versions of nationality and citizenship. 
The third dimension of inequality addressed by the education literature concerns 
the recognition of identity and difference in education systems and content. 
Education systems contribute to political and cultural violence through repression or 
‘non-recognition’ of identity and difference (cultural, ethnic, religious, etc.). The 
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transmission of essentialist or assimilationist conceptions of identity and ‘scapegoating’ 
or ‘othering’ of particular groups can (re)produce divisions, fear, and hatred (Davies, 
2004, p. 229; Harber, 2004, pp. 85–96; Davies, 2005, p. 361, 2006, p. 13; Dupuy, 
2008a, pp. 41–54; L. Davies, 2010, p. 491). Education systems transmit dominant group 
(‘official’) knowledge and historical or national narratives that may omit, suppress, or 
be irrelevant to the historical experiences, perspectives, and practices of different groups 
(Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 40–1; Freedman et al., 2008, p. 675; Smith, 2010, pp. 17–8).  
Educational segregation or integration (according to religion, ethnicity, 
language, socioeconomic status, etc.) influences intergroup dynamics and outcomes. 
Some argue that shared schools and instruction contribute to national identity, economic 
opportunity, and intergroup understanding, while separate services reinforce group 
divisions and create parallel education systems. Others argue that denial of education 
preferences affects access and attainment for minority groups, reproducing ‘cultural’ 
violence and socioeconomic inequalities. They suggest that recognition of preferences 
for separate approaches, content, and languages of instruction can strengthen 
educational access, outcomes, and recognition of identities (Harber, 2004, pp. 86–96; 
Davies, 2005, pp. 361–5, 2006, p. 13; Degu, 2005, pp. 131–44; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 41–
7; Smith, 2010, pp. 8–14; Brown, 2011, pp. 192–7; Novelli and Smith, 2011, p. 26). 
Responses to forms of cultural violence involve recognising ‘marginalised’ 
identities and groups, respecting and affirming difference, addressing aspects of 
segregation, and ensuring content meaningful to diverse communities (Tikly and 
Barrett, 2011, pp. 9–12; Power, 2012, pp. 476–87; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 
2015, pp. 12–7). Curriculum reforms provide opportunities for including multiple 
perspectives in historical and national narratives. However, representations of identity 
and history are highly political and require attention to which ‘official’ narratives are 
accepted and who is responsible for such decisions (Cole, 2007, p. 128; Dupuy, 2008a, 
p. 55; McCully, 2012, p. 156). The role of identity in conflict also raises questions about 
the extent to which difference “should be highlighted or obscured in educational 
settings” (Bekerman, Zembylas and McGlynn, 2009, p. 226). 
These three areas of inequality are shaped by the multi-scalar nature of power 
and influence in education policy and practice. Discussions of education governance 
(ownership, organisation, provision, regulation, decision-making) draw attention to the 
influence of actors, interests, and priorities at multiple scales, on national and ‘local’ 
decisions and practices. These dynamics influence patterns of, and responses to, 
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inequality in education systems and resulting implications for conflict and 
peacebuilding. Education governance is characterised by the ‘globalisation of education 
reforms’ (Astiz, Wiseman and Baker, 2002, p. 66), the ‘transnationalisation of 
education policy making’ (Moutsios, 2009, p. 469), and a ‘globally structured’ 
education agenda (Dale, 2000, p. 428, 2005, p. 120). While policy decisions are made at 
the national level, with states as central authorities, these involve interstate and 
supranational influences (Ball, 1998, p. 120; P. W. Jones, 1998, p. 144; Dale, 1999, pp. 
1–2; Olssen, 2004, pp. 240–3; Dale, 2005, pp. 120–33; Jones, 2007, p. 329; Robertson 
and Dale, 2008, p. 21; Dale and Robertson, 2009, p. 1115; Moutsios, 2009, p. 471, 
2010, p. 122; Robertson, 2011, p. 291). Actors include national and subnational 
authorities, communities and households, multilateral and international agencies, and 
market actors. Policies increasingly reflect externally-defined rather than ‘national’ or 
‘local’ priorities (Samoff, 1999, pp. 252–6, 2003, p. 14; Dale, 2000, p. 440; Rizvi and 
Lingard, 2000, p. 421; Robertson, 2006, p. 313; Jones, 2007, p. 331; Mundy, 2007, pp. 
346–7). These are influenced by ‘global’ education agendas (e.g. EFA, MDGs, SDGs), 
whose development is dominated by multilateral agencies.  
Wider neoliberal ideologies influence education agendas and reforms, illustrated 
by the decentralisation of decision-making and service provision and privatisation and 
marketisation. Such reforms prioritise education’s economic function, notably its 
contributions to economic growth and productivity, human capital development, and 
labour production (Ball, 1998, p. 122; Rizvi and Lingard, 2000, p. 423; Astiz, Wiseman 
and Baker, 2002, pp. 68–9; Samoff, 2003, pp. 18–9; Robertson and Dale, 2006, pp. 
221–5; Robertson, 2007, pp. 137–9, 2009, pp. 542–5, Moutsios, 2009, pp. 477–8, 2010, 
p. 123). The ‘new’ governance of education has also shifted boundaries and relations 
between sectors and expanded educational agendas (Dale, 2005, p. 134; Jones, 2007, p. 
334; Robertson and Dale, 2008, pp. 25–6; Dale and Robertson, 2009, pp. 1121–2; 
Robertson, 2011, p. 293). For example, education policy agendas and aid are 
‘securitised’ and ‘militarised’, with education projects (e.g. school construction) used as 
strategies for ‘winning hearts and minds’ and military or security funding directed via 
education aid budgets (Novelli and Robertson, 2007, p. 251; Novelli, 2010, pp. 456–8; 
Nguyen, 2014, pp. 118–20).  
Critiques of global education agendas and ‘hegemonic policy discourse’ 
(Knutsson and Lindberg, 2012, p. 806) reflect critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ model. 
Global policy agendas may ignore or undermine ‘local’ or national priorities, interests, 
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and contexts (Samoff, 2007, p. 487; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008, p. 482; Novelli 
et al., 2014, pp. 40–3), resulting in a disconnection between “the education agenda 
designed by donors and global actors and… political economy factors that are shaping 
educational provision in conflict-affected contexts” (Novelli et al., 2014, p. 38). 
External influences operate through policy ‘borrowing’, harmonisation, standardisation, 
or imposition associated with donor conditions and power relations. However, while 
common elements may exist, policies are filtered, interpreted, modified, adapted, and 
resisted in national and ‘local’ contexts. There are significant differences in responses to 
similar policy ‘problems’, and similar policies may be implemented in different ways 
(Ball, 1998, pp. 125–7; Mundy, 1998, p. 449, 2007, pp. 346–7, Dale, 1999, pp. 2–6, 
2000, p. 428, 2005, pp. 130–2; Phillips and Ochs, 2003, pp. 451–7; Samoff, 2003, pp. 3, 
16; Rizvi, 2006, p. 200; Rappleye and Paulson, 2007, pp. 257–67; Knutsson and 
Lindberg, 2012, p. 819; Novelli et al., 2014, pp. 42–55). 
The multiple dimensions of inequality discussed in this section provide 
important insights for the critical peacebuilding literature. The points outlined above 
expand on and complicate critical peacebuilding discussions of the role of education (or 
‘social services’ more broadly) as a form of socioeconomic distribution, contributor to 
state-society relations, and response to ‘everyday’ needs. They also provide entry points 
for exploring critical peacebuilding ‘themes’, notably responses to systems of violence 
and inequality, ‘local’ participation, and ‘everyday’ concerns. The education literature 
complicates the critical peacebuilding narrative of service delivery/provision as 
socioeconomic distribution (and as part of broader responses to responses to systems of 
inequality). Education’s peacebuilding role is not simply about the ‘delivery’ or 
‘provision’ of services. It involves the distribution of wider educational resources (e.g. 
material, financial, human) as well as decision-making arrangements, structures and 
content, and underlying interests and agendas. Critical peacebuilding scholars also 
generally frame service delivery/provision as beneficial or neutral, a point that is 
challenged when considering the ways in which resource allocation, decision-making 
arrangements, structure, and content intersect with and reinforce historical, political, 
economic, and cultural inequalities. In these ways, service delivery/provision itself can 
contribute to conflict rather than peacebuilding. 
The education literature contributes to and expands critical peacebuilding 
discussions of education’s contribution to state-society relations and of broader 
processes of ‘local’ participation and influence. It illustrates how participation processes 
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play out in a specific sector, at multiple ‘local’ scales (e.g. subnational governments, 
schools, households), including who participates and how. It also provides insight into 
processes and institutions linking international- or national-level governance and ‘local’ 
spheres. These illustrate entry points for understanding how power and influence might 
be (re)distributed in ‘local’ contexts – as well as ways in which inequalities are 
reproduced. This expands the focus beyond service delivery/provision, considering 
decision-making arrangements informing policy development, resource distribution, and 
management priorities. This is one way in which engagement with education illustrates 
relationships between ‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ participation, and systems 
of/responses to violence and inequality. 
In addition to political aspects, the education literature emphasises ‘cultural’ 
dimensions of violence and inequality. When discussing the importance of responses to 
inequalities, some critical peacebuilding scholars refer to aspects of identity and 
difference. When discussing contributions of ‘social’ services, however, they focus 
mainly on socioeconomic and political issues, with little attention to ‘cultural’ 
dimensions or implications. While Richmond (2016, p. 123) identifies education as a 
potential area for ‘building bridges’ across groups and Lidén (2009, p. 621) refers to 
“culturally adapted provision of… education”, little detail is provided. The education 
literature explores in detail the reproduction and implications of ‘cultural’ violence and 
inequalities, expanding critical peacebuilding discussions of inequality by considering 
questions of identity and difference in education structure and content.  
The critical peacebuilding literature suggests that interventions responding to 
‘everyday’ concerns and priorities, including social services, can serve as mechanisms 
of external control and influence. The education literature provides insights into 
mechanisms of influence within a specific sector, describing ‘global’ influences on 
national education policies and the advancement of particular political and economic 
agendas. This illustrates the potential for education to advance externally- or elite-
driven (neoliberal) priorities and interests, rather than contributing to ‘emancipatory’ or 
‘popular’ peace. At the same time, while the points outlined above illustrate the ways in 
which education systems intersect with and reproduce inequalities and violence, they 
also provide insight into mechanisms for their transformation.  
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have examined key themes articulated in the critical 
peacebuilding literature, focusing on responses to systems of violence and inequality, 
‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ concerns. Given the significance of education 
systems in reproducing patterns of violence, inequality, and power, I suggest that 
engagement with education can provide insight into: 1) mechanisms or processes 
through which these critical peacebuilding issues can be addressed; 2) relationships 
between responses to ‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ participation, and systems 
of/responses to violence and inequality; and 3) processes and institutions linking 
international- or national-level governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres, which are limited 
in critical peacebuilding discussions. 
The critical peacebuilding literature is characterised by limited engagement with 
education and other social institutions. Existing discussions are limited by a 
depoliticised focus on service ‘delivery’ or ‘provision’, assumptions about education’s 
‘positive’ contributions to peacebuilding, and limited attention to political, economic, 
and cultural forms of violence and inequality reproduced within and through social 
institutions such as education. The education literature addresses in detail the 
complexity of education’s role in conflict and peacebuilding, with a focus on multiple 
forms of inequality and their implications as well as possibilities for (and mechanisms 
of) transformation. This literature provides entry points for bringing education into 
critical peacebuilding discussions and (re)politicising these discussions through a focus 
on how services (and resources) are distributed across sites and scales, specific 
mechanisms of ‘local’ participation in education contexts, forms of identity and 
inequality privileged or neglected in policy and practice, and influences of wider 
political and economic reforms and interests. 
‘Peacebuilding through education’ may represent a top-down, (neo)liberally 
oriented approach led by national and international actors, shaped by global, 
international, and national interests and representing a mechanism of social order and 
control. However, as one of the most widespread social institutions, education systems 
also represent a mechanism through which to understand and address ‘local’ and 
‘everyday’ dimensions of inequality and injustice as part of peacebuilding analysis and 
intervention. While the critical peacebuilding literature draws attention to critically 
important questions of inequality, ‘local’ engagement, and the ‘everyday’, the lack of 
attention to education represents a significant gap. This thesis seeks to address this gap.  
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CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter, I outline the theoretical approach guiding this research. In the 
first section, I describe the broad critical theoretical perspective guiding discussions of 
inequality, violence, and peacebuilding processes within education contexts. In the 
second section, I describe a critical realist perspective, which provides an ontological 
framework for this research. In the third section, I outline a critical cultural political 
economy framework that draws attention to interrelated factors influencing 
peacebuilding and education processes, policies, and practices. In the final section, I 
discuss considerations of ‘scale’ in the analysis of these processes.  
 
4.2 Critical Theoretical Approach 
This research is guided by a theoretical perspective that critically examines 
existing social orders and institutions and considers possibilities for social and political 
change. Critical peacebuilding scholars emphasise the need for a critical perspective 
considering alternative orders and relations in order to address structural, political, and 
historical dimensions of violence (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Pugh, 2004; Heathershaw, 
2008; Mac Ginty, 2008; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a; Lidén, Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2009; Richmond, 2009a; Sabaratnam, 2013; Howarth, 2014; Richmond and 
Mac Ginty, 2015). Some education literature also emphasises the need for a critical 
perspective challenging existing power relations and structural forms of violence, 
inequality, and injustice operating within and through education systems (Lopes 
Cardozo, 2008; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011; 
Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013; Bajaj, 2015; Novelli, 2016). This involves locating 
education systems within wider political, economic, and cultural contexts and 
considering links to broader processes of (in)equality, (in)justice, and peacebuilding.  
I draw on a theoretical perspective that broadly distinguishes between ‘problem 
solving’ and critical approaches. A problem-solving approach “takes the world as it 
finds it… as the given framework for action” (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Specific policy 
‘problems’ are addressed within prevailing systems and relations of power, aiming “to 
make these relationships and institutions work smoothly” (p. 129). This sustains 
existing social orders and patterns of inequality, injustice, and oppression and associated 
political interests. In contrast, a critical approach aims to challenge existing orders of 
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power and promote change in social and political institutions and relations (Cox, 1981, 
pp. 128–30, 1994, p. 101, 2002a, p. 76). Rather than taking prevailing institutions and 
power relations for granted, this approach “calls them into question by concerning itself 
with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 
1981, p. 129). It considers constraints and opportunities influencing change, including 
political, economic, sociocultural, and historical factors and contexts (Cox, 1981, pp. 
129–30, 1994, p. 101, 2002b, p. 32, 2002c, p. 59; Hoffman, 1987, p. 243; Devetak, 
2005, p. 150). Critical analysis locates a given phenomenon “within its historical 
context, testing and teasing-out tensions between the phenomenon and the cultural, 
social, political, economic… institutions and struggles” (Rabaka, 2010, p. 15). This 
includes interactions between social forces, states, and world orders (Cox, 1981, pp. 
137–8), as well as the “elaborate machinery” harmonising (peacebuilding and 
education) policies and ‘internationalised’ policy processes driven by international 
agencies (p. 145). Problem-solving and critical theoretical approaches are not, however, 
mutually exclusive, and “may be understood to address different concerns or levels 
within one overall story” (Sinclair, 1996, p. 6). 
As Hill Collins (1998, p. xiv) explains, critical theoretical perspectives “actively 
grapple with the central questions facing groups of people differently placed in specific 
political, social, and historical contexts characterized by injustice”. Collins argues that 
what makes critical theory ‘critical’ is its challenge to ‘unjust ideas and practices’ and 
‘commitment to justice’ (pp. xiv–xvi). In this research, I consider systems of power, 
inequality, and injustice associated with peacebuilding and educational institutions and 
processes. This involves attention to the ways in which these shape the experiences of 
different groups of people: those who are relatively privileged and ‘successful’, those in 
subordinate, precarious, or peripheral positions, and those excluded from economic and 
political systems (Cox, 1996, pp. 203–4, 2001, pp. 48–9, 2002a, pp. 84–5). This also 
involves attention to interactions between structures (configurations of ideas, material 
capabilities, and institutions providing frameworks for individual and group activity) 
and the agency of different ‘forces’ or actors (e.g. international organisations, 
governments, private agencies, civil society) (Cox, 1981, pp. 135–7, 2001, pp. 55–6). 
Critical theory aims to “shed light on the character and bases” of relations of dominance 
and subordination, and the approaches and ideologies that rationalise or obscure them 
(Fraser, 2013, p. 19). 
My engagement with critical theory is grounded in broader debates about the use 
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of this theoretical perspective. This includes Jahn’s (1998) critique of the use of critical 
theory in international relations. She argues that instead of “analysing concrete 
phenomena in their historical and social totality” (p. 614), ‘critical’ theory often 
abstracts concepts, ideas, and objects from their social role and historical context. It thus 
represents a “reenactment of liberal idealism” (p. 614), rooted in assumptions about 
‘universal’ values and norms (p. 637). Cammack (2007) also discusses the failure of 
‘critical’ theorists to engage in historical and holistic analysis. He describes as simplistic 
and misleading the assumption “that problem-solvers are the mere instruments of 
existing interests, while critical theorists have a degree of distance, or autonomy, from 
them” (p. 5). He challenges assumptions that ‘dominant interests’ are ‘monolithic and 
unchanging’, and describes the failure of ‘critical’ approaches to engage in holistic 
analysis (pp. 6–13). My research is therefore rooted in holistic, historical analysis: to 
avoid ‘naturalising’ existing social orders, “critical theory… has to engage in historical 
analysis, thus revealing the historically contingent character of its objects” (Jahn, 1998, 
p. 616). In studying education’s peacebuilding implications, I consider political, 
economic, and sociocultural processes beyond the education system, and its historical 
context. I also consider historical dimensions of inequalities and structural violence (and 
their links to conflict), including political and institutional legacies of colonial rule 
(Mamdani, 2001, pp. 652–3, 2003, pp. 136–40; Brown and Langer, 2010, p. 30; 
Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014, pp. 547–51). The “historically established social 
relations that lie behind… manifestations of inequality” are critically important in 
understanding their consequences (Cramer, 2003, p. 404). 
‘Critical’ analyses (of peacebuilding and education, in this case) involve 
normative dimensions, “offering alternatives to what is (domination and 
discrimination), by projecting possibilities of what ought to be and/or what could be” 
(Rabaka, 2010, p. 20). This includes assessments or assumptions regarding particular 
rights and outcomes associated with social change (Cox, 2002a, p. 76) and definitions 
of ‘emancipation’ (Rengger, 2000, p. 160). However, ‘critical’ approaches to 
peacebuilding may rely on and reproduce assumptions about ‘universal’ definitions or 
forms of emancipatory peace (Richmond, 2006a, p. 370, 2008a, pp. 453–4). 
Assumptions about ‘universal’ values and norms undermine analyses of political issues: 
“because concrete political phenomena are located in particular times and places, they 
are particular and not universal” (Jahn, 1998, p. 637). Such assumptions also obscure 
and reproduce forms of inequality and injustice: “to suggest universal answers to global 
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problems can only mean to hide the particular relations of injustice… constituted in this 
relationship” (p. 638). In this research, I explore contextualised and ‘localised’ 
understandings and meanings of (in)equality and peacebuilding in education contexts in 
South Sudan and explore the ways in which these align with or challenge ‘global’ 
concepts, assumptions, and agendas. 
I draw on critical feminist perspectives to inform a more comprehensive analysis 
of multiple dimensions and systems of power, inequality, and domination in education 
and peacebuilding. Feminist inquiry is concerned with “power in all of its visible and 
invisible forms”, including ‘boundaries’ and difference associated with relations of 
power and patterns of exclusion, marginalisation, inequality, and oppression (Ackerly, 
2008, pp. 28–30). This involves efforts to explore, understand, and transform structures 
and relations of social, political, and economic violence, subordination, inequality, and 
oppression across multiple levels of analysis (Tickner, 1997, pp. 616–20, 2001, pp. 62–
4, 2006, pp. 21–5; Ackerly and True, 2006, p. 246; Peterson, 2016, p. 514). I also draw 
on post-colonial perspectives to gain insight into global and historical dimensions of 
power and oppression. This informs an analytical approach challenging “the centrality 
of particular ideas about the international which naturalises forms of historic 
inequality… connected to the legacies, broadly understood, of European colonialism 
and the hierarchies of power… that it sought to institute” (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 784). 
Post-colonial scholars explore the continued effects and legacies of colonial practices 
implicated in contemporary relations of political, economic, and cultural power, 
authority, and advantage (Said, 1989, p. 207, 1994, p. 9; Bhabha, 1994, pp. 6, 171; 
Chowdry and Nair, 2002, pp. 11–2; Loomba, 2005, p. 16), thus politicising and 
historicising (global) inequalities (Jones, 2006, p. 10). It considers “traces of the past in 
the present”, “in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, 
ideological, economic, and social practices” (Said, 1994, pp. 20, 9). This includes 
processes and relations of power manifested through education systems. (Neo)colonial 
processes occur “by continuing consolidation within education” (Said, 1994, p. 12). 
Education (or ‘schooling’) represents “institutional/cultural weapons” of (neo)colonial 
violence (Serequeberhan, 1994, p. 65), serving to “instill in the exploited a mood of 
submission and inhibition which considerably eases the task of the agents of law and 
order” (Fanon, 2004, pp. 3–4). 
Feminist and post-colonial perspectives draw attention to “the personal and 
previously invisible spheres” of world politics (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006, p. 7). 
  
68 
They inform an approach that begins with the lives of individuals and the social, 
political, and economic contexts and relations in which they are situated, challenging 
the separation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ or ‘political’ spheres (Peterson, 1992, p. 202; 
Tickner, 1997, pp. 616–21, 2006, p. 25). This highlights the ‘personal’ dimensions of 
political conflict and peacebuilding and relationships between ‘personal’ and 
‘international’, between subjective experiences and international politics (Sylvester, 
2012, pp. 484–501; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636). Similarly, post-colonial theory 
draws attention to “the daily imposition of power in the dynamics of everyday life” and 
interactions between communities and institutions of authority (Said, 1994, p. 109).  
 
4.3 Critical Realism  
This research reflects a critical realist ontology, which suggests that the social 
world involves underlying structures and powers existing beyond what is ‘known’ 
through experience and observation (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 223–5; Bhaskar, 
2009, p. 4; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). Social, economic, and political worlds are 
understood as “too complex to be fully grasped in real time by… external observers” 
(Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 265). With respect to peacebuilding and education, 
“explanations… need to take into account those mechanisms and processes that are not 
observable but which have real effects” (Robertson and Dale, 2015, p. 150). 
Ontologically, critical realism distinguishes between the ‘real’, ‘actual’, and ‘empirical’, 
while emphasising their relational nature (Jessop, 2005a, p. 42). The world is viewed in 
terms of: 1) ‘real’ generative or causal structures and mechanisms existing 
independently of knowledge and providing conditions in which 2) ‘actual’ events and 
processes occur and are in turn 3) ‘empirically’ experienced or observed by social actors 
(Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 223–5; Jessop, 2005a, p. 41; Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 46–7, 
2011, p. 2; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). Together, “the empirical and the actual provoke 
questions about the nature of the real” (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). I move beyond 
empirical aspects of social reality (associated with inequalities and peacebuilding in 
education contexts) to explore conditions for these phenomena and forms of 
organisation (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 96–7). This reflects an attempt to “reach 
beyond experiences to grasp the deeper generative causal properties that give rise to 
these experiences” (Jackson, 2011, p. 74). I am interested in understanding conditions 
or properties making possible social systems, relations, and actions shaping inequalities 
and peacebuilding implications within and through education. 
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A critical realist approach considers “why occurrences and phenomena are 
linked”, rather than simply noting they are linked (Jackson, 2011, p. 99). This involves 
attention to ‘causal’ factors, or “processes, structures or conditions… directing 
outcomes, actions, states of affairs, events or changes” (Kurki, 2008, p. 16). This 
considers both material (e.g. relations of power and production, resources) and 
discursive or ideational (e.g. social rules, norms, meanings) aspects of the world as 
having ‘causal’ powers and effects (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 223, 235; Joseph, 
2007, pp. 351–4; Kurki, 2008, pp. 11–2, 206; Wight, 2012, pp. 267–70). These 
influence (constrain or enable) experiences and outcomes, avoiding a language of linear 
causation, determinism, or prediction. In complex, ‘open’ social systems, multiple 
external and internal forces interact to produce effects (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 
229–32; Sayer, 2004, pp. 262–3; Kurki, 2007, pp. 364–5, 2008, pp. 204–5, Bhaskar, 
2008, pp. 108–9, 2009, pp. 21–2, 71–2, 2011, p. 5; Scott, 2010, p. 88). These 
relationships “involve countless different and contradictory causal mechanisms, each 
mediated by countless further intervening factors” (Selby, 2014, p. 839). This is 
illustrated by Sayer’s (2004, pp. 260–4) distinction between (potential) ‘causal’ 
dimensions of power (individual, institutional, or relational forms), its ‘actual’ exercise, 
and its effects. Relations with other causal powers within open social systems influence 
their exercise and effects, and the same action may have different effects in different 
contexts (pp. 261–4). This approach accounts for complex interactions between social 
relations, structures, and contexts, which can help to understand (policy) decisions and 
change in relation to education and peacebuilding. Insight into ‘causes’ of patterns of 
violence, inequality, and domination is necessary to understand the nature of power 
maintaining them and possibilities for transformation.  
Critical realism considers how social processes and events are shaped by 
‘causal’ powers of both structures (questions of context) and human agency (questions 
of self-determination), examining their interrelations without reducing one to the other. 
This approach considers ‘pre-existing’ structures or patterns of social relations in which 
agents are embedded, including positions, rules, opportunities, and resources 
influencing actions. At the same time, structural conditions are reproduced and 
transformed (intentionally or unintentionally) by agents’ actions. Structures may not 
equally constrain or enable all agents, drawing attention to skills and capabilities, 
knowledge and interpretations, desires and intentions, privilege and disadvantage, and 
other influencing factors (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 230–2; Scott, 2000, pp. 34–5, 
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80–1, 2010, pp. 97–104; Fairclough, 2005, pp. 922–3; Jessop, 2005a, pp. 45–51; 
Bhaskar, 2009, pp. 83–6, 2011, pp. 92–8). Critical realism defines social structures as 
“internal social relations that tie agents to each other, their roles, and ideational and 
material resources”, constraining agents or providing opportunities, as well as 
positioning them in relation to one another within a hierarchy (Kurki and Sinclair, 2010, 
pp. 6–7). 
Social agents are embedded in, and reproduce, “structures of power which may 
involve alienation, domination and oppression” (Bhaskar, 2011, p. 6). A critical realist 
approach facilitates analysis of underlying ‘causes’ or explanations for relations of 
power, domination, and injustice in social and historical context (Joseph, 2007, p. 348; 
Njihia, 2011, pp. 77–80). Understanding structures and mechanisms underlying social 
experiences and processes is necessary for structural change (Bhaskar, 2011, p. 6). This 
contributes to an expanded understanding of relationships between education, 
inequality, and peacebuilding, by examining ‘causal’ influences associated with 
political, economic, and cultural structures and systems and actors at multiple scales 
(Kurki, 2007, pp. 373–4, 2008, pp. 262–72; Yirenkyi-Boateng, 2016, pp. 108–11).  
Critical realism is guided by a view of knowledge claims or accounts as 
provisional, partial, contextualised, and open to critique. Explanations represent a 
particular interpretation or understanding within a particular social, political, and 
historical context, rather than an ‘objectively true’ account (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, 
p. 227; Scott, 2005, pp. 2–3, 2010, pp. 11–2, 80, Kurki, 2007, p. 370, 2008, p. 15, 
Bhaskar, 2008, p. 115, 2009, pp. 21–41; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 5–6).  
 
4.4 Critical Cultural Political Economy 
I draw on cultural political economy (CPE) as a broad, meta-theoretical 
framework for understanding relationships between inequality, violence, and 
peacebuilding in education. Drawing on a critical realist ontological perspective, CPE 
considers interrelated influences, at multiple scales, of cultural, political, and economic 
structures and systems on the selection, reproduction, and implications or effects of 
particular discourses, approaches, and strategies. CPE is meant to address the 
limitations of critical perspectives focusing on narrow conceptions of power (e.g. class, 
relations of production) by considering the role of ideas, identities, and discourses 
(Jessop and Sum, 2001, pp. 94–5; Schechter, 2002, pp. 5–13). This aligns with feminist 
concerns with interrelated structures of sociocultural, political, and economic power, 
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subordination, and oppression (Tickner, 2006, pp. 21–5; Fraser, 2013, p. 5) and post-
colonial challenges to “dichotomies between political economy and materialism… [and] 
inflections of power/identity/culture/knowledge” (Jones, 2006, p. 6). 
I draw on broad understandings of the ‘economic’ and ‘political’. This involves 
attention to relations between education and market and non-market economic 
activities, viewing the education sector “as a complex ‘economy’ in its own right” 
(Robertson and Dale, 2015, pp. 153–4). I also consider multiple aspects of governance 
as well as formal political institutions. Jessop and Sum (Jessop, 2004, p. 161, 2010, p. 
337; Jessop and Sum, 2010, p. 415; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 152–3) define culture in 
terms of ‘semiosis’, referring to forms of intersubjective meaning within particular 
social and historical contexts. However, this pays limited attention to systems of norms, 
values, and understandings associated with particular experiences, practices, and 
relationships, as well as aspects of identity and difference (Jessop and Sum, 2001, p. 96; 
Sayer, 2001, p. 688; Jessop, 2004, p. 161, 2005b, p. 143, 2010, pp. 336–8; Best and 
Paterson, 2010, pp. 7–12; Robertson and Dale, 2015, pp. 153–4). I consider a broad 
understanding of the ‘cultural’, including discourses, ideas, concepts, beliefs, and 
meanings, as well as forms of identification and representation (Hall, 1997c, pp. 15–22; 
Loomba, 2005, p. 26) and aspects of difference and categorisation associated with 
‘culture’ and identification (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 34–45; Said, 1994, p. 15; Appadurai, 
1996, pp. 12–3; Hall, 1996, pp. 3–4). I consider configurations (and material 
dimensions) of power, inclusion/exclusion, and domination/subordination associated 
with ideas, identities, and other ‘cultural’ aspects. These include social status and 
treatment, patterns of privilege and oppression, and access to opportunities and 
resources (Said, 1994, p. 15, 2003, pp. 5–6; Mbembe, 2001, pp. 5–6; Chowdry and 
Nair, 2002, pp. 17–22; Loomba, 2005, pp. 50–1, 84–7; Appiah, 2006, p. 16; Fraser, 
2008b, pp. 131–8, 2008a, pp. 12–8, 2013, pp. 162–79; Rabaka, 2010, p. 13).  
CPE explores the ways in which cultural, political, and economic processes or 
domains of activity intersect to shape outcomes in particular contexts (Best and 
Paterson, 2010, pp. 12–7). While considering the specificities of each, the cultural, 
political, and economic are understood as interconnected rather than isolated or 
autonomous spheres. Practices and processes can be understood as simultaneously 
cultural, political, and economic without prioritising any one dimension (Jessop and 
Sum, 2001, p. 96, 2010, p. 445; Jessop, 2005b, p. 146; Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 12–
7; Walker, 2010, pp. 225–6; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 22). This challenges 
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peacebuilding perspectives viewing politics, economics, and culture as largely 
independent of one another (Pugh, 2005, p. 31). Given their simultaneously cultural, 
political, and economic roles, education systems provide insight into relationships 
between the ‘symbolic’ and ‘material’. However, I acknowledge the potential for a 
‘cultural’ focus to depoliticise understandings of political and economic questions (Best 
and Paterson, 2010, pp. 18–9; van Heur, 2010, p. 454; Staricco, 2016, p. 1). CPE aims 
to avoid reducing political and economic relations to ‘cultural’ understandings, 
considering ‘extra-cultural’ factors shaping actions and relationships and potential 
disjunctions between ‘cultural’ meanings and political or economic practices (Sayer, 
2001, pp. 688–9; Jessop, 2004, pp. 163–5, 2005b, pp. 143–5, 2010, pp. 338–41; Jessop 
and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1155–7; Jessop and Sum, 2010, p. 445; Sum and Jessop, 
2013, p. 98). This facilitates the holistic approach to critical analysis emphasised above.  
CPE, using a ‘strategic-relational’ approach, explores how and why particular 
discourses, practices, or ways of understanding the world are privileged, selected, and 
retained by individual, collective, or organisational actors in specific contexts.24 It 
examines the ways in which these discourses, practices, or understandings are 
‘operationalised’, retained, and reproduced in particular institutions or projects across 
different scales and sites (Jessop, 2004, pp. 162–6, 2005b, pp. 144–5, 2010, pp. 338–46; 
Sum, 2005, pp. 6–7; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1157–60; Sum and Jessop, 
2013, pp. 49–51, 165–86). The selection, retention, and reproduction of political and 
economic policies and practices are influenced by discursive and material mechanisms. 
‘Material’ aspects include structural mechanisms (e.g. policy networks, transfer 
mechanisms), technologies or instruments of power (e.g. policy or decision-making 
techniques), and individual and collective agents (Sum, 2005, pp. 1–2; Jessop, 2008, p. 
51, 2010, pp. 339–43; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 165–7, 214–7; Jessop and Sum, 2016, 
pp. 107–8). The strategic-relational approach considers aspects of both structure and 
agency. It examines the ways in which structures or systems privilege and reinforce 
certain actors, identities, interests, strategies, and actions over others (thus reproducing 
particular economic, political, or social orders). It also examines the ways in which 
individual and collective actors take account of this ‘differential privileging’ to 
                                                
24  Political and economic practices and policies are said to be shaped by discursive systems or 
‘imaginaries’ framing collective perceptions of the world, giving meaning to particular fields of action 
and relations, and privileging certain activities as objects of intervention and governance (Jessop, 2004, 
pp. 162–6, 2005b, p. 145, 2010, pp. 344–6; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1157–8; Sum and Jessop, 
2013, pp. 165–74).  
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strategically advance particular courses of action (Jessop, 2001, pp. 1223–4, 2005a, pp. 
48–51, 2008, pp. 38–47, 236; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 49–51, 183–4).  
In these ways, CPE provides a means of understanding “patterns of distribution 
and inequality, and the power relations that sustain and constrain them” (Best and 
Paterson, 2010, p. 22). It considers intersecting discursive and material aspects of 
disadvantage and oppression (p. 189). A strategic-relational approach informs analysis 
of the reproduction or transformation of relations of power, domination, and inequality. 
It draws attention to: 1) patterns and processes of domination, oppression, and exclusion 
associated with particular discourses and material practices; 2) actors and institutions 
legitimising, operationalising, sustaining, and reproducing these patterns and processes; 
and 3) ways in which discourses, practices, and institutions, and associated power 
relations, are directly or indirectly resisted, challenged, and changed (Jessop and Sum, 
2001, p. 96, 2016, pp. 107–8, Jessop, 2005b, p. 161, 2008, pp. 157–8; Sum, 2005, pp. 
21–3; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 172, 189). 
CPE provides a useful framework for analysing education and peacebuilding, 
representing a “holistic approach to exploring and addressing inequalities in education 
in conflict-affected contexts… in multiple economic, cultural and political dimensions” 
(Novelli, 2016, p. 848). Robertson and Dale (2015, p. 154) propose a ‘critical cultural 
political economy of education’ (CCPE) exploring “ways in which the cultural, political 
and economic… work on, in, and through” education structures, institutions, and 
practices. CCPE is broadly guided by four ‘education questions’ (Dale, 2005, p. 141, 
2006, p. 190, Robertson and Dale, 2008, p. 26, 2015, pp. 155–7; Dale and Robertson, 
2009, p. 1120), exploring different aspects of education systems: 1) education practice 
and the distribution and circumstances of educational experiences (Who is taught what, 
how, by whom, where, and when? For what purposes and with what justifications? 
Under what circumstances and conditions, and with what results?), 2) education 
outcomes and consequences of educational practices, policies, and politics (What are the 
individual, private, public, collective, and community outcomes of ‘education’?), 3) 
education politics and relations between policy and practice (How, by whom, and at 
what scale, are aspects of practice problematised, determined, governed, administered, 
and managed?), and 4) politics of education and relations with political, economic, and 
cultural structures and ‘rules’ (In whose interests are practices and politics carried out? 
What is the scope of ‘education’? What are its relations with other sectors, scalar units, 
and national society?).  
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A critical approach to analysis moves beyond ‘actual’ practice, outcomes, and 
politics to focus on the ‘real’ politics of education (Dale, 2005, p. 139). CCPE considers 
complex dynamics of power and agency and the influence of broader projects and 
processes shaping educational strategies, policies, and programmes (Robertson and 
Dale, 2015, pp. 157–9). It provides a framework for examining the discursive and 
material aspects of relationships between education, inequality, and peacebuilding, with 
a focus on sociocultural relations, experiences, and practices, economic relations of 
production, distribution, and exchange, and political agendas and governance (Novelli, 
Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, p. 8). 
 
4.5 Considering Scales of Analysis 
CPE explores the ways in which political and economic ideas, systems, and 
activities are ‘operationalised’ and reproduced across different sites and scales, and 
considers interactions between different sites and scales of action (Jessop, 2004, pp. 
162–6, 2005b, pp. 145–52, 2010, pp. 344–6; Sum, 2005, p. 9; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 
2008, pp. 1157–9). The importance of examining roles, relationships, interests, and 
power between and within global, international, regional, state, and ‘local’ (e.g. 
community, household) levels is emphasised in critical literature on peacebuilding 
(Manning, 2003; Richmond, 2006a, 2009a, 2010b, 2013; Hameiri, 2011; Mac Ginty, 
2011a; Sending, 2011; Zaum, 2012; Heathershaw, 2013; Paffenholz, 2015) and 
education (Dale, 2005; Robertson and Dale, 2006, 2008; Mundy, 2007; Rappleye and 
Paulson, 2007; Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Dale and 
Robertson, 2009; Moutsios, 2010; Robertson, 2011; Knutsson and Lindberg, 2012).  
Scales involve physical and social dimensions. I consider aspects of 
geographical, territorial, or spatial place or location as well as sociocultural, political, 
and economic arrangements, networks, interactions, and activities, and the relations 
between these dimensions (Massey, 1993, p. 67; Agnew, 1994, pp. 55, 71–7; Cox, 
1998b, pp. 2–3; Brenner, 1999, pp. 40–1; Marston, 2000, pp. 220–1; Brenner, 2001, p. 
599; Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 26; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, pp. 393–5). Education 
systems, for example, are ‘physically’ organised according to geographic location and 
administrative levels. At the same time, these spaces and scales intersect with wider 
patterns of social identities and relationships and aspects of governance (Bray and 
Thomas, 1995, pp. 474–5; Noyes, 2013, p. 112). I consider vertical or hierarchical 
dimensions of scale (different activities taking place at different scales, from local to 
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global, in the same place) and horizontal or spatial dimensions (similar activities taking 
place at similar scales in different places) (Collinge, 2005, pp. 189–90; Jessop and 
Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1159; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, p. 393). I also consider 
actors operating across multiple spatial scales (Jessop, 2008, p. 46), and differences, 
tensions, and conflicts within scales (Massey, 1993, p. 69; Sum, 2005, pp. 10–2). While 
separating ‘local’, ‘national’, and ‘international’ or ‘global’ actors, contexts, and 
influences for analytical purposes, I do not assume a clear divide between them. Rather 
than viewing scales as fixed, bounded, and mutually exclusive, I consider scales in a 
relative sense, with attention to their interrelations, interconnections, fluidity, and 
flexibility (Massey, 1993, p. 68; Agnew, 1994, pp. 66–7; Cox, 1998a, pp. 41–2; 
Brenner, 1999, p. 53, 2001, pp. 605–6; McDowell, 2001, p. 230; Swyngedouw, 2004, 
pp. 34–5; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, pp. 393–5).  
Questions of scale are associated with relations of power, advantage, 
representation, domination, and subordination (Massey, 1993, p. 67; Robertson, 2006, 
p. 313; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 425). Scalar analysis requires attention to 
different centres of power and opportunities for representation, decision-making, and 
action and the ways in which arrangements privilege certain interests and opportunities 
(Massey, 1993, pp. 62–3; Cox, 1998a, pp. 43–4, 1998b, pp. 15–6; K. T. Jones, 1998, p. 
28). Analysis of inequalities and structural violence also requires attention to the ways 
in which these “extend from the household to the global” (Tickner, 1997, p. 626). I 
consider the ways in which scalar aspects and relations are reproduced, negotiated, and 
contested (Brenner, 2001, pp. 605–6; McDowell, 2001, p. 230), within particular socio-
political, geographical, and historical contexts (K. T. Jones, 1998, p. 28; Jessop, 
Brenner and Jones, 2008, p. 395) and in “multiple, mundane domains” of ‘everyday’ 
practices (Ferguson, 2006, pp. 110–1). This involves movement of actors, resources, 
and information across different scales, and shifting relations of power within and 
between scales (Cox, 1998b, pp. 2–17; K. T. Jones, 1998, p. 27; Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 
70, 2004, pp. 26–35). I consider ‘downward’ shifts in power to ‘local’ actors and 
institutions and ‘upward’ shifts to inter- or supranational organisations and institutions 
(Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 70). This does not assume an erosion of the state as a pivotal 
site and agent of power and activity; rather, it reflects a relative understanding of the 
influence of national, subnational, and supranational scales (Brenner, 1999, pp. 52–3; 
Swyngedouw, 2000, pp. 68–9). 
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter outlines elements of the broad theoretical framework guiding this 
research. A critical theoretical perspective informs analysis of existing orders of power 
and inequality in education institutions, policies, and practices. I draw on feminist and 
post-colonial perspectives to inform a more comprehensive analysis of multiple 
dimensions and systems of power, inequality, and domination. Critical cultural political 
economy, informed by a critical realist ontological perspective, provides a framework 
for examining interrelated cultural, political, and economic factors informing the 
selection, implementation, and reproduction of discourses and strategies in education 
contexts, at multiple scales, and their implications for violence and peacebuilding. A 
theoretical framework drawing on critical cultural political economy and critical realism 
provided a means of interpreting ‘real’ structures (underlying ‘causal’ factors) shaping 
policy decisions and processes, roles and relations between actors (and associated 
power and opportunities), and subjective perceptions and experiences. The role of this 
theoretical material is briefly discussed in each empirical chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter, I outline the methodology and methods used in this thesis. This 
qualitative research integrates case study and critical discourse analysis approaches to 
gain insight into cultural, political, and economic dimensions of education, inequality, 
and peacebuilding at ‘local’, national, and international scales. First, I describe the 
methodological approach, including the case study approach and critical discourse 
analysis. I then describe specific data collection and analysis methods as well as 
research participants and sites. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on ethical 
considerations central to the research process. 
 
5.2 A Case Study of Peacebuilding and Education in South Sudan 
This research is based on a qualitative case study approach examining the 
relationship between education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South Sudan and using 
these findings to inform broader contributions to the critical peacebuilding literature. 
Case studies involve rich, detailed, in-depth exploration, description, and analysis of 
particular issues within a ‘bounded’ setting or context (Creswell, 2007, pp. 73–6; 
Gerring, 2007, p. 49), such as a particular system, institution, or country (Collier, 1999, 
pp. 4–5; Gerring, 2007, p. 19; Klotz, 2008, p. 43; Simons, 2009, pp. 3–4, 2014, p. 457). 
They involve analysis and interpretation of subjective experiences, perceptions, and 
meanings, examining multiple perspectives to gain insight into the complexity of a 
particular ‘case’ (Gerring, 2007, pp. 70–1; Simons, 2009, p. 4, 2014, p. 461). Case 
studies examine places, groups, activities, events, relationships, interactions, and 
experiences within particular political, economic, social, cultural, historical contexts 
(Yin, 2003, p. 13; Stake, 2005, pp. 444–54; Simons, 2014, pp. 455–7) and are useful in 
exploring dynamics and processes of change (Simons, 2009, p. 23). 
Case studies are useful when examining complex phenomena (e.g. violent 
conflict, peacebuilding), involving interactions “among large numbers of actors across 
multiple levels of analysis” (Bennett and Elman, 2007, p. 171). Vavrus and Bartlett 
(2006, p. 95) outline a ‘vertical case study’ approach “comparing knowledge claims 
among actors with different social locations… to situate local action and interpretation 
within a broader cultural, historical, and political investigation”. This multilevel 
approach examines interactions between local, national, international, and global scales, 
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and enables “grounded, particularized analysis linked with larger, even global, 
economic and political frameworks” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 501). It considers processes, 
interactions, and interpretations among different ‘stakeholder’ groups involved in a 
particular policy or institution (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006, pp. 96–9). The ‘case’ can be 
understood as a field of difference and contestation emerging “from the ways in which 
individuals and groups articulate… different needs, desires and interests – how they join 
forces [or] struggle against each other” (Schostak, 2005, pp. 44–5).  
Understanding dynamics of inequality and structural violence requires attention 
to interactions between scales of analysis, between the ‘personal’ and ‘international’, 
between people’s experiences and international politics (Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501; 
Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636). I explore broad policy discourses and political and 
economic processes as well as personal experiences, perceptions, meanings, and 
emotions. War and peacebuilding “cannot be fully apprehended unless… studied up 
from people’s physical, emotional, and social experiences, not only down from ‘high 
politics’ places that sweep blood, tears, and laughter away, or assign those things to 
some other field” (Sylvester, 2013, p. 2). This involves attention to “physical and 
emotional connections with war that people live – with their bodies and their minds and 
as social creatures in specific circumstances” (p. 5). I understand conflict and 
peacebuilding “as not only caused and practiced, but lived and experienced” (Sjoberg, 
2013, pp. 593–4), examining social, political, and historical dimensions and 
implications of individual and collective experiences, emotions, perceptions, and 
interpretations of the politics of conflict and peacebuilding (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 798, 
2013, pp. 270–4, Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501, 2013, pp. 2–5; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–
6, 593–636; Ahmed, 2014, pp. 9–28).  
The ‘vertical case study’ approach enables analysis of “what ‘ought to be’ based 
on policy pronouncements and… what ‘is happening’ as recounted by local actors” 
(Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006, p. 98). However, I do not aim to present the policy 
narratives as ‘ideal’ with gaps between policy and practice illustrating (or responsible 
for) the ‘failure’ of peacebuilding. Rather, I am interested in understanding the ways in 
which policy discourses frame the relationship between education and peacebuilding 
and the ways in which these claims are challenged and undermined by ‘actual’ 
education practices, experiences, and perceptions. Data collection methods provide 
opportunities to examine differences, tensions, and similarities between ‘official’ policy 
discourses and practices, as well as different perspectives and interpretations (e.g. 
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development actors and ‘local’ communities) regarding interventions (de Sardan, 2005, 
p. 4). I explore the gaps between policy and practice, as well as “the broader political 
significance of interventions” (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 5). 
Case studies draw on multiple sources of information or evidence (Yin, 2003, 
pp. 85–97; Creswell, 2007, pp. 73–6; Simons, 2014, p. 461). I draw on a range of data 
sources, including policy and strategy document analysis, interviews and group 
discussions with education and peacebuilding stakeholders, and some observation of 
ministry, school, and donor contexts. These methods and sources provide insight to 
different perspectives and experiences and connections and divergences across sources 
(Barakat et al., 2002, pp. 995–8). I conducted primary research over 10 months, from 
November 2014 to August 2015. I conducted this thesis work concurrently with data 
collection for a study commissioned by UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Africa 
Regional Office, which focused on education sector governance, inequality, conflict, 
and peacebuilding in South Sudan.25 This involvement with UNICEF enabled access to 
documents (e.g. letter of invitation) necessary to obtain an entry visa for South Sudan as 
well as registration with the national Directorate of Immigration and subsequent visa 
renewals. This also facilitated access to research sites, contacts with key government 
and donor stakeholders, and access to security resources during the fieldwork period, 
including UNMISS security training and updates. 
Critical realist analyses of ‘causal’ factors emerge through detailed examination 
of particular events, processes, and experiences, which are shaped by specific structural 
and contextual factors. Case studies necessarily involve detailed exploration of events, 
processes, and experiences within a particular case or place, and enable contextualised 
analysis of underlying structures shaping political, economic, and sociocultural 
relations, roles, power, and resources (as described in Chapter 4). Data collection 
methods such as interviews and group discussions enable the ‘observation’ of empirical 
experiences and forms of agency at multiple levels and sites within the education 
system, while policy analyses as well as interviews/discussions provide insights into 
                                                
25 This thesis and the research report prepared for UNICEF ESARO draw on the same set of interview 
and focus group data. During the data collection process, I informed participants (through information 
sheets and verbal explanations) that the data would be used for these two projects. Some similar themes 
concerning the relationship between education governance, inequality, violent conflict, and peacebuilding 
are discussed in both this thesis and the UNICEF report. However, in contrast to the UNICEF report 
(intended to inform UNICEF policies and strategies), the findings in the thesis are analysed in 
significantly greater detail and through a different (theoretical) framework, and are located in the context 
of wider, academic peacebuilding debates.  
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‘actual’ policy and practice-related decisions, processes, and ‘events’. The use of these 
multiple data collection methods supports ‘causal’ analysis based on multiple 
perspectives or interpretations of underlying ‘reality’, as well as insights into various 
types of structures shaping particular events and experiences. A case study approach 
also facilitates CPE analysis, enabling the tracing of discourses (on education, 
peacebuilding, and inequality) vertically and horizontally, supporting analysis of the 
ways in which these discourses are understood, operationalised, reproduced, or 
contested across different scales and sites. Interview, group discussions, observation, 
and policy analysis methods provide access to perspectives and experiences on ‘actual’ 
education practice, outcomes, and politics, which inform the interpretation of ‘real’ 
underlying ‘politics of education’.   
 
5.3 Policy Document Review and Discourse Analysis 
I draw on a critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to examine narratives of 
peacebuilding, education, and inequality reflected in government and donor policy and 
strategy documents and interview data. ‘Discourses’ refer to “the language associated 
with a particular social field or practice” (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 179–80). They involve 
particular representations and interpretations of the world, ways of acting and 
interacting, and identities or ways of being, reflected in written, spoken, and visual 
‘texts’ (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 269–86, 1995, p. 135, 2004, p. 121, 2005, pp. 924–5, 
2013, pp. 179–80; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010, pp. 1214–5). These include 
official texts (e.g. policy documents, curricula, textbooks, administrative 
announcements) and aspects of speech, writing, and interaction (e.g. meetings, 
interviews) (Luke, 1995, p. 28; Rogers et al., 2005, pp. 378–83). These discourses 
involve specific framings or definitions of problems, situations, and solutions (Gasper, 
1996, pp. 37–9; Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, pp. 6–9; Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p. 3). 
Discourses shape and are shaped by social relations, practices, and changes 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 269, 1995, pp. 132–3, 1995, p. 230, 2004, pp. 123–4, 2005, p. 
924; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010, pp. 1214–5). Critical analysis aims “to make 
clear social determinants and effects of discourse” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 28), examining 
how it is implicated in political, economic, social, and cultural formations (Rogers et 
al., 2005, p. 369). Education institutions and practices are sites of discursive power, 
mediating and transmitting discourses within and outside education settings 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 220; Luke, 1995, pp. 10–1, 27–8). These discourses serve 
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particular political and material interests, articulating, reproducing, and sustaining 
relations of power, privilege, and material and symbolic distribution (van Dijk, 1993, 
pp. 249–55; Fairclough, 1995, pp. 219–20; Luke, 1995, pp. 12–20; Janks, 1997, pp. 
329–40; Rogers et al., 2005, pp. 367–83). Discourse analysis draws attention to the 
ways in which language and interpretations, representations, values, and meanings serve 
as forms of power and regulation (Mudimbe, 1988, pp. 29–33, 57–105; Hall, 1997a, pp. 
1–5). I consider relations of power, domination, and inequality influencing particular 
discourses, and the role of discourses in producing and consolidating (or destabilising 
and transforming) systems of power, domination, and inequality (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 
1–4, 30–5, 1992, pp. 270–1, 2004, p. 125; van Dijk, 1993, pp. 250–2; Luke, 1995, pp. 
12–3; Rogers et al., 2005, pp. 376–84; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010, p. 1215). As 
Loomba (2005, p. 45) explains, 
Discourse analysis… makes it possible to trace connections between the visible 
and the hidden, the dominant and the marginalised, ideas and institutions. It 
allows us to see how power works through language, literature, culture and the 
institutions which regulate our daily lives.  
CDA examines the ways in which discourses are: 1) articulated and become 
dominant in particular contexts; 2) disseminated, recontextualised, and interpreted 
across structural, scalar, and institutional boundaries; and 3) ‘operationalised’ (in ways 
of being, acting, and interacting) and ‘materialised’ (in physical spaces or resource 
distribution) (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 109–66, 1995, pp. 97–8, 2005, pp. 932–4, 2013, pp. 
182–3; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010, pp. 1215–6). This involves micro-level 
analysis of ‘texts’ and macro-level analysis of their contexts (Fairclough, 1989, p. 25, 
2013, p. 178; Luke, 2002, p. 100). CDA examines relationships between texts, including 
differences or similarities in how they articulate particular discourses (Fairclough, 1992, 
pp. 270–2, 2005, p. 920) as well as “gaps or inconsistencies between the ‘saying’ of 
policy documents and the ‘doing’ of practice” (Stepputat, 2012, p. 442). These have 
important implications for the reproduction of forms of inequality and violence 
operating within and through education contexts. 
Policy and strategy document analysis provides insight into dominant 
peacebuilding and education discourses in South Sudan, including priorities, objectives, 
and approaches articulated by national and international actors. I reviewed policy and 
strategy documents developed by national government bodies (and supported by 
international donors and organisations), including peacebuilding and development 
strategies, education sector policies and plans, and programme and curriculum 
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frameworks. I also reviewed strategic plans developed by bilateral and multilateral 
education donors and development agencies (e.g. UNICEF, DFID, USAID) as well as 
other relevant institutional or organisational policy documents addressing peacebuilding 
and education issues. These provided a basis for examining (dis)connections between 
policy discourses and practice and guided the development of interview questions. 
 
5.4 Data Collection Approaches 
The critical literature on peacebuilding (Cooper, 2007; Richmond, 2007a, 2008a, 
2009a; Lidén, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2009; Newman, 2011; Sending, 2011; Mac 
Ginty, 2012; Millar, van der Lijn and Verkoren, 2013; Sabaratnam, 2013, 2017; 
Paffenholz, 2015) and education (Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 
2008; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013) emphasises the importance of examining the 
perspectives of actors involved in and targeted by policies and interventions. This 
involves attention to the ‘lifeworlds’, experiences, interpretations, and responses of 
intended recipients of peacebuilding interventions (Sabaratnam, 2011a, pp. 797–9, 
2013, pp. 270–4). Interviews and discussions provide insight into people’s 
“understandings of the nature and functions of intervention”, with responses 
representing “expressions of political consciousness” of historical and contemporary 
dimensions and conditions of intervention (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 44). 
I conducted individual interviews and group discussions with 217 participants in 
South Sudan (see Table 5.1). At the national level, I interviewed officials from MoEST 
directorates in Juba and from the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MoCYS), 
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW), and SSPRC. I also 
interviewed representatives of international and national education and peacebuilding 
organisations in Juba, including donors, development agencies, NGOs, and civil society 
organisations (CSOs). I used semi-structured interviews, with open-ended questions, 
enabling participants to determine answers based on their own experiences, 
perspectives, interpretations, and level of comfort. Interviews involved active 
interaction and in-depth dialogue and provided opportunities to follow up on points 
identified by participants as well as other issues relevant to the research topic (Mason, 
2002, pp. 205–6; Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 109; Mertens, 2010, pp. 370–3; Creswell, 
2012, p. 218; Brinkmann, 2013, pp. 21–5, 2014, pp. 286–8).  
At the subnational level, I interviewed state-level MoEST, MoCYS, MoGCSW, 
and SSPRC officials, county and payam education officials, and primary and secondary 
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school managers in seven research sites. I conducted group discussions with one group 
of county officials and one group of payam officials. I also interviewed representatives 
of national and international education and peacebuilding organisations at state and 
county levels. I conducted focus group discussions with members of youth 
organisations, primary and secondary school teachers, PTA members, and students. 
Group discussions provided insight into both collective and individual perspectives and 
experiences, including commonalities and differences. I could observe interactions and 
dynamics between participants, including the ways in which they discussed issues of 
interest. Participants could also assume greater control over the discussion. Group 
discussions allow a large amount of data to be collected in a short period of time, 
particularly for participants facing time constraints (such as teachers or students) 
(Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 109; Mertens, 2010, pp. 240, 370; Creswell, 2012, p. 218; 
Brinkmann, 2013, p. 26, 2014, p. 289; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2014, pp. 324–8). 
Table 5.1. Summary of research participants 
Participants Female Male Total 
Central MoEST officials 3 14 17 
Other government ministry officials 4 7 11 
State-level MoEST officials 5 11 16 
County-level education officials 0 10 10 
Payam-level education officials 1 4 5 
School managers (headmasters, principals) 2 7 9 
Teachers, union representatives, and PTA members 23 30 53 
Students and youth representatives 25 27 52 
Education partner representatives (international, 
national, and subnational agencies and organisations) 8 20 28 
Civil society representatives 3 3 6 
Peacebuilding actors (national and subnational) 2 8 10 
Total 76 141 217 
 
Interviews and discussions were guided by a series of open-ended questions (see 
Appendix 2 for interview guides and transcript excerpts). This enabled some 
consistency across interviews and discussions, and flexibility in responding to emerging 
issues. I adapted questions based on initial interview experiences and participants’ area 
of focus (e.g. budgeting, alternative education, peacebuilding). I used follow-up 
questions to explore specific topics and elicit additional information (e.g. ‘Could you 
please tell me more about that?’ ‘Why do you think that is the case?’). When requested, 
I provided participants with a copy of the questions prior to our interview, to allow them 
to familiarise themselves with the topics. Interviews and group discussions lasted 
between 45 and 90 minutes. I asked participants to choose the location and time, to 
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respect confidentiality and avoid disrupting administrative or teaching responsibilities. 
All ministry officials chose to be interviewed in their offices. Interviews with school 
managers, teachers, and students were conducted at the school, either in the head 
teacher’s office or an empty classroom. Interviews with organisation representatives 
were held in their offices or at local restaurants identified by participants.  
Although English is the official language in teaching and education management 
in South Sudan, language differences affected engagement with participants in some 
research sites. This varied across geographic regions. For example, in Central and 
Western Equatoria I was able to conduct all interviews in English, while in Upper Nile 
and Warrap discussions with some teachers and students were facilitated in Arabic or 
Dinka with the help of a translator. While translators enable access to a wider range of 
participants, they also influence the nature of the data collected (Hermann, 2001, p. 83; 
Barakat et al., 2002, p. 993). Data might reflect translators’ interpretations of questions 
and responses, or translators might try to ‘help’ participants answer questions 
(Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 97). Translators also gain access to sensitive 
information about participants (Zwi et al., 2006, p. 267). I tried to mitigate these 
challenges by clearly explaining the aim of the research, emphasising the importance of 
confidentiality, and observing participants’ body language when responding to 
questions. Interviews with all government officials were in English. 
During discussions with students, I distributed paper and coloured pencils and 
asked them to draw pictures representing their ideas or understandings of peace, 
violence, and (in)equality (see Figures 5.1 to 5.3 for examples). Arts-based research 
approaches represent alternative, and engaging, forms of expression or communication. 
For young people, drawing can provide a means of organising, interpreting, and 
communicating experiences, perceptions, and feelings. It gives them more control over 
data collection processes and enables them to share a large amount of information in a 
short time (Hart and Tyrer, 2006, pp. 31–2; Fargas-Malet et al., 2010, p. 183; Farokhi 
and Hashemi, 2011, pp. 2219–23; Chilton and Leavy, 2014, p. 403). The use of arts-
based methods can mitigate risks associated with sensitive research topics, allowing 
students to determine the focus of their drawings and express as much or as little as they 
wish. I was unable to use this approach with all groups of students due to time 
constraints during some discussions, but it appeared to be well received by participating 
students. They were very focused on the activity, paying close attention to the 
presentation of their drawings (erasing mistakes or redoing their drawing if they were 
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unhappy with the first version). I noted that students who were hesitant to engage in 
verbal discussions appeared more comfortable and engaged when using drawing 
materials. Some provided written descriptions or notes on their drawings to illustrate 
key points. 
Figure 5.1 Drawing by a female student 
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Figure 5.2 Writing by a female student 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Drawing by a male student  
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Involvement with UNICEF enabled me to attend national and subnational 
meetings and workshops organised by the MoEST, UNICEF, and other international 
organisations, as well as education partner working group meetings. Working within 
UNICEF offices in Juba and field sites allowed me to observe daily interactions, 
discussions, and activities. I was able to hear the ways in which different stakeholders 
discussed conflict and education ‘problems’ and solutions and to observe interactions 
between different actors (e.g. governmental and non-governmental, ‘national’ and 
international). I also conducted observation during visits to central and state MoEST 
offices. I made repeated visits to introduce the research project and schedule and 
conduct interviews, and spent significant time in national and subnational MoEST 
offices, waiting to meet with various ministry officials or waiting for UNICEF transport 
(in Upper Nile, where I was unable to take public transport or walk due to security 
concerns). This provided opportunities to observe physical spaces, settings (including 
‘visible’ distribution of resources across different sites, directorates, or departments), 
and interactions. This also provided opportunities for conversation with ministry 
officials, during which I would usually be offered a cup of tea. During these informal 
conversations, officials were generally more open in sharing their opinions on education 
policies, conflict and peacebuilding, and relationships between the MoEST and donors 
and between different MoEST offices. I made repeated visits to schools, although I 
limited school and classroom observation to avoid disrupting school routines.  
Observational approaches shifted across sites and activities, involving elements 
of participant and non-participant observation. During meetings and workshops, for 
example, I was involved in activities in the setting being observed, while visits to 
ministry and school settings involved more passive observation. These forms of 
observation provided insight into patterns of activity and interaction, physical settings 
or spaces, and organisation of people, communication, and relationships (formal and 
informal, verbal and non-verbal) (Sánchez-Jankowski, 2002, p. 148; Angrosino, 2005, 
p. 741; Mertens, 2010, pp. 367–9; Creswell, 2012, pp. 214–6).  
 
5.5 Engaging Research Participants 
When identifying participants, I purposefully approached individuals who could 
help to develop a detailed understanding of the research topic. To represent as many 
  
88 
perspectives as possible, I tried to engage participants from a range of different settings 
(geographic sites) and different roles or position within the education system (e.g. 
central and subnational government officials, international and national organisations, 
school managers, teachers, students). Within these broad categories, participation was 
often based on convenience or availability of individuals (e.g. teachers, students). I 
asked participants suggested other people to contact based on their knowledge of the 
study topic. The sampling process was ongoing, occurring before and during data 
collection and adapted to opportunities and constraints in different research sites. 
Before beginning data collection, I obtained a letter of approval from South 
Sudan’s central MoEST (see Appendix 3). I obtained permission to access subnational 
education sites and schools at multiple levels: from state ministries, county and payam 
offices, and school managers. UNICEF facilitated contact with key central MoEST 
officials (e.g. Undersecretary, Peacebuilding Reference Committee) and state ministry 
officials (e.g. Ministers, Directors General, DGs). Following these initial introductions, 
I independently scheduled meetings to further explain the research, conduct interviews, 
and obtain introductions to or contact information for other officials. These 
‘independent’ meetings helped to establish (to the greatest extent possible) my thesis 
research as separate from UNICEF. In each site, I contacted (by telephone or in person) 
MoEST officials from as many directorates or departments (e.g. general education, 
planning and budgeting, AES) and administrative levels (e.g. DGs, state inspectors, 
county directors, payam supervisors) as possible. I invited them to participate in an 
interview or to recommend another representative. For international and national 
organisations, I contacted (by email or telephone) the heads of education and 
peacebuilding programmes or executive directors or chairpersons of CSOs. I invited 
them to participate in an interview or to recommend another representative.  
To engage teachers and students in the research, I asked school managers to 
extend a general invitation to participate in a focus group discussion. I attempted to 
involve equal numbers of women/girls and men/boys in teacher and student discussions. 
In some cases this was not possible, such as in schools with few or no female teachers. 
In most schools, student participants were members of peace clubs or student 
governments. While this presented some potential for bias, due to their familiarity with 
UNICEF’s ‘peacebuilding’ language, they were also more likely to feel comfortable 
expressing themselves in English. I followed school protocols for student research 
participation, with school managers (considered responsible for students in school 
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contexts) serving as ‘gatekeepers’.  
Identifying research participants “necessarily involves… political and ethical 
choices about which voices are heard” (Goodhand, 2000, p. 12). I did not aim to engage 
a fully ‘representative’ sample; rather I was interested in “[revealing] different and 
competing ideas” (Ackerly, 2008, p. 34). When approaching potential participants, I 
tried to represent as wide a variety of perspectives as possible. The diversity of 
experiences and perspectives across and within communities in South Sudan influences 
responses provided by research participants. Perceptions, experiences, and expectations 
of education services and peacebuilding processes differ widely between ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, geographic, or livelihood communities, as well as between people 
who have returned from East Africa, Sudan, North America, or Europe, and those who 
remained in South Sudan prior to the CPA and independence. However, access to such 
diverse perspectives strengthens the findings of the study.  
 
5.6 Data Analysis and Review 
Before beginning interviews, I asked participants if they consented to the 
conversation being audio-recorded. For those who provided explicit consent, interviews 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim. During unrecorded interviews and group 
discussions, I took handwritten notes. Following a ‘template coding’ approach, I 
identified initial codes and themes through the analysis of a sample of data, and used 
these to organise the remaining data for more in-depth analysis. Analysis of transcripts 
and notes involved reading through the data to identify and reflect on general ideas and 
gaps, coding (labelling and categorising) the data, and identifying broad themes and 
patterns, with attention to expected, unexpected, and contradictory findings (Mertens, 
2010, pp. 424–8; Creswell, 2012, pp. 237–52, 2014, pp. 197–200; Saldaña, 2014, pp. 
583–8). I began analysis while data was being collected, moving back and forth 
between data collection and analysis. I took note of patterns of experiences, 
understandings, and explanations shared by different participants (Quinn, 2005, p. 43) 
and of ‘unique’ statements, considered part of “an ongoing dialogue with… other 
interview subjects” (Ackerly, 2008, p. 36). In addition to formal coding and 
categorising, the analysis process involved deriving meaning and insights by rereading 
transcripts and ‘puzzling’ over statements and observations (Simons, 2009, pp. 117–8). 
I drew on different strategies to verify the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of 
data and interpretations. I examined consistency and variations in data from different 
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sources and methods, but did not discount ‘inconsistent’ findings. Examining 
difference, contradiction, and complexity is central to avoiding the ‘appropriation’ of 
participants’ experiences to meet researchers’ interests (Opie, 1992, pp. 52–60). 
Competing and contradictory narratives provide insight into explanations, interests, 
understandings, and incentives of different actors (Perera, 2017, pp. 42–4). “Information 
which is messy and difficult to triangulate can itself be a valuable source of… 
knowledge” and is critical to understanding dynamics of conflict (p. 42). I discussed 
emerging findings with participants and colleagues in South Sudan, to assess the 
accuracy, fairness, and nuance of interpretations and representations. The length of the 
research period provided opportunities for sustained conversations about data and 
interpretations with national and subnational UNICEF and MoEST representatives as 
well as the Director of the University of Juba’s Centre for Peace and Development 
Studies (CPDS, a partner for the UNICEF study). This provided opportunities to 
critique and refine interpretations and examine similarities and differences in 
perspectives and interpretations.  
I presented preliminary research findings during two national workshops in 
August 2015, organised as part of the UNICEF-commissioned study. Government and 
partner representatives (MoEST, SSPRC, UNICEF, UNDP, DFID, and others) provided 
feedback during a workshop organised in collaboration with UNICEF and the MoEST. 
Civil society and university (faculty and student) representatives provided feedback 
during a workshop held at the University of Juba, organised in collaboration with the 
CPDS. While these workshops focused on findings emerging from the UNICEF study, 
some of the same key points are addressed in this thesis. These discussions provided 
opportunities to explore different perspectives, interpretations, and recommendations 
concerning inequality, violence, and peacebuilding in education contexts. 
It was not always possible to verify the ‘truthfulness’ of statements shared 
during interviews and discussions: “What is most important is that these statements and 
opinions reflect local perceptions of situations… these perceptions are reality” 
(Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 97). My research approach involves taking experience 
and perception seriously as elements of knowledge (Jacoby, 2006, p. 161). In the 
following chapters, I share numerous participant quotations, centering “people’s ideas, 
thoughts, and memories in their own words” (Jacoby, 2006, p. 161). However, I 
acknowledge the ways in which data analysis is “an exercise of power, of delimiting 
boundaries, of appreciating relationships” (Ackerly, 2008, p. 36). I integrate 
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participants’ words with my own insights and analyses: knowledge is “actively created 
through questions and answers… coauthored by interviewer and interviewee” 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p. 63). I attempt to represent the complexity of views 
(including similarities and tensions) emerging from the data, but acknowledge that 
certain views, understandings, and interpretations are excluded in analysis and writing 
(Schostak, 2005, p. 84).  
 
5.7 Research Sites 
I collected data in seven sites in five states in South Sudan: Juba in Central 
Equatoria state (CES), Yambio in Western Equatoria (WES), Wau in Western Bahr el 
Ghazal (WBG), Kuajok and Tonj East in Warrap, and Malakal and Wau Shilluk in 
Upper Nile (UNS) (see Figure 5.4). I selected sites representing, to the greatest extent 
possible, different geographic, demographic, and conflict contexts. These sites are 
characterised by significant differences in socioeconomic, demographic, conflict, and 
education conditions (see Table 5.2), representing different geographic contexts (e.g. 
northern and southern states, urban and rural communities, distance from Juba), 
demographic factors (e.g. diverse ethno-cultural and linguistic groups, population 
displacement), and contemporary and historical conflict dynamics. However, in 
conflict-affected contexts, site selection is determined “by what is practically possible 
(in terms of access and security)” (Barakat et al., 2002, p. 992), and site selection and 
follow-up visits were affected by on-going violence. I identified specific research sites 
with guidance from UNICEF, based on security assessments as well as transport 
options. Certain sites, such as Malakal and Wau Shilluk, were accessible only by UN 
transportation (e.g. World Food Programme Humanitarian Air Service, UNICEF boat), 
and all travel was dependent on formal approval from UNICEF and the UNMISS 
Department of Safety and Security. I was able collect data in one state (Upper Nile) 
affected by on-going government-opposition violence, where I spoke with government 
and NGO representatives as well as members of displaced communities. The research 
sites are described in the following paragraphs.  
  
  
92 
!!!!!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!!
!!
!
!!!
!
!
!
! [
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Ju
ba
B
or
W
au
To
rit
Aw
ei
l
Ya
m
bi
o
R
um
be
k
K
w
aj
ok
B
en
tiu
M
al
ak
al J
on
gl
ei
La
ke
s
U
ni
ty
U
pp
er
 N
ile
W
ar
ra
p
W
es
te
rn
 E
qu
at
or
ia
Ea
st
er
n 
Eq
ua
to
ria
W
es
te
rn
 B
ah
r e
l G
ha
za
l
C
en
tr
al
 E
qu
at
or
ia
N
or
th
er
n 
B
ah
r e
l G
ha
za
l
R
ag
a
Pi
bo
r
W
au
Ju
ba
Lo
pa
U
ro
r
A
yo
d
W
ul
u
K
ap
oe
ta
 E
as
t
Ib
ba
Ez
o
Ye
i
B
al
ie
t
M
ab
an
D
uk
Ta
m
bu
ra
B
or
 S
ou
th
A
ko
bo
N
ag
er
o
M
el
ut
To
rit
M
ar
id
i
B
ud
i
Te
re
ke
ka
N
yi
ro
l
Pa
ria
ng
Ya
m
bi
o
R
en
k
Ju
r R
iv
er
N
za
ra
To
nj
 N
or
th
Fa
ng
ak
Po
ch
al
la
M
vo
lo
A
w
ei
l C
en
tr
e
Tw
ic
K
oc
h
U
la
ng
M
ag
w
i
G
ui
t
C
an
al
To
nj
 S
ou
th
M
an
yo
C
ue
ib
et
Lo
ng
oc
hu
k
Tw
ic
 E
as
t
A
w
ei
l E
as
t
Pa
ny
iji
ar
A
w
er
ia
l
M
ay
om
Yi
ro
l E
as
t
Ik
ot
os
A
w
ei
l N
or
th
La
in
ya
M
ai
w
ut
Pa
ny
ik
an
g
Yi
ro
l W
es
t
To
nj
 E
as
t
M
un
dr
i W
es
t
M
un
dr
i E
as
t
Fa
sh
od
a
K
ap
oe
ta
 N
or
th
R
ub
ko
na
G
og
ri
al
 E
as
t
Le
er
M
ay
en
di
t
R
um
be
k 
N
or
th
K
aj
o-
K
ej
i
A
w
ei
l W
es
t
Lu
ak
pi
ny
/N
as
ir
G
og
ri
al
 W
es
t
R
um
be
k 
E
as
t
R
um
be
k 
C
en
tr
e
A
bi
em
nh
om
M
or
ob
o
A
w
ei
l S
ou
th
M
al
ak
al
K
ap
oe
ta
 S
ou
th
Ab
ye
i
µ
U
G
A
N
D
A
Su
da
n
So
ut
h
Su
da
n
! [
C
ou
nt
ry
 C
ap
ita
l
!
S
ta
te
 C
ap
ita
ls
U
nd
et
er
m
in
ed
 b
ou
nd
ar
y*
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! ! !!
A
by
ei
 re
gi
on
**
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l B
ou
nd
ar
ie
s
S
ta
te
 B
ou
nd
ar
ie
s
C
ou
nt
y 
B
ou
nd
ar
ie
s
C
od
e:
 S
S-
00
02
D
at
e:
 1
6/
07
/1
2
IM
U
 O
C
H
A 
SS
0
10
0
20
0
50
Ki
lo
m
et
er
s
W
hi
te
 N
ile
Se
nn
ar
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f S
ou
th
 S
ud
an
 - 
C
ou
nt
ie
s
R
en
k
M
an
yo
* 
 F
in
al
 b
ou
nd
ar
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f S
ud
an
  
 a
nd
 t
he
 R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
So
ut
h 
Su
da
n 
ha
s 
no
t 
ye
t
   
 b
ee
n 
de
te
rm
in
ed
.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
**
 F
in
al
 s
ta
tu
s 
of
 A
by
ei
 a
re
a 
is
 n
ot
 y
et
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
.
K
EN
YA
ET
H
IO
PI
A
D
EM
O
C
R
AT
IC
R
EP
U
B
LI
C
 O
F 
C
O
N
G
O
C
EN
TR
A
L
A
FR
IC
A
N
R
EP
U
B
LI
C
SU
D
A
N
U
pp
er
 N
ile
Et
hi
op
ia
U
ga
nd
a
K
en
ya
D
R
C
C
A
R
Th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ow
n 
on
 th
is
 m
ap
 d
oe
s 
no
t i
m
pl
y 
of
fic
ia
l r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
or
 e
nd
or
se
m
en
t 
of
 a
ny
 p
hy
si
ca
l, 
po
lit
ic
al
 b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s 
or
 f
ea
tu
re
 n
am
es
 b
y 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
. 
U
N
 O
C
HA
 a
nd
 a
ffi
lia
te
d 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 a
re
 n
ot
 l
ia
bl
e 
fo
r 
da
m
ag
es
 o
f a
ny
 k
in
d 
re
la
te
d 
to
 t
he
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
da
ta
. U
se
rs
 n
ot
in
g 
er
ro
rs
 o
r 
om
is
si
on
s 
ar
e 
en
co
ur
ag
ed
 to
 c
on
ta
ct
 th
e 
IM
 U
ni
t, 
O
C
H
A
 a
t i
m
us
ou
th
@
un
.o
rg
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Fi
gu
re
 5
.4
 M
ap
 o
f S
ou
th
 S
ud
an
  
So
ur
ce
: O
C
H
A
, 2
01
2 
(h
ttp
://
re
lie
fw
eb
.in
t/s
te
s/
re
lie
fw
eb
.in
t/f
ile
s/
re
so
ur
ce
s/
Pa
ge
s%
20
fr
om
%
20
m
ap
_0
.p
df
) 
  
93 
Table 5.2. Socio-demographic and educational profiles for research sites 
State/county 
Ethnic 
majority 
# conflict 
events 
(2011-14) 
Education indicators (primary level, 
2013)26 
GER Gender parity 
index 
Student-teacher 
ratio 
Central 
Equatoria   57%  33 
Juba Bari 186  0.93 35 
Western 
Equatoria   62%  33 
Yambio Azande 5  0.85 33 
Western Bahr el 
Ghazal (WBG)   70%  41 
Wau Fertit, Jur-Chol 36  0.85 41 
Warrap   68%  52 
Gogrial West Dinka 15  0.46 36 
Tonj East Dinka 3  0.29 53 
Upper Nile   72%  66 
Malakal Shilluk 86  1.05 42 
Source: Adapted from Novelli et al., 2016, with data from MoEST, 2014a 
 
Table 5.3. Socio-demographic and educational profiles for research sites (continued)27 
State/county 
Pop’n 
density 
(person
/ km2) 
                                                                                                              
Poverty 
rate28 
%
pop’n 
in rural 
areas  
Agriculture 
as primary 
livelihood 
source29 
Paid
employ
-ment 
Literacy
rate 
(age 
15+)30 
Never
attended 
school  
(age 6+) 
Central 
Equatoria 26 44% 65% 58% 19% 44-55% 42% 
Juba 20 36%      
Western 
Equatoria 8 42% 84% 91% 6% 33-45% 52% 
Yambio 17 38%      
WBG 4 43% 57% 64% 21% 34-35% 62% 
Wau 8 41%      
Warrap 21 64% 91% 87% 4% 13-16% 87% 
Gogrial West 51 63%      
Tonj East 29 67%      
Upper Nile 12 26% 75% 59% 20% 28-45% 68% 
Malakal 171 12%      
Source: Adapted from Novelli et al., 2016, with data from NBS 2012a, 2012b; SSCCSE 2010a, 2010b 
                                                
26 Data obtained from South Sudan’s Education Management Information System (EMIS). While EMIS 
covered over 90% of known primary and secondary schools in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a), reliability is 
affected by conflict and insecurity impeding data collection and inflation of enrolment figures by school 
or administrative authorities (to obtain additional teachers and resources). 
27 Figures are for 2008-2009. Figures calculated based on census data are affected by under-estimation of 
2008 census data due to population return during the census period. For certain indicators (e.g. rural 
population, livelihood source, literacy rate), county-level figures were not available. 
28 Estimated percentage of the population in each county or state with per person consumption below the 
poverty line (72.9 Sudanese pounds in 2008) (NBS, 2012b). 
29 Crop farming or animal husbandry (breeding/raising livestock) (SSCCSE, 2010a; NBS, 2012a). 
30 Ranges reflect differences in reported literacy rates between SSCCSE reports (2010a, 2010b). 
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Central Equatoria: CES is home to the national capital, Juba, also the state 
capital. Counties have benefited to varying degrees from investment (e.g. infrastructure, 
economic development, services) in and around Juba (UNMIS, 2010b), and the greater 
Equatoria region serves as a corridor for importing goods to South Sudan/Juba from 
East African countries (Small Arms Survey, 2016a). In 2008, CES’s estimated 
population was 1.1 million, with the highest population density of all states (SSCCSE, 
2010b). However, population estimates do not include returnees from neighbouring 
countries during and after the census period. Between 2004 and 2008, over 220,000 
displaced South Sudanese people returned to CES (SSCCSE, 2010b; UNMIS, 2010b). 
CES is home to roughly 14 ethnic groups, including Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Lokoya, 
Pajali, and Makaraka (UNMIS, 2010b). CES includes six counties: Juba, Lainya, 
Morobo, Kajo-Keji, Terekeka, and Yei. I collected data in two payams in Juba county.  
During the 1983-2005 war, CES was split between the GoS and SPLM/A 
(UNMIS, 2010b). In recent years, conflict has occurred between ethnic communities 
(e.g. Bari and Mundari groups) within the state, and cross-border conflict (e.g. between 
Mundari in CES and Dinka in Lakes state) has been linked to tensions between 
‘pastoralist’ and agricultural communities (UNMIS, 2010b). CES has been heavily 
affected by displacement resulting from the current conflict. The 2013 violence in Juba 
involved the targeting of Nuer civilians and soldiers by predominantly Dinka forces 
(Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014), causing significant displacement. In 
August 2016, there were over 65,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in CES 
(UNOCHA, 2016), with over 40,600 (mainly Nuer) living in UNMISS PoC sites in 
Juba (IOM South Sudan, 2016). In July 2016, fighting broke out between SPLA and 
SPLA-IO forces following Machar’s return to Juba. Civilians, including PoC residents 
and humanitarian workers, were targets of violence, including killings and sexual 
violence (United Nations, 2016).  
Western Equatoria: In 2008, WES had a population of roughly 620,000, with 
over 160,000 returnees between 2004 and 2008 (SSCCSE, 2010b). WES’s population 
includes eight main ethnic groups, including Azande, Avokaye, Balanda Baka, Beli, 
Fertit, Moru, and Mundu (UNMIS, 2010e). Livelihoods are based primarily on farming, 
with rich agricultural production (the main economic activity) and lower livestock 
ownership than other states (Poggo, 2008, p. 12; UNMIS, 2010e). WES includes ten 
counties: Mundri West, Mundri East, Maridi, Mvolo, Ibba, Yambio, Ezo, Nzara, 
Nagero, and Tombura. I collected data in Yambio, the state headquarters.  
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Participants in WES described insecurity in border counties, including land 
ownership disputes and conflict between farming communities and cattle-keepers from 
neighbouring states. WES borders Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central 
African Republic (CAR). In previous years, attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army 
along state borders have driven population displacement and insecurity (UNMIS, 
2010e). WES is home to refugees from DRC and refugees fleeing conflict in CAR. 
Nearly 9,500 refugees were residing in WES in November 2015 (UNHCR, 2015), along 
with nearly 96,000 IDPs (UNOCHA, 2016). Although people in WES emphasised their 
history of peace and stability (one MoEST official referred to the state’s ‘peaceful 
culture’), tensions in WES increased after 2013. Armed clashes occurred prior to the 
signing of the 2015 peace agreement, including in Yambio. Frustrations with Juba’s 
political elite were exacerbated by the dismissal of the state governor, South Sudan’s 
only independent governor and frequent government critic. Clashes have occurred 
between government forces and armed groups (such as the recently established South 
Sudan National Liberation Movement), some of which have aligned with SPLM-IO, 
and government forces have targeted civilians. The Arrow Boys, community defence 
groups originally mobilised to protect civilians, have also been accused of involvement 
in armed violence (Small Arms Survey, 2016a; Schomerus and Taban, 2017).  
Western Bahr el Ghazal: In 2008, WBG had a population of roughly 333,000, 
the smallest of all states although it is the second largest geographically, with the lowest 
population density (SSCCSE, 2010b). Between 2004 and 2010, an estimated 122,000 
South Sudanese returned to WBG from neighbouring countries (UNMIS, 2010a). 
WBG’s population includes three main ethnic groups: Jur (Luo), Fertit (including 
multiple subgroups), and Dinka. Although WBG is home to a larger Muslim community 
than some other states, Christians are the dominant religious community (Poggo, 2008, 
p. 11; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 19; UNMIS, 2010a). Livelihoods are based on 
small-scale farming supplemented by cattle herding (Poggo, 2008, p. 11; UNMIS, 
2010a; IOM, 2013b). The state includes one municipality (Wau Municipality) and three 
counties: Wau, Jur River, and Raja. I collected data in Wau Municipality, the state 
headquarters.  
Participants in WBG described tensions associated with inter-group conflict 
between Dinka, Fertit, and Jur communities during the 1983-2005 war. Dinka and Jur 
communities were associated with and protected by the SPLM/A, while Fertit were 
supported and armed by the GoS (UNMIS, 2010a). Wau remained under GoS control 
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until the CPA (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 19). Participants also described conflict 
between farming communities and cattle-keeping communities from Warrap state and 
disputes over land ownership, and insecurity along northern borders due to the targeting 
of Sudanese rebel groups by the GoS. WBG borders CAR to the west and Sudan’s 
South Darfur to the north, and the presence of the SPLA, Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF), and other armed groups along the border contributes to insecurity (UNMIS, 
2010a). Since 2015, civilians have been targets of violence and killings by the SPLA in 
and around Wau, as part of government operations against Fertit ‘rebels’ (HRW, 2016). 
In August 2015, over 111,000 IDPs were living in WBG (UNOCHA, 2016) and by 
April 2017 Wau was home to over 70,000 IDPs, including over 46,600 in a PoC site 
(IOM South Sudan, 2017).  
Warrap: In 2008, Warrap had a population of roughly 973,000 (SSCCSE, 
2010b). The population is predominantly Dinka (Jieng), with minority groups including 
Luo (Jur Chol, Jur Mananger) and Bongo. Warrap is home to many returnees and 
refugees from Sudan due to its proximity to the north (UNMIS, 2010d; BCSSAC, 
SSPRC and UNDP, 2012b), with 180,000 South Sudanese returning between 2004 and 
2008 (SSCCSE, 2010b). Warrap has historically been the most ‘under-developed’ state 
in South Sudan (UNMIS, 2010d), a point emphasised by numerous participants in the 
state. In 2008-2009, Warrap was home to over 1.6 million cattle and 88 per cent of 
households owned livestock (NBS, 2012a). Livestock represent the dominant livelihood 
source, although some communities also engage in small-scale agriculture. Delayed 
rainfall and drought in recent years have increased food insecurity and affected access 
to water and grazing land. Counties and payams in Warrap include a range of permanent 
and temporary or nomadic settlements (UNMIS, 2010d; IOM, 2013a). Warrap includes 
six counties: Twic, Gogrial East, Gogrial West, Tonj North, Tonj East, and Tonj South. 
I collected data in Kuajok, the state headquarters, in Gogrial West County, and in three 
payams in Tonj East County.  
Participants in Warrap reported conflict along eastern borders, between groups 
from Warrap and Unity or Lakes, over cattle raiding, contested and poorly demarcated 
borders, and control of water points and grazing land (particularly during the dry 
season). Similar conflicts, and cycles of reprisal violence, occur between groups (e.g. 
different Dinka sections) from different payams and counties in Warrap (UNMIS, 
2010d; Saferworld, 2011; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012b). Participants described 
the role of gelweng, youth often armed with small weapons and responsible for 
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protecting family, communities, and cattle and, according to some government 
representatives, often engaged in violent intergroup conflict. Warrap borders Sudan’s 
South Kordofan as well as the contested Abyei area. Insecurity has been associated with 
seasonal movement of communities and conflict-related displacement, as well as attacks 
from northern rebel and militia groups and the border presence of both the SPLA and 
SAF (UNMIS, 2010d; Saferworld, 2011; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012b). 
Upper Nile: In 2008, UNS had a population of roughly 964,000, with nearly 
166,000 returnees between 2004 and 2008 (SSCCSE, 2010b). The state is home to three 
main ethnic groups, including Shilluk (the largest group in the state), Dinka, and Nuer 
(including Jikany and Gajaak sections), as well as Berta, Burun, Anuak, Dajo, and 
Mabani, with each county dominated by particular groups (Poggo, 2008, pp. 11–2; 
UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a). Communities rely on cattle 
herding and agriculture, although livelihoods have been affected by unpredictable 
rainfall patterns and increased flooding (Poggo, 2008, pp. 11–2; BCSSAC, SSPRC and 
UNDP, 2012a). UNS includes 13 counties: Akoka, Bailet, Fashoda, Longochuk, Maban, 
Maiwut, Malakal (Makal), Manyo, Melut, Luakpiny/Nasser, Panyikang, Renk, and 
Ulang. I collected data in the state headquarters of Malakal, including in Malakal PoC, 
and in Wau Shilluk, both in Malakal (Makal) County.  
UNS has historically been economically and politically marginalised due to 
limited state and ethnic representation in the SPLM/A hierarchy. After the CPA, for 
example, UNS was the only state with a governor from the NCP. As a base for armed 
groups (including SAF, SPLM/A factions, and other armed groups) due to its proximity 
to the north, UNS has been disproportionately affected by wartime violence (Schomerus 
and Allen, 2010, p. 17; UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a; Small 
Arms Survey, 2016b). Significant oil deposits are located in the state, making it 
politically and economically valuable. However, communities have not benefited from 
the state’s oil resources, either through oil revenue allocation or local development 
initiatives (BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a). UNS has experienced frequent 
conflict over county border demarcation, access to grazing land and water points, and 
seasonal movement toward rivers (between, for example, Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer 
groups, and between Dinka and Nuer and Dinka and Shilluk groups). Cross-border 
conflict (including cattle raiding and border disputes) occurs between communities in 
UNS and Jonglei. Tensions have been affected by the targeting of Shilluk and Nuer 
communities during SPLA civilian disarmament campaigns (UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC, 
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SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a; Breidlid and Arensen, 2017). UNS borders Ethiopia to the 
east and Sudan to the northeast. Insecurity has been linked to the presence of the SPLA 
and SAF along the northern border and movement of groups from Sudan and Ethiopia 
due to dry season migration and conflict-driven displacement (UNMIS, 2010c; 
BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a).  
As the centre of SPLM-IO activity, UNS is one of the states most affected by 
ongoing conflict. In 2013, most Nuer security forces in UNS joined the opposition, 
which largely targeted Dinka and Shilluk civilians. Several military commanders have 
split from both government and opposition forces, with some forming new forces (such 
as the predominantly Shilluk Tiger Faction New Forces). Nuer ‘White Armies’ (mainly 
youth-based civilian defence groups) have fought with the SPLM-IO against 
government forces, and Dinka militia groups have supported the SPLA (while operating 
largely outside of its command) (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014; Small 
Arms Survey, 2016b; Breidlid and Arensen, 2017). Government and opposition forces 
have battled for control of oil-producing sites and Nile riverbanks (to control river 
transportation), and Malakal has changed hands multiple times. Ongoing clashes have 
occurred in and around Malakal and Wau Shilluk, with groups targeting humanitarian 
aid deliveries and workers (Small Arms Survey, 2016b). On-going fighting in the state 
has resulted in mass population displacement. In August 2016, there were roughly 
293,000 IDPs in UNS (UNOCHA, 2016), with over 33,000 people (primarily from 
Dinka and Shilluk communities, as well as some Nuer) living in Malakal PoC (IOM 
South Sudan, 2016). In February 2016, suspected SPLA and Dinka (Padang) militia 
members attached the Malakal PoC, killing or injuring at least 130 Shilluk and Nuer 
residents (Small Arms Survey, 2016b). There are also nearly 133,000 refugees (mainly 
Sudanese) from neighbouring countries in UNS (UNHCR, 2015). 
 
5.8 Research Ethics in a Conflict-Affected Context 
Prior to collecting data, I obtained ethical approval from the University of 
Sussex Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities Cross-School Research Ethics Committee. 
However, research in conflict-affected contexts requires attention to emerging ethical 
issues at every stage of the process; ethical questions are not ‘settled’ once institutional 
approval is obtained (Shaw, 2008, p. 401; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 12). 
The significance of ethical considerations is mediated by the specific research context 
(Simons and Usher, 2000, pp. 1–3), and is intensified in conflict-affected settings 
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(Barakat et al., 2002, p. 992; Wood, 2006, p. 373; Campbell, 2010, p. 1; Hutchinson, 
2011, p. 79; Komatsu, 2012, p. 146; Bush and Duggan, 2015, p. 21). 
Research in conflict-affected contexts requires attention to potential risks for 
‘vulnerable’ participants who have experienced social, economic, physical, and 
psychological consequences of violence (Collogan et al., 2004, p. 363; Newman and 
Kaloupek, 2004, p. 383; Seedat et al., 2004, pp. 263–4). Research participation can 
result in emotional discomfort or distress (e.g. anger, shame, fear) and ‘re-
traumatisation’ associated with painful memories. It can also provide opportunities to 
share personal experiences, stories, and opinions in a safe, non-judgmental context 
(Collogan et al., 2004, pp. 366–7; Newman and Kaloupek, 2004, pp. 383–4; Seedat et 
al., 2004, pp. 262–4; Hart and Tyrer, 2006, p. 18; Zwi et al., 2006, p. 268; Campbell, 
2010, p. 4). To address these concerns, I encouraged participants to control the direction 
of our conversation according to their level of comfort, avoided direct questions about 
experiences of violence, and provided the option to refuse to answer certain questions or 
end the interview at any time. Ethnicity, political critique, and other potentially sensitive 
topics were discussed only when introduced by participants. However, psychological or 
emotional risks associated with the research were not necessarily greater than those 
encountered by participants on a daily basis. Researcher interest, non-judgment, and 
empathy are critically important when discussing sensitive topics (Sands, Bourjolly and 
Roer-Strier, 2007, pp. 367–9; Morse et al., 2008, pp. 201–4), and my prior training and 
experience in social work practice and research (including interviewing and counselling 
on violence and other sensitive issues) informed interactions with participants.  
Association with researchers can draw public attention to participants and result 
in suspicion or risk (Collogan et al., 2004, p. 367; Newman and Kaloupek, 2004, p. 384; 
Seedat et al., 2004, pp. 262–4; Hart and Tyrer, 2006, p. 18; Zwi et al., 2006, p. 268; 
Campbell, 2010, p. 4). Confidentiality is thus critically important, referring to the 
protection of participants’ identities and the information they provide, during and after 
data collection. To protect participants’ anonymity and ensure data protection, I 
removed identifying information (e.g. names, specific roles, locations) from interview 
and discussion notes and transcripts to ensure that individuals could not be identified or 
associated with specific data. I stored materials (e.g. notes, transcripts, forms, 
recordings) on a password-protected computer or in a locked cupboard.  
Prior to each interview and group discussion, I obtained informed consent from 
participants. I explained (in writing and verbally) the nature and purpose of the research, 
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including objectives, anticipated outcomes, potential risks, and confidentiality and 
anonymity provisions (see Appendix 4 for the information sheet and consent form). I 
obtained either written or verbal consent, to accommodate varying levels of literacy and 
concerns about anonymity. Certain participants preferred not to record their name on a 
consent form and chose to provide verbal consent. I ensured ongoing consent with 
participants before and after each interview and during subsequent meetings. I obtained 
explicit consent from each participant prior to audio-recording interviews. Numerous 
participants stated that they did not wish to be recorded but gave permission to take 
handwritten notes. If they expressed any hesitation, I did not record the interview.   
My approach to research interactions considered aspects of mutual 
responsibility, recognising participants’ knowledge, judgment, and agency in making 
decisions about their lives and accepting potential research-related risks. This 
challenges assumptions that external researchers can anticipate all possible 
consequences of research participation, suggesting that participants can better foresee 
context-specific, subjective risks (Kovats-Bernat, 2002, pp. 214–5; Wood, 2006, p. 380; 
Campbell, 2010, p. 3; Jayawickrama, 2013, p. 30; Traianou, 2014, p. 63). 
Considerations of vulnerability, agency, and consent are particularly significant in 
research involving young people. While recognising young people’s real vulnerability, 
it is also important to provide them with opportunities to voice their perspectives, 
experiences, and suggestions, as well as respecting their decision to participate in 
research (David, Edwards and Alldred, 2001, pp. 351–3; Hart and Tyrer, 2006, pp. 5–9). 
Young people are social actors, and research participation provides them with the 
chance to influence “the creation or production of knowledge about them” (Doná, 2011, 
pp. 39–40). In engaging with students, I followed guidance from the MoEST and 
UNICEF, who are familiar with working with young people in South Sudan. I followed 
school protocols for students’ research participation, provided students with clear 
written and verbal explanations about the research, and focused on older students in 
Primary 6 and above. I asked young people about daily activities, experiences, and 
concerns relevant to their educational experience, to avoid creating ‘risk’ beyond what 
might be encountered on a daily basis. The use of drawing activities enabled students to 
share as much or as little as they wished. 
Questions of ethics and ‘risk’ require attention to people’s prior experiences of 
research (Smith, 2008, pp. 42, 99). Research projects “take place in a milieu that has 
already experienced previous interventions which have left their mark” (de Sardan, 
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2005, p. 139). In contexts such as South Sudan, communities may be approached by 
numerous researchers and repetitive research experiences result in psychological, 
emotional, and time burdens (Collogan et al., 2004, p. 367). While in South Sudan, I 
noted that frequent short-term research-based projects (e.g. needs assessments, 
programme evaluations) commissioned or supported by UNICEF’s country office 
nearly always involved the same sites and schools. To avoid adding to this research 
burden, I tried to engage with different schools (beyond those supported by UNICEF’s 
PBEA programme), based on suggestions from county and payam officials. 
 
5.9 Negotiating Research Sites and Relationships  
Research involves negotiating systems of power and authority: “the multiple 
positions of any given research informant and the multiple positions of any given 
researcher make the terrain of research itself a terrain of power” (Ackerly and True, 
2006, p. 257). Researchers must consider visible and invisible relations of power, 
hierarchy, and obligation at micro and macro levels (Zwi et al., 2006, p. 268; Ackerly, 
2008, pp. 28–32; Robinson-Pant and Singal, 2013, p. 444), as power relations between 
researchers and gatekeepers, gatekeepers and participants, and national and international 
institutions and participants affect participation and consent (Thomson, 2009, p. 7; 
Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 4). Access to sites and participants is facilitated 
by, or dependent upon, collaboration with local, national, and international actors, 
including government authorities and organisations serving as ‘gatekeepers’. People’s 
decisions to participate in research are influenced by the power of both government 
authorities and international organisations. It can be difficult to ensure voluntary 
consent in contexts of political oppression and limited freedoms. People may feel that 
they do not have a choice, fearing reprisal if they refuse to participate (Beyrer and Kass, 
2002, p. 249; Shaw, 2008, p. 405). Ethical challenges also arise when access to research 
sites and participants is negotiated through (or dependent upon) political authorities 
responsible for violence against populations (Goodhand, 2000, p. 14; Thomson, 2009, p. 
5; Hutchinson, 2011, pp. 82–93).  
Educational research, in particular, requires multiple levels of permissions, from 
central and subnational governments to schools, classrooms, and students (Bogdan and 
Biklen, 2007, p. 85; Mertens, 2010, p. 329). Research in education settings also 
involves specific relations of power, and managers, teachers, and students may feel 
obligated to participate in research approved by higher authorities (e.g. central or 
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subnational ministry officials, school managers) (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 49; 
Heath et al., 2007, p. 413; Fargas-Malet et al., 2010, p. 178; Gallagher et al., 2010, pp. 
478–9). In contexts where people rely on international organisations to meet basic 
needs, research may be perceived as tied to aid or service delivery and expectations of 
assistance, fear, or desperation may influence participation (Goodhand, 2000, pp. 13–4; 
Collogan et al., 2004, p. 366; Zwi et al., 2006, p. 266; Thomson, 2009, p. 10; Pottier, 
Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 3; Jayawickrama, 2013, p. 30). These dynamics of 
power can enhance the effects of ‘social desirability’ on participants’ responses: 
participants may provide answers they think researchers expect or which portray their 
institutions (ministries, schools) in a positive light.  
I secured approval for this research from the central MoEST and obtained 
ministry permission to access subnational education sites at state, county, payam, and 
school levels. These protocols were particularly significant at subnational levels. Many 
county and payam officials expressed frustration when higher levels of government and 
donors bypass ‘official’ channels (see Chapter 7), and I wanted to avoid undermining 
‘local’ authority during my research. Officials from one payam office, for example, told 
me they were glad I had asked for their permission to approach primary schools under 
their authority, explaining that the state ministry and international donors often fail to 
do so. I was aware of limitations on ‘voluntary’ decision-making in schools and 
ministry offices. I also tried to establish, to the greatest extent possible, a sense of 
independence and impartiality from the MoEST and UNICEF. I directly contacted, and 
established my own relationships with, participants rather than relying on MoEST or 
UNICEF to facilitate contact. I did not schedule interviews during UNICEF visits to 
ministry offices or schools, to avoid having my research perceived as tied to UNICEF 
support. Reciprocity and transparency can help to establish a sense of comfort and trust 
(Jacoby, 2006, p. 166), and I began each interview or discussion by asking participants 
if they had any questions for me (e.g. about my role, experience, and intensions). I was 
clear, honest, and consistent when describing the research objectives and potential 
contributions to participants, explaining that despite research affiliation with UNICEF, I 
could not influence provision of material resources.  
In an attempt to minimise ‘obligatory’ participation and social desirability, I 
explained to all participants that confidentiality applied to those who agreed or refused 
to participate, and that individual decisions regarding participation would not be shared 
with others. I tried to maximise safety and comfort by taking handwritten notes rather 
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than audio-recording if a participant expressed any hesitation. I explained that the 
research focused on exploration, not evaluation, and worded questions to ask about 
people’s own definitions of peace, (in)equality, and other key concepts. Indeed, many 
MoEST officials emphasised that they were sharing their individual perspectives. For 
example, when discussing benefits and challenges of decentralised education 
governance, one central official stated (laughing) that, “That’s what I’m thinking. That’s 
my own thinking, but I don’t know what’s the thinking of the ministry”. Finally, as 
Pottier et al. (2011, p. 15) suggest, “trust may come from informants’ independent 
observations that the information they have divulged so far to the researcher has been 
treated confidentially and responsibly”. 
Considerations of researcher safety and security are important in conflict-
affected settings. To mitigate risks, I made decisions about research sites, mode and 
timing of travel, and so on in consultation with MoEST and UNICEF colleagues in Juba 
and different states. My involvement with UNICEF enabled access to UNMISS security 
training (Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments course) and security 
information. Consultation and conversations with colleagues and participants at national 
and local levels informed awareness of changing conflict dynamics, security risks, and 
broader political, socio-cultural, and historical contexts. They provided guidance and 
feedback on research approaches (including the relevance of research objectives and 
questions), behaviours, and ethical concerns.  
The securitisation of international organisations and agencies has affected and 
restricted ‘field research’ approaches. UNICEF’s country and field offices exemplify 
South Sudan’s ‘gated aid complex’: fortified compounds, enclosed offices and 
accommodation, and security protocols and restrictions constraining movement 
(Duffield, 2010a, p. 455, 2014, pp. 85–8). Security training and protocols “normalise 
risk-aversion and the necessity, even desirability, of defensive living” (Duffield, 2010a, 
p. 453), representing “the antithesis of fieldwork as the art of being in the world” (2014, 
p. 86). I tried to establish independent research contacts and relationships, operating 
outside UNICEF’s procedures to the greatest extent possible. This included spending 
extended periods of time in ministry buildings and schools, and walking to meetings 
and interviews or taking public transportation such as motorbike taxis (this was not 
possible in Upper Nile due to security restrictions). By walking through different 
neighbourhoods and marketplaces, greeting or talking to people along the way, asking 
  
104 
for directions when necessary, and stopping at roadside breakfast stalls and ‘local’ 
restaurants, I was able to gain some sense of ‘place’ in the different sites that I visited. 
 
5.10 Reflecting on Positionality 
As social actors, researchers observe the world from particular geographic, 
cultural, and epistemological positions (Scott, 2005, p. 3, 2010, p. 13). As Said (2003, p. 
10) explains, 
No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the 
circumstances of life, from the fact of [their] involvement (conscious or 
unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere 
activity of being a member of a society… There is such a thing as knowledge 
that is less, rather than more, partial than the individual (with [their] entangling 
and distracting life circumstances) who produces it. Yet this knowledge is not 
therefore automatically nonpolitical.  
This draws attention to the contextualised nature of all knowledge claims and the need 
for reflexivity about one’s own practices, values, attitudes, and judgments (Jessop and 
Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1157; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 7–8). Empirical claims are 
grounded in the practices of knowledge production, which cannot be separated from the 
researcher’s social position (and social conditions, distinctions, and implication in sets 
of social relations) (Jackson, 2011, pp. 157–60). This is particularly important in 
conflict-affected contexts, considering the ways in which identity and positionality 
intersect with aspects of conflict and security (Jayawickrama, 2013, pp. 34–5; 
Jayawickrama and Strecker, 2015, pp. 133–8). It is also significant in research crossing 
cultural, racial, geographic, socioeconomic, and other boundaries, which affect research 
roles, relationships, and power (Sands, Bourjolly and Roer-Strier, 2007; Jayawickrama, 
2013; Oikonomidoy and Wiest, 2015). 
Reflexivity involves attention to the effects of personal background and identity 
(e.g. race, nationality, gender, age, class) on research interactions and interpretations. It 
involves reflection on personal beliefs, biases, values, and ideological, ethical, and 
epistemological assumptions and preconceptions about contexts and communities 
(Griffiths, 1998, pp. 96–7; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005, p. 305; Bogdan and Biklen, 
2007, pp. 94–8; Creswell, 2007, pp. 178–80, 2012, p. 18, 2014, p. 186; Mertens, 2010, 
p. 261; Bhavnani, Chua and Collins, 2014, pp. 171–2). In my case, this involved 
reflections on my role as a white researcher from a British university in South Sudan, 
and the (neo)colonial dimensions of this form of research engagement (discussed 
below). This also involved reflections on my role as a female researcher. This presented 
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particular gendered vulnerabilities, including physical risks faced when walking alone 
in more isolated or distant areas. It also presented forms of privilege and access, 
including potentially being perceived as less ‘threatening’ when negotiating interactions 
with government officials. 
Given the scale of global inequalities, “the social worlds of critical IR scholars 
and those we wish to serve are so vastly disconnected” (Murphy, 2007, pp. 131–2). 
While I made efforts to establish a research role separate from my work with UNICEF, 
I acknowledge my own position as a member of the ‘international’ community that I 
critically examine: “there is no position from which I can analyse the circuitry of project 
and policy processes… which does not place me within it as a member of the 
‘communities’ I describe” (Mosse, 2005, p. 11). I was acutely aware of the aspects of 
privilege that I represented and carried with me as I navigated research contexts. My 
day-to-day life in South Sudan was generally characterised by comfort, safety, and 
security (in housing, transport, workspace, and so on) as well as freedom of movement, 
access to multiple physical and social spaces, and engagement with national 
government and international donor ‘elites’. I could selectively engage with spaces 
outside these zones of comfort, and was very conscious of this throughout the research 
process. I also know that “immense quantities of social, political, cultural, and 
economic phenomena – many of them doubtless highly significant – pass unnoticed” 
(Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 4) in my research, due to my position as an ‘outsider’.  
Critical theoretical scholarship challenges the belief that it is possible to adopt a 
neutral stance, suggesting that ‘neutrality’ is characterised by “an effective complicity 
with the world as it [is]” (Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007, p. 6) and “is at best a 
‘harmless’ naïveté, and at worst a pernicious subterfuge for hidden agendas” 
(Serequeberhan, 1994, cited in Rabaka, 2010, p. 21). Critical research intended to 
contribute to understandings of (in)equality and (in)justice and possibilities for social 
change involves taking a position of the nature of social justice (Griffiths, 1998, p. 85). 
As such, my research reflects certain normative assumptions about the nature of 
(in)equality and oppression and ‘ideal’ peacebuilding processes. It can also be difficult 
to maintain positions of neutrality in politically (and emotionally) charged conflict-
affected contexts (Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, pp. 12–3). Research in conflict-
affected contexts “cannot be regarded as a ‘neutral’ activity” (Barakat et al., 2002, p. 
991). Hutchinson (2011, p. 92) questions the possibility (and morality) of adopting a 
‘position of political neutrality’, which would effectively support the status quo: 
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“Violence is the kind of subject that makes it difficult to maintain the illusion of 
research impartiality, especially when one becomes aware of the ramifications of the 
violence on those who are most vulnerable”. However, this does not mean that 
researchers cannot produce nuanced research, that they must ‘take sides’ or allow 
personal biases to affect research processes, or that a given political and conflict 
situation “is easy to read in terms of its rights and wrongs” (McCandless and Bangura, 
2007a, pp. 80–1; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 10). 
When collecting data, I tried to adopt a position of relative ‘neutrality’. While I 
have opinions regarding conflict and political dynamics in South Sudan, I did not 
express them during interviews or discussions (although I was able to share and 
challenge my own perspectives during informal conversations with colleagues and some 
participants). This thesis (as well as the study produced for UNICEF) does, however, 
involve critique of government policies, decisions, and actions in peacebuilding and 
education sectors, and their implications for systems of violence. I also engage in a 
critique of the practices and perspectives of international donors and organisations. 
While I did not agree with the views of all participants, I have tried to represent a range 
of perspectives, not only those with which I agree (Jacoby, 2006, p. 160). This required 
attention to my own emotional responses to research data and experiences (e.g. affinity, 
excitement, discomfort, unease, doubt, sorrow), which represent a central aspects of 
subjectivity and inform, obscure, or distort analysis and understanding (Lee-Treweek 
and Linkogle, 2000, p. 4; J. Davies, 2010, pp. 1, 25; Levy, 2016, pp. 40–1). 
Considering ‘risk’ and power in research relationships involves attention to the 
representation of people and places: “The moment these communities share their 
stories… this establishes an unwritten agreement that the researcher will respect and do 
justice to these stories” (Jayawickrama and Strecker, 2015, p. 148). Critical reflectivity 
requires attention to the (neo)colonial dimensions of research and the ways in which 
“scholarly practices… are inscribed in relations of power”, including those associated 
with “the production, distribution, and consumption of information and ideas” about  
‘non-Western others’(Mohanty, 1991, pp. 53–5). This involves attention to the potential 
of research questions, processes, and reports to reproduce stereotypical, essentialised, 
stigmatising, or deficit-focused representations and narratives (Said, 1989, pp. 212–3; 
Osaghae, 1999, p. 63; Goodhand, 2000, p. 15; Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 2006, p. 252; 
Shaw, 2008, pp. 409–10; Smith, 2008, pp. 42–3).  
Post-colonial literature emphasises the role that scholars play in reproducing 
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colonial discourses and descriptions (Said, 1994, p. 9, 2003, p. 12; Loomba, 2005, p. 
45), considering how research and writing about “‘other’ cultures, societies, peoples… 
feed into, connect with, impede, or enhance the active political processes of… 
domination” (Said, 1989, p. 218). Research can reproduce oppressive, ‘paternalistic’ 
narratives about people and places, perpetuating representations of ‘otherness’, 
difference, and Western ‘superiority’ (Mohanty, 1988, pp. 80–1). Examples include 
narratives of particular people or communities as having “‘needs’ and ‘problems’, but 
few if any… ‘choices’ or the freedom to act” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 72), reproducing 
images of ‘Third World cultures’ rooted in “powerlessness, passivity, poverty, and 
ignorance” (Escobar, 1995, p. 8). Other examples include using violent conflict as the 
primary reference point or lens through which to represent communities. This 
reproduces discourses of ‘risk’, ‘danger’, and ‘insecurity’ associated with, for example, 
African contexts (Osaghae, 1999, pp. 63–4; Goodhand, 2000, p. 15; Pottier, Hammond 
and Cramer, 2011, p. 2).  
While in South Sudan, I noticed that statements by many donor and NGO 
representatives – as well as some government representatives – focused on ‘needs’, 
absences, and challenges rather than assets, strengths, and agency, emphasising the 
‘pathology of vulnerability’ (rather than reasons for vulnerabilities, such as inequality) 
(Jayawickrama, 2013, p. 29; Jayawickrama and Strecker, 2015, pp. 140–1). I found that 
I had to consciously work to avoid adopting the language of international actors (which 
may still be reflected in this thesis). Empirical research can challenge prevailing 
understandings and assumptions about conflict, violence, development, and 
peacebuilding, including social, political, and economic influences on inequalities and 
tensions. This can inform more nuanced understandings of the effects of conflict on 
individuals and communities as well as the development of alternative policy responses 
(Osaghae, 1999, pp. 69–70; Collogan et al., 2004, p. 364; King and Sall, 2007, pp. 11–
5; Thomson, 2009, p. 2; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 7; Bush and Duggan, 
2015, p. 3). This involves efforts to understand specific historical contexts and their 
continued effects on different sectors of society (McKeever, 2000, p. 102). 
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CHAPTER 6. “THEY ARE DEPRIVING THE OTHER COMMUNITY”: THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION RESOURCES AND SERVICES 
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 3, the critical peacebuilding literature calls for responses to 
inequalities through resource (re)distribution, as part of the wider transformation of 
systems of domination, oppression, and inequality. The uneven distribution of resources 
and services, including education, across regions and groups represents a form of 
structural violence, and ‘just’ peacebuilding thus involves equitable resource and 
service distribution (Galtung, 1969, pp. 171, 183). Some critical literature has suggested 
that the provision of social services, including education, can play a peacebuilding role 
by promoting social and economic rights and equality, responding to ‘local’ and 
‘everyday’ needs and priorities, and strengthening state-society relations. In this 
chapter, I aim to expand these understandings of education’s peacebuilding role by 
examining the distribution of resources and services in South Sudan. I aim to present 
what Sabaratnam (2013, pp. 273–4) describes as a ‘repoliticised’ understanding of 
peacebuilding processes through attention to their distributive dimensions and people’s 
interpretations of their economic and material effects. This is particularly significant 
given the links between education resource inequalities, structural violence, and conflict 
in South Sudan. This illustrates the need to examine the ways in which education 
resources are distributed, managed, and intersect with dynamics of conflict. 
I draw on empirical findings concerning resource and service distribution 
processes and implications in South Sudan to inform contributions to the critical 
peacebuilding scholarship. I critically engage with formal government and donor policy 
statements on educational distribution and peacebuilding and present a three-step 
critique of these policy statements. First, I argue that existing resource and service 
distribution procedures, at multiple scales, reproduce, depoliticise, and justify 
geographic and intergroup inequalities linked to conflict and undermine policy 
statements about the peacebuilding role of education service provision. Second, I argue 
that education’s potential peacebuilding role does not simply involve the ‘actual’ 
distribution of resources and services. Rather, community and school-level perceptions 
of exclusion from resource distribution produce and entrench tensions and grievances 
between communities. Third, I argue that neither the government (represented by the 
MoEST) nor donors address the redistribution of resources and services, privileging 
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certain forms of inequality over others and entrenching distributional inequalities.  
In making these arguments, I draw upon the CPE framework to explore ‘causal’ 
factors underlying approaches to education resource and service distribution, and the 
ways in which particular processes and patterns of inequality are legitimised and 
reproduced by different actors and institutions. This framework provides insight into the 
influence of neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy 
decisions (including ‘decentralised’ financing and a focus on ‘individualised’ 
dimensions of inequality) that shift service provision costs and responsibilities from the 
state to communities and households and limit redistributive responses to collective 
dimensions of marginalisation and inequality. Resource distribution processes may also 
be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the 
SPLM/A, which influence budget decisions that prioritise military and security sectors, 
as well as the appropriation and diversion of subnational education resources by 
political elites. These patterns are also shaped by a structure of education governance 
that positions actors in relation to one another within a clear hierarchy, providing 
power in the form of control over allocation of resources. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the ways in which policy 
and strategy documents produced by the government of South Sudan and international 
donors describe the role of education resource and service distribution. I provide an 
overview of key policy narratives, which focus primarily on education as a ‘peace 
dividend’, contributor to state-society relations, and response to past inequalities. 
Second, I examine the ways in which resources are distributed by central and 
subnational government authorities, at the school level, and by donors. I describe 
existing resource flows and management and the ways in which these intersect with and 
reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities. Third, I explore the experiences and 
perceptions of school-level actors and communities regarding education resource and 
service distribution, and the implications of perceived exclusion and inequalities. 
Fourth, I examine government and donor responses to educational inequalities at the 
policy and programme level, with a focus on their redistributive dimensions. Finally, I 
discuss the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature.  
 
6.2 Education Distribution in Government and Donor Policies 
In this section, I examine the ways in which policy and strategy documents 
produced by the government of South Sudan and international donors have described 
  
110 
the role of education in peacebuilding. These policy statements involve three broad 
narratives: education as a ‘peace dividend’, contributor to state-society relations, and 
response to current and past inequalities. These statements echo the contributions of 
social service provision set out in the critical peacebuilding literature. They reflect “a 
perception not simply of ‘good government’ (efficient and technically functional 
institutions) but of a government that is ‘good’ (morally benevolent and protective of its 
people)” (Ferguson, 2006, p. 85). The ‘politics of distribution’ is thus central not only to 
individual wellbeing but also to “the political life of the state” (p. 47). 
Post-CPA strategies, including the 2005 JAM Framework, 2008 GoNU and 
GoSS report on peace and development, and 2011-2013 SSDP, identify expanded 
education service and resource provision (particularly primary and alternative education 
enrolment and school construction and rehabilitation) as a peace and development 
priority. The first broad policy narrative, reflecting a short-term ‘post-conflict’ focus, 
suggests that improved education access represents a ‘peace dividend’ or tangible peace 
outcome. The JAM (2005, p. 43) and GoNU and GoSS report (2008, p. 2) identify the 
delivery of immediate, ‘tangible’ benefits to the population as critical for consolidating 
peace. The GoNU and GoSS report refers to projects “to achieve quick peace dividends, 
like schools” as critical to “cement peace at the state and local levels” (p. 2). Education 
policy documents echo this narrative. The GESP identifies rapid expansion of education 
services and infrastructure as “a great dividend from the peace” (MoGEI, 2012, p. 66). 
Similarly, international strategy documents identify education services as ‘peace 
dividends’. For example, a UNESCO (2011, p. 2) policy paper identifies the delivery of 
a ‘peace premium’ through education as a foundation for democracy and security, 
responding to public expectations and demonstrating ‘that peace delivers’.  
 The second policy narrative suggests that improved education access can 
strengthen state legitimacy and state-society relations. The JAM Framework (2005, p. 
24) suggests that expanded education access contributes to a ‘social contract’ between 
authorities and populations and enhances confidence in governance institutions. The 
SSDP describes government resource management to meet public expectations, 
including service delivery, as “legitimising the state in the eyes of the population” 
(GRSS, 2011, p. 10). Donor strategies echo this narrative. UNICEF’s (2012, p. 7) 
country programme document identifies management of state revenues for basic service 
delivery as contributing to perceived state legitimacy, while USAID’s (2011b, p. 43) 
transition strategy for South Sudan refers to “a stable and democratic state… contingent 
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on the receipt of essential services by the public”. Other donors suggest that service 
provision meeting popular expectations supports the development of state legitimacy 
and state-society relations (including public confidence in the state) (DFID, 2010b, p. 
23, 2010a, pp. 13, 34, 2013, p. 9; GPE, 2012, pp. 15–22).  
The third policy narrative suggests that ‘equitable’ education resource and 
service delivery can address historical inequalities. The SSDP calls for “efforts to 
address the political, social and economic legacies of the conflict period… as well as the 
historical legacies of South Sudan’s colonial past” in order to consolidate peace (GRSS, 
2011, p. 381). The JAM Framework (2005, p. 43) suggests that expanded education 
access “redresses one key dimension of the historical neglect of the people of the 
South”. Similarly, the 2015 Curriculum Framework, citing the 2012 Education Act, 
calls for “equitable access to learning opportunities… to redress past inequalities in 
education provision” (MoEST, 2015a, p. 2). The GESP refers to the need for equitable 
education resource distribution between and within states, responding to specific needs 
and ensuring delivery of the same level and quality of education services. Donors echo 
this narrative. For example, a UNESCO (2011, p. 12) policy paper calls for equitable, 
needs-based education resource allocation across states and groups. Other donors also 
draw attention to the need for equitable education delivery and emphasise the role of 
education in reducing inequalities (DFID, 2010a, p. 56, 2010b, p. 13, 2014, p. 17; 
USAID, 2011a, p. 14; GPE, 2012, p. 22; UNESCO, 2014, p. 26; UNICEF, 2015, pp. 
28–39). Based on empirical findings outlined in the subsequent sections, I argue that 
these policy narratives are challenged or undermined by existing resource distribution, 
community perceptions of distributive inequalities, and a failure to consider 
redistribution in policies and programmes. 
 
6.3 Distribution and Flows of Education Resources and Services 
Understanding education’s peacebuilding implications involves examining the 
ways in which resources and services are allocated and managed by actors across 
multiple scales. This section presents the first part of my critique of the policy 
statements described above. I examine the ways in which resources are distributed by 
central and subnational government authorities, at the school level, and by international 
donors. I argue that existing resource flows and service distribution intersect with and 
reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities, while depoliticising and justifying 
these inequalities through resource allocation procedures. At the central government 
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level, resource flows are constrained by the underfunding of the education sector and 
inequitable geographic distribution. At subnational levels, tensions between levels of 
government, resource shortages, and diversion of available resources impede responses 
to context-specific education needs and inequalities. At the school level, resource 
shortages and the transfer of financing responsibilities from government to communities 
and households reproduce geographic inequalities. Among international actors, resource 
allocation contributes to the reproduction of inequalities through uneven geographic 
distribution of partners and projects, allocation criteria that reproduce geographic 
inequalities, and limited consultation with the MoEST. 
I begin by examining resource distribution at the central government level. 
Policy statements about the peacebuilding role of education services assume that 
sufficient resources will be allocated to the sector. However, resources are constrained 
by the long-standing underfunding of the education sector (as noted in Chapter 2) and 
existing resource distribution involves inequitable geographic allocations. At all levels 
of the education system, financial resource shortages present one of the most significant 
challenges and sources of frustration – which are intensified when education is 
prioritised in government speeches and policies but not in budgets. “The government 
gives lip service to education”, explained a group of university professors: political 
speeches are “putting education as a priority, as the first priority in the country… 
saying that education is very important and the key to everything, but [there is] little 
attention in practice”. A payam official reported that, “Every year, we hear that… 
education is number one in the budget, but when we see the budget, education is less”. 
The 2015-2016 budget speech (Athorbei, 2015, pp. 10–3) and 2014-2015 budget 
book (MoFEP, 2014, p. 15), for example, refer to improved education delivery 
allocations. Although nearly one-quarter of the government budget was allocated to 
subnational transfers, the education sector received only 14 per cent of these transfers 
(versus two-thirds for organised forces salaries). In total, five per cent of the national 
budget was allocated to education. “The Ministry of Education is the last ministry in 
South Sudan… because the government is not taking education seriously”, stated a 
teacher’s union representative. This illustrates tensions between ministries and between 
government levels, with implications for legitimacy and trust within the government. 
This represents a dimension of state ‘legitimacy’ and ‘trust’ neglected in policy 
statements, which focus on relations between states and populations. 
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Central and subnational MoEST officials explained that the diversion of 
government funds to the security sector due to the current war has caused education 
resource shortages. According to one central MoEST official, “There are no resources. 
Teachers aren’t being paid… The money’s not there… We are no longer a priority; the 
priority is the war. All the resources are going to the war”. Reduced social spending to 
sustain huge military budgets is, according to Tickner (2001, p. 62), a form of state 
violence. The framing of war-driven resource scarcity as a ‘new’ problem depoliticises 
and justifies the prioritisation of the security sector at the expense of social sectors. The 
‘crisis’ narrative ignores the long-standing marginalisation of the education sector and 
concentration of funds in the security sector since (and prior to) 2005. It depoliticises 
the problem as a ‘lack’ of resources rather than a result of government policy choices 
(Ferguson, 2006, p. 60). The ‘wartime crisis’ becomes “a perennial state of exception 
that turns into a rule” through “the production and management of truth” (Butler and 
Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 149–50) rationalising budget allocation decisions. This is 
significant given that government spending on military and security sectors can be 
understood as representing not only a focus on practical war-related concerns, but also 
as a means of distributing resources and opportunities to maintain and reward loyalty 
(including from former militia commanders and groups integrated into the SPLA).   
Central budget flows affect subnational resource distribution. Central 
government funds are transferred and distributed to states and counties in the form of 
general block grants and conditional (salary and operating) transfers earmarked for 
education salary payments and operating costs (MoFEP, 2014, p. 14). Transfers vary by 
state and county, based on the number of schools and personnel. For both state and 
county operating transfers, 60 per cent is allocated equally between states/counties and 
40 per cent is allocated based on the number of schools in the state/county (MoEST, 
2014c, pp. 11–2). Allocations are not necessarily proportional to population size, 
student enrolment, actual service provision costs, level of need, or historical 
marginalisation. ‘Official’ allocation procedures thus justify and institutionalise 
distributive inequalities. Per-student spending varies widely across states, ranging from 
SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) in Warrap to SSP 394.9 (USD 133.4) in Upper Nile in 2014-
2015 (see Table 6.1). There are also variations in the proportion of funds actually 
disbursed (versus allocated) across states (MoFEP, 2014).  
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Table 6.1 Annual primary education transfers to states in 2014-2015 
 Education 
transfers 
(SSP) 
Projected 
population 
(2015) 
Primary 
enrolment 
(2013) 
Transfers per 
student 
SSP USD 
CES 33,271,522 1,462,604 150,629 220.9 74.6 
EES 26,839,787 1,274,684 94,876 282.9 95.6 
Jonglei 34,516,137 1,753,272 205,389 168.1 56.8 
Lakes 23,024,245 963,541 97,894 235.2 79.5 
NBG 27,671,719 955,346 161,425 171.4 57.9 
Unity 20,954,335 804,703 177,583 118.0 39.9 
UNS 39,284,490 1,281,365 99,488 394.9 133.4 
Warrap 26,261,122 1,283,621 182,997 143.5 48.5 
WBG 17,598,572 440,010 58,735 299.6 101.2 
WES 25,105,336 759,884 82,451 304.5 102.9 
Source: Novelli et al., 2016, p. 45  
At subnational and ‘local’ government levels, responses to context-specific 
education needs and inequalities are constrained by standardised, centrally determined 
allocation guidelines, tensions between levels of government, resource shortages and 
the shifting of financing responsibility to subnational levels, and diversion of available 
resources. According to the Local Government Act (LGA), local governments are 
responsible for planning and budgeting based on central government transfers and local 
revenues (GoSS, 2009). Education funds are transferred from the centre to states and 
then to counties, payams, and schools. When discussing the distribution of financial 
resources, state-level MoEST officials described adherence to standardised, centrally 
determined procedures and limited participation in decision-making. This impedes 
responses to ‘locally’-specific needs and contributes to the reproduction of geographic 
resource and service inequalities. “[We] allocate the schools based on the criteria that 
the national ministry [sets]… The approach is coming down from up top”, explained a 
state MoEST official in Warrap, discussing the allocation of school construction 
projects. A MoEST official in Central Equatoria described the reproduction of 
geographic inequalities through standardised resource allocation procedures: 
It is not equitable… The allocation sent to Tombura county, it’s bigger than that 
of Ibba county. Ibba has five payams, when Tombura has three payams. Now the 
small [amount for] Ibba will be divided and will not be sufficient, and the one 
for Tombura, now they divide it and it will be higher than that of Ibba… The 
small allocation for the county with five payams, when it is divided it is very less 
compared to the county that has only three payams.  
  
115 
Even when state-level officials have some influence over subnational budget 
distribution, insufficient transfer amounts restrict contextualised resource distribution. 
State and county transfers do not currently cover operating and development costs, 
leaving little or no possibility for ‘redistributing’ resources in response to geographic 
inequalities. As a state MoEST official in Western Equatoria explained, 
The transfers are just… salary transfers and then another transfer is the 
operating transfer, which goes right to the counties, which we have been 
allocated from the headquarters. They come just through the account of the 
ministry and we make the transfer to counties. Then for the salaries, also the 
same: they come, we transfer. The only thing we can decide upon is the 
operation costs, which is a limited amount that we use for running fuel, vehicles, 
everything… We have to prioritise, because the money is not enough… We have 
to prioritise fuel, we have to prioritise vehicle maintenance, we have to 
prioritise Internet use, we have to prioritise airtime. 
The ‘shortage’ of government funds for education means that responsibility for 
resource mobilisation is transferred to subnational levels (as part of a wider 
‘decentralisation’ agenda). A statement by one central MoEST official illustrates 
constraints resulting from central budget allocations, and the shifting of education 
financing responsibility to the state level: “We want the states themselves to top up that 
money… The budget gets fixed because our budget also here has not been increased at 
the national level”. In theory, states are meant to ‘top off’ transfer funds through local 
revenues, to support education provision. As a state MoEST official in oil-producing 
Upper Nile explained, 
We get part of the conditional grant for the budget, and the state has to put 
because they have oil revenue and the local revenues. They have to put also to 
the conditional grant… because there are ways to collect money.  
State and county governments can generate revenues from taxes (e.g. property, land, or 
animal taxes), trade (e.g. cattle, small arms), markets (e.g. livestock), and fees (e.g. 
licenses, permits, auctions) and fines (e.g. administrative or court fines).31 Certain states 
and communities also have access to oil revenues.32 In practice, however, many states 
                                                
31 The LGA outlines different revenues (e.g. taxes, fees and fines) to be generated by local governments 
(GoSS, 2009, p. 37). However, it does not set tax rate or allocation guidelines (Kameir, 2011, p. 18) and 
revenues are limited due to a reliance on non-commercial livelihoods, low population density in rural 
areas, and collection systems operating outside formal structures (Hutton, 2014, p. 32). State and county 
revenues rarely trickle down to payams or bomas (Podder, 2014, p. 233). 
32 Under the 2012 Petroleum Act and 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Bill, two per cent of 
revenues are allocated to oil-producing states and three per cent to communities (local governments). The 
Petroleum Act calls for development plans to improve local communities, including school construction 
(GRSS, 2012, p. 39). However, policies provide no clear definition of ‘affected’ communities and no 
clear revenue management and disbursement procedures are implemented. Conflict is linked to exclusion 
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do not generate their own revenues and rely on central transfers for education provision. 
States, counties, and payams have differing access to revenue sources, entrenching 
geographic inequalities. 
Resource flows, and implications for resource and service inequalities, are 
influenced by relationships (and tensions) between central and subnational governments 
and between ministries. This illustrates the significance of within-government relations 
for state ‘legitimacy’ and ‘trust’. Some MoEST officials described limited trust between 
levels of government, particularly central and state ministries. Some central officials, 
for example, suggested that subnational resource shortages result from the neglect of 
education or diversion of transfer funds by state-level authorities. Statements by two 
officials illustrate the framing of resource shortages as state-level problems:  
There’s no political will in the lower level of governance, because if the states 
prioritise education, that means from their own local revenue collection they 
can top up, from their own generation of resources… But they don’t want to. 
Instead, from what we sent, they deduct it for their own use. 
We are sending the money according to the number of the teachers they have, to 
those states. But when these states receive this money, they go and pay their 
local staff instead of paying teachers. The little money that goes to the teachers, 
the state government uses it for other things. 
Relations between government ministries influence resource distribution. 
Resource flows “depend so much on relationships with government as a whole, with the 
Ministry of Finance”, explained one donor representative. Education funds are 
transferred from central to state Ministries of Finance (MoFEP) and then to state 
MoESTs. Central and state MoEST officials reported a lack of communication, delayed 
disbursement, and diversion of education funds by the MoFEP. Discussions of MoEST-
MoFEP relationships (at central and state levels) were characterised by mistrust and 
‘finger pointing’, as illustrated by a state MoEST official in Upper Nile: 
Those who are transferring the cash from Juba, the national Ministry of 
Finance, they don’t provide us with copies of the transfer, so sometimes we 
don’t know if this money is transferred… How can we go and ask the Ministry of 
Finance that we have money here if we don’t have some paper…? That is why 
sometimes we don’t know what is going on. Is this money going to the counties 
or not? No, we don’t know.  
As a payam official reported, corruption by state-level MoEST and MoFEP officials is 
rampant due to impunity and a lack of accountability: “You are allowed to continue”. 
This can be connected to patterns of resource diversion and theft on a wider (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                          
from oil revenue allocations and mismanagement by political and military elites (Patey, 2010, pp. 628–
31; Kameir, 2011, pp. 30–1; Savage, 2013, pp. 4–5; Cordaid, 2014, pp. 17–9; Deng, 2015, pp. 7–8).  
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national) scale, include the diversion and theft of public resources (e.g. oil wealth) by 
central government elites and nepotism and clientelism in allocation of government 
opportunities (de Waal, 2014, pp. 348–58; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 39–42; Pinaud, 2014, p. 
194). The institutionalisation of these patterns can legitimise ‘localised’ corruption. 
Patterns of appropriation and diversion affect not only funds available to 
subnational education authorities but also the distribution of available material 
resources, which can contribute to tensions and grievances associated with conflict. 
Teachers, payam and county officials, and donor and NGO representatives described 
political influence over resource distribution (e.g. school construction, distribution of 
materials). Through these allocation processes, “economic things [are] converted into 
social and political things” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 46). Educational resources are diverted, 
appropriated, and ‘redistributed’ to secure political support and loyalty.33 National and 
subnational authorities (e.g. ministry officials, county commissioners, payam 
administrators) may ensure that schools are constructed in a particular location in order 
to mobilise, secure, or reward political and military support from community members 
and leaders. According to a central MoEST official, “Some politicians were saying, ‘No, 
in my constituency there is no school’… They want a beautiful school there, so that now 
people can vote for [them]”. One MoEST official in Central Equatoria made direct 
connections between this ‘(re)distribution’ and conflict: 
If I’m an education manager and I monopolise every resource that is supposed 
to be used, I say, ‘No, take this to my payam, don’t take to payam Z, don’t take 
to payam Y, I want every resource’, what will happen? I’m trying to create an 
environment for conflict.  
MoEST officials were hesitant to discuss this issue in depth. During one interview, a 
central official explained that, “[Politicians] build a school where there is no 
population, no students… They just want to take the school to their own place so it is 
known that it is they who have done this”, but quickly stated, “It is too political, we 
can’t go further than this” and changed the topic.  
The diversion of scarce resources is particularly significant when linked to 
‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ grievances over perceived exclusion from resource distribution 
(discussed in the following section). However, while such diversion was frequently 
                                                
33 This illustrates education’s role in South Sudan’s ‘political marketplace’, in which political elites 
secure loyalty of local leaders and communities through patronage systems and resource distribution (de 
Waal, 2013, pp. 224–5). Government elites are faced with “demands… to redistribute state resources 
through networks of kinship and ethnicity” (Leonardi, 2011, p. 233), providing resources to kinship 
networks and communities to sustain loyalty and power (Leonardi, 2011, p. 228; Awolich, 2015, p. 4). 
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described as ‘corruption’ for personal gain, it was also described as ensuring collective 
benefits for communities by ensuring access to resources and services such as schools, 
representing “an informal redistribution of funds and resources” (Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2011, p. 335). This demonstrates the ways in which resource and service 
distribution supports political loyalty and authority through a combination of coercion 
and consent – at the level of individual ‘local’ political elites rather than the ‘state’ or 
‘government’ (although these networks are not purely ‘local’, and are often connected 
to national-level political and military elites). This also echoes historical processes of 
bargaining, brokering, and negotiation between ‘local’ authorities and governments 
(including through forms of patronage) in (South) Sudan during and after the British 
colonial period (Leonardi, 2013, pp. 49–59). This also reflects aspects of ‘divide and 
rule’ strategies through strategic distribution of valued resources and services 
Having discussed approaches to resource distribution and management at the 
subnational level, I now turn to resource mobilisation and management processes at 
school and community levels. School-level resource shortages and the shifting of 
financing responsibilities from the government to communities and households 
reproduce geographic inequalities and undermine policy statements concerning state-
society relations. This has implications for peacebuilding given the links between 
education resource inequalities and conflict in South Sudan. Service delivery funds are 
transferred to primary and secondary schools in the form of capitation grants (under the 
MoEST-DFID GESS programme). These grants, managed by PTAs, are intended to 
finance basic operating costs (e.g. infrastructure, maintenance, supplies, volunteer 
teacher incentives)34 and enable provision of ‘free’ primary education. This is meant to 
widen access and respond to socioeconomic inequalities between households and 
individuals, as a donor representative explained: 
The idea of the capitation grants is that they should remove the registration fees 
[that] poor people often couldn’t pay… They’re not supposed to pay registration 
fees. They can contribute in kind to community projects, we don’t want to 
undermine that, but that is one fee they’re not supposed to pay as a result of 
capitation grants.  
Capitation grants are based on student enrolment, described as a ‘fair’ and 
‘transparent’ approach to allocation. However, school managers and teachers explained 
                                                
34 In 2015, primary school grants included a fixed amount of SSP 5,000 plus SSP 36 per pupil (SSP 78 in 
‘hard to reach’ areas). Secondary school grants included SSP 10,000 plus SSP 80 per pupil (MoEST and 
UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). 25 per cent of the grant is allocated to physical improvement (e.g. school 
construction and maintenance), 25 to inspections, and 50 to learning processes (e.g. materials, textbooks). 
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that grants are not sufficient to cover projects such as classroom or office construction. 
Primary teachers in Warrap, for example, reported that capitation grants “have helped a 
lot, but not enough” due to small amounts, the value of which is further reduced in a 
context of currency devaluation and rising prices: “[You] can’t even build a tukul 
because things are now very expensive”. Enrolment-based allocation presents 
challenges for schools with fewer students, reproducing geographic inequalities in 
resource access when low-enrolment schools in remote communities receive smaller 
grants. The diversion of capitation funds by ministry officials and school managers also 
reduces available resources. A group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western 
Bahr el Ghazal, discussing capitation grants, explained that, “When the money reached 
the bank here, we don’t know where it went… Was the money lost in the Ministry of 
Education? The state government? We don’t know”. A donor representative described 
the ways in which diversion of school funds reflects higher-level resource diversion: 
The corruption and misuse of funds is something which has struggled a lot, 
especially at the top level, but it also filters down to middle level… You find 
heads, for example, embezzling funds from capitation grants or cash transfers. 
These funding shortages mean that households and communities must cover 
basic school operating and service provision costs, compensating for government 
budget ‘constraints’. They are “charged with attending to those responsibilities that the 
state cannot or will not… accept” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 68), shifting financing 
responsibilities to communities and households. This reflects a neoliberal framework in 
which “individual ‘responsibility’ increases as social services… fail” (Butler and 
Athanasiou, 2013, p. 103). Although the Transitional Constitution and Education Act 
state that primary education is to be free of charge, families cover costs such as ‘school 
development fund’ contributions (registration fees, in practice), examination fees, and 
school materials.  
The MoEST and international organisations explicitly encourage community 
responsibility for school financing. For example, while the GESS programme states that 
capitation grants will remove financial barriers, its School Governance Toolkit 
identifies teachers, parents, and community members as responsible for ‘stimulating’ 
and sustaining school improvements (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, pp. 6–11). 
School governing bodies (and thus parents, teachers, and community representatives) 
are responsible for providing school and classroom infrastructure and equipment, 
employing part-time or contract teachers, supporting teacher development and welfare, 
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and mobilising funds and resources. MoEST officials’ descriptions of community 
‘support’ to education involves not only contributions to school functioning but primary 
or sole responsibility for constructing learning spaces, paying and housing teachers, and 
other core aspects of service provision. As one primary head teacher explained, 
The government is not doing anything for education. Parents are the ones 
furnishing the school. They pay a little fund to run the school, for maintenance 
of tables and chairs, chalk. All is from the contributions of the parents.  
A state MoEST official in Upper Nile described the ways in which responsibilities are 
assigned to PTAs, as representatives of households and communities: 
If there is any problem in the school also, [the PTAs] solve the problems, and 
also if there is a need, like we want to have a teacher’s house of something like 
that… If they want their children to be taught or to learn, they have to also 
construct a house for the teacher… If we are constructing these temporary 
learning spaces, they have to also participate in this.  
PTAs may have to increase school ‘fees’ to meet school needs, increasing the financial 
burden on households with fewer financial resources: 
Most of the schools are without teachers… The school management committee 
with the PTA, they increase the school fees in order to generate money to 
employ secondary school leavers to support the system, to support the schools.  
Another way in which financing responsibility is shifted from the government to 
households is through the privatisation of education services. Donor representatives 
reported an increasing number of private schools in South Sudan, including church-, 
NGO-, and community-run and for-profit schools.35 This is another way in which 
households compensate for government budget ‘constraints’, financing education 
through private school fees. Indeed, a state MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal 
described this shift as compensating for the lack of government funds for education: 
The community… takes it for granted that children are children of the 
government and the government will do the whole job. But the government has 
put the policy, and is not having any funds to support the policy. It is only the 
parents who could support the policy.  
In some areas, private schools account for the majority of enrolment, illustrating 
the scale of (and geographic differences in) reliance on household financing. For 
example, non-government schools accounted for 52 per cent of primary schools in Juba 
county in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a). A payam official in Central Equatoria reported that it 
                                                
35 According to the MoEST (2015b, p. 34), private schools are meant to “bring about school competition, 
leading to improvement in quality delivery, increase in access to education, [and] reduction of 
congestion in public schools”. Between 2009 and 2011, the number of private primary and secondary 
schools increased from 117 to 275 and 30 to 59, respectively. In 2013, 74 and 62 per cent of primary and 
secondary schools, respectively, were government run or aided, while 26 and 37 per cent were private or 
community managed (Ministry of Education, 2010; MoEST, 2014a).	
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would be impossible to meet education needs without private schools: “We don’t know 
where we would be without the church and community… The government doesn’t have 
any power to do anything by itself”. Forty-nine of the 55 primary schools in that payam 
were private (including both church- and community-run schools) and over 19,500 
children were registered in private schools (compared to 6,600 in government schools). 
Reliance on community and household financing reproduces inequalities between 
wealthier and ‘poorer’ households and communities. Wealthier communities are better 
able to finance and maintain services, while ‘poorer’ communities face challenges in 
ensuring service provision. A school manager in Warrap explained that their PTA is 
“unable to do anything… as you have seen the area, people are very poor”. Similarly, a 
group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal reported that, 
“This school is not helped by the community”.  
This contributes to the segregation of education services when geographic and 
socioeconomic ‘boundaries’ intersect with ethnic identification, reinforcing divisions 
and tensions and impeding peacebuilding efforts. Reliance on community and 
household financing also creates tensions between communities and government over 
responsibility for service provision and contributes to grievances associated with 
inadequate resource and service provision, particularly when linked to the government’s 
failure to deliver anticipated post-CPA ‘peace dividends’. This reinforces grievances 
related to long-standing reliance on community education financing, illustrating the 
need to consider these dynamics in historical context. Describing approaches to 
education provision in Sudan in the 1980s (and illustrating the entrenched nature of 
these challenges), Hajjar (1983, p. 188) reports that,  
Local participation has a discriminating effect as the poorest local communities 
do not have the means of making up the difference between the government’s 
contribution and the total cost… Less prosperous communities could end up 
with poorer or fewer facilities.  
When examining education resource flows, a focus on government resources 
represents only a partial account. International actors are central to education provision 
in South Sudan and heavily influence resource distribution. “The government doesn’t 
have any power to do anything by itself”, stated one payam supervisor. This undermines 
policy arguments about strengthening state legitimacy and state-society relations 
through government service provision. Resource distribution practices among 
international actors contribute to the reproduction of inequalities (and limit context-
specific distribution) through the uneven geographic distribution of partners and 
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projects, allocation based on criteria that reproduce geographic inequalities, and limited 
consultation with the MoEST. Donor resources are often allocated to geographic areas 
based on the presence of NGOs or other implementing partners. The distribution of 
development and humanitarian actors and projects across states and counties affects 
resource and service distribution. Organisations and projects are often concentrated in 
particular locations, with gaps in geographical coverage. This entrenches resource and 
service disparities as well as perceptions of deprivation. An INGO representative 
described the significance of disparities in the geographic coverage of international 
actors and projects, with certain regions experiencing long-standing gaps in support: 
We have partners but in a handful, just a few pockets of locations. Some of the 
locations have not had the kind of responses… What has always been a problem 
is that in some of the locations good partners are able to take on the activities. 
In some of the locations there are no partners. 
In November 2015, emergency education partners were concentrated primarily 
in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Lakes, and Central Equatoria, with significant variations across 
counties. For example, partners were operating in four of six counties in Central 
Equatoria and six of 12 in Upper Nile (OCHA South Sudan, 2015). Funding constraints 
require the prioritisation of ‘high need’ areas (e.g. communities most affected by armed 
violence), and access to geographic areas depends on security, physical access, and 
negotiation with opposition forces. However, international actors may also focus on 
“needs that might ‘realistically’ be met, given a set of constraints” they are unwilling to 
challenge, legitimising the near absence of interventions in certain areas (Keen, 1994, p. 
185). Donor allocation of humanitarian and development resources may reflect their 
own agendas or definitions of ‘needs’ due to limited consultation with government 
officials. For example, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile described a lack of 
ministry consultation among donors and partners: 
Sometimes [the NGOs] don’t consult the ministry. They just go and do their 
things there. When we go there, we found the schools are well built and there is 
not enough children. They’re supposed to ask the ministry and then we show 
them that where there is a big population, this is where you can build a school.  
While certain MoEST officials reported some (limited) influence over donor resource 
distribution, this varied by donor. This limits responses to context-specific needs, and is 
also perceived as undermining government authority and frustrating ministry officials. 
As one official explained, 
Room to Learn is a US funded programme. They wanted to do their activities 
behind our back but we are now very strong… so we’ll be getting a hammer. We 
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tried carrot and then we tried the stick, but still we go for hammer… We need to 
know exactly what do they intend to invest the money on… We completely don’t 
have a say… The first cooperation that we are beginning to see ourselves as 
partners, recognising that we are already a government, it is the DFID and 
GESS programme. This is where we have a say… Some partners are beginning 
to listen. 
Some MoEST officials described donor relations as reflecting pre-2005 
interactions between international partners and the SPLM/A as a rebel movement. The 
importance of historical patterns of donor involvement with authorities should be 
considered, as they influence current frustrations and concerns when reproduced in 
contemporary donor-government interactions. A paper co-authored by the MoEST 
Undersecretary refers to “a tendency within the humanitarian actors of undermining the 
responsibility, leadership and ownership of local and national authorities” (Lotyam and 
Arden, 2015, pp. 7–8) during the pre-CPA period. As one central MoEST official 
explained, “We were still a rebel movement. You don’t have a say … It just becomes like 
some of the workers only who are told what to do”. 
Some donor and NGO representatives described the use of ‘transparent’ criteria 
for resource distribution (e.g. school construction, capitation grants, school feeding), 
intended to avoid tensions and political influence (and to encourage communities to 
improve their schools to access resources). Criteria include accessibility (e.g. presence 
of roads, mobile networks), security, school facilities (e.g. latrines, kitchen), functioning 
school governing bodies, and record keeping and reporting. These entrench inequalities 
when schools and communities, particularly in hard-to-reach or conflict-affected areas 
or those with few financial resources, struggle to meet criteria and access resources and 
support. Efforts to promote ‘transparency’ in resource distribution can therefore 
entrench inequalities between communities and justify and legitimise inequitable 
distribution patterns, suggesting that schools or communities cannot access resources 
because they do not meet required criteria rather than due to structural factors.  
The ways in which education resources and services are distributed, managed, 
and mobilised at multiple scales, from the central government to schools, contributes to 
the reproduction of inequalities across states, counties, and payams, and between rural 
and urban areas. Geographic inequalities intersect with other group dimensions (e.g. 
ethnicity), illustrating interconnections between different dimensions of inequality as 
well as the significance of education resource and service inequalities for conflict. 
Quantitative analyses of education data in South Sudan (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 32–6) 
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reveal clear geographic inequalities in educational resources and services, with Greater 
Upper Nile experiencing the lowest access to school facilities and resources (e.g. 
classrooms, teachers, drinking water, latrines). Inequalities in the distribution of 
teachers and facilities exist across counties, with southern counties generally having 
more adequate school resources than central and northern counties. Administrative 
borders in South Sudan (e.g. states, counties, payams, bomas) tend to mirror ethnic, 
tribal, and sectional boundaries, reflecting legacies of colonial ‘native administration’. 
Geographic resource and service inequalities are thus linked to inequalities between 
ethnic groups or sub-groups/sections. These must be considered in a historical context 
characterised by tensions associated with border demarcation and the role of subnational 
borders in colonial and post-colonial violence and conflict. This must also be considered 
in relation to the significance of administrative (territorial) units, such as counties, 
payams, and bomas, in driving public expectations of government services and 
resources. As Leonardi (2013) explains, decentralisation policies outlined in the Local 
Government Act resulted not only in increasingly “territorialised and ethnicised 
definitions of locality and community” (p. 182), but also the linking of access to 
government (or NGO) services and resources with ‘territorial locality’ (pp. 185–6).   
In this section, I have explored how education resources and services are 
distributed and managed in South Sudan, from ‘international’ to ‘local’ levels. Resource 
and service distribution reproduces and entrenches inequalities across geographic 
communities. This has peacebuilding implications due to links between geographic 
inequalities and violent conflict and the shifting of financing responsibilities from the 
government to communities and households. Depoliticised explanations for distributive 
inequalities illustrate “the normalization of poverty and precarity” associated with 
neoliberal governance (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 29). These resource flows 
challenge policy statements about the ‘peacebuilding’ role of service provision, not only 
in terms of ‘actual’ distribution but also in terms of perceptions and interpretations. 
 
6.4 Perceptions and Interpretations of Resource and Service Distribution 
Having discussed the ways in which education resources and services are 
distributed and managed at different scales, I turn to the second part of my critique. In 
this section, I examine interpretations, experiences, perceptions, and emotions 
associated with resource and service distribution among those intended to benefit from 
them: people in schools and surrounding communities. I argue that education’s 
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peacebuilding role does not simply involve ‘actual’ distribution of resources and 
services: frustrations and grievances associated with perceived exclusion from resource 
distribution undermine education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role. This is linked to the 
government’s failure to provide expected ‘peace dividends’ in the form of education 
services, and perceptions of deliberate exclusion from government and donor resource 
distribution. Donor and government policy statements discuss public perceptions only in 
relation to perceived state legitimacy and authority, but do not consider the ways in 
which people experience and perceive processes of resource distribution.  
Emotions, perceptions, and experiences are located in historical contexts, 
“[taking] shape through the repetition of actions over time” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 4). 
Experiences, emotions, identities, and roles “produced by one set of war experiences 
affect people in the future and their memories of war and peace” (Sylvester, 2012, p. 
502). These have important social and political effects, including the ways in which 
they ‘produce’ demands for collective responses (Ahmed, 2014, pp. 9–28). This is 
particularly significant in relation to people’s expectations of access to services as 
benefits of independence, peace, and development – and as ‘rewards’ for supporting the 
liberation struggle. Expectations of ‘peace dividends’ are “grounded in past suffering 
and past contributions that require redress or compensation… understood as both 
collective and inherited across generations” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 55). The failure to 
deliver expected (and promised) resources and services can intensify grievances and 
undermine peacebuilding efforts, shaping community confidence in the government 
(and donors) as well as perceived responsiveness to needs and obligations. The 
significance of educational inequalities (both real and perceived) must be considered in 
relation to historical patterns of conflict in (South) Sudan. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
education resource and service inequalities in southern Sudan contributed to feelings of 
frustration, resentment, alienation, and exclusion, and were key factors leading to the 
outbreak of armed conflict in the 1950s-1960s. 
Explicit statements about increased service provision made by political leaders 
raise community expectations, and take on particular significance given the historical 
marginalisation of specific geographic regions. During the ‘war of liberation’ and CPA 
negotiations, Garang stated that the southern government would “take the towns to 
people in the countryside” through development and service provision (including 
education) (2013, p. 180, 2014, p. 150), referring specifically to “equality in social 
services and their distribution in all the southern areas” (2014, p. 188). Garang 
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described the provision of social services as “payback… to the Sudanese people who 
fought and sacrificed”: “the peace dividend that they expect as individuals and as 
communities and for which they have fought… will be provided” (2014, pp. 140, 176). 
Post-CPA government and donor strategy documents describe increased education 
provision as a tangible peace outcome (‘dividend’) for populations, and access to 
education and other services were popular expectations of post-CPA peace and 
development (Deng, 2005, p. 247; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 71, 247; Mayai, 
2012, p. 1). However, highly anticipated ‘peace dividends’, including education, have 
been limited or non-existent (Leonardi, 2011, p. 232; Mayai, 2012, pp. 1–4; Jok, 2013, 
p. 2; Awolich, 2015, p. 10).36 Promised ‘dividends’ have not materialised, illustrated by 
the continued marginalisation of rural and remote communities. “The money is still in 
Juba and is not going to the periphery”, stated a South Sudanese CSO representative. 
This has driven community-level frustrations, grievances, and anger. A South 
Sudanese state-level peacebuilding representative described the failure to meet people’s 
expectations: “All hope was placed on peace dividends… [but] until today people are 
squeezed into a corner… Children are learning under trees, there are no teachers”. 
Subnational MoEST officials, teachers, PTA members, and students expressed 
frustration over the lack of sufficient government resources for education. “They don’t 
even give a piece of paper to the school”, stated one payam official. A group of 
secondary students explained that when the government does not provide necessary 
resources, communities are ‘exposed’ to risks (associated with poverty and a lack of 
services and opportunities) and will blame the government. The government’s failure to 
meet popular expectations represents not only a failure to deliver required services, but 
also a failure to ‘compensate’ for wartime contributions. In some communities there is 
the sense that, “We contributed during the struggle, but what now do we have? It is too 
late for this government”. A state MoEST official in Warrap explained the ways in 
which failure to address these expectations undermines state-society relations: 
When people are fighting, they complain, ‘We need this, we need this, we need 
this’. When they don’t get it… there will be conflict between the community and 
the government and then there is going to be a lack of trust between the 
government and the community, because we were promised last time, ‘Your 
children will be educated’. 
                                                
36 In recent national opinion surveys, 68 per cent of adults were dissatisfied with government education 
provision and 60 per cent believed education delivery had worsened (IRI, 2013; World Bank, 2015). 
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Frustrations and grievances associated with the failure to deliver expected 
services are affected by the transfer of responsibility for school financing to 
communities and households. Not only are communities not receiving promised 
services, but they have to finance these services themselves. Perceptions of the 
government’s failure to deliver expected ‘peace dividends’ must also be considered in 
historical context, in relation to post-CPA promises of services as well as similar prior 
experiences. Promises of CPA ‘peace dividends’ echo expectations following the 1972 
Addis Ababa agreement. As one southern minister then explained, “people who have 
returned to their homes from bush or exile now expect to be provided with a welfare 
state, particularly in regard to health and education” (Stevens, 1976, p. 251). As noted in 
Chapter 2, education resource and service expansion during this period were limited. 
The post-CPA process echoes this prior failure to meet popular expectations. These 
historical dimensions are not acknowledged in policy documents, despite their influence 
on perceptions of government commitment and responsiveness. 
Resource distribution across communities can result in perceptions of deliberate 
marginalisation or exclusion by political authorities and international actors. This has 
implications for conflict in terms of grievances associated with geographic and 
historical inequalities. This is particularly significant given the deliberate use of 
education resource and service distribution by colonial and Sudanese authorities as 
mechanisms of power and control. Geographic inequalities overlap with other 
dimensions of identity and inequality, including ethnicity and socioeconomic status, 
which intensify perceptions of deliberate marginalisation or exclusion from resource 
and service distribution. A state MoEST official in Warrap described the significance of 
perceptions of exclusion from development projects: 
If the ministry was to sit and say, ‘Okay, we are going to take [the schools] to 
Tonj South’ or ‘We are going to take them to Tonj East or to Gogrial West’, 
leaving the other counties, then the tension rises there, between the local 
politicians [and] the community. They say, ‘Okay, the ministry here, the donors, 
they are depriving the other community’.  
Similarly, a central MoEST official described the ways in which resource distribution 
drives grievances and conflict: 
They identified one county and then jumped another county and then identified 
another one there and then jumped and identified. Now this county that is 
jumped, we can say, ‘Is it because… so and so there is from this county?’ That’s 
already brought a tribal conflict here, meaning you are not representing us all.  
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Perceptions of exclusion and inequalities reinforce intergroup and state-society 
divisions and tensions when framed in ‘us and them’ terms: resources and services are 
viewed as being provided to one group or community to the exclusion of others. People 
“judge their own peace benefits in direct comparison to that of other groups”, 
reinforcing a sense of deliberate exclusion (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 71). 
Discussing perceived marginalisation from school construction programmes, a group of 
primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal illustrated this point: 
“The places where they build concrete schools are better than us”. Resource 
distribution is interpreted as tied to group membership and status. This is reinforced by 
the diversion of education resources by political authorities to secure or reward loyalty, 
discussed above. This reproduces historical exclusion from entitlements linked to 
geographic and ethnic origin among southern communities under Sudanese rule 
(Ahmed, 1988, p. 8). A South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor 
described how perceived (and actual) benefits of or marginalisation from distribution 
are tied to group representation:   
The system of governance is politically loaded… The reason why people 
celebrate is that Mr X is made minister in the government and his community 
will feel they have been rewarded… ‘We have our man in government who will 
bring services closer to us’… What about the other communities who don’t have 
a man in government? 
Perceptions of deliberate exclusion from resource distribution are shaped by 
patterns of communication among governments and international donors. This includes 
explicit or implicit commitments to service support and a lack of communication of 
decision-making procedures. Explicit or implicit commitments made by government 
and international agency representatives during visits to communities and schools (for 
needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation, etc.) influence resource and service 
expectations. Teachers, PTA members, and students in different states expressed 
frustrations when donors and development partners visit communities and schools, 
conduct assessments, raise expectations, and fail to provide expected resources. A South 
Sudanese INGO representative described the problem of donors raising expectations by 
visiting communities while failing to provide material benefits:  
You will go and generate a need and an interest in the community and you move 
out, so it will kind of cause a frustration in the community because UNICEF 
came and UNICEF has gone out with nothing that they have left on the ground.  
A group of secondary students in Warrap reported that international organisations 
“come for assessments and needs, but nothing is done… [This] creates expectations but 
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nothing is done”. Similarly, a group of teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el 
Ghazal described frustrations when expectations are raised but unmet by donors: 
UNICEF has come to this school several times. They have seen the challenges, 
the problems with the school environment… Why do they not provide just one 
thing for this school…? They come to ask at the school for [our] needs… but are 
just giving counselling to us… So many NGOs come to the school, make 
promises, and don’t come… so many empty promises. 
This intensifies frustrations and perceptions of exclusion when communities 
observe that resources are distributed to others. When people hear or see (on the radio 
or television, for example) that other schools or communities have received resources 
(e.g. materials, latrines) while their own school or community has not, this intensifies 
perceptions of relative deprivation, exclusion, and inequality. An education official in 
Tonj East explained that when community chiefs travel to other states and counties, 
they observe differences between communities: “‘We want to be like that county, that 
state’… they see that things are coming through education”. “When certain geographic 
areas don’t have secondary schools, this can bring conflict because less attention is 
paid to them”, explained a group of secondary teachers and PTA members in Central 
Equatoria. Feelings of frustration and anger are intensified given the significance of 
material resources and facilities for communities, school managers, teachers, and 
students, as reflected student drawings (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
Figure 6.1 Drawing by a female student  
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Figure 6.2 Drawing by a female student 
 
Perceived inequalities are compounded by limited communication of decision-
making procedures. Some payam officials and school managers stated that they do not 
know how donors make decisions about resource allocation: why some schools receive 
resources while others do not, or why donors decide to stop providing support to some 
schools. As noted above, perceptions of exclusion and inequalities are often framed in 
‘us and them’ terms. The group of teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el 
Ghazal illustrated this point as they described reactions to resource distribution: 
[We] see that UNICEF has been helping other schools in South Sudan, 
especially in other states… [We] see on TV that in some states UNICEF is the 
one to represent all these things… When services are provided to some places, 
others will think, ‘Why? What about us…? We think that we are not important. 
Even when communities are aware of donors’ reasons for resource distribution, 
perceptions of exclusion persist, linked to perceived ‘rewarding’ of particular forms of 
violence through humanitarian aid and neglect of others. While people understand why 
international responses are concentrated in ‘crisis’ areas, the significance of perceived 
exclusion (and associated frustrations and anger) should not be underestimated, nor 
should the perceived ‘rewarding’ of violence (or provision of ‘conflict dividends’). This 
has frustrated authorities and communities in (formerly) ‘stable’ states (e.g. Western 
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Equatoria) and in counties experiencing effects of armed violence. “Where there is fire, 
more water will be thrown… If you are okay, no one takes care of you,” claimed one 
central MoEST official. A state MoEST official in Warrap described the ways in which 
communities perceive ‘benefits’ of conflict: “It’s telling people if they are not getting 
the same support, then the concern is that, ‘Okay, can we fight so that we get other 
support?’” Another official in Warrap explained that aid delivery to sites of fighting 
between government and SPLM-IO forces neglects the effects of conflict in other states: 
Sometimes you don’t get the resources because you may find the donors’ 
funding is dictated to certain areas… Donors shift from these other areas, they 
call it ‘non-conflict affected’ areas, and then they take three states of Upper 
Nile, that’s the most conflict areas… Donors shift from that place to others, 
when actually the effect of that conflict is the same. For example, Warrap is 
housing the IDPs from Unity state, and when there is fighting in Unity state they 
come… But [donors] say, ‘Okay, in this place, it is only experiencing conflict 
through other places, but not directly, conflict is not taking place’. But then I 
say, ‘Okay, how do you define conflict…?’ The same to Tonj South when they 
fight themselves, the same to Tonj North when the fighting comes from Unity 
state and then affected them. It’s all the same danger. And all the children are 
affected no matter what… When you say, ‘Okay, this is not for your place, it is 
for emergency only’, then [communities] say, ‘Okay, our children ran away 
from this fighting. How do you define your emergency?’   
 
In this section, I have described how education resource and service inequalities are 
perceived as deliberate forms of marginalisation or exclusion among communities and 
school-level actors. This illustrates the significance of perceived, as well as ‘actual’, 
distributive inequalities. It raises questions about the ways in which government and 
donors address intersecting inequalities and grievances in policy and practice. 
 
6.5 Policy and Programme Responses to Resource and Service Inequalities 
In this section, I present the third part of my critique, examining government and 
donor responses to educational inequalities at policy and programme levels. I argue that 
neither the government (represented by the MoEST) nor donors consider questions of 
‘horizontal’ redistribution of resources and services, thus entrenching forms of 
inequality linked to conflict. Donors heavily influence education policy agendas, 
funding policy development and providing ‘technical expertise’. Specific policy and 
programme responses focus on (and privilege) ‘individualised’ dimensions of inequality 
(specifically girls’ education and students with disabilities, reflecting global education 
agendas) and fail to systematically address geographic inequalities in resource 
distribution. In addition to contributing to the reproduction of geographic and 
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community-level inequalities, this undermines broad policy narratives about ‘equitable’ 
responses to ‘local’ needs and existing (and historical) dimensions of inequality.  
This critique does not suggest that girls’ education (or gender equality) and 
‘inclusive’ education are less significant than geographic inequalities. Rather, I argue 
that policies and programmes fail to respond to ‘collective’ dimensions of inequality 
linked to conflict and undermining peacebuilding aims. This illustrates a ‘ranking’ of 
inequalities and the implicit (or explicit) acceptance of inequalities linked to geographic 
or community-level resource distribution. Certain inequalities are considered 
‘unacceptable’ (by donors, for example) and others, such as wealth and resource 
distribution, are considered ‘acceptable’ (Richmond, 2014, pp. 450–1). The distribution 
of educational resources across geographic regions is intensely political, as it intersects 
with ‘local’ dynamics of political (and ethnic) representation and loyalty and histories 
of mobilisation and conflict. Government bodies and donors may be unwilling to 
explicitly address these highly political dynamics. Broad policy statements emphasise 
the importance of educational equality, but specific policies and programmes selectively 
respond to ‘neutral’ forms of inequality and neglect more ‘political’ forms. Policies call 
for “greater equality without any tackling of the problem of… persistent redistributive 
failure” (Mkandawire, 2004, p. 5). 
There were marked differences between the ways in which MoEST and school 
representatives described resource inequalities and desired responses, and specific 
inequalities addressed in policies and programmes. When discussing resource and 
service distribution and implications for conflict, MoEST and school-level actors 
emphasised the significance of distributive inequalities across geographic areas (e.g. 
counties, payams, communities), located within historical contexts of marginalisation. 
While some MoEST officials defined ‘equality’ as the provision of the same resources 
across all areas (e.g. counties, payams), others called for responses to context-specific 
needs and disparities. Statements by two state-level MoEST officials in Central 
Equatoria and Warrap, respectively, illustrate arguments about the need to respond to 
geographically specific needs and disparities in education resources and infrastructure: 
The central point is looking at what are the needs of these counties, in specific. 
The needs of Terekeka county may not be the same as the needs of Yei county, 
and the needs of Yei county may not be the same as the needs of Kajo Keji 
county or Juba county… When it comes to resource allocation, if Terekeka says, 
‘Our priority area is teachers’, then Kajo Keji says, ‘Our priority area in 
learning space’, and then Morobo says, ‘No, we want capacity building on 
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education managers’… We need to make sure that all the needs of these counties 
are met… This is the equity I am trying to express.  
We see how many payams have a permanent structure, and then we also see how 
many payams have a semi-permanent structure. The payam that has nothing 
completely, then we say that [school] has to go to this payam… We also see the 
most isolated places that are really marginalised, the places that also have 
conflict.  
Educational inequalities and responses must be considered in historical context, 
particularly given the role of education resource and service distribution in colonial and 
post-colonial dynamics of oppression and violence. ‘Peacebuilding’ efforts involve not 
only the distribution of resources or delivery of services, but also the redistribution of 
resources and services to address long-standing inequalities. For example, a state 
MoEST official in Upper Nile described the significance of historical inequalities and 
the need for ‘special attention’ to disadvantaged areas:  
The counties who have some difficulties, like Maban… since the time of the old 
Sudan, they have a lot of difficulties… It’s a remote area, so the people there are 
not more educated. In fact, those who are educated, they are very few in 
number. This is why that place needs special concentration.  
 
A donor representative drew connections between historical inequalities and conflict, 
but stopped short of calling for redistributive approaches to resource allocation: 
The history of the country is very much that of patchy development and 
inequalities… It’s partly historical development, and so you’ve got these 
inequities, much of which are shown in remote rural areas especially, but not 
just there, but I do think it is contributing to the conflict.  
While some MoEST and donor representatives acknowledged historical service 
disparities, no specific policies or programmes address these inequalities in any 
systematic way. Discussions of historical inequalities focused on the marginalisation or 
exclusion of the south by colonial authorities and Sudanese regimes, rarely addressing 
the current government’s (and donors’) role in reproducing patterns of marginalisation. 
MoEST and school-level representatives described education resource and 
service inequalities in geographic terms, connected to current and historical conflict 
dynamics. However, no systematic government and donor initiatives address questions 
of ‘redistribution’ in response to context-specific, conflict-related geographic or 
community-level inequalities. When international donors, rather than populations 
themselves (or their government ‘representatives’), drive policy agendas, this 
undermines policy statements about responses to ‘local’ needs and inequalities. While 
some actors (and donor strategy documents) acknowledged the significance of 
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geographic inequalities, discussions of educational ‘equality’ – and, more importantly, 
policy and resource responses – address ‘individual’ rights-based dimensions.  
Equality-focused education policies and programmes focus specifically on 
educational access for girls and children with disabilities: “In terms of equity, girls’ 
participation is the most glaring issue”, stated one donor representative. This echoes 
priorities outlined in donor education frameworks and policy documents (DFID, 2010a, 
pp. 23–5; GPE, 2012, pp. 9–15; USAID, 2013b, p. 3; DFID, 2014, p. 17). Specific 
equality-focused policy and programme initiatives include the Girls’ Education Strategy 
for South Sudan, launched in 2015 and developed with UNICEF funding and the DFID-
funded GESS programme, the only large-scale donor programme ‘redistributing’ 
educational resources to a particular population (through cash transfers37 to female 
students). A National Inclusive Education Policy is being developed for students with 
disabilities, funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. A 
Directorate of Gender Equity and Social Change exists within the MoEST, responsible 
for promoting education of girls and children with disabilities.  
No comparable policy, programme, or institutional efforts address inequalities 
affecting historically marginalised geographic areas (e.g. counties, payams, rural or 
remote communities). Existing equality-focused policies and programmes pay little 
attention to these disparities. While some components address geographic or 
community-level issues, these are not systematic, targeted responses. For example, the 
GESS programme, intended to address social, cultural, and economic barriers to 
education, refers to supporting ‘hard to reach’ schools. Per-pupil capitation grant 
amounts are higher in ‘hard to reach’ areas (MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016), but as 
noted earlier, allocation criteria reproduce disadvantages for schools in particularly 
isolated areas. At the government level, the AES aims to “increase access to education 
for disadvantaged communities or groups”, including in rural communities (MoEST, 
2014b, p. 9). The AES includes six non-formal basic education programmes, targeting 
children, youth, and adults who have missed out on education due to conflict, poverty, 
or livelihoods. Programmes include Community Girls Schools (CGS) “in villages that 
have no schools” and the Pastoralist Education Programme (see Chapter 8). However, 
these do not systematically address inequalities in resource and service distribution, and 
                                                
37 Girls in upper primary and secondary (P5 through S4) receive cash transfers (SSP 125 per year in 
2015), based on regular school attendance. The programme also includes community awareness and 
mentoring components. 
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are undermined by a lack of funding. Although the AES is meant to be allocated 10 per 
cent of the total education budget (MoEST, 2014b, p. 13), in 2014-2015 it received one 
per cent and in 2013-2014 only 21 per cent of allocations were disbursed (MoFEP, 
2014). A central MoEST official acknowledged this gap between rhetoric and practice: 
The government has tried, that’s why we have the Department of Alternative 
Education, that’s why where you are seated is also a Department for Gender 
and Equity and Social Change… I think the ministry is trying but the action has 
never taken place.  
Responses to distributional inequalities are not solely due to resource ‘shortages’, but 
also to choices or decisions about how and where available resources are allocated. The 
marginalisation of equality-focused domains in MoEST budgets illustrates not just 
funding shortages, but a failure to prioritise responses to educational inequalities. The 
low priority assigned to alternative education is articulated (and legitimised and 
institutionalised) in the Education Act, which states that, “education through the [AES] 
shall be provided subject to availability of resources” (UNICEF, 2008, p. 18).  
The lack of systematic, formalised responses to context-specific, community-
level dimensions of distributive inequality undermines policy statements about 
‘equitable’ responses to ‘local’ needs. This is due in part to reliance on donor funding 
for policy and programme development and implementation, the marginalisation of 
‘equality-focused’ programmes within MoEST budgets, and the shifting of 
responsibility for action from one scale of action to another (often to ‘local’ 
governments and communities). One central MoEST official acknowledged the failure 
of policies and programmes to respond to context specific needs: “Sometimes, 
politically, we found the direction is that equity is just a blanket. They are not based on 
the real needs”. Reliance on donor funds to address educational inequalities limits 
responses to inequalities prioritised by government bodies and ‘local’ communities. 
Donors are the primary funders of programmes intended to address educational 
inequalities. For example, DFID largely funds the GESS programme, while USAID and 
BRAC are responsible for CGS development. MoEST representatives described limited 
consultations or influence in donor resource distribution. “Donors direct resources to 
their areas of intervention”, reported one central MoEST official. 
Government and donor discussions about responses to geographic or 
community-level inequalities are also characterised by the shifting (or ‘passing off’) of 
responsibility from one scale of action to another – and ultimately, context-specific or 
‘local’ inequalities remain unaddressed. By passing responsibility to ‘local’ 
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governments and communities, governments and donors justify the absence of 
‘equitable’ resource and service distribution responses. Some donors argued that the 
government should be responsible for responding to geographic inequalities, with one 
donor representative suggesting that the persistence of inequalities is due to the 
government’s failure to act: “Within government circles they talk about it but they don’t 
sit down and decide how to manage inequality, even on a geographical level”. This 
reflects the role (and complicity) of international actors in failing to respond to 
distributive inequalities. Donors and NGOs “fill the space vacated by shrinking states” 
but do little “to challenge the receding tide of public provision or to build political 
support for responsive state action” (Fraser, 2013, p. 221).  
Conversely, government officials may feel that donors are responsible for 
addressing issues not covered by government budgets. As a state MoEST official in 
Warrap explained, 
The donors or aid is seen as a permanent kind of thing and so the government 
sometimes is reluctant, the ministry sometimes is reluctant. They say, ‘Okay, it 
can be dealt with by the partners, by the donors’… Donors are now, to my own 
thinking, they are now the one driving this thing.  
At the same time, central government officials shift responsibility to subnational 
levels. While MoEST officials discussed the significance of historical marginalisation, 
they rarely addressed the government’s role in reproducing these inequalities. Many 
argued that inequalities result from problems or ‘deficiencies’ (e.g. lack of education or 
awareness) within communities rather than inequitable resource distribution. This 
illustrates another way in which educational inequalities are depoliticised, by 
identifying communities as ‘responsible’ for resource and outcome disparities – and 
thus responsible for redressing them. With respect to teacher allocation disparities, for 
example, one county education official explained that, “The government doesn’t isolate 
these areas… These payams don’t have educated children to become teachers”. State 
and central MoEST officials shared similar explanations for material and human 
resource shortages. Many officials explained that geographic disparities result from 
‘local’ ignorance or lack awareness of the value and importance of formal education. 
These ‘cultural’ narratives (discussed in Chapter 8) define educational inequalities in 
terms of ‘awareness’ or ‘attitudes’ rather than unequal resource and service distribution. 
Such narratives are particularly common among central MoEST officials, illustrated by 
an official who explained ‘marginalisation’ in terms of ‘knowledge’ and ‘tradition’: 
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This place has been marginalised… It’s actually a place that the community are 
not very much in knowledge of the value for education… It’s very marginalised 
and it’s only because the community are following much of their own tradition. 
Other MoEST officials explained the failure to respond to geographic inequalities as 
resulting from ‘logistical’ factors such as distance, poor transportation, and insecurity. 
For example, as a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria explained, 
We are thinking of the many payams outside Terekeka, where we need to meet 
their needs, but… we cannot go there easily, because it’s not easy to access the 
area because the roads are not there… How will these materials come to this 
place, for building of schools? 
While such factors do affect possibilities for addressing distributive inequalities, these 
explanations depoliticise and justify both inequalities and the lack of response. The 
failure, on the part of the government and donors, to systematically address inequalities 
in resource and service distribution through ‘redistributive’ approaches to existing 
inequalities undermines broad policy statements about education’s peacebuilding role. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary and Implications 
In this chapter, I have explored empirical findings concerning resource and 
service distribution and implications. I examine government and donor policy 
statements on education resource and service distribution, which describe education as a 
‘peace dividend’, contributor to state-society relations, and response to inequalities. 
Some critical peacebuilding literature echoes these narratives. Some critical scholars 
emphasise responses to systems of inequality underlying conflict through 
(re)distribution of economic or material resources and benefits (Pugh, Cooper and 
Turner, 2008a, p. 396; Richmond, 2008b, p. 290, 2014, pp. 458–63, 2016, pp. 5, 180; 
Mac Ginty, 2013, pp. 4–5; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 315). Some suggest that 
‘service provision’ represents a form of socioeconomic distribution, contributing to 
peacebuilding by addressing social and economic rights and exclusion (Lidén, 2009, p. 
621; Newman, 2011, p. 1750). Critical scholars also claim that service provision can 
contribute to peacebuilding by responding to ‘everyday’ concerns and strengthening 
state-society relations and state legitimacy (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009a, pp. 567–
80, 2009c, p. 158, 2010a, p. 30; Mac Ginty, 2011b, pp. 81, 137, 180; Mitchell, 2011, p. 
1626; Newman, 2011, pp. 1737–50, 2014, p. 193; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 414–6; 
Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 6; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 308–9).  
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The findings in this chapter illustrate some limitations of formal policy 
statements and objectives, and of the critical peacebuilding discussions above, and the 
ways in which they are undermined through existing distribution contexts and practices. 
First, rather than serving as a means of ‘redistribution’, resource flows (at multiple 
scales) intersect with and reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities in resources 
and services. Second, ‘transparent’ resource allocation criteria justify and 
institutionalise distributional inequalities. Third, the lack of redistributive policies and 
programmes illustrates the ‘acceptance’ of inequalities linked to geographic or 
community-level resource distribution among donors and government. Actual and 
perceived geographic resource and service inequalities (and thus future political and 
economic opportunities) intersect with other dimensions of inequality, including 
socioeconomic class and ‘ethnic’ identity, and contribute to maintaining and 
intensifying tensions and grievances linked to historical and contemporary violence. 
However, these dynamics are omitted from policy narratives – and are paid little 
attention in the critical peacebuilding literature. 
Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge the ways in which neoliberal 
interventions focused on ‘productive’ self-reliance reproduce and widen distributional 
inequalities (Duffield, 2001, p. 51, 2010b, pp. 65–6, Richmond, 2008b, p. 295, 2009a, 
pp. 562–6, 2012, pp. 359–68, 2014, pp. 450–64; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 
2006; Newman, 2011, pp. 1743–4; Pugh, 2011, pp. 312–3). Duffield (2007a, pp. 68–9) 
refers to a neoliberal agenda that “shifts the burden of supporting life from states to 
people”. He draws a (biopolitical) distinction between ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ life, 
with ‘uninsured’ communities made responsible for meeting their social, economic, and 
welfare needs (2001, p. 101, 2005, p. 145, 2007b, p. 238, 2007a, pp. 16–24, 2008, pp. 
149–50, 2010b, p. 65). They are “expected to live within the limits of their own powers 
of self-reliance” (2007a, pp. 68–9) rather than benefiting from formal, centralised social 
protection or welfare systems. Education resource management thus serves 
‘governmental’ functions, shaping community practices through encounters with 
systems used to meet basic needs (Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1630–1). This focus on ‘self-
reliance’ (re)produces inequalities by entrenching different standards of and access to 
service provision and support (Pugh, 2010, pp. 263–8).  
The critical peacebuilding literature does not explicitly explore these processes 
in relation to the role of ‘social services’, or in terms of community perceptions and 
implications. The findings in this chapter expand critical peacebuilding discussions by 
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further illustrating ways in which the shifting of education financing responsibilities to 
communities and households is perceived as representing the state’s failure to provide 
anticipated ‘peace dividends’ and respond to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities. This 
contributes to grievances associated with inadequate resource and service provision and 
resulting intergroup and geographic inequalities, with clear implications for conflict 
when perceived by communities as involving deliberate marginalisation or deprivation. 
The ways in which the critical peacebuilding literature frames the potential 
contributions of ‘service provision’ pays limited attention to the links between 
education resource distribution and management and wider political and economic 
systems. The findings described in this chapter illustrate some ways in which education 
resource management advances wider neoliberal agendas, and associated implications 
for inequalities and peacebuilding. Taylor (2007, pp. 556–8, 2010, pp. 154–62) 
describes peacebuilding interventions in Gramscian terms as hegemonic political and 
economic projects operating and consolidated through domestic and external political 
and bureaucratic frameworks and policies. This requires “a form of politics that 
insulates elites and dissipates resistance… a ‘politics of support’ as well as a ‘politics of 
power’”, with neoliberal reforms presented “as the only sensible response which 
political leaders and policy-makers [can] possibly make” (Taylor, 2010, pp. 159–60, 
167). This chapter illustrates specific ways in which this occurs, and specific narratives 
used, within and through education systems. Reliance on community financing is 
presented as the inevitable solution to economic challenges (that is, ‘emergency’ budget 
shortages due to the war), marginalising or silencing discussion of alternatives (Pugh, 
2005, p. 31; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 2–3; Taylor, 2010, p. 167).  
This chapter illustrates the need to consider not only formal service 
‘provision/delivery’ and ‘actual’ distributional inequalities, but also how communities 
perceive distribution. Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge that the state’s 
failure to respond to public service expectations and ‘everyday’ needs can result in 
disappointment and dissatisfaction among populations (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 561–7; 
Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 319–20). Some critical scholars also acknowledge 
resulting implications for state-society relations. As Richmond (2014, p. 457) notes, 
“where the state and international community cannot mitigate inequality in order to 
distribute a range of peace dividends” (through, for example, socioeconomic 
redistribution), “citizens… begin to question the point of the state and its legitimacy”. 
Sabaratnam (2017, p. 132) explains that fragmentation (resulting from international 
  
140 
intervention) “negatively impacts the interactions of citizens and the state, because 
public services… become erratic, unpredictable and unreliable”. However, questions of 
perception and experience are largely neglected in this literature. This chapter illustrates 
the significance of community perceptions of marginalisation or exclusion (by political 
authorities and donors), reinforcing intergroup tensions and grievances when framed in 
‘us and them’ terms. They also illustrate the intensification of these processes in relation 
to specific historical conflict and peacebuilding contexts, not explicitly addressed in 
critical peacebuilding discussions.  
The CPE framework informed these analyses and the identification of potential 
‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to education resource and service distribution. 
Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of 
neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions 
(including ‘decentralised’ financing) that shift service provision costs and 
responsibilities from the state to communities and households. This is linked to a focus 
on ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘self-reliance’ that reproduces and widens 
distributional inequalities and intensifies perceptions of ethnic and geographic 
marginalisation and exclusion among community members. At the same time, a 
neoliberal focus on ‘individualised’ forms of inequality informs an ‘acceptance’ of these 
collective dimensions of marginalisation and limits redistributive responses. Resource 
distribution processes may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and 
elite reproduction by the SPLM/A. Budget decisions that prioritise military and security 
sectors, as well as appropriation and diversion of subnational education resources, can 
be understood as guided by efforts to secure and reward loyalty in order to maintain 
existing structures of power and authority. These patterns, along with tensions between 
levels of government, are also shaped by a structure of education governance that 
positions actors (e.g. national versus subnational officials) in relation to one another 
within a clear hierarchy, providing power in the form of control over allocation of 
resources (financial, material, and human). In these ways, the theoretical framework 
informs my arguments about the political structures underlying largely depoliticised 
explanations for inequalities in education resources and services, the ways in which 
these inequalities are reproduced and ‘legitimised’ at multiple scales, and the ways 
in which these shape both community perceptions and formal policy responses.  
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CHAPTER 7. “WE MADE IT AND WE OWN IT AND WE RUN IT”: 
DECENTRALISATION AND PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION CONTEXTS 
 
7.1 Chapter Introduction 
The critical peacebuilding literature emphasises the importance of ‘local’ 
participation and representation, to provide ‘local’ actors with opportunities to influence 
peacebuilding definitions and strategies and to promote responses to inequalities and 
‘everyday’ needs through the (re)distribution of opportunities for political participation. 
Some of this critical literature suggests that social service provision can attend to ‘local’ 
priorities, contribute to ‘democratic’ politics and state-society relations, and strengthen 
legitimacy of peacebuilding interventions. Participation and representation in decision-
making communities and processes are understood as representing ‘political’ 
dimensions of social justice (Fraser, 2013, p. 195). Analyses of specific aspects of 
‘local’ administration and service delivery provide insight into how governance agendas 
play out at ‘local’ levels (Mohmand and Loureiro, 2017, pp. 4–8). This requires 
attention to meanings and practices associated with participation, to “who is 
participating, in what, and for whose benefit” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 269). In this chapter, I 
explore these points in order to contribute to an expanded understanding of education’s 
peacebuilding role through the analysis of ‘local’ participation strategies and 
experiences in the education system. 
To inform my contributions to the critical peacebuilding scholarship, I draw on 
empirical findings concerning issues of participation and representation in education 
discourse and practice (specifically through ‘decentralised’ approaches to governance) 
and their implications in South Sudan. I critically engage with government and donor 
policy statements concerning participation in education and peacebuilding, and present 
a three-step critique of these statements. First, I suggest that education governance 
practices, as perceived and experienced by subnational actors, maintain centralised 
decision-making power while undermining trust in higher government levels. Second, I 
suggest that wider political systems and ‘cultures’ undermine possibilities for ‘local’ 
decision-making. Third, I suggest that while ‘decentralisation’ (through school-based 
management) is described in terms of ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, communities and 
households are defined as providers of resources and labour rather than participants in 
decision-making processes.  
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I draw upon the CPE framework to explore the ways in which discourses, 
practices, and understandings of decentralisation and participation are operationalised 
and reproduced across different scales and sites, and the ‘causal’ factors underlying 
approaches to ‘decentralised’ or ‘school-based’ education management. Events, 
processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of 
neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions that shift 
service provision costs and responsibilities from the state to communities and 
households, widening distributional inequalities and intensifying frustrations among 
community members. Governance processes may also be shaped by mechanisms of 
regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A, with rigid, hierarchical, and 
militarised management and communication procedures limiting opportunities to 
influence decision-making and maintaining existing structures of power and authority 
within and through educational institutions. These patterns are also shaped by a 
structure of education governance that positions actors in relation to one another 
within a clear hierarchy across scales of authority.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the ways in which policy 
and strategy documents produced by the government of South Sudan and international 
donors describe ‘local’ participation in education and peacebuilding. I provide an 
overview of key policy narratives, which focus on providing opportunities for ‘local’ 
participation, improving service delivery, and strengthening state-society relations. 
Second, I describe the ways in which education officials and other actors perceive and 
interpret the concept of decentralisation, and associated opportunities for participation, 
across scales of education governance. Third, I explore the ways in which existing 
political systems constrain opportunities for ‘local’ participation and influence. Fourth, I 
explore the experiences and perceptions of school-level actors and communities, 
focusing on tensions between ideas of ‘participation’ and ‘responsibility’. Finally, I 
discuss the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature. 
 
7.2 Participation and Representation in Government and Donor Policies 
In this section, I examine how policy and strategy documents produced by the 
government and international donors describe the role of ‘local’ participation in 
education and peacebuilding. Government peacebuilding and development policies and 
strategies identify ‘local’ participation and representation, generally through 
decentralised governance, as necessary for political transitions and peacebuilding. These 
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policy statements involve three broad narratives concerning the devolution of power and 
decentralisation38 of decision-making: providing opportunities for ‘local’ participation, 
improving service delivery, and strengthening state-society relations.  
The first broad narrative suggests that decentralisation provides opportunities for 
‘local’ political participation. The CPA (2005, pp. 11–3, 47) refers to decentralised 
administration based on ‘significant devolution of powers’ to state and local levels, with 
“involvement and participation of the people of South Sudan at all levels of government 
and national institutions” central to national unity. The Transitional Constitution and 
LGA established a system of decentralised governance based on the devolution of 
power and authority to state and local governments, with ‘local’ referring to counties 
and payams (GoSS, 2009, 2011). The School Governance Toolkit identifies school-
based management as a form of decentralisation involving “redistribution of decision-
making authority… to head-teachers, teachers, parents, students and community 
members” (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, p. 6). School governing bodies include 
primary school management committees and secondary school boards of governors, 
who report to and are part of PTAs. According to the General Education Act, cited in 
the School Governance Policy, school governing bodies “are the authority in all 
matters… in schools” (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, p. 8). Donors such as USAID 
(2011b, p. 2) also refer to ‘citizen participation’ and responsibility for service delivery, 
including through parental involvement in school management. 
The second narrative suggests that decentralisation can strengthen and improve 
service delivery and resource management. The CPA (2005, p. 47) cites “a commitment 
to devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making in regard to 
development, service delivery and governance”. This involves delivery of public 
services by “the level of government close to the people” (p. 42). The State and Local 
Government Guidelines for the education sector suggest that funding provision to 
‘local’ government improves services “through more effective budgeting, spending and 
reporting” (MoEST, 2014c, p. 2). International donors also describe decentralisation as 
a means of ensuring effective service delivery (World Bank, 2013a, p. 21). 
                                                
38 Decentralisation involves the transfer of power, responsibility, and finances from central to subnational 
levels of government (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008, p. 7). Different types of decentralisation involve 
different objectives, decision-making authority, and degrees of subnational autonomy (Hartmann, 2008, 
p. 171). These range from deconcentration (administrative decentralisation), involving redistribution of 
financial and management responsibilities among subnational branches of the central government to 
devolution (democratic decentralisation), involving transfer of decision-making authority, resources, and 
management responsibilities to quasi-autonomous subnational or local governments (Manor, 1999, p. 5). 
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The third narrative suggests that decentralisation strengthens state-society 
relations. The JAM (2005, p. 24) identifies local participation through devolution as a 
means of “restoring the social contract between the authorities and the citizens” and 
enhancing confidence in governance institutions. The national curriculum framework 
emphasises education’s role in developing “good citizens of South Sudan”, as “active 
participants in society” and committed to democracy (MoEST, 2015a, p. 5). Drawing 
links to democratisation, international donors suggest that education contributes to 
democratic governance and transitions by promoting respect for democracy (DFID, 
2010b, p. 11; USAID, 2011a, pp. 2–3; UNESCO, 2014, p. 14). Based on empirical 
findings outlined in the subsequent sections, I argue that these policy statements are 
challenged or undermined by existing ‘decentralised’ governance processes and 
practices, perceptions of opportunities for participation across scales of governance, and 
community perceptions of ‘participation’ as ‘responsibility’ for service provision. 
 
7.3 Perceptions and Experiences of Decentralisation 
This section presents the first part of my critique of government and donor 
policy statements. I examine how the concept of decentralisation and associated 
opportunities for participation are defined, perceived, and experienced across scales of 
education governance. I suggest that current governance processes and practices 
maintain centralised decision-making power while undermining trust in higher levels of 
government among county, payam, and school representatives. Education actors 
described decentralisation, in an idealised sense, as addressing some of the most 
significant challenges and concerns facing communities: opportunities for involvement 
in decision-making, access to and management of social services and resources, and 
geographic isolation and access. These assumptions and expectations concerning 
decentralisation, as well as the lack of ‘real’ decentralisation in practice, must be 
considered in historical context, in relation to processes (and perceived promises and 
benefits) of reform associated with ‘liberation’, peace, and independence. 
Education officials at all levels of government, as well as some peacebuilding, 
civil society, and international actors, suggested that decentralised education 
governance could, ideally, contribute to strengthening decision-making processes, 
improving resource and service management, and addressing geographic access 
challenges. These represent some of the most significant concerns facing communities 
in South Sudan, as well as reflecting factors associated with historical and contemporary 
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patterns of conflict (described in Chapter 2). With respect to decision-making, education 
and civil society actors suggested that decentralisation could encourage needs-
responsive decision-making, strengthen government visibility and legitimacy, and 
provide opportunities for ‘local’ political participation, ‘ownership’, self-reliance, and 
self-determination. For example, a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria described 
possibilities for political expression through decentralisation:  
The most important thing is always to allow for democratic space. Let people 
express what they want within a bigger system… because if you know what are 
priorities of the people, then you will be able to address their problems. 
Many MoEST representatives described decentralisation’s (potential) benefits in 
terms of informing decisions responsive to popular needs and situations, based on more 
‘localised’ presence and communication. As a CSO representative explained, 
decentralised governance enables decisions to be made by people who know the 
context: “[This] gives responsibility to people of the state: ‘I know my state, my people, 
the language that people take… I have many skills necessary to work here’”. A state 
MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal drew attention to possibilities for increased 
government presence and communication: “This decentralisation of education is that 
they want to get near to the community or to grassroots, because it should be helping 
the flow, going up and coming down”.  
People responsible for ‘up and down’ communication include ‘local’ (county, 
payam) education officials and school-level actors (school managers, teachers, 
governing bodies such as PTAs). School-level actors are important mediators between 
governments and communities. They serve as “agents who constitute the… interface 
between an intervention and those to whom it is destined”, mediating contact between 
populations and public (or international) institutions (de Sardan, 2005, pp. 166–7). As a 
government official in Western Bahr el Ghazal explained, PTAs play critical roles in 
mediating school- community relations: “The PTA’s role is to relate the school with the 
community… They can be a mediator between the community and the school. They are 
the eyes of the community at the schools [and] can bring school needs to the 
community”. As a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained, decentralised 
education governance, including school-based management, can encourage community 
members to take initiative in decision-making and management: 
When we decentralise the powers, it’s good. This will make all the people 
concerned to participate with their ideas… They will not stay idle. They will not 
just wait for the instruction. They need to participate. 
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With respect to resource and service management, education officials suggested 
that decentralisation could increase efficiency, accountability, and sustainability and 
encourage needs-responsive allocation. A state MoEST official in Central Equatoria 
explained that decentralised governance could enable context-specific, equitable, and 
accountable resource allocation, in addition to promoting cooperation and ownership: 
There are so many benefits, one of which there is an equitable sharing of 
resources based on the needs of each county… The rights of each county are 
granted according to what they demand, so in a way, there’s democratic space 
that is always allowed, to make sure that everybody becomes participatory. 
There’s a state of ownership because we made it and we own it and we can run 
it, so that is the benefit. It also promotes a lot of teamwork, people go together… 
It’s all about saying, ‘Okay, if these are the resources, then we need to divide 
these resources accordingly’, so that it allows for proper accountability.  
 
An INGO representative described the role of PTAs in school-level planning and 
resource management. This includes community engagement in governance, responding 
to specific needs and priorities, and ensuring accountability: 
The chair of the PTA or the school management committee is the principal 
signatory for the [capitation grant] account, so before that money goes we have 
to help the school develop a plan. ‘What’s your plan, as a school?’ ‘We want to 
dig a pit latrine, we want to fix a window… This is our plan’… The money goes 
to the school and the PTAs ensure that the money is used properly. 
Similarly, a donor representative described school-based management as strengthening 
‘accountability’ in resource management: 
Strong community involvement in education needs to be maintained and 
strengthened, especially in terms of reducing misuse of funds and facilities by 
officials… Having a stronger community watchdog mentality and stronger 
involvement in the oversight of budgeting and planning will be healthy, and 
there’s a lot trying to do now with the school management committees… 
[There’s] a bottom-up process being encouraged.  
Decentralisation could also strengthen sustainability in resource management, explained 
a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria: 
Our vision should be towards granting people to be self-sustaining, so that they 
can be able to develop… People can develop when they are given democratic 
space, when they can be allowed to manage their resources [and be] 
accountable.  
With respect to geographic access, education and civil society representatives suggested 
that decentralisation could facilitate access to remote geographic communities. 
“Decentralisation might be good as it can give accessibility to the most rural 
communities”, suggested one South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor. 
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Similarly, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained that decentralisation might 
help to address geographic service and representation inequalities: 
[Decentralisation] will help that a lot, because some people are very far from 
the centre. Like Maban here, it is very difficult because of poor communication. 
If they are given all of their own things there and they can make their own 
affairs, this is well and good… This will be good because the country is very 
large and other places are very far from the centre. 
The statements above illustrate the expected benefits associated with 
decentralisation. In practice, however, subnational education officials described very 
different experiences of ‘participation’ and ‘representation’. The ways in which 
‘decentralisation’ is experienced and perceived by ‘local’ officials and school 
representatives provides insight into tensions between ‘official’ aims and associated 
assumptions and expectations, and ‘actual’ implementation of decentralisation. This 
affects trust in higher levels of government, in terms of representing ‘local’ interests, 
responding to needs and concerns, and communicating policy information. This 
challenges and undermines formal policy statements as well as anticipated benefits. For 
example, a group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Equatoria felt that 
decentralisation was meant to increase budgets allocations to states and schools, 
including construction of more schools, but is not implemented by the government.  
Subnational education officials explained that the central ministry and donors 
develop policies with limited, if any, input from subnational ministries. Even when 
provided with opportunities to ‘participate’ in decision-making, school managers, 
teachers, and county and payam officials are generally limited to approving decisions 
made by higher-level authorities, rather than influencing policy processes based on their 
stated needs and priorities. Some subnational officials described involvement in national 
policy reviews and state-level policy and budget development (based on national 
guidelines). Others described initiatives to facilitate communication of information to 
schools, such as meetings and workshops for managers. For example, one county 
education official explained that meetings are organised for inspectors, supervisors, and 
head teachers to communicate information about policies and decisions (such as school 
calendars). However, these occasions generally involve being informed of and ‘rubber 
stamping’ decisions made by central or state governments, rather than opportunities to 
influence decisions. They represent tokenistic forms of ‘participation’ with little to no 
transfer of power and control (Cornwall, 2008, p. 270). “The issue is [that] everything is 
put in Juba. It’s not sent to the state… Every money, every resources, every decision, 
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only in Juba”, explained a state teachers’ union representative. A state MoEST official 
in Upper Nile explained that central ministry decisions are sent to state ministries and 
passed down to schools with no opportunities to influence the policy content:  
The national ministry in Juba is always the one who plan. After they plan, they 
give us the final plan and the information required from us at the level of the 
state… and from there we come down from the level of the ministry to the 
county, payam, up to the schools.  
Payam and school representatives, in particular, reported few (if any) 
opportunities to influence policy development and decisions, and are often unaware of 
processes or decisions at the central level. School managers and teachers in different 
states described inconsistent transmission of policies from the MoEST to schools, 
affecting trust in the ministry. They reported that they do not receive information about 
education policies or that information is significantly delayed, causing confusion and 
frustration. “Up to now, we don’t have a clear policy. This is confusing us… What we 
want from the ministry is the curriculum and the plan,” reported a group of secondary 
teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Similarly, a state teachers’ 
union representative explained how this lack of communication affects confidence in 
the ministry: “The Ministry of Education has its policy, but we don’t know what 
happens inside the office… Without transparency, there is something moving in the 
darkness. You will not see”.  
 In addition to problems with top-down policy communication, payam officials, 
school managers, and teachers expressed frustration with bottom-up communication. 
They described a lack of representation in decision-making at school and ministry 
levels, explaining that their concerns and suggestions are rarely communicated ‘up the 
chain’ or considered by higher authorities. For example, payam officials in Warrap 
reported that they have no opportunities to influence central or state policy decisions or 
planning. They make recommendations at the payam level, but state officials “don’t see 
our decisions as something important”. As a payam supervisor explained,  
[Central ministry officials] are supposed to meet us because the work is done 
down here in the schools… [We] are supposed to go and plan together but they 
don’t do it. They just do it up there, and just pass the information to us. We are 
not involved in planning, but we should be. 
Similarly, a head teacher in Central Equatoria described the lack of opportunities to 
provide input on policy decisions or communicate concerns: 
We are not able to communicate these concerns, to say, ‘This is wrong’, to make 
suggestions for change to the state ministry or the central ministry… We can say 
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things sometimes in meetings, but it doesn’t go further… They make [the 
policies] there and bring to us. We have to implement without knowing how 
good it is.  
County and payam officials and school managers reported that they frequently attempt 
to communicate specific needs, concerns, and suggestions (regarding, for example, 
financial or human resources) to state ministries, donors, and INGOs. However, there is 
rarely any feedback and never any increase in resource allocations. This intensifies 
frustration and decreases confidence in the government and international actors.  
Central and state MoEST officials and donor and INGO representatives are often 
themselves responsible for undermining existing opportunities and procedures for 
communication and participation in decision-making. This is illustrated by limited 
consultation with MoEST on the part of donors in relation to resource allocation 
decisions, discussed in Chapter 6. Additionally, county and payam officials expressed 
disappointment and frustration when government officials and international actors 
bypass their offices when approaching schools, while school managers and teachers 
expressed disappointment and frustration when government and international officials 
fail to engage them in planning.  
Some subnational officials were frustrated with the way in which donors engage 
with different ministry levels in project planning and implementation. As one payam 
supervisor explained, donors ought to involve payam and school managers when 
making decisions involving schools: “They should involve us… They don’t know what 
happens down here if they make meetings ‘up there’”. Another payam official in 
Warrap emphasised the expectation that people will pass through proper channels and 
respect payam authority when contacting schools: “If anyone comes from higher 
authority to go to the school, they can’t bypass our office. It has to pass through our 
office… If anyone wants to support a school, we are the one to go into schools”. 
However, some donors approach schools directly without involving payam offices. I 
observed this during the research period: higher-level MoEST officials and UNICEF 
representatives would move straight from the state ministry to schools without officially 
informing county and payam offices prior to school visits. Payam officials in different 
states expressed frustration when government officials and partners engage only with 
state and county authorities, or when they approach schools without passing through the 
payam. A payam official in Warrap described feelings of frustration that result when 
ministry or NGO representatives bypass their office and undermine their authority: 
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There are people who… bypass the payam, go to the school direct… It is like in 
the family and someone goes direct to your children without consulting you as 
the head of family… I feel as somebody who does not know anything… I cannot 
feel as I am a responsible person.  
While county and payam officials reported that donors and government officials 
bypass their offices when approaching schools, school managers and teachers in 
different states expressed frustration when donors and partners engage only with 
subnational government authorities. They suggested that direct communication with 
schools is necessary to ensure the representation of community voices and concerns. A 
group of primary teachers and PTA members in Warrap explained that donors used to 
go directly to schools to ask about challenges and provide materials, but that since 2011 
there has been no direct relationship between donors and schools. Instead, donors 
approach the MoEST to identify challenges and needs. These teachers felt that donors 
should engage directly with schools: “When you come direct to the school… 
information will be correct”. Similarly, a head teacher in Central Equatoria explained 
that, “If donors are supposed to be serious, they shouldn’t go only straight to the 
ministry. They should go to schools to see what is happening first”.  
In these ways, government officials and donors undermine the limited authority 
and responsibility that local government and school officials feel they have, and exert 
their own authority over subnational ministry offices. This illustrates a clear gap 
between policy statements emphasising the importance of ‘decentralised’ administration 
and ‘local’ participation, and actual engagement with ‘local’ representatives. 
‘Decentralised’ procedures and practices thus maintain and reinforce vertical, scalar 
hierarchies (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, pp. 982–4), through “multiple, mundane 
domains of bureaucratic practice” at the ‘everyday’ level (Ferguson, 2006, pp. 110–1).  
Discussions of school managers’ and subnational officials’ ‘participation’ were 
often framed in terms of ‘failure’ to fulfil roles and responsibilities. Central MoEST and 
donor representatives focused on their ‘lack of capacity’, ‘limited understanding’ of 
responsibilities, and ‘ignorance’ or ‘lack of awareness’. For example, as one 
international organisation representative stated,  
Headmasters don’t know what their roles are. School supervisors are just by 
name. The majority of people sitting in the government and the Ministry of 
Education, they are called inspectors but you need to ask them, ‘What does an 
inspector do?’  
These perspectives reflect a focus on ‘formal’ definitions and expectations of 
knowledge and capacity required for participation and influence – such as the ‘capacity’ 
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to mobilise community-level financial resources. They also reflect (neo)colonial denial 
of ‘local’ management abilities and approaches rooted in the context-specific 
knowledge and years (and decades) of education sector experience. These framings 
depoliticise, justify, and legitimise limited opportunities for decision-making 
involvement and influence, reflecting a view of local officials and school managers as 
“unable to play a constructive role because they effectively lack ‘capacity’ in building 
formal liberal order” (Richmond, 2009c, p. 153).  
To understand decentralisation processes and implications, historical dimensions 
and contexts must be considered. Beliefs, assumptions, and expectations tied to 
decentralisation, and barriers to implementation, should be considered in relation to 
processes (and perceived promises) of reform associated with ‘liberation’, peace, and 
independence – as well as implications for conflict. Discussions of the maintenance of 
centralised authority echo historical tensions and frustrations over political authority 
and control in southern Sudan. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, under the Addis 
Ababa agreement in the 1980s, the southern administration did not formally control 
education, undermining aspects of autonomy. Additionally, frustrations over top-down 
imposition of decisions about education policy and practice on the part of Sudanese 
authorities were implicated in dynamics of violent conflict between north and south. 
During the ‘war of liberation’, Garang described the centralised power of the Khartoum 
regime as injustice, explaining the collapse of the Addis Ababa agreement thusly: “That 
arrangement did not stand the test of time because it did not redistribute power at the 
center” (2013, p. 194). During CPA negotiations, he repeatedly referred to the 
establishment of an inclusive, representative, and democratic system of governance, 
identifying ‘strong local governments’ as central to peace (2014, pp. 104, 149–50, 164, 
196). He called for a national development strategy that would “effectively deliver 
social services through devolution and decentralization of power and empowerment to 
the people” (p. 128). Current grievances associated with the lack of ‘real’ 
decentralisation of authority in South Sudan must be considered in relation to these 
statements, and the ways in which decentralisation has been (in theory, at least) tied to 
processes of liberation and peace. This raises questions about the ways in which 
existing political ‘cultures’ and interests undermine, rather than support, the 
redistribution of power and influence.  
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7.4 Wider Political Dynamics of Education-Sector ‘Decentralisation’  
This section presents the second part of my critique. I explore broader political 
factors and contexts influencing processes and experiences of decentralisation at 
subnational and school levels. I suggest that these wider political systems and ‘cultures’ 
limit and undermine possibilities for ‘local’ participation and influence in decision-
making. As discussed above, county, payam, and school-level actors (managers, 
teachers, PTA members) experience limited involvement in decision-making processes. 
Numerous obstacles restrict their participation, including hierarchical communication 
procedures and protocols, ‘militarised’ and patronage-based institutional cultures, and a 
lack of subnational financial resources. Together, these challenge policy statements as 
well as popular expectations described in the preceding section.  
The decentralisation agenda can be understood as a means of redistributing 
power. It also provides “a powerful means of maintaining relations of rule” (Cornwall 
and Brock, 2005, p. 5), “allowing rulers to dodge more meaningful political reforms” 
(LeVan, 2015, p. 20). Subnational and school-level education actors described barriers 
to participation illustrating the maintenance of existing political hierarchies and 
relations of power, as well as the influence of wider political contexts. Contemporary 
‘decentralisation’ should be considered in historical context rather than as a ‘new’ (e.g. 
post-CPA) process. The contemporary system is based on subnational ‘civilian’ 
administration structures established (but inconsistently implemented and characterised 
by continued military control) by the SPLM/A in the 1990s39 (Branch and Mampilly, 
2005, pp. 6–7; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 54–8, 114–6, 150–66, 2007, p. 5; Podder, 2014, pp. 
225–8; Awolich, 2015, pp. 10–2). These reforms drew on systems of ‘indirect rule’ 
established during the colonial period and decentralisation policies enacted by Sudanese 
regimes since the 1960s (Johnson, 2003, p. 105, 2014b, p. 21). ‘Decentralisation’ 
processes described by subnational and school-level education actors illustrate the 
persistence of some of these historical dynamics. 
Education governance approaches cannot be considered in isolation from wider 
political norms and ‘cultures’. Existing communication procedures and protocols 
between different levels of the MoEST limit opportunities for ‘local’ officials and 
school actors to influence decision-making or voice needs and suggestions. They also 
                                                
39 This was considered a means of extending control over rural areas, communities, and resources and 
gain support from different ethnic communities (Branch and Mampilly, 2005, pp. 4–6; Rolandsen, 2005, 
p. 114; Thomas, 2012, pp. 31–2; Podder, 2014, pp. 226–7) and from international supporters, aligning 
with INGO agendas (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 54; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 427). 
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entrench and legitimise the centralisation of authority under the guise of formal 
‘procedures’. It is difficult to communicate concerns or suggestions to higher levels of 
government as there are so many steps involved: school to payam, payam to county, 
country to state, state to centre. Central and state MoEST officials emphasised the 
importance of this hierarchical chain of communication, illustrating the ways in which 
‘decentralisation’ maintains existing political hierarchies. “The [payam] supervisor will 
come and report to the county director, the county director reports to the state director 
general. That’s the link… The state head is the centre”, explained a central MoEST 
official. School or payam representatives “cannot jump from the payam to the state 
ministry, or from the ministry to the payam”, reported a payam supervisor. This limits 
opportunities for communication of (and responses to) needs and concerns, as 
communication ‘up the chain’ may depend on individual relationships and interests. For 
example, if a head teacher’s concern is considered important by the payam supervisor it 
may be transmitted to the county office, but “if the payam doesn’t consider it or value 
it, it stops there”. Payam officials in Warrap reported that if their suggestions do not 
serve the interests of or benefit higher-level authorities, their suggestions are ignored: 
“We cannot bring them something, so they don’t accept”.  
While these officials cannot directly approach higher ministry levels, central or 
state officials can bypass county and payam offices (to transmit or collect information 
directly to/from schools, for example). This illustrates unequal possibilities for action 
across scales of MoEST administration. For those at central or state levels, positions in 
the ‘vertical hierarchy’ provide “the privilege of a particular kind of spatial mobility” 
(Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p. 987). The ways in which individual officials exert 
agency within this system should also be considered. For example, while central and 
state-level ministry officials oversee hierarchical systems of communication that limit 
opportunities for ‘local’ officials, individuals at each ministry level control upward and 
downward information flows. These processes illustrate how power “is remade at 
various junctures within everyday life” and the ways in which education actors “consent 
to (and reproduce) those tacit and covert relations of power” in ‘everyday’ institution 
contexts and relations (Butler, 2000, pp. 13–4). Education officials at different levels of 
education governance (state, county, payam) and school-level actors described 
frustrations and tensions associated with existing governance arrangements, but also 
described the ways in which they work within (and reproduce) these arrangements.  
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Decentralisation can be understood as a means of redistributing decision-making 
power or maintaining existing power relations. Subnational MoEST officials’ 
descriptions of their ‘decentralisation’ experiences illustrate ways in which education 
governance (and opportunities for participation) are shaped by, and replicate, wider 
structures and dynamics of political authority at national and subnational levels. These 
include hierarchical and militaristic relations of power, as well as systems of patronage 
and loyalty in government institutions. These wider political dynamics challenge policy 
statements concerning improved participation and accountability through 
decentralisation.  
First, hierarchical and militaristic relationships between school-level and 
ministry actors and within the MoEST influence communication and participation 
opportunities. Civilian political and administrative structures remain highly militarised, 
reflecting the SPLM/A’s military origins and the presence of former armed group 
members in positions of authority in the MoEST. Military personnel occupy many 
senior government positions, and management approaches are characterised by 
centralised authority, militaristic language, use of threats and force, and intolerance of 
dissent (Blunt, 2003, pp. 133–4; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 64, 155–6; Knopf, 2013, p. 23; de 
Waal, 2014, p. 348; Hutton, 2014, p. 16). These factors are reflected in education 
leadership practices. Education and donor representatives explained that local education 
officials ‘work on orders’ and often feel unable to voice suggestions: “You don’t give 
ideas to the boss. You just salute”. “The government is a military government and 
people work on orders”, noted one CSO representative. Supervision and management 
are often based on rank, threats, and intimidation of teachers and school managers. For 
example, a donor representative observed, “I think the relationship between [school] 
heads and supervisors must be affected to some extent by the fact of rank… certainly 
ranking and depending on what kind of powers do you have in reality”. Even when 
formal policies and procedures guide administration, institutional ‘culture’ exerts a clear 
influence on decision-making opportunities and influence.  
Systems of patronage, authority, and loyalty in government institutions influence 
dynamics of participation at subnational levels, and complicate assumptions about 
‘local’ representation and accountability. Decentralisation enables “a localised power 
grip over resources”, with subnational authorities acting (in theory, at least) in the 
interest of their constituencies (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 38–9). Local 
government administrators (including education officials) are often appointed on the 
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basis of kinship, ethnic, or ‘tribal’ affiliation or military or political connections (Blunt, 
2003, pp. 133–4; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 41; Kameir, 2011, p. 17; Jok, 2013, p. 
4; Pinaud, 2014, pp. 207–9). Public sector employment is central to patronage networks, 
use to secure political loyalty for political/military elites and provide access to resources 
for ‘local’ officials and constituencies (Leonardi, 2007, p. 400; Kameir, 2011, p. 17; de 
Waal, 2013, p. 225, 2014, pp. 350–1, 2014, p. 354; Pinaud, 2014, pp. 208–9). 
Decentralisation, in tying access to government services and resources to a particular 
administrative (territorial) location, contributes to what Leonardi (2013, p. 120) 
describes as ‘the production of locality’ by “tethering people to their chiefs”, under 
British colonial rule and in contemporary South Sudan.  
MoEST officials and teachers described patronage, nepotism, and tribalism in 
education sector hiring and promotion practices. For example, primary teachers and 
PTA members in Western Equatoria explained that state ministries hire members of 
their network so they can receive salaries: “The ministry employs only one tribe or 
county and this leads to conflict… [With] tribal employment at the ministry level, other 
counties or tribes cannot benefit”. “People are employed for their interests… People 
receive money but we don’t know how or when they were recruited. We just find them 
there”, reported a payam official. Systems of patronage and authority influence access 
to information and ‘participation’. For example, a group of primary teachers and PTA 
members in Western Bahr el Ghazal described the allocation of opportunities to attend 
training and policy development events: 
When there is training in Juba, the ministry does not choose those who are in 
the field… they choose people in the ministry to go for training, even for training 
on something that is very important for teachers, they just choose those in their 
office, they just choose themselves. 
Systems of patronage and authority complicate assumptions about ‘local’ 
representation and accountability through decentralisation. As one INGO representative 
noted, school managers may feel that their loyalty lies with state ministries, rather than 
payam or county offices: “Most of the places don’t have PTAs, just a headmaster… You 
know he’s close to the county education director… He’s just posted to the school and 
that’s it”. Appointment through patronage networks can mean that ‘local’ 
representatives are more accountable to their ‘patrons’ (at state or central levels), upon 
whom they rely for their position and salary, than to their communities or schools. A 
state MoEST official in Central Equatoria described the ways in which patronage-based 
appointments influence dynamics of loyalty, accountability, and representation: 
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If we go by appointments systems… [I am] answerable to you because I want to 
make sure my position is maintained… The people whom I lead, I disregard 
them because… they will not take me wherever they want… Because Gabrielle 
appointed me, I should do more in her area where she’s from than in my own.  
This raises questions about the representativeness of ‘local’ voices, given that aims and 
expectations associated with decentralisation focus on ‘local’ representation and 
accountability. Local authorities do, however, ‘redistribute’ education resources to their 
own constituencies (described in Chapter 5), illustrating, in a sense, how 
decentralisation models are “ignored, resisted, ‘consumed’ or tactically used” by 
subnational officials (Mosse, 2005, pp. 16–7). This draws attention to the multiple roles 
that ‘local’ education actors (e.g. county and payam officials, school managers) play, 
balancing multiple dimensions and scales of representation and accountability, from 
‘local’ school and community to ministry and government levels. This also echoes 
historical processes of bargaining, brokering, and negotiation between ‘local’ authorities 
and governments (including through forms of patronage) in (South) Sudan during and 
after the British colonial period (Leonardi, 2013, pp. 49–59). 
 Finally, a lack of resources at subnational levels limits ‘decentralisation’ of 
management and decision-making opportunities. As noted in Chapter 6, resource 
distribution procedures constrain context-specific allocation possibilities, and no 
specific policies address redistribution across geographic areas. Statements about the 
expected benefits of decentralisation are based on the assumption that service delivery 
resources will be available, and the failure to deliver expected benefits can undermine 
communities’ trust in the government. Disparities in ‘benefits’ of decentralisation across 
geographic regions may drive tensions and grievances, linked to differences in 
financing sources, geographic barriers impeding decentralised governance, and so on. 
Geographic inequalities in resources and representation are particularly significant when 
they intersect with ethnic boundaries. As noted earlier, Leonardi (2013) explains that 
decentralisation policies outlined in the Local Government Act resulted not only in 
increasingly “territorialised and ethnicised definitions of locality and community” (p. 
182), but also strengthening expectations of access to services and resources linked 
directly to ‘territorial locality’ (pp. 185–6). In this context, perceptions of the ‘failure’ 
of decentralisation have particular significance. A group of primary teachers and PTA 
members in Western Equatoria explained that while decentralisation could, in theory, 
enable greater access to government resources and services, this is not the case in 
practice: “Decentralisation was supposed to be good… It was supposed to ensure that 
  
157 
more budget was given to the state and to schools… but it is not implemented by the 
government”. Decentralisation of financing responsibility from central to subnational 
levels government can also entrench existing inequalities in material and human 
resources. A central MoEST official acknowledged the limitations of the 
decentralisation agenda, suggesting that it could actually widen resource inequalities 
given geographic access disparities: 
The issue of decentralisation does not work… My fear is that the moment we 
decentralise education we cripple the education and we make it more disabled… 
because there are areas that are not yet having qualified teachers, so if you are 
emphasising decentralisation, how will you get the teachers?  
Decentralisation depends on communication and interaction between multiple 
levels of government, and between ‘local’ ministry officials and schools. In the previous 
section, MoEST officials suggested that ‘decentralised’ education governance can 
extend the government’s reach to and relationship with remote, rural areas. However, as 
the examples below indicate, the mere presence of ‘local’ officials does not translate to 
improved information flows. School managers and local officials described 
communication that was infrequent at best, due to poor transport infrastructure and 
resources and intermittent mobile networks – which were experienced first-hand during 
the fieldwork period. 40  Payam and county education officials (e.g. supervisors, 
inspectors) are responsible for visiting schools to assess administration and 
management, identify needs and challenges, and communicate policies and directives. 
As government transfers rarely cover anything but salaries, a lack of resources limits 
opportunities for bottom-up and top-down communication. A county education official 
in Upper Nile reported that to visit payams and schools, they use their own money to 
pay for transportation or travel by foot for up to four hours: “There is no car. I have to 
go on foot, you see, but if there were cars, I would just go by car and then come back in 
a short time”. Unreliable or non-existent telephone and Internet networks in some areas 
leave few options for communication: “Some counties, they don’t have these networks, 
so it is sometimes very difficult, because you cannot give a report verbally… It is very 
                                                
40 For example, the journey between Kuajok and Tonj East (both in Warrap), travelling directly with 
UNICEF, took two days and required passing through an adjacent state (Western Bahr el Ghazal), as 
there are no direct roads between Kuajok and Tonj. The journey was dependent on the weather, with rain 
making parts of the road impassable. (Many subnational MoEST authorities do not have access to 
vehicles capable to navigating the difficult roads, relying on motorbikes or bicycles.) In Tonj East, there 
was no Internet connection and the one mobile network was only intermittently accessible.  
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difficult in some places”, explained a central MoEST official. A state MoEST official in 
Western Equatoria described these challenges in detail: 
When the network is poor, you will fail to get in touch with a particular county. 
In case we have a hard copy of the policy we want to disseminate to the 
counties, that’s where we have problems because there is no mailing system so 
we have to look for an individual and say, ‘Please help us’. Sometimes the 
person might forget and then we have to send the same document twice. And the 
information required, we might not get it in time because of the issue of our 
mailing system and inefficiency… Secondly, the network, Internet connection is 
not available. We might have Internet here, but Internet connections are not in 
the counties, so communication of information is difficult.  
At the same time, geographic isolation and challenges to communication systems mean 
that county and payam officials, school managers, and teachers have some autonomy 
from direct control, and more ‘independent’ decision-making.  
Experiences and perceptions outlined in these sections suggest that, contrary to 
policy statements about decentralised decision-making and devolution of power, 
subnational education officials experience governance processes as involving little 
space for participation. This is linked to hierarchical communication protocols, wider 
political norms and cultures, and resource shortages impeding communication and 
engagement. Together, these affect ‘local’ trust in higher levels of government, in terms 
of representing their interests, responding to needs and concerns, and communicating 
policy information. The gap between policy statements and experiences of 
‘decentralisation’ is further highlighted by approaches to ‘decentralisation’ through 
school-based management, involving the (re)definition of community and household 
‘participation’ as responsibility for  education financing.  
 
7.5 Interpretations of Decentralisation: ‘Participation as Responsibility’ 
This section presents the third part of my critique, examining interpretations, 
experiences, and perceptions associated with ‘participation’ in education management 
and decision-making in schools and communities. I argue that while ‘decentralisation’ 
through school-based management is framed in terms of ‘participation’ and 
‘ownership’, communities and households are defined as resource and labour providers 
rather than participants in decision-making. In theory, school governing bodies are 
mechanisms for community participation and redistribution of authority. In practice, 
they serve neoliberal agendas involving reduced public spending on education and 
shifting of financing responsibilities to communities and households. This illustrates the 
  
159 
instrumentalisation of ‘participation’ to achieve other aims and interests (Cornwall, 
2008, p. 274). This builds on findings in Chapter 6 concerning frustrations and 
grievances associated with government failure to deliver expected services and shifting 
financing responsibility to communities and households. School managers and teachers 
in different states described the importance of ownership over school functioning, 
resources, and internal decision-making. However, MoEST and donor discourses blur 
the line between ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, and primary or sole responsibility for 
school financing. This undermines the positive (‘peacebuilding’) effects of efforts to 
‘decentralise’ management responsibility and increase community participation, of 
particular importance given expected education improvements (via decentralisation) as 
peace dividends and benefits of ‘post-conflict’ reforms.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, school governing bodies (primarily PTAs) are 
responsible for collecting funds to support education provision. This reflects the direct 
transfer of responsibility (or burden) for financing from the government to ‘local’ level. 
Communities and households are responsible not only for contributing to school 
functioning but are assigned primary or sole responsibility for constructing learning 
spaces, paying and housing teachers, and other central aspects of education provision. 
Community and household responsibility is not just about financing: it involves taking 
on a wide range of education management and administration roles, representing 
multiple forms of labour as part of ‘decentralised’ school-based management. The 
School Governance Toolkit assigns numerous roles and responsibilities to school 
managers and governing bodies, requiring multiple areas of expertise: school 
development planning, budgeting and management of school funds, human resource 
management, supervising teaching and classrooms, supporting teacher conduct and 
development, promoting student achievement, monitoring school progress, and 
mobilising local school development support (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014). As a 
state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained,  
The budget of the school, if there is collection of money, they should know how 
that money is used, and they must monitor the teachers, whether they are 
teaching, they are doing work. And they must see the result of the examination, 
they must analyse the results … They should visit the school from time to time to 
know the situation of the school, how this school is functioning. 
Similarly, an INGO representative explained that school managers are expected to take 
initiative in fulfilling multiple management responsibilities:  
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Getting the PTA involved in the governance of the school… they should not wait 
for an inspector from the state capital. ‘You’re in Maridi… why should you wait 
for the inspector from Yambio?’ So we tell the PTAs, ‘If you are supposed to be 
the boss, you know how the school should run, should be run properly [to] 
ensure that the teachers come on time’.  
These statements illustrate the multiple forms of responsibility and labour 
assigned to communities and households. MoEST and INGO representatives described 
(and justified) community and household responsibility for school support and 
financing in different ways, drawing on two main narratives: promoting ownership and 
investment, and demonstrating ‘care’ for children. This reflects (neoliberal) assumptions 
that communities and households will only value (or feel ‘ownership’ of) education if 
they are paying for it. This also reflects ‘naming power’ through policy discourses: the 
transfer of financial responsibility is reframed in a language of ‘ownership’ and ‘care’. 
With respect to the first narrative, MoEST and INGO representatives described 
responsibility for school support as promoting ownership and investment and enabling 
communities to feel that schools ‘belong’ to them. “We encourage the PTA and the 
other parents to participate in the school because we want them to feel that that school 
is belonging to them, not to the government”, explained a state MoEST official in Upper 
Nile. Another official in Upper Nile discussed this reasoning in more detail:  
The organisation like UNICEF comes to construct learning spaces and the 
community is not participating. They will say, ‘This school belongs to UNICEF, 
it does not belong to the community. This school belongs to UNICEF or belongs 
to the government there’. This is what the community will say, but if they are 
participating in constructing, ‘This is our school. This is ours’.  
Similarly, an INGO representative described financial ‘contributions’ as ‘reminding’ 
parents of their responsibility for school management:  
They just probably think maybe [it’s] making a contribution to the school or 
seeing how the progress of the children is going, and probably it’s a forum 
where parents meet to make contributions to the school, more money to the 
headmaster for particular work or increasing registration fees. But many of 
them did not know exactly that the school belongs to them, that they have to 
ensure that they run the school.  
With respect to the second narrative, MoEST and INGO representatives 
described community and household responsibility for school financing in terms of 
‘caring for children’. For example, as a state MoEST official in Upper Nile stated, “If 
they want their children to be taught or to learn, they have to also construct a house for 
the teacher”. Similarly, an INGO representative described material contributions (e.g. 
school construction) as illustrating commitment to children’s education: 
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We have to tell people the school does not belong to the government, because 
people think the government comes and constructs the school… No, we are 
telling them, ‘The school belongs to you. The government is not here’. That 
alone changes peoples’ mind that the school will not belong to the government… 
And also asking people to get involved in the education of their children… [If] 
the school lacks desks or doesn’t have a pit latrine, what will you be able to do 
to the school to make the school, using the UNICEF buzzword, ‘child friendly’ 
so that your children can come and learn?  
This illustrates the way in which “the notion of responsibility is deployed by neoliberal 
discourses in terms of personal responsibility… and self-preservation” (Butler and 
Athanasiou, 2013, p. 105). Communities or households unable to contribute materially 
to education provision “are represented as incompetent, lazy, and… shamefully 
irresponsible” (p. 105). When education contributions are defined in terms of ‘care for’ 
and ‘commitment to’ children, a failure to contribute financially is framed as personal 
and moral failure to properly ‘care’ for, or value education of, children – rather than a 
failure of government resource distribution and service provision. For example, a state 
MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal described communities’ failure to ‘look 
after’ schools as a failure to value education: 
The community, they open schools and they are not serious of [looking] after 
them… They don’t contribute positively. They do not know the importance or 
contribution towards the education of their children.  
This raises questions about the extent to which enforced responsibility involves 
a participatory, empowering, or even voluntary concept of ‘ownership’. The ways in 
which many MoEST and donor officials described community and household roles in 
education financing and provision focused on compliance (framed as ‘participation’) 
rather than choice. The enforcement of responsibility was clearly illustrated by a central 
MoEST official who described a forceful approach to ‘participation’: 
When we were still in the war, I went to the area where the mother of my mother 
was and I told the head man, ‘Please, your area has no school. You need a 
school here. So do like this: organise all your community, do this, do this, do 
this’… He said, ‘No, the NGOs are building everything from the beginning. We 
are busy, we need to produce food’… I said, ‘I cannot allow these children of 
ours to go uneducated because you are busy. If you don’t begin the work 
tomorrow, I’m going to send 10 soldiers to teach you how to do the work’… He 
started calling me, ‘No, I have already organised the community, they are 
already collecting the stones’… Whatsoever you can do as a community, do it 
without any payment, and how much money the NGO has to buy what you 
cannot do, let the NGO buy it… So we build a lot of schools using threat, carrot 
and stick.  
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These narratives raise important questions about what ‘participation’ actually 
means for communities and households. The ways in which MoEST and donor officials 
discussed ‘participation’ through school-based management illustrates the ways in 
which discourses and processes of participation “can both conceal and reinforce 
oppressions and injustices” (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, p. 13). This depoliticises 
processes of decentralisation, through a focus on the means or modes rather than 
meaning of participation and ownership. When material contributions to school 
functioning are identified as the primary (or only) means of ‘participation’ and 
‘ownership’, these concepts are “stripped of any association with a transfer of power 
and control and invoked to describe the need for people to make contributions in cash or 
kind” (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p. 7). This focus on the means, rather than meaning, 
of participation presents participation and ownership “as a de facto conclusion” (Leal, 
2010, p. 95) to school-based management processes, rather than challenging underlying 
systems of power and influence.  
As noted in Chapter 6, reliance on community and household financing 
reproduces inequalities between wealthier and poorer households and communities, 
between those who can mobilise resources and those who cannot. Wealthier 
communities are better able to finance and maintain services, while poorer communities 
face challenges in ensuring service provision. By framing participation and ownership 
as financing responsibility, donors, INGOs, and the MoEST reproduce and legitimise 
these inequalities. This approach to ‘development’ reproduces, rather than reduces, 
disparities between populations. This reproduces pre-CPA processes of ‘local 
participation’ in education based on community and household provision of resources 
and labour (Hajjar, 1983, p. 188; Joyner, 1996, p. 72; Deng, 2003, p. 14; Sommers, 
2005, pp. 103–5), as well as resulting service disparities. 
At the community level, these processes contribute to grievances associated with 
inadequate resource distribution and create tensions between communities and 
government over service provision responsibility. On one hand, the government expects 
communities to maintain schools because schools are ‘for the people’. On the other 
hand, communities feel that schools should belong to the government,41 particularly 
when government and donors emphasise the importance of education as a ‘peace 
                                                
41 In a public opinion survey (IRI, 2011) of adults aged 18 and older in South Sudan’s 10 states, 79 per 
cent felt that national or state-level governments are responsible for building schools. 
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dividend’ and contributor to ‘national’ development. For example, a group of primary 
teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal reported that their community 
established a school but once the school was formally registered with the MoEST the 
community felt the school had been ‘released’: it now belonged to and should be 
supported by the government, not the community. The government, however, “are 
saying that the school belongs to the community and not to the teachers or to the 
government”. This represents a key tension associated with the current form of ‘school-
based management’ (as financing and service provision), and illustrates how 
‘participation’ efforts can undermine peacebuilding aims associated with strengthening 
state-society relations and responding to ‘local’ needs and expectations. ‘Local’ 
expressions of dissatisfaction with ‘participation opportunities’ (and resource flows 
described in Chapter 6) can be understood as expressions of agency or ‘resistance’. 
School, household, and community representatives demonstrate such resistance through 
a lack of compliance with expected roles as ‘beneficiaries’ of ‘participation’ or services. 
While ‘decentralisation’ through school-based management is described in terms 
of ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, in its implementation, ‘local’ communities and 
households are identified as sources of resources and labour rather than participants in 
decision-making. Communities and households, through school governing bodies, 
finance school operations but are not provided with opportunities to influence the 
policies they are responsible for implementing. As one head teacher explained, “We are 
not able to communicate these concerns, to say ‘this is wrong’”. This illustrates a 
neoliberal framing of ‘decentralisation’ focused on reducing state costs and 
responsibility rather transferring power or enabling ‘democratic’ participation in 
decision-making (Mosse, 2001, p. 17; Cornwall and Brock, 2005, pp. 5–7; Crawford 
and Hartmann, 2008, p. 12). Rather than expanding participation opportunities, school-
based management reforms secure ‘new’ sources of financing and labour. However, in 
discussing the shifting of responsibility to the community and household level, it is 
important to consider potential opportunities for agency and influence: while 
experienced as a source of burden and frustration, it also presents opportunities for 
controlling school resource allocation and use. Roles and responsibilities as core 
providers of education can also represent a source of agency and pride for communities 
and households. This complicates simplistic understandings of oppression or 
exploitation versus agency and action. 
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7.6 Chapter Summary and Implications 
In this chapter, I have explored empirical findings concerning processes and 
implications of decentralisation and participation. I critically examine government and 
donor policy statements on participation, representation, and ‘decentralisation’ in 
education and peacebuilding, focused on improving ‘local’ participation opportunities, 
service delivery, and state-society relations. These narratives are echoed in some critical 
peacebuilding literature. Discussing the importance of responses to systems of 
inequality underlying conflict, some critical scholars refer to the (re)distribution of 
political power and representation at multiple scales, responding to marginalisation in 
political institutions and processes (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Pugh, Cooper and 
Turner, 2008a, p. 391; Richmond, 2010a, p. 30, 2013, pp. 279–82, 2016, p. 5; Mac 
Ginty, 2013, p. 5). Some suggest that ‘service provision’ can contribute to state-society 
relations by contributing to democratic participation and state legitimacy (Richmond, 
2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 137; Newman, 2011, pp. 1737–50, 
2014, p. 193; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416). 
The findings in this chapter illustrate some limitations of formal policy 
statements and objectives, and of the critical peacebuilding discussions above, and the 
ways in which they are undermined through existing ‘decentralisation’ processes. First, 
hierarchical education sector management and communication practices (as formal 
decentralisation ‘protocols’) entrench and legitimise rather than redistribute 
(centralised) authority and influence. Second, policy statements (and donors shaping 
them) abstract education from wider political dynamics and fail to address the 
‘informal’ aspects of governance that permeate and are reproduced through education 
systems. Third, the transfer of education financing responsibilities to communities and 
households, framed as ‘participation’, reproduces ‘distributional’ (geographic) 
inequalities in service delivery rather than contributing to ‘representational’ equality. 
Together, these represent a failure to deliver anticipated ‘benefits’ of decentralisation, 
negatively affect relations and trust, and contribute to grievances between communities 
and the government and between levels of government. 
These findings echo critical peacebuilding discussions concerning ‘local’ 
participation in externally- (or elite-) driven interventions and the reinforcement of 
power through ‘participation’. Mac Ginty (2011b, p. 45), for example, notes that the 
focus on strengthening ‘local’ ownership and participation “is often marginal and does 
not involve a fundamental rethinking of the meaning and location of power”. Similarly, 
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Pugh (2010, p. 273) describes a form of ‘participation’ that “reinforces the power of 
those facilitating participation to ‘contain’ it within the bounds of the existing order”. 
This chapter confirms and advances these discussions by illustrating specific means and 
practices through which patterns of authority are reinforced within a social institution 
that effectively extends authority and influence from central to ‘local’ levels. Some 
critical peacebuilding scholars refer to ways in which ‘participation’ discourses are used 
to transfer responsibility, rather than power, to ‘local’ populations, as part of a wider 
neoliberal project, contributing to the reproduction of existing power relations. For 
example, Mac Ginty (2015, pp. 846–7) explains that, 
The local turn… in sections of the policy world chimes with neoliberal notions 
of the rollback of the state as a political unit responsible to its citizens and 
charged with providing services… [The] government are able to tap into popular 
narratives of individuals and communities taking responsibility for themselves… 
to find their own ‘solutions’ to problems… Community responses are supposed 
to take over and utilise local knowledge and resources. 
This is linked to Duffield’s (2005, p. 145, 2007a, pp. 5, 16, 2007b, p. 238, 2008, pp. 
149–50) (biopolitical) distinction between ‘insured’ and ‘non-insured’ populations. 
‘Decentralisation’ and school-based management, as forms of ‘indirect rule’, provide 
mechanisms “for securing self-reliant populations” (2005, p. 149) and managing risks 
presented by ‘uninsured’ or ‘underdeveloped’ populations (2010b, p. 63). 
The findings in this chapter echo these discussions and provide more detailed 
insight into how education financing and provision responsibility is transferred to 
communities and specific narratives used to encourage and legitimise this process. For 
example, they illustrate the ways in which household and community responsibility for 
education financing and provision is framed in ‘moral’ terms, focusing on ‘care’ for 
children and their education. This illustrates what Taylor (2010, pp. 159–60) describes 
as the advancement of a hegemonic (neoliberal) peacebuilding project requiring a 
‘politics of support’ and a ‘politics of power’. This prevents resistance or discussion of 
alternatives (Pugh, 2005, p. 31; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 2–3; Taylor, 2010, 
p. 167), particularly when framing a lack of material support provision as a ‘moral’ 
failure to care and provide for children.  
The ways in which the ‘local’ is framed in this chapter echo some definitions 
presented in the critical peacebuilding literature (national or subnational state 
authorities, ‘conflict-affected’ populations) but identify some precise actors and locate 
their role at the ‘border’ between state and community. Subnational education officials, 
  
166 
school managers, teachers, and PTA members are identified as critically important 
‘local’ actors, as both representatives of their communities and mediators between 
governments and populations. These findings add to critical peacebuilding discussions 
of the ‘local’ by illustrating some of the tensions and multiple loyalties and forms of 
accountability affecting ‘local’ actors. The findings in this chapter also draw attention to 
the ways in which the (re)centralisation of authority and transfer of financing and 
provision responsibility are experienced and perceived by ‘local’ actors and 
communities. This is of particular importance in relation to expected education service 
improvements (via decentralisation) as peace dividends and benefits of ‘post-conflict’ 
reforms. However, questions of perception and experience are largely neglected in the 
critical peacebuilding literature, illustrating the contributions of these findings to critical 
peacebuilding discussions concerning the implications of the ‘local’. 
Finally, the findings in this chapter illustrate some implications of the 
maintenance of existing relations of authority and transfer of responsibility to 
populations, specifically in terms of the reproduction of, and relations between, forms of 
inequality. This advances critical peacebuilding discussions, which rarely explicitly 
examine connections between aspects of the ‘local’, ‘service delivery’, and inequalities. 
For example, this chapter illustrates ways in which existing ‘decentralisation’ processes 
entrench distributional (geographic) inequalities in service delivery rather than 
contributing to ‘representational’ equality, and ways in which decision-making 
influence is linked to resource access. 
The CPE framework informed these analyses and the identification of potential 
‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to ‘participation’ in education contexts. Events, 
processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of 
neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions 
(including ‘decentralised’ management) that shift service provision costs and 
responsibilities from the state to communities and households. This is linked to a focus 
on ‘individual’ (or household) responsibility and care that reproduces and widens 
distributional inequalities and intensifies frustrations toward the government among 
community members. Education governance may also be shaped by mechanisms of 
regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A. Rigid, hierarchical, and 
militarised management and communication procedures limit opportunities to influence 
decision-making among ‘lower level’ actors, and serve to maintain existing structures of 
power and authority within and through educational institutions. These patterns, along 
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with tensions between levels of government and between government and schools, are 
also shaped by a structure of education governance that positions actors (e.g. national 
and subnational officials, ministry officials and school actors) in relation to one 
another within a clear hierarchy, providing power in the form of control over 
allocation of resources and control over other actors, as well as different possibilities 
for movement between scales of authority. At the same time, individual education 
officials and school managers demonstrate agency in the ways in which they navigate 
and negotiate these structures of power. In these ways, the theoretical framework 
informs my arguments about the political structures underlying education governance 
practices, shaping relations between actors at different scales of the education system as 
well as their possibilities for decision-making, and producing experiences of ‘local 
ownership’ as responsibility rather than ‘participation. 
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CHAPTER 8. “IT’S NOT EASY TO EDUCATE SUCH A COMMUNITY”: 
IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
 
8.1 Chapter Introduction  
 The critical peacebuilding literature emphasises the importance of recognition of 
and responses to ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ priorities, norms, and knowledge. Some of this 
literature also argues that peacebuilding processes ought to involve recognition of 
‘cultural’ diversity and consideration of identity categorisations and exclusion as part of 
wider responses to (and transformation of) social inequalities and systemic oppression. 
Some of the critical peacebuilding literature suggests that social service provision can 
provide a means of responding to different forms of inequality and exclusion, as well as 
responding to ‘local’ contexts and priorities. Insight into the peacebuilding role of social 
institutions such as education can be informed by the analysis of the symbolic and 
material ways in which education systems (as key ‘socialising’ institutions) engage with 
specific dimensions of ‘identification’ and ‘difference’, and the specific ways in which 
they support or undermine processes of recognition.42  
To inform my contributions to the critical peacebuilding scholarship, I draw on 
empirical findings concerning issues of identification and difference in education 
discourse and practice and their implications. I critically engage with formal 
government and donor policy statements concerning ‘identity’ and ‘diversity’ in 
education and peacebuilding in South Sudan. I present a three-step critique of 
government and donor policy statements on education and peacebuilding and identify 
three broad points undermining these policy statements. First, I argue that government 
and donor representatives’ informal narratives about ‘cultural’ and livelihoods 
communities contradict formal policy statements about ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ by 
using discourses of ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ to explain, justify, depoliticise, and 
institutionalise inequalities. Second, I argue that explanations of education’s 
peacebuilding role focus on pacifying and controlling communities through ‘cultural’ 
and livelihood changes, without considering the roles of such processes in colonial and 
                                                
42 ‘Recognition’ is understood in relation to processes of social differentiation, status and privilege, 
subordination and domination, and respect and valorisation in representations and interactions – which 
are institutionalised in social relations, policies, and practices and linked to questions of distribution and 
representation (Fraser, 2008a, pp. 12–8, 2008b, pp. 131–8, 2013, pp. 162–79). (Mis)recognition is not 
only a question of ‘cultural inferiority’ but also of political and economic inequality (Ferguson, 2006, p. 
33), associated with ‘real’ material or social effects in terms of power, resources, and opportunities 
(Chowdry and Nair, 2002, p. 17; Loomba, 2005, p. 106; Fraser, 2013, pp. 176–9).	
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post-independence patterns of violence. Third, I argue that government and donor 
policies and programmes fail to explicitly ‘recognise’ and engage with collective or 
‘cultural’ aspects of identification and difference and that discourses of ‘recognition’ are 
applied only to certain dimensions of identification. Together, these points support a 
broader argument that both informal narratives and formal education objectives 
reproduce (neo)colonial approaches to particular communities in South Sudan, 
entrenching structural forms of violence and undermining peacebuilding aims.  
During the data collection process, government, donor, NGO, and school 
representatives used terms such as ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and ‘pastoralist’ (livelihoods) 
when discussing aspects of identification and difference. They used these terms to both 
describe communities and explain their actions. The use of these terms illustrates the 
complexity and difficulty of analysing issues of identification and difference – not only 
in terms of defining the meaning of these concepts, but in distinguishing between the 
terms people use and what they are actually talking about. The findings presented in this 
chapter draw attention to descriptions, assumptions, interpretations, representations, and 
classifications associated with identification and difference (Hall, 1996, p. 4, 1997a, pp. 
1–4; Appiah, 2006, pp. 16–7; Fraser, 2013, p. 179). I do not consider ‘identity’ or 
‘culture’ as fixed, ‘settled’, stable, or homogenous. Instead, I understand them as 
‘historically constituted’ (Said, 1989, pp. 224–5), ‘complex and multiple’ (Appiah, 
1992, pp. 178–9), and changing over time, shaped by political, economic, and social 
forces (Appiah, 1992, pp. 178–9; Hall, 1996, pp. 3–4; de Sardan, 2005, p. 83; Amin, 
2009, p. 7). For this reason, I use the term ‘identification’, focusing on processes of 
construction or articulation, rather than ‘identity’, which implies a stable and essentialist 
concept (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 44–5; Hall, 1996, pp. 2–6).43 I am interested in how aspects 
of (collective) identification and difference are “produced in specific historical and 
institutional sites” (Hall, 1996, p. 4) and linked to particular socioeconomic and political 
institutions (Said, 2003, pp. 5–6; Mohanty, 2010, p. 530). Rather than providing 
definitions of ‘identity’, ‘culture’, or ‘difference’, I consider how people use these terms 
or concepts and their implications for peacebuilding.  
I draw upon the CPE framework to understand how particular processes and 
patterns of identification and inequality are constructed, legitimised, and reproduced by 
                                                
43 Similarly, ‘difference’ can be understood as drawing attention to interactions, contestation, and 
‘moments of differentiation’ in everyday life, compared to ‘diversity’, which focuses on “recognition of 
pre-given cultural contents and customs” or “separation of totalized cultures” (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 34–5). 
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different actors and institutions. Events, processes, and experiences identified in 
empirical data illustrate the influence of colonial logics underpinning persistent 
narratives about ‘cultural’ identification and difference, and resulting explanations of 
education’s ‘civilising’ role. This is linked to underlying assumptions about the role of 
formal education as ordering and ‘disciplining’ populations, as well as liberal ideologies 
of individual ‘inclusion’ in education. Education provision across geographic and 
livelihoods communities may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance 
and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A, with the strategic provision or restriction of 
education as a means of exerting control over populations and maintaining existing 
structures of power.  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the ways in which 
government and donor policy and strategy documents describe the role of education in 
peacebuilding, specifically in relation to identification and difference. I provide an 
overview of broad policy narratives, including differences between government and 
donor statements on identification and difference. Second, I explore ‘informal’ 
narratives of identification and difference among government and international actors, 
specifically in relation to explanations for educational inequalities and conflict. Third, I 
examine the ways in which education actors explain education’s peacebuilding role, 
framed as addressing and transforming ‘cultural’ practices and difference. Fourth, I 
consider government and donor responses to forms of identification and difference in 
education policy and practice, focusing on aspects of recognition and relevance. Finally, 
I discuss the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature. 
 
8.2 Identification and Difference in Government and Donor Policies 
In this section, I examine how policy and strategy documents produced by the 
government of South Sudan and international donors describe issues of identification 
and difference in relation to education’s role in peacebuilding. Government 
peacebuilding and development documents repeatedly identify respect for different 
aspects of ‘identity’ and ‘diversity’ as contributing to nation-building and peace. These 
policy statements involve four broad narratives: promoting respect for diverse aspects of 
identity, ensuring the relevance of education to diverse communities, responding to 
historical dynamics of oppression, and contributing to ‘national’ identity. Donor policy 
statements more commonly describe identification and difference in terms of ‘barriers’ 
to education, illustrating tensions in contemporary policy discourse.  
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The first broad government narrative focuses on respect for aspects of ‘identity’ 
and ‘diversity’. The CPA (2005, p. 2) emphasises the need to consider the cultural, 
ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic diversity of the Sudanese population in 
governance systems. The Transitional Constitution states that the education sector 
should “recognize cultural diversity and encourage such diverse cultures to 
harmoniously flourish and find expression through education” (GoSS, 2011, p. 12). 
More recently, the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict refers to the need 
to “[respect] ethnic and regional diversity and communal rights, including the right of 
communities to preserve their history, develop their language, promote their culture and 
expression of their identities” (IGAD, 2015, p. 46). Education policies echo these 
statements. The GESP, citing the General Education Bill, refers to “respect and 
tolerance for other cultures, traditions, opinions and beliefs” (MoGEI, 2012, pp. 51–2). 
The national curriculum framework refers to the need to “value diversity and respect 
people of different races, faiths, communities, [and] cultures”, pride in “the diverse 
nature of South Sudanese society”, and respect and tolerance (MoEST, 2015a, pp. 8–
10). The AES Policy also refers to the need to “promote unity, pride and respect for 
South Sudan’s diverse cultural heritage” (MoEST, 2014b, p. 10). Calls for recognition 
were central to SPLM/A ‘liberation’ and ‘peacebuilding’ rhetoric. Garang (2014, p. 
111) called for a state “in which all different ethnic groups, different tribes… are equal 
stakeholders with equal opportunities in the political, economic and social fields”. He 
suggested that “failure to appreciate the wealth in diversity is a major cause of our 
national woes and crisis”, emphasising efforts for “preserving and protecting the rights 
of… different ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic groups” (pp. 152, 164).  
The second government policy narrative focuses on the ‘relevance’ of education 
for diverse communities. The JAM Framework (2005, p. 43) emphasises the need to 
“make learning content contextually and culturally relevant”. The GESP describes the 
need “to empower people by grounding education in South Sudan’s local cultures and 
traditions”, considering ‘relevant and inclusive curriculum’ for diverse learners 
(MoGEI, 2012, pp. 51–2, 66). Similarly, the curriculum framework refers to curricula 
“set within [young people’s] own experiences, locations and cultures”, enabling the 
development of ‘strong identities’ and appreciation for cultural traditions and beliefs 
(MoEST, 2015a, p. 9). The AES Policy aims “to provide equitable access and relevant 
quality learning opportunities”, referring to “unique and cultural differences, livelihoods 
and learning needs” (MoEST, 2014b, pp. 6, 9). The third government policy narrative 
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focuses on responding to historical (colonial) patterns of oppression and violence. The 
SSDP emphasises the importance of addressing ‘residual tensions’ and “historical 
legacies of South Sudan’s colonial past”, to consolidate peace and strengthen national 
unity (GRSS, 2011, p. 381). The GESP frames recognition of difference in relation to 
historical dimensions of ‘cultural’ marginalisation and alienation: 
The dawn of Sudan’s formal independence from colonial rule in 1956 did not 
bring an end to concerted assaults on the cultures and traditions of its indigenous 
people… Systematic policies and programmes were enacted to suppress, and 
eventually alienate, some cultures and traditions (MoGEI, 2012, p. 36). 
 The fourth broad government policy narrative focuses on education’s role in 
promoting national identity and unity. The SSDP refers to “the building of a strong and 
cohesive national South Sudanese identity which unifies all the people and takes 
precedence over and above tribal and clan loyalties” and to “a national identity that 
fully respects and promotes ethnic and cultural diversity” (GRSS, 2011, pp. 40, 94). 
Similarly, the Transitional Constitution describes governance approaches “that reflect 
the unity of the people of South Sudan while recognizing their diversity” (GoSS, 2011, 
p. 15). In education policy, the curriculum framework emphasises the development of 
‘good citizens of South Sudan’ based on patriotism and national pride and identity 
(MoEST, 2015a, pp. 5–8). The construction of a collective, shared identity and unity are 
identified as central to South Sudan’s post-independence nation-building project (Jok, 
2011, pp. 2–4; Zambakari, 2013b, pp. 21–3). This builds on SPLM (2008, p. 6) 
criticisms of the failure of Sudanese regimes to support “nation-building based on 
Sudan’s multiple diversities”, referring to “unviable unity… rooted in the economic, 
political and cultural hegemony… that exclude other groups”.  
 Government policy documents (developed with support from international 
actors) explicitly refer to the recognition of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’. Some global 
donor strategies also refer to tolerance of difference and social cohesion through 
education (DFID, 2010a, pp. 7, 56, 2010b, p. 9), including support to peace education 
(USAID, 2011a, p. 14), as important approaches in conflict-affected contexts. However, 
donor strategies more commonly use a language of ‘barriers’, ‘vulnerability’, and 
‘disadvantage’ when discussing ‘cultural’ identification and difference. For example, 
GPE’s global strategic plan refers to overcoming ‘barriers’ and ‘marginalisation’ 
associated with ethnicity and culture, while DFID’s (2010b, p. 25) education strategy 
refers to the needs of ‘educationally disadvantaged’ groups such as ‘nomadic peoples’ 
and ‘root causes of marginalisation’ including ethnicity, language, and location. 
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USAID’s (2013a, sec. 3) Room to Learn strategy for South Sudan suggests that 
promoting equitable education access involves “focusing on the most vulnerable such 
as… ethnic minorities”. DFID’s GESS (2015, pp. 5, 10) strategy refers to the need to 
address social and cultural barriers to education. Based on empirical findings outlined in 
the subsequent sections, I suggest that government policy statements of recognition, 
tolerance, and respect are challenged or undermined by existing discourses of and 
approaches to identification and difference, both in formal policies and programmes and 
informal political narratives. Donor policy statements concerning ‘barriers’ are reflected 
and intensified through informal narratives and formal programme responses. 
 
8.3 ‘Informal’ Narratives of Identification and Difference  
This section presents the first part of my critique of government and donor 
policy statements. I examine ‘informal’ narratives about identification and difference 
(rather than those formally presented in policy documents) among government and 
donor representatives. These were repeated during interviews, informal discussions, and 
meetings and workshops with government, donor, and NGO representatives. I argue 
that dominant informal narratives about identification and difference reproduce, 
institutionalise, and depoliticise patterns of subordination, oppression, and alienation 
within the education system, and undermine policy statements about respect and 
recognition. They foreground particular representations of ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ 
identification and livelihood practices (focusing predominantly on ‘pastoralist’ or cattle-
herding communities), presented in negative, essentialising, and depoliticised terms as 
both descriptions of communities and practices and explanations for inequality and 
conflict. Narratives of ‘traditional’ beliefs and practices and ‘local’ violence also fail to 
address changing political and economic realities and wider dimensions of conflict. 
These informal narratives are important because they legitimise and entrench 
assumptions and perceptions about different communities and frame material responses. 
Government, donor, and NGO representatives hold positions of influence and authority 
and their statements have significant power in communities, schools, and classrooms. 
‘Authoritative’ discourses and interpretations enable claims to be made about (or 
against) particular groups (Fraser, 2013, p. 57), and representations and classifications 
of identification, difference, and ‘otherness’ serve as techniques of power, organisation, 
and regulation (Mudimbe, 1988, pp. 57–105; Hall, 1997a, pp. 1–5).  
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As discussed in Chapter 6, significant education disparities exist across states, 
counties, and payams, linked to patterns of resource and service distribution. MoEST 
officials in different states frequently explained (and depoliticised) education challenges 
and inequalities across ethnic and geographic communities in terms of ‘culture’, 
‘tradition’, or livelihoods. They focused predominantly on ‘pastoralist’ or cattle-herding 
communities, referring to broad groupings such as Nuer communities in Upper Nile or 
Toposa in Central Equatoria. They suggested that educational inequalities result from 
‘traditional’ attitudes or practices and lack of awareness or understanding of the value of 
formal education. These explanations link livelihood practices (‘pastoralism’) with 
particular ‘cultural’ attitudes and values. For example, state MoEST officials in Upper 
Nile and Central Equatoria described overlapping geographic and ethnic inequalities as 
resulting from livelihood practices and associated ‘cultural’ attitudes and values: 
The eastern counties of Nuer, where the rebels are now, they are very poor, just 
because they don’t stay in one place. Some of them are children of pastoralists, 
they are moving with their cattle, you know, they go to the Ethiopia borders and 
the education there is not existing well. 
Terekeka in Central Equatoria is the most need… It seems to be part of the state 
where education didn’t go deeper, for reasons that these people are basically 
pastoralists, so they keep animals and it’s not easy to educate such a community. 
Because of that, there’s too much illiteracy and they devalue education so much. 
So today if someone tells me, ‘Which is the worst situation in Central Equatoria 
for education provision?’ I would mention Terekeka.  
When discussing ‘cultural’ dimensions of educational inequality, MoEST officials 
occasionally acknowledged legacies of historical, colonial practices (although this was 
not accompanied by arguments for redistributive responses). For example, one central 
official described colonial effects on educational inequalities, focusing specifically on 
‘pastoralist’ communities, 
The British, they closed us, kept us away, without educating us. So how do 
people know the importance of education while they are just used to their cows? 
What do they know [when] their nearest resource is cow? Now, when you go to 
one community and you say, ‘Okay, let us build a school’, you will see the 
community seems not more eager to do that… ‘School for what? Our children 
are just pastoral’… Convincing them to participate is one of the biggest 
challenges. Not only political will, but the community knowledge of the 
importance of education… The community are not very much in knowledge of 
the value for education here, so it’s very marginalised and it’s only because the 
community are following much of their own tradition.  
International donor and NGO representatives also presented ‘cultural’ explanations for 
educational inequalities, illustrating the role of international actors in reproducing and 
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legitimising reductive narratives of identification and difference. A conversation with 
one donor representative illustrated the reproduction of essentialising (and colonial) 
narratives about particular communities: 
The [Toposa], the group there, it’s always been very isolated and has had a 
war-like reputation, so even the British and the other people circumvented it… 
So they’ve retained their way of independence, but they’ve also their traditional 
attitude which has often been anti-education, whereas the Nuer, who were also 
pastoralists originally embraced education… as a kind of liberation from the 
Arabs. So it is interesting that although they’re both pastoralists and they both 
have very common attitudes towards land, cattle, marriage, their attitudes 
towards education are completely different. 
 
Explanations for violent conflict also focused predominantly on cattle-herding 
communities. Government, donor, and NGO representatives in all states repeatedly 
identified these communities as driving conflict and insecurity. Their (depoliticised) 
explanations centred on ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ norms and practices (a ‘culture of 
revenge’, a ‘war-like’ tradition) and livelihood practices, notably seasonal migration 
across payam, county, and state borders (leading to conflict with other ‘pastoralist’ or 
farming communities). A donor representative clearly articulated this explanation: 
It is contributing to conflict… Obviously, without education, a lot of attitudes 
tend to be cemented, the kind of revenge attitudes and practices of pastoralist 
groups… Quite war-like traditionally, reluctant to change. 
A conversation with a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal 
illustrates how conflict is explained as resulting from livelihood practices and linked to 
narratives of ‘otherness’ and ‘unbelonging’ (‘they are not from this state’): 
So many problems happen here in Wau now between the cattle keepers and the 
farmers… Those of the cattle keepers sometimes they used to move from place to 
place and many in Western Bahr el Ghazal here, they don’t have cattle. They 
used to cultivate their crops here locally, and when the cattle came they just go 
to their farms and destroy everything there… That’s a big problem here because 
most of the cattle keepers, they are not from this state… They just take their 
cattle to the farms and destroy everything there, and the people they live in 
anger for that reason. 
As with inequalities, violent conflict was often described as resulting from ‘ignorance’ 
or a lack of (formal) education, individualising conflict and abstracting it from its 
political-economic context. These explanations reflect interpretations of experience, 
identification, and difference centred on ‘absence’, ‘deficiency’, or ‘lack’ (of 
knowledge, of education) in political and economic practices (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 1–4; 
de Sardan, 2005, p. 119). As a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained, 
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Due to lack of education, some people, some other tribes from other places are 
not educated. Their behaviours here is different… He is somebody who likes 
fighting, has got concern in the mind to go to other payam or to other county to 
take something or to loot… The problem is because people are not well 
educated. 
A South Sudanese INGO representative echoed this binary assumption of 
‘educated/peaceful’ versus ‘uneducated/violent’:  
If we would compare those who are in the cattle camps and those who are in the 
school, I think there is a bit of difference, like those who are in the cattle camp 
who misbehave in a different setting compared to the others, especially if you 
compared the cattle keepers and the other communities in South Sudan.  
 
 The narratives above illustrate how inequality and violence are attributed to 
‘cultural’ or livelihood practices or attitudes and to a lack of (formal) education. This 
assigns responsibility for educational inequalities and conflict to individuals and 
specific communities. Similarly, ‘peace’ was explained in ‘cultural’ terms. For example, 
a payam official in Warrap suggested that, “those who know peace are those who have 
been educated… others do things violently”. A government official in Western 
Equatoria explained that the state “is the first state that has maintained peace after 
independence of South Sudan… because of the culture of the people here”. He identified 
people from other states, including seasonally migrating cattle-herding communities, as 
causing ‘local’ conflict. In previously ‘stable’ regions (such as Equatorial states), 
discussions of conflict and peacebuilding often blamed ‘other’ ethnic, geographic, or 
livelihood groups for violence. For example, teachers may refer to conflict among 
ethnic groups in other states as examples for students: “If the teacher is talking and 
explaining… [they] need to give examples so children can understand… For example, 
in Jonglei, Upper Nile, states are not in peace, there is insecurity, killings”, explained a 
payam supervisor in Central Equatoria. This contributes to ‘us versus them’ (‘peaceful’ 
versus ‘violent’) intergroup perceptions and entrenches existing stereotypes. This also 
illustrates the significance of narratives of identification and difference articulated by 
people in positions of authority and influence within ministry and classroom contexts. 
This can be understood as a way in which these individuals construct and assert their 
status as ‘modern’, ‘urban’, and ‘educated’ in contrast to ‘traditional’ communities, as a 
means of asserting political authority (Leonardi, 2013, p. 148). 
A focus on ‘cultural’ or ‘livelihood’-based explanations for inequality and 
conflict ignores broader systems and contexts of violence (including economic 
pressures on cattle-keeping communities) and the role of political elites (and the state) 
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in patterns of violent conflict. The informal narratives above place responsibility for 
inequalities and conflict on members of particular communities. Inequality and violence 
are presented as ‘internal’ – not just to the state but also to communities – without fully 
acknowledging wider political, economic, and historical dynamics of violence. For 
example, these explanations pay limited attention to political and military authorities’ 
roles in ‘local’ conflict. National and subnational authorities politicise and mobilise 
identity and provide arms to communities in order to secure political support and 
advance political and military interests (during current and previous wars, as described 
in Chapter 2). For example, a South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor 
drew attention to links between ‘local’ conflict and higher-level political interests and 
power struggles: “Political differences are not tribal differences, just political 
differences at the top… Conflict is not among tribes. It starts at the political level and 
then goes to the tribes”. Similarly, a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western 
Bahr el Ghazal explained that, 
In the village they are just thinking that these people in the town, they are the 
ones who are causing the problems and making them suffer from it… The 
politicians, what they are saying, their political problems sometimes may cause 
tension within the people in the community.  
However, these narratives often reproduce assumptions about communities’ ‘ignorance’ 
and lack of formal education (as causing vulnerability to mobilisation by political or 
military authorities). For example, describing the effects of ‘elite’ conflict on ‘local’ 
communities, a state-level government peacebuilding representative explained that, 
Most of the people who are on the ground level, they are the ones who are 
affected [rather] than the other people who are in the higher level… Everything 
that happens in the towns, it will go back and affect them, and most of them are 
ignorant, they are not educated, so they can change automatically according to 
negative ideas. 
Similarly, a central MoEST official described the role of political elites in ‘local’ 
conflict, emphasising the ‘lack of education’ facilitating community mobilisation and 
the strategic ‘withholding’ of education: 
What concerns us much is really the tendency of some people, very much 
educated people, who are not willing to change the lives of their people… 
wanting to keep a big chunk of their people not educated so that if they go for 
arms then they can easily take up the arms to protect [the politician’s] 
interests… So no matter how much we really want our people to be educated, 
there are others outside who want their people not to be educated so that they 
can listen to them… The politicians get their money, take it back to the villages 
to buy cows, buy guns, give to their siblings to go and raid more cows.  
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While these narratives acknowledge the role of political elites, they do not fully 
acknowledge wider (structural) political and economic dynamics of violence, including 
inequitable opportunities and resource distribution and broader systems of inequality 
and domination, which are not specific to particular communities or regions. They also 
fail to acknowledge the role of state policies in ‘local’ conflict, including expropriation 
and fragmentation of territory and resources (e.g. grazing land, water points, migration 
and market routes) due to oil production, agricultural projects, dam construction, and 
land tenure policies (Fahey and Leonard, 2007, p. 14; Casciarri, 2009, p. 71).  
Narratives about cattle-herding communities illustrate tensions between the 
historical and contemporary value of cattle resources and simultaneous devaluing of 
cattle-herding livelihoods in formal educational and economic narratives. While 
government officials blame cattle-keeping livelihoods and ‘cultures’ for conflict, cattle 
themselves are highly valued (by political elites) as political, economic, and military 
resources. 44  Cattle ownership patterns involve accumulation of large herds by 
government officials and military commanders, as sources of wealth and status (Fahey 
and Leonard, 2007, p. 4; Pinaud, 2014, p. 201). President Kiir, for example, owns at 
least 3,000 cattle, of such value that they are transported “using trucks guarded by 
heavy armed soldiers” (Sudan Tribune, 2015). Government officials and elites 
(themselves part of South Sudan’s colonial history) are part of the system they criticise, 
which challenges ‘us’ and ‘them’ (‘modernity’ versus ‘tradition’) narratives. They 
critique ‘cultures’ and livelihoods of particular communities but rely on these same 
communities as political constituencies. These depoliticised narratives serve strategic 
purposes. By presenting conflict (and inequalities) as ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ in nature 
(and thus ‘irrational’ and apolitical), elites mask their involvement (and that of the state) 
and remove themselves from political responses. This also delegitimises political or 
distributive claims made by communities through violence (Chandler, 2010a, pp. 373–
4), including claims to political representation or government resource access.  
The narratives described above frame identification and difference in ways that 
reproduce simplistic, essentialised, fixed representations of identity, beliefs about 
                                                
44 Cattle were critically important resources during the colonial period and conflicts between (and within) 
Sudan’s north and south, including for the SPLM/A. They provided sources of economic wealth (through 
taxation and confiscation for sale) and were used to reward loyalty and feed troops (Gonda and Mogga, 
1988, pp. 73–8; Deng and Daly, 1989, p. 187; Keen, 1994, pp. 19–41, 220; Hutchinson, 1996, pp. 14–5, 
2001, pp. 318–9, Deng, 1999, p. 31, 2010, p. 238; Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, p. 133; Johnson, 2003, pp. 
10–1, 151–2; Jok, 2005, p. 157; Young, 2005, p. 109). 
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‘otherness’, and binary oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (particularly along lines of 
ethnicity and livelihoods). These narratives construct identities ‘through difference’, as 
“the product of the marking of difference and exclusion” (Hall, 1996, p. 4). This reflects 
and reproduces colonial discourses of ‘tradition’ versus ‘modernity’, ‘customary’ versus 
‘civilised’, and ‘developed’ versus ‘underdeveloped’, with violence, aggression, and 
‘irrationality’ defined in opposition to ‘civilised’ peoples and cultures (Mudimbe, 1988, 
p. 17; Said, 1989, p. 207; Escobar, 1995, pp. 10–6; Loomba, 2005, pp. 91–3). This 
entrenches ethnic or tribal stereotypes and divisions, and undermines peacebuilding 
efforts intended to strengthen inter-community relations. This reflects long-standing 
perceptions and narratives, echoing views among colonial and Sudanese authorities of 
particular (southern) ethnic and livelihood communities as ‘backward’, ‘uneducated’, 
and resistant to change and ‘progress’ (Deng and Daly, 1989, p. 172; Keen, 1994, p. 58; 
Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 612). Disparities in political representation and 
education were “explained in terms of cultural differences or differences in ‘mentality’” 
(Johnson, 2003, p. 18), and this is reproduced in contemporary narratives.  
Government and donor explanations of inequality and conflict link livelihood 
practices with particular ‘cultural’ attitudes and values. While cattle serve important 
social and cultural roles,45 reliance on ‘cultural’ labels fails to consider their economic 
and political dimensions and contexts. These explanations also reproduce (misleading) 
assumptions that ‘pastoralism’ is a traditional practice. While cattle-keeping livelihoods 
involve so-called ‘traditional’ dimensions (in terms of knowledge and expertise 
transmitted over time), the use of the term in government and donor discourse presents 
identities and practices as homogeneous and unchanging and “reduces, essentializes, 
naturalizes and fixes ‘difference’” (Hall, 1997b, p. 258). This fails to acknowledge 
variations, contradictions, and changes within ‘cultural’ or ‘collective’ identities (Said, 
1994, p. 15; Hall, 1997c, p. 45; Mbembe, 2001, p. 4; de Sardan, 2005, p. 77). Those 
using the term ‘pastoralist’ paid little attention to people’s actual and changing practices 
and integration into regional and global economic systems. Cattle-herding communities’ 
actual practices challenge ‘traditionalist’ assumptions: “far from being merely 
                                                
45 Cattle are central to communities’ social, cultural, and economic systems, representing a primary 
livelihood and food source and source of wealth, as well as having social and cultural value. They are 
directly linked to status, pride, and identity and their exchange is central to community rituals and kinship 
and inter-communal ties (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 18–9; Gonda and Mogga, 1988, pp. 65–6; Deng, 
1995, pp. 186–7, 2010, p. 237; Hutchinson, 1996, pp. 59–61; King and Mukasa-Mugerwa, 2002, p. 4; 
Catley, Leyland and Bishop, 2005, pp. 7–8; Poggo, 2008, p. 13; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 54–5; 
Ryle, 2011, pp. 83–4).  
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‘traditional’, contemporary livelihoods across the Sudans are hybrid, dynamic, globally 
integrated and… distinctly ‘modern’” (Selby and Hoffmann, 2014, p. 365).46 In addition 
to serving particular (political) interests, ‘traditionalist’, ‘culturalist’ narratives may also 
reflect the ‘internalisation’ of particular (colonial) beliefs about identity, difference, and 
the relative value or inferiority of forms of knowledge and livelihoods (Said, 1994, p. 
249; Fanon, 2008, pp. 4–9). 
This section illustrates how government and donor representatives use aspects of 
identification, ‘culture’, and livelihoods to classify people and communities, make 
predictions about their behaviours, and guide their treatment (Said, 2003, pp. 41–2; 
Appiah, 2006, p. 16). It illustrates how ‘culture’ is used as both description (‘this is 
what they do’) and explanation (‘this is why they do it’). Informal narratives linking 
educational inequalities and conflict to aspects of identification and difference inform 
explanations for education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role, discussed in the following section.  
 
8.4 Explanations of Education’s ‘Peacebuilding’ Role  
This section presents the second part of my critique. I examine narratives 
concerning education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role and argue that these explanations focus on 
pacifying and controlling communities through ‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, 
without clearly considering the roles of such processes in colonial and post-
independence patterns of violence. Some education and peacebuilding actors discussed 
the importance of recognising identity and difference, echoing broad government policy 
statements. More frequently, however, MoEST and international actors described 
communities and ‘culture’ as things to be secured, controlled, and changed through 
education (building on explanations for inequality and conflict described above). They 
described education as a means of supporting stability and security by changing 
‘cultural’ norms, practices, and identities and ‘civilising’ and ‘modernising’ 
populations. These explanations reproduce reductive, negative, and colonial 
representations of identification and difference. They contradict government policy 
                                                
46 Many communities described as ‘pastoralist’ combine herding and cultivation activities and those 
identified as ‘agriculturalists’ also own cattle. Communities temporarily or permanently shift between 
livelihood activities due to political, economic, and environmental pressures and opportunities (Deng, 
1995, pp. 186–7; Catley, Leyland and Bishop, 2005, p. 3; Poggo, 2008, p. 13; Leonardi, 2011, p. 220; 
Ryle, 2011, pp. 83–4; d’Errico, Kozlowska and Maxwell, 2014, p. 12). ‘Traditionalist’ narratives ignore 
the complexity of livestock market networks in South Sudan. They ignore the commercialisation, 
liberalisation, and regional and global dimensions of cattle production and the integration of ‘pastoralist’ 
communities in the capitalist market economy (Aklilu, 2002; King and Mukasa-Mugerwa, 2002; Catley, 
Leyland and Bishop, 2005; Fahey and Leonard, 2007; Casciarri, 2009; Onyango et al., 2015). 
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statements about ‘respect’ and ‘recognition’, and echo and intensify donor policy 
statements about ‘cultural barriers’ to education and peace. 
MoEST, donor, and NGO representatives frequently described education’s 
‘peacebuilding’ role in terms of ‘cultural’ change, reducing tension and conflict by 
eliminating ‘harmful’ cultural practices and attitudes about education.47 These narratives 
reflect a ‘modernising’ paradigm of development (de Sardan, 2005, p. 70), with 
‘modernity’ defined as liberation from collective ties (Mouffe, 2005, p. 1) and from “the 
authority of faith and tradition” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 10). MoEST and international actors 
often described education’s role in terms of ‘enlightenment’, teaching ‘civilised’ 
behaviours, and removing ‘cultural barriers’. One INGO representative, for example, 
suggested that education can break ‘cultural bondage’ or ‘chains’, while a central 
MoEST official described education’s role in the following way: 
The role of education is really to try and bring enlightenment to the children 
who are growing, to show them the sense of belonging, the acceptance of each 
other… Education is a key, of course, to making you understand and be able to 
analyse issues. And if you are not educated, certainly you will be involved in 
thinking in your own way, so I think it is an enlightenment or it is a key or a 
road towards putting people together.  
Similarly, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile described education’s ‘civilising’ role: 
If people are well educated, all these things which is happening now should not 
happen because education can open the mind, can make you civilised, aware, to 
avoid doing evil things. People can come together when there is knowledge in 
their mind. People can be aware, they can respect themselves, they can work 
together… If people are well educated, people can sit and negotiate and even 
talk to each other and understand.  
Some officials described education as ‘teaching’ communities to resist 
mobilisation by political and military authorities, again using a language of 
‘enlightenment’. “If you give communities enough enlightenment and awareness, you 
can create a situation where they can resist the ones who are recruiting to use them for 
war”, explained a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Central Equatoria. More 
specifically, MoEST and donor representatives described education’s peacebuilding role 
as teaching people to resolve conflict in ‘non-violent’ ways, transforming ‘traditional’ 
                                                
47 The assumption that ‘educated’ means ‘peaceful’ is challenged by patterns of conflict in South Sudan’s 
current war and previous north/south wars, described as a ‘war of the educated’ driven by elites 
politicising ‘local’ tensions (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, pp. 31–5). However, the assumption that being 
educated leads to peace was questioned during only two interviews. For example, a South Sudanese non-
governmental peacebuilding actor explained that, “Education may not necessarily be a guarantee to 
peace. Some people who went to school cause more trouble than those who never went to school”. 
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ways of interacting, and eliminating ‘cultures’ of violence or aggression. “They also 
need to know how to act or to react with these people peacefully, not by violation or by 
revenge”, explained a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal. 
A state MoEST official in Western Equatoria described this in detail: 
We have been at war for quite a long time, and you have a huge number of the 
population who have not been to school at all so their thinking pattern is 
different. So it is good to try to change their mindset… The culture of the people 
was affected by the war period. Everybody was aggressive, so if you want to tell 
me any nonsense, better that I either kill you or beat you… When you educate 
people on how to live peacefully, now somebody will at least try to change from 
that culture of aggression, warrior’s behaviours, to a culture whereby he adopts 
peace and he lives peacefully with his neighbourhood. And this can be mainly 
through education.  
 
Education sector actors identified curriculum content (including ‘peacebuilding and life 
skills’ education) as central to education’s peacebuilding role, by shaping intergroup 
attitudes and relations and teaching ‘correct’ (‘non-violent’) behaviours. These 
conversations illustrated the ‘civilising’ or ‘disciplining’ role of curriculum content 
focused explicitly on changing individual attitudes and behaviours. A state MoEST 
official in Western Bahr el Ghazal described this approach: 
[Children] have to be taught with that behaviour… That’s why the curriculum is 
being planned by good planners in the government and the experts of education, 
because you want to shape your child. A child is like a tree. You can make a tree 
that will become very, very straight. You can make a child to be straight. You 
can bend it this way and bend it this way according to your wishes… You can 
create a child to become right from the very beginning. 
Education was described not only as a means of ‘disciplining’ and controlling 
individual students’ knowledge, behaviours, and practices, but those of families, 
communities, and wider ‘cultural’ or livelihood systems. As one central MoEST official 
suggested, “If [students] are educated and they go home to educate their parents, I 
think it will bring understanding to their parents and some unity can be achieved”. 
Similarly, a state teachers’ union representative explained that, “Teachers… pass 
information through the learners, the learners will also convey the information through 
their parents, that is their mothers and fathers, and within the community”. In addition 
to changing interpersonal attitudes and behaviours, education was described as changing 
‘cultural’ and livelihoods practices by encouraging permanent settlement among cattle-
herding communities and removing children from community influences. According to 
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some MoEST officials, formal education can reduce (or prevent) cross-border 
movement and limit intergroup contact driving conflict, illustrating a clear ‘disciplinary’ 
focus in explanations of education’s role. As one central MoEST official explained, 
The communities keep migrating from one area to another. They are not stable. 
And how do we develop, how do we really sustain and promote peace if we are 
throughout migrating, on the move…? It’s very difficult to do that, unless the 
communities are settled, stable… We want our communities to be stable. They 
need to settle… I’m talking about targeting the Greater Upper Nile and the Bahr 
el Ghazal… We need those communities to settle.  
Some MoEST officials described education as a means of separating children from the 
‘negative’ influence of families and communities. According to one central official:  
Here, in terms of priority, what is it? It’s education, or I mean awareness. It’s 
maybe giving support in private schools, in terms of boarding, making sure that 
children are kept in the fence, not allowed to go out, because once they go out, 
they may not come back. They may be following their parents with the cows.  
An education official in Western Equatoria shared a similar perspective: 
Most of the parents are illiterate, so some of them will tell you, ‘I am not 
educated, why should you expect my child to be educated, because my child 
should what I do. I’m a farmer, my child should be a farmer.’ That’s why it 
needs awareness raising, to show them the importance of education. When 
parents are aware then they can send their children to school so that children 
will not [remain] in their families… With time, we will have a society that we 
want, through education. 
While education can play a positive role in shaping ‘non-violent’ behaviours, 
attitudes, and relations, equating ‘education’ with peace and ‘civilisation’ (and lack of 
formal education with ignorance and ‘violent cultures’) stigmatises, subordinates, and 
alienates particular communities and their social, political, and economic systems. 
These narratives echo and intensify donor policy statements about ‘cultural barriers’ to 
education and peace. Explanations of education’s peacebuilding role described above do 
not simply address specific ‘cultural’ barriers to education. Rather, they challenge and 
aim to transform, discipline, and manage ‘cultures’ and livelihoods themselves. The 
narratives described in this chapter also fail to acknowledge education ‘development’ as 
a system of violence, including historical dynamics of control through education in 
(South) Sudan, as discussed in Chapter 2. This is particularly significant given the ways 
in which colonial and Sudanese authorities used education provision and content as a 
means of exerting control over southern populations. These narratives reflect colonial 
and post-independence Sudanese views on education, as ‘civilising’, ‘developing’, and 
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‘modernising’ ‘primitive’, ‘backward’ rural communities (Currie, 1935, pp. 41–2; Deng 
and Daly, 1989, p. 172; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 610), addressing “the 
backwardness of Southern Sudan… to redeem its inhabitants from ignorance, 
superstition, poverty” (Elnur, 2009, p. 12).  
Education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role can be understood as a means through which 
political authorities exert control over populations seen as threatening systems of power 
and authority. Simplified, essentialising representations of identification and difference 
can be deployed and exploited “in the interest of state policies” (Said, 1994, p. 36). The 
use of aspects of identification, ‘culture’, and difference to explain educational 
inequalities and conflict, focusing on particular communities, echo colonial “ideological 
formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech 
domination” (Said, 1994, p. 9), to justify “systems of administration and instruction” 
(Bhabha, 1994, p. 70). Specific communities are defined as targets of intervention when 
‘traditions’, practices, and ‘attitudes’ are perceived as threatening existing political 
orders and control over territories, populations, and resources. These narratives justify 
and legitimise what Duffield (2002, p. 1053) describes as the governance and reform of 
‘borderland’ spaces and populations:  
[Descriptions] of borderland conflict destroying a nation’s social fabric, 
entrenching generations of hatred, targeting civilians, and so on, provide a 
powerful justification. At the same time, the veiling and separating of ‘their’ 
irrational violence from the restraint of ‘ours’ provides a legitimation… Such 
forms of justification and legitimation combine to establish a will to govern the 
borderlands.  
Education is described a means of securing ‘threats’, of incorporating or integrating 
(‘including’) communities into the dominant political and economic order, and 
maintaining post-CPA systems of status and power. This occurs through a ‘benevolent’ 
approach to meeting people’s ‘needs’ (e.g. education). This echoes colonial use of 
social policies “designed to alter the moral behavior of the colonized… behind the 
ideological mask of benevolence” in order to produce “a pacified and policed society… 
for maintaining domination and… ensure subordination” (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 31, 38). 
This is reflected in narratives of and approaches to education policy and practice. 
 
8.5 (Mis)Recognition in Education Policy and Practice  
Having discussed ‘informal’ narratives concerning identification and difference 
in relation to inequality, violence, and education’s peacebuilding role, I now move to 
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formal policy and programme strategies. This section presents the third part of my 
critique, examining how aspects of recognition and relevance are addressed in the 
development and implementation of specific education policies and programmes, as 
well as the ways in which informal narratives described in the preceding sections are 
‘operationalised’ through education practice. I argue that government and donor policies 
and programmes fail to explicitly ‘recognise’ and engage with collective or ‘cultural’ 
aspects of identification and difference, and that ‘inclusion’ in education services can 
reproduce patterns of oppression and violence against particular communities. Only 
certain identities are ‘recognised’ in education policy and practice, and only certain 
knowledge and skills are deemed ‘practical’ and ‘productive’. In addition to 
reproducing forms of oppression, violence, and inequality, these systems link economic 
and political objectives, with promotion of ‘productive’ training and ‘cultural’ change 
serving security interests and vice-versa. 
Parents and young people in cattle-herding communities may consider formal 
education as important or necessary to facilitate access to economic and political 
opportunities at national and subnational levels. Formal education has long been 
perceived as a means of facilitating knowledge, understanding, and navigation of formal 
government systems and bureaucracy, including during the period of British colonial 
rule (Leonardi, 2013, p. 87, 126–8). It may be perceived as a means “to obtain 
knowledge of the regulation and procedures that might offer security and protection” 
(political, legal, or otherwise) (p. 147). However, geographic context, community 
priorities and interests, and livelihood patterns and responsibilities affect education 
access, experiences, and outcomes. For example, during the dry season communities 
move away from established schools, seeking grazing land and water. During the rainy 
season when cattle camps are established close to towns, school timetables overlap with 
cattle supervision schedules. “If [children] are sent to school, who will be looking after 
the animals?”, questioned one central MoEST official. Even when young people access 
education services, education form and content reproduce patterns of ‘non-recognition’, 
oppression, and violence. The strategic distribution of specific forms of education can 
be used as a means of changing community practices. Formal, fixed-location schools 
can ‘discipline’ young people through rules, routines, and content focused on individual 
behaviour change and separation from families and communities. The geographic 
location of services areas can force parents to send their children outside the community 
for schooling, driving cultural and livelihood change and operationalising 
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‘peacebuilding’ narratives. “They will be forced to get their children to towns, and the 
children live outside their parents’ life”, explained a central MoEST official. 
Communities, families, and students may be hesitant or resistant to engage with 
education services perceived as irrelevant to ‘local’ needs and contexts or as trying to 
change ‘cultural’ norms and livelihood practices. These factors reproduce and entrench 
disparities in education access and outcomes (and subsequent economic and political 
opportunities) across communities. The use of education to contribute to 
‘peacebuilding’ by transforming (or eliminating) ‘cultural’ practices and identities 
illustrates a form of structural violence institutionalised in the education system, 
involving alienation or ‘desocialisation’ from communities (Galtung, 1990, p. 193).  
Even programmes tailored to particular cultural or livelihoods communities may hold 
limited relevance. While the AES Policy emphasises the importance of education 
relevant to learners’ contexts and livelihoods, programme content aligns with the formal 
curriculum framework to ensure transition to formal education and qualifications 
(MoEST, 2014b, p. 10). ‘Alternative’ education programmes are extensions or 
adaptations of formal programmes (and curricula) rather than necessarily ‘alternative’ 
or ‘relevant’ opportunities.  
Members of cattle-herding communities may prioritise the development of 
knowledge and skills essential to meet immediate livelihood and protection needs, 
individual development and life transitions, and wider community obligations. This 
involves long-standing knowledge of cattle supervision, health, and production, and 
community protection, history, and cultural, economic, judicial, and political systems. 
‘Traditional’ approaches to education exist, and are of great significance for 
communities. For example, young people gain knowledge and skills necessary for cattle 
supervision and protection roles within their communities by living and working in 
cattle camps, practicing and demonstrating skills and gradually assuming 
responsibilities (Deng, 1987, pp. 304–5, 1995, p. 196). Leonardi (2013) emphasises the 
importance of oral histories or narratives in the transmission of historical knowledge in 
(South) Sudan, including knowledge of territory and population movement, relations 
between communities, forms and structures of authority, and strategies for security. 
These and other ‘traditional’ approaches to education represent a challenge to the 
‘centralisation’ of (and monopoly over) knowledge (Leonardi, 2013, p. 28).  
However, this knowledge, and the systematic community-based teaching and 
learning approaches and systems through which it is transmitted, are not acknowledged 
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in formal education programmes. Even ‘alternative’ education programmes, including 
the Pastoralist Education Programme (PEP),48 intended to facilitate access for children 
in cattle-herding communities, are extensions or adaptations of formal programmes (and 
curricula) rather than necessarily ‘alternative’ or ‘relevant’ opportunities. The Policy for 
Alternative Education Systems (MoEST, 2014b, pp. 5–8) refers to ‘traditional barriers’ 
and ‘traditional cultural practices’ as detrimental to education outcomes, and does not 
mention the potential value of long-standing community knowledge. This reflects the 
exclusion, rather than recognition or valorisation, of different (‘traditional’ or informal) 
forms of knowledge. Formal schooling can undermine livelihood systems and ‘de-skill’, 
disconnect, and alienate young people from their culture, family, and community. As a 
senior MoEST official noted during a presentation at a MoEST-UNICEF conference in 
2014, communities believe that “children belong to the people”. Parents and 
communities may view formal education as undermining, fragmenting, or suppressing 
sociocultural, kinship, economic, and political systems (Cowan, 1983, p. 84; Leonardi, 
2011, p. 227), reinforcing tensions and mistrust between communities and governments 
or international organisations providing education services.  
In these ways, ‘inclusion’ in education can itself be a form of oppression and 
violence when programmes and content deny, dismiss, or suppress particular knowledge 
and practices. This is justified precisely in terms of ‘inclusion’, as a response to 
‘exclusion’ from formal education and from “the presumably ‘benign’ and ‘protective’ 
encompassment of the modern liberal state” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 86). 
However, community members may not respond as intended by policy makers, 
challenging assumptions about ‘submissive and passive’ communities reduced “to the 
oppression to which they are subjected” (de Sardan, 2005, pp. 47, 78). As one non-
governmental peacebuilding actor noted, “communities will agree that ‘all children 
must go to school’, say what donors want to hear, in order to get resources or funds”. 
Communities and households may selectively engage with education services: for 
example, parents in cattle-herding communities might send certain children to school 
while others remain to supervise cattle. “If there are four sons of a father, according to 
tradition two can go to school [and] the others take up the cattle”, explained a group of 
                                                
48 The PEP involves mobile primary schools intended to integrate schooling into cattle herding schedules, 
with teachers and materials moving with cattle camps and programmes structured around camp activities. 
The PEP provides a four-year primary curriculum, intended to enable students to continue in traditional 
primary schools or ALP (MoEST, 2014b). Implementation challenges are linked to insecurity and 
difficult working conditions for teachers as well as limited budget allocations.  
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secondary students in Warrap. This balances education with livelihood needs, protection 
of family wealth, and community obligations, reflecting a form of resistance to and 
adaptation of opportunities (while also, however, excluding some children from 
education opportunities). This illustrates differences between policy discourses and 
what happens in practice, and ways in which individuals and communities demonstrate 
agency within structures of oppression. 
Existing education programmes reflect a focus on so-called ‘productive’ 
economic activities driven by market-focused education agendas, facilitating integration 
into formal economic systems. As noted above, ‘pastoralist’ livelihood systems are 
complex, formal, and ‘modern’ – but are not described as such as in government and 
donor policy discourse.49 Development discourses represent (rural) livelihoods as ‘low 
productivity’ and therefore in need of ‘modernisation’ (Escobar, 1995, p. 162). 
Technical and vocational training (TVET) programmes may hold limited relevance for 
diverse livelihood or geographic communities, as they generally focus on ‘modern’ 
commercial trades such as construction, carpentry, welding, masonry, auto mechanics, 
computing, and tailoring. Government and international actors’ discussions of 
‘practical’ and ‘productive’ skill development focus on these trades or professions: “We 
should include practical subjects that can develop the [learner] to become self-reliant… 
Maybe carpentry, maybe computer lessons, so that the [student] evolves”, suggested a 
state MoEST official in Central Equatoria.  
In this way, only certain knowledge and skills are deemed ‘practical’ and 
‘productive’, presenting other knowledge and skills as inferior. This reflects 
(neo)colonial discourses of ‘custom’ versus ‘modernity’, ‘tradition’ versus 
‘productivity’, and so on (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 17), reproducing ‘insulting’ colonial 
views of the ‘poverty’ of cattle-herding communities in South Sudan (Deng and Daly, 
1989, p. 179). Education programmes and content devalue unpaid productive work 
generally carried out by women or members of rural communities, including cattle 
herding, small-scale agriculture, and household production. This orientation of young 
people toward formal ‘productive’ employment can also distance them from their 
livelihoods and communities, contributing to ‘disciplining’ and ‘civilising’ aims 
                                                
49 In the 1980s and 1990s, donors and NGOs maintained generally negative views of cattle-herding 
communities in southern Sudan. They viewed pastoralism as a ‘non-viable’ system (Keen, 1994, p. 184) 
that “did not align well with common international agency approaches” due to patterns of movement and 
authority (Sommers, 2005, p. 122). These perceptions are maintained (or at least unchallenged) in 
contemporary education policy discourse. 
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discussed in the previous section. This reflects links between economic and political 
objectives, with the promotion of ‘productive’ training through ‘cultural’ and livelihood 
change serving security interests and vice-versa. This, again, depoliticises inequality 
and conflict, presenting them as “fundamentally a problem of production” with the 
solution being to bring people “into the world of production” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 36). 
This has implications for inequalities and conflict when ‘productive’ skills and 
trades are not compatible with ‘local’ labour markets. A visit to one community in 
Warrap illustrated this challenge. A group of young people had received carpentry 
training through a UNICEF-funded project but were unable to work as there were no 
wood, nails, or other required materials in the county market. Wood needed for building 
furniture is not available in (or near) Warrap, and the remote location and poor road 
conditions limit transportation of goods. “We don’t have timbers, not even enough to 
practice… If there were timbers we could be working now… We don’t have varnish, not 
in the market… even nails are not in the market”, explained one group member. 
Education and training programmes oriented to the formal market economy can fuel 
grievances when knowledge and skills are not aligned with existing economies and 
opportunities and when ‘promises’ of economic benefits are not fulfilled. Young people 
are trained for jobs that are not available or profitable in their communities, but are 
disconnected from community livelihoods and economies through formal education or 
training. Resulting frustrations and a lack of other livelihood and survival opportunities 
can drive involvement in conflict. While some education and peacebuilding actors 
acknowledged this issue, they described it as a problem of limited job opportunities 
rather than of educational relevance or structural barriers, as illustrated by a state 
MoEST official in Warrap: 
It is going to invite the future crisis problem because… they go and they are 
raiding cattle now, the young men from the village, from the rural areas. They 
are taking the cattle of other people, and why? Because the market is not 
attractive to them. They want to buy the good things for themselves, but where to 
get, unless they go and take it by force from another person who has 
accumulated rewards?  
Narratives of ‘livelihood change’ are also challenged by the role of the 
government and international actors in supporting so-called ‘unproductive’ ‘pastoralist’ 
livelihoods. Post-CPA peacebuilding and development strategies identify strengthening 
rural livelihoods, including ‘pastoral’ activities, as key to peace and economic growth 
(JAM, 2005, pp. 26, 41–2; GoNU and GoSS, 2008, pp. 101–3, 110–1; GRSS, 2011, pp. 
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74–5, 99). The Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries includes an Animal Production 
Directorate supporting livestock health and management and dairy production (MoFEP, 
2014, pp. 250–7) and donors such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (2015) 
provide support to livestock health (e.g. vaccines, surveillance) and milk production.  
Some government and international actors acknowledged the importance of 
adapting education services to geographic and ‘cultural’ contexts. As one central 
MoEST official explained, referring to the national curriculum framework, “It should 
address the needs and relevancy of the people of South Sudan”. A youth representative 
in Warrap provided examples of ‘relevant’ training content, suggesting that young 
people in rural areas are looking for training on agriculture or livestock rather than, for 
example, small business training. However, discussions of ‘cultural’ or ‘contextual’ 
relevance may reproduce narratives of superiority and inferiority and ‘educated’ versus 
‘ignorant’. For example, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile framed the adaptation of 
education to ‘local’ needs in terms of a ‘lack of capacity’ in rural communities: 
Curriculum needs to be all the country… When you give it to somebody in the 
village, you cannot just teach somebody in the village something about computer 
or whatever. They need to address some features in the environment… If you 
bring higher technology just to a student, a pupil in the village, he will not 
understand [it]. 
Statements about contextual relevance can also reproduce narratives of ‘cultural’ or 
livelihood change and improving ‘productivity’, as illustrated by a donor representative: 
For pastoralist communities, people have been suggesting a combination of 
literacy, life skills, and labour skills, particularly perhaps how to convert 
pastoralism into an agricultural productivity approach where you could see 
them as livelihoods, cattle as property goods, markets… It’s really looking at 
innovative ways to reach these marginalised groups and to change their 
attitudes towards the education.  
The assumption that ‘formal’ education or training is not relevant to certain 
communities reflects a binary distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’, cultural and economic systems and practices. Linking relevance50 solely 
to ‘traditional’ livelihoods and knowledge (without considering other perceived social, 
political, and economic benefits of education, formal or otherwise) reifies identities and 
livelihoods, neglecting their dynamic and changing nature. It also overlooks changes to 
the political economy of communities discussed above.  
                                                
50 There is also a need to challenge uncritical or romanticised conceptions of ‘respect’ and ‘tolerance’, to 
consider what precisely is being ‘respected’ or ‘tolerated’. Relations of oppression and inequality (e.g. 
gendered oppression) within different communities may be ignored and reproduced through a focus on 
‘tolerance’.   
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A focus on ‘relevance’ and ‘recognition’ in education can (re)produce forms of 
oppression and division by ‘institutionalising’ and fixing or reifying identification and 
difference, romanticising ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, and elevating ‘difference’ above 
‘unity’. A focus on ‘difference’ can reproduce problematic (and colonial) ways of 
thinking, through what Said (1989, pp. 213–4) describes as the “fetishization and 
relentless celebration of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’”. Policy and programme responses 
can ‘institutionalise’ ethnic, cultural, or livelihoods differences when they demand that 
people “identify themselves in essentialist terms… imprisoned by the language and the 
logic of colonial thinking” (Idris, 2005, pp. 94, 100), reducing “the whole reality of a 
person’s life… to a single feature” (Escobar, 1995, p. 110). New forms of oppression 
emerge when policies and services require that individuals or communities organise 
their lives around a particular aspect of identification. This also echoes historical aspects 
of colonial (‘native’) administration that, as discussed in Chapter 2, determined access 
to entitlements and resources on the basis of ‘fixed’ tribal or ethnic identities. This 
reflects aspects of ‘divide and rule’ strategies through strategic distribution of valued 
resources and services. ‘Recognition’ thus becomes “not liberating but oppressive” 
(Appiah, 2006, pp. 20–1). This illustrates what Sjoberg (2017, p. 164) calls ‘the 
violence of inclusion’ involving “enforcement, replication, and naturalization of… 
identities”. This illustrates the extremely complex challenge of ‘recognition’ through 
education. On one hand, ‘inclusion’ in education can be a form of oppression and 
violence when programmes and content deny, dismiss, or aim to suppress particular 
forms of knowledge and practices, as described above. On the other hand, the reification 
and ‘enforcement’ of difference can also serve as a form of oppression and violence.  
The denial of difference can drive oppression and grievances. However, a focus 
on difference, ‘relevance’, and ‘recognition’ in education programmes and content can 
solidify rather than challenge boundaries, reifying and elevating ‘difference’ above 
commonalities (although the two are not mutually exclusive) and entrenching divisions 
between communities. Broad government policy statements refer to balancing 
recognition of diverse identities and ‘cultures’ with efforts to develop national identity 
and unity, as part of wider peacebuilding processes. Some education and peacebuilding 
actors described the importance of education in contributing to national identity and 
unity. For example, a South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor described 
education’s role in contributing to national unity through appreciation of different 
communities: “[We] want to let children know who are the people occupying South 
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Sudan, show them the faces of different people so they begin to appreciate people who 
are just like them”. A South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal 
described education’s role in ‘validating’ the importance of different communities in 
response to current and historical conflict: 
Our country was in conflict for a long time and most of our people are 
affected… It caused a lot of problems between our people, and also our people 
are still having grievances… So many conflicts, violence, between the people, 
the tribes, and the communities, even the areas, these things affected our 
community and… until now it is difficult for these people of South Sudan to be 
as one nation because so many events created the differences between them… 
But we want to tell them that, ‘You are important in this country’.  
The importance of a sense of national identity and unity was reflected in student 
drawings (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
Some officials described national identity and unity as emerging through 
recognition of difference, as illustrated by a central MoEST official: 
You want education that includes all of us. No one… will be left out of education 
and everyone, every citizen of South Sudan must feel that he’s in there. These 
were the ones who have been fighting all the years, because we were not 
included in the curriculum done by the North. We don’t see ourselves in there.  
Other MoEST and school-level representatives discussed tensions between ‘locally’ 
responsive and ‘national’ education approaches. Some suggested that centrally defined, 
consistent curriculum content can ensure ‘equality’ in education experiences and 
outcomes and contributes to a sense of national identity. A group of secondary students 
in Warrap stressed the importance of studying the same curriculum and subjects, both in 
terms of equality across different schools and in promoting unity: “It is important 
because we are one country… [You] won’t separate those who are studying the same 
curriculum”. A state teachers’ union representative described the ways in which 
curriculum content can contribute to national identity and unity: 
We have one system in the country, one system, one calendar, one curriculum… 
so that we realise those factors that are promoting nationalism and those things 
that are promoting brotherhood. ‘I can see you, you are South Sudanese only, I 
don’t want to know your colour, I just want to see that you are South 
Sudanese’… To look to it that education is for all, regardless of religious 
background, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of race. 
This presents an important challenge: how to engage with questions of 
‘recognition’ without reproducing “the liberal manipulation, adjudication, tolerance, and 
governance of difference” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 86), how to balance 
between belonging to and respect for difference and plurality, and commonality, 
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solidarity, and “belonging to the political community” (Mouffe, 1995, pp. 100–1). 
These tensions are of particular significance in South Sudan given the historical 
imposition of ‘national’ identities (including aspects of language, religion, and 
‘culture’) by Sudanese regimes. As discussed in Chapter 2, these were framed in terms 
of ‘nation-building’ but were experienced as forms of marginalisation, oppression, 
exclusion, and violence by southern communities, processes that can be reproduced – or 
challenged – through representations and recognition of identities within education 
contexts. 
Figure 6.1 Drawing by a female student 
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Figure 6.2 Drawing by a male student 
 
In this chapter, I have outlined how questions of identification and difference, 
‘culture’, and livelihoods intersect with educational, and wider economic and political, 
inequalities. However, as noted in Chapter 6, systematic policies and programmes 
promoting equality and ‘rights’ in South Sudan focus on girls’ education and students 
with disabilities. There are no targeted, comprehensive policies or strategies that 
systematically address context-specific educational inequalities facing different ethnic 
or livelihood (e.g. cattle-herding) communities – despite attention given to these issues 
in informal and formal peacebuilding policy discourses. Inequality-focused education 
policies involve little, if any, focus on intersecting dimensions of identification and 
difference, and relevant programmes are undermined in funding and implementation. 
For example, the Inclusive Education Policy refers to the inclusion of ethnic and 
cultural ‘minorities’, but specific strategies and actions focus only on learners with 
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disabilities (MoEST, 2014d). The Girls’ Education Strategy refers to ‘cultural’ factors 
affecting gender inequalities (in ‘pastoralist’ communities, for example) and responses 
such as community sensitisation with traditional leaders and mobile schools in 
‘pastoralist states’ (MoEST, 2015c). However, the policy contains no other references 
(or responses) to gendered experiences in specific ‘cultural’ or livelihood communities.  
Some ‘cultural’ dimensions of identification, difference, and inequality are 
addressed by AES programmes targeting children and youth who have missed out on 
education due to ‘livelihood responsibilities’, including the PEP. However, these 
programmes are undermined by budget allocations and expenditure and distributional 
disparities. The AES received one per cent of the education budget in 2014-2015, and 
not all AES programmes are prioritised in funding and implementation: PEP accounted 
for 0.7 per cent of AES centres, 0.3 per cent of AES teachers, and less than one per cent 
of AES enrolment in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a). PEP services are not implemented in all 
states or counties, including those with large cattle-herding populations. In 2013, five 
PEP services were operating in Central Equatoria, two in Warrap, one each in Jonglei 
and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and none in other states (MoEST, 2014a). In Tonj East, an 
education official reported that no programmes specifically for cattle-herding 
communities were funded although there were over 100 cattle camps in the county and 
chiefs from all camps were requesting education services for their communities: “Why 
is AES not operating here? The government doesn’t answer us… Why [do they] fail to 
extend this programme?” Some MoEST and donor representatives acknowledged gaps 
in policy and programme responses to aspects of identification and difference. 
However, their discussions generally justified the failure to address particular 
dimensions of inequality by referring to geographic distance or ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. As 
one donor representative explained,  
I don’t think there are enough actors addressing the really marginalised 
pastoral groups yet sufficiently… It’s so difficult, for a start, and it’s dangerous. 
In present circumstances, there’s a lot of issues around danger and risk. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the policy focus on specific (individual) dimensions 
of inequality suggests an implicit (or explicit) acceptance of inequalities linked to more 
political and politicised aspects of identification, which governments and donors may be 
unwilling to explicitly address. Broad policy statements emphasise the importance of 
educational equality and respect for difference, but specific policies and programmes 
selectively respond to ‘neutral’ forms of inequality and identification and overlook (or 
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accept) more ‘political’ forms implicated in historical and contemporary violence. 
Discourses of ‘equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain populations or 
dimensions of identification. This raises questions about “what… the liberal nation-state 
is recognizing and what is it misrecognizing when it acknowledges difference” and 
“why some forms of life and relatedness are more… eligible for recognition, thinkable, 
and livable than others” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 76, 86).  
This section illustrates the ways in which narratives of ‘culture change’ 
(contributing to ‘securitisation’, ‘civilisation’, and ‘modernisation’) are operationalised 
through government and donor decisions about education practice and content. Current 
curriculum priorities and content have limited relevance for diverse social, cultural, and 
economic systems, and work to suppress (or eliminate) certain aspects of ‘difference’. 
They define certain skills, knowledge, and livelihood systems as ‘productive’ and others 
as inferior, requiring transformation or ‘modernisation’. Education services thus 
perpetuate structural violence as well as entrenching dimensions of oppression and 
domination. This illustrates how inclusion or participation in education services can 
itself be a form or mechanism of oppression, domination, and violence, although this is 
not acknowledged in government and donor policy discourses.  
 
8.6 Chapter Summary and Implications 
In this chapter, I explore empirical findings concerning education sector 
engagement with identification and difference. I critically examine government policy 
statements on participation and representation in education and peacebuilding, focused 
on respect for diverse aspects of ‘identity’, relevance of education for different 
communities, responses to historical dynamics of oppression, and ‘national’ identity, 
and donor narratives focused on ‘barriers’ to education. Discussing the importance of 
responses to systems of inequality as underlying of conflict, some critical peacebuilding 
scholars refer to the recognition of different forms of (collective) identity and attention 
to political dimensions of identity, ‘plurality’, and boundaries of difference (Busumtwi-
Sam, 2002, p. 106; Richmond, 2013, p. 282, 2016, pp. 5, 33). The findings in this 
chapter illustrate some limitations of formal policy statements and objectives, and 
critical peacebuilding discussions, associated with identification and difference, and the 
ways in which they are undermined through formal and informal policy discourses and 
practices. First, negative and essentialising narratives of ‘identity’, ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, 
and ‘livelihoods’ are used to depoliticise and justify or legitimise forms of inequality 
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and violence. Second, ‘peacebuilding’ narratives ‘in practice’ are described in terms of 
‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, reproducing colonial dynamics of violence. Third, 
discourses of ‘equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain populations or 
dimensions of identification and difference in government and donor policies and 
programmes, reproducing patterns of ‘cultural’ violence. 
Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge the use of discourses of 
‘culture’ and ‘otherness’ to justify and depoliticise injustices and interventions. For 
example, Richmond (2010b, p. 668) describes ‘liberal’ peacebuilding discourses as 
reflecting a “colonial intellectual move” in which “inequality can be effectively justified 
by non-liberal alterity”. Jabri (2010, pp. 47, 43) describes peacebuilding projects as 
“framed in a discourse of modernisation… that is institutionally implemented and 
discursively legitimised”, based on “a hierarchical conception of subjectivities premised 
on the primacy of the European liberal self as against others”. Similarly, Chandler 
(2010a, p. 369) explains that, “the discourse of culture is key to understanding the 
peacebuilding discourses of intervention and regulation”, as it explains and legitimises 
the persistence of social, political, and economic problems and divisions “while 
simultaneously offering potential policy programmes on the basis of… goals of social 
transformation”. This chapter illustrates specific ways in which these processes occur 
within a particular social/institutional context, through formal and informal discourses 
and practices. In general, the critical peacebuilding literature pays limited attention to 
‘cultural’ aspects of inequality linked to identification and difference, and associated 
responses and implications (in relation to ‘social services’ or to peacebuilding processes 
more broadly). This chapter emphasises the importance of these issues and the ways in 
which ‘cultural’ inequalities intersect with socioeconomic dimensions of resource and 
service distribution and political dimensions of representation. 
This chapter illustrates how ‘peacebuilding’ narratives in education contexts are 
described in terms of ‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, reproducing colonial and post-
independence patterns of violence. This echoes critical peacebuilding discussions of 
externally-driven peacebuilding interventions as (neo)colonial, reproducing historical 
systems of power and domination over ‘non-Western’ populations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 
31–2; Heathershaw, 2008, p. 620; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 565–8; Darby, 2010, pp. 701–
5; Taylor, 2010, p. 156; Pugh, 2011, p. 314; Jabri, 2013, p. 8; Richmond and Mac 
Ginty, 2015, p. 176; Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 136–41). Jabri (2010, p. 53), for example, 
describes (liberal) peacebuilding (in Foucauldian terms) as a form of colonisation 
  
198 
“expressed in the form of… confinement of populations to spaces subject to 
surveillance, administration… and the ‘training’ of locals into societies amenable to 
self-discipline”. As central sites and mechanisms of colonisation, education systems are 
particularly relevant to critical discussions of neo-colonial dimensions of peacebuilding 
interventions, although this is neglected in the critical peacebuilding literature. Analysis 
of education systems provides insight into continuities in (historical) colonial processes, 
which may occur under the guise of ‘inclusion’ and ‘welfare’.  
This chapter echoes the point made by some critical peacebuilding scholars that 
(‘liberal’) responses to inequality and exclusion aim to integrate populations into 
existing structures rather than working for structural transformation (Richmond, 2009a, 
pp. 566–8, 2010b, p. 667; Mac Ginty, 2012, pp. 170–1). Some acknowledge that 
‘service provision’ interventions (responding to ‘welfare’ and ‘everyday’ needs) may 
illustrate external influence and control (Richmond, 2008b, p. 299; Lidén, 2009, pp. 
620–2; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624; Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 269), involving disciplinary, 
regulatory, and ‘normalising’ interventions (Duffield, 2007a, p. 6; Richmond, 2007b, p. 
470; Jabri, 2010, p. 48). Jabri (2010, p. 53), for example, refers to “the government of 
populations through… pedagogical means” shaping their conduct. This is illustrated by 
the focus on education’s ‘enlightening’, ‘civilising’, and ‘modernising’ function for 
‘peacebuilding’ purposes. Education is instrumentalised as disciplinary mechanisms or 
techniques to shape and ‘improve’ behaviours, actions, and moral attitudes – and to 
teach young people and their wider communities to ‘govern’ their own behaviours and 
practices. As Duffield (2007b, p. 239, 2007a, pp. 16–24, 217–8) explains, ‘uninsured’ 
(‘non-Western’) populations (described in terms of political, economic, and cultural 
‘underdevelopment’) are presented as threats to security and stability. Security-oriented 
responses are framed as “supporting and promoting life through, for example, 
interventions in… education” (2007a, p. 189), intended “to change whole societies and 
the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them” (2001, p. 42).  
In these ways, this chapter indicates that for some communities, inclusion or 
participation in education services can involve oppression, domination, and violence. It 
also illustrates specific narratives used by government and donor representatives to 
advance these aims. This illustrates the need to consider the specific aims and content of 
‘social’ services (both formally and informally stated), including aspects of ‘relevance’, 
and raises questions about whether ‘culturally appropriate’ interventions “represent a 
more efficient instrument of neo-colonial governance” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 270). 
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While some critical scholars explore the disciplinary and (neo)colonial dimensions of 
‘liberal’ peacebuilding, their discussions of ‘social services’ do not explicitly 
acknowledge the ways in which ‘service provision’ can reproduce such dynamics. This 
chapter also expands critical discussions of control and influence through peacebuilding 
interventions, illustrating the extension ‘international’ influence as well as ‘national’ 
elite control over ‘local’ populations. 
This chapter suggests that it is insufficient to consider ‘recognition’ only in 
terms of formal institutions and policies. Critical peacebuilding discussions of ‘social 
services’ generally concentrate on formal processes, with less attention to the 
significance of informal discourses. This chapter demonstrates that informal narratives 
reproduced and legitimised by individuals in positions of authority are critically 
important to understanding the peacebuilding role of ‘social service’ systems. 
Dismissive, negative representations of particular communities among government 
authorities, as well as education services irrelevant or antagonistic toward those same 
communities, undermine policy statements of ‘respect’ and ‘recognition and negatively 
affect relations between the government and populations and perceived responsiveness 
to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities of communities. 
The CPE framework informed these analyses and the identification of potential 
‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to identification and difference in education 
contexts. Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the 
influence of colonial logics underpinning persistent narratives about ‘cultural’ 
identification, difference or ‘otherness’, and ‘tradition’ versus ‘modernity’, and 
resulting explanations of education’s ‘civilising’ role. This is linked to underlying 
assumptions about the role of formal education as ordering and ‘disciplining’ 
populations by shaping ‘proper’ behaviour, attitudes, interactions, and knowledge. This 
also reflects liberal ideologies of individual ‘rights’ to and ‘inclusion’ in education (as 
provided by a ‘benevolent’ state), as well as a focus on ‘individualised’ forms of 
inequality and an ‘acceptance’ of collective dimensions of marginalisation. Education 
provision across geographic and livelihoods communities may also be shaped by 
mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A. The 
strategic provision or restriction of education (in terms of content, type, and 
distribution) represents a means of exerting control over populations, and serves to 
maintain existing structures of power and authority within and through educational 
institutions. At the same time, community members demonstrate agency in the ways 
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in which they navigate and negotiate these structures of power. In these ways, the 
theoretical framework informs my arguments about the political structures 
underlying educational narratives about ‘culture’, identification, and difference, 
explanations of education’s peacebuilding role, and the ways in which these shape 
both community perceptions and formal policy responses.   
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CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Reviewing the Empirical Findings 
 As Richmond (2016, p. 186) states, “the slow and painful piecing together of 
new services, institutions, and agreements on how to distribute resources or bridge 
identity difference… is a marked characteristic of every post-conflict society”. In this 
thesis, I attempt to understand the role of education, as a specific socio-political 
institution, in relation to peacebuilding in South Sudan. I examine the ways in which 
different forms of inequality are reproduced within and through the education system, 
and the resulting implications for violence and peacebuilding. I use these findings to 
expand critical peacebuilding discussions of responses to systems of violence and 
inequality underpinning conflict, ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ priorities and 
concerns. In this section, I summarise key empirical findings concerning the 
relationship between education and peacebuilding in South Sudan, focusing on key 
points from the three empirical chapters before addressing crosscutting themes. 
 My analysis of the ways in which educational resources and services are 
distributed in South Sudan indicates that existing distribution patterns reproduce, 
justify, and institutionalise inequalities and grievances. First, rather than serving as a 
means of ‘redistribution’, existing resource flows (at multiple scales) intersect with and 
reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities in resources and services. For 
example, central budget shortages and allocation procedures mean that education 
financing responsibilities are shifted from central to subnational and household levels, 
further marginalising areas and communities with limited access to material resources. 
Geographic resource and service inequalities intersect with other dimensions of 
inequality, including socioeconomic class and ‘ethnic’ identity. Second, ‘transparent’ 
resource allocation criteria depoliticise, justify, and institutionalise these ‘distributional’ 
inequalities. For example, ‘conflict-sensitive’ donor criteria for allocating capitation 
grants or school construction projects reproduce inequalities associated with geographic 
access or material resource challenges. Third, the lack of redistributive donor and 
government policies and programmes illustrates the ‘acceptance’ of inequalities linked 
to geographic or community-level resource distribution and the prioritisation of more 
‘individualised’, less ‘political’ inequalities.  
My analysis of ‘local’ participation in education indicates that processes of 
‘decentralised’ education governance reproduce patterns of political oppression and 
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exploitation. First, formal decentralisation processes entrench and legitimise rather than 
redistribute (centralised) authority and influence. For example, hierarchical 
management and communication ‘protocols’ restrict possibilities for influence and 
decision-making among county and payam officials and school managers, and donor 
and government authorities actions can undermine the existing positions and authority 
of these ‘local’ actors. This negatively affects relations and trust between subnational 
MoEST and school-level representatives and higher levels of government (and donors). 
Second, policy statements (and donors shaping them) abstract education from wider 
political dynamics and fail to address ‘informal’ aspects of governance that permeate 
and are reproduced through education systems. This includes the militarisation of 
government institutions and patronage systems reflected in education management. 
Third, the transfer of education financing responsibilities to communities and 
households, framed as ‘participation’, reproduces distributional inequalities in service 
delivery rather than contributing to ‘representational’ equality. The ways in which 
communities experience and perceive ‘participation’ (as ‘responsibility’ or burden) 
reflect wider debates about neoliberal influences on social service financing and 
provision. My empirical findings provide some insight into specific narratives used to 
encourage and legitimise this process, including framing financing responsibility as 
‘care’ for children and their education. Together, these represent a failure to deliver 
anticipated ‘benefits’ of decentralisation and negatively affect relations and trust 
between communities and the government and between levels of government. 
My analysis of questions of identification, difference, and ‘recognition’ within 
the education sector indicates that formal programmes and informal sector narratives 
reproduce (neo)colonial dimensions of oppression and violence. First, negative and 
essentialising ‘identity’-based, ‘cultural’ narratives are used to depoliticise and justify 
forms of inequality (in education access and resources) and the occurrence of violent 
conflict, explained as resulting from ‘tradition’ and ‘livelihoods’ rather than political 
marginalisation and exploitation. These narratives are advanced and legitimised through 
informal narratives among government and donor officials in positions of authority. 
Second, education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role is described in terms of ‘cultural’ and 
livelihood change, focusing on education’s ‘enlightening’, ‘civilising’, and 
‘modernising’ function (through transformation of individual and community 
behaviours and attitudes) rather than respect or recognition. This reflects patterns of 
oppression ‘devaluing’ particular livelihoods and forms of knowledge and reproducing 
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colonial dynamics of violence. Third, as noted above, discourses of ‘equality’ and 
‘recognition’ are applied only to certain populations or dimensions of identification and 
difference in government and donor policies and programmes, reproducing patterns of 
‘cultural’ violence. Aspects of ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, or ‘livelihoods’ are omitted from 
formal policy responses, despite their significance in dynamics of violence and peace. 
A number of crosscutting themes emerge from these empirical findings. First, 
inequalities and dynamics of violence are depoliticised and justified in multiple ways, 
including through ‘conflict-sensitive’ resource allocation criteria and ‘cultural’ 
explanations for inequality. For example, decision-making criteria for resource 
allocation used by government and donors can reproduce, justify, and depoliticise 
distributive inequalities in the name of ‘transparency’. Additionally, informal narratives 
reproduced by individuals in positions of authority normalise and depoliticise dynamics 
of inequality and conflict while masking the role of political elites and policies. Wider 
processes influencing these narratives ought to be considered. International and 
government institutions face pressures “to present simple messages” that simplify the 
complexity of experiences, in order to account to donors, raise funds, influence other 
agencies, and so on (Crewe and Harrison, 1999, p. 191). ‘Stabilised’ interpretations of 
events function to mobilise and maintain political support and justify and legitimise 
policy goals, resource allocation, and practice (Mosse, 2004, pp. 648–55).  
Second, current education policy and programme responses selectively engage 
with aspects of inequality, addressing some while ‘accepting’ others. Government and 
donor policies have not explicitly addressed forms of inequality associated with, for 
example, geographic and intergroup disparities in resources and services or 
‘recognition’ of identity (e.g. ‘ethnic’, livelihood) and difference. Formal policy 
responses prioritise ‘individualised’ aspects of inequality while failing to systematically 
address collective, ‘context-specific’ inequalities linked to historical and contemporary 
conflict. This reflects the influence of global education agendas, focused on ‘gender’ 
(girls’ education), disability, and primary education with limited attention to underlying, 
historical systems and structures of cultural, political, and economic violence and 
inequality (which entrench and influence gender- and disability-related inequalities). 
‘Equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain dimensions of identification and 
difference, while others (e.g. geographic location, ethnicity, livelihoods) are omitted 
from systematic policy responses. The distribution of educational resources across 
geographic regions, for example, is intensely political, due to the ways in which this 
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intersects with ‘local’ dynamics of political (and ethnic) representation and loyalty as 
well as histories of mobilisation and conflict. MoEST officials emphasised the 
importance of addressing these dynamics of inequality. However, as Sabaratnam (2017, 
p. 135) explains,  
The absolute and relative lack of resources for the host state means that they feel 
pressure to accept resources from donors, even when accompanied by dubious 
arrangements, not wholly aligned with what they really want to do, or even 
obviously potentially damaging. 
At the same time, government bodies and donors may be unwilling to explicitly 
address these highly political dynamics. Broad policy statements emphasise the 
importance of educational equality, but specific policies and programmes selectively 
respond to ‘neutral’ forms of inequality and overlook (or accept) more ‘political’ forms. 
It is difficult for government ministries and international organisations to address 
institutionalised systems of privilege and disadvantage that involve challenging the 
interests of those in power. As such, policy decisions reproduce, entrench, and 
institutionalise relations of subordination and inequality by neglecting historical, 
‘cultural’, and political dimensions of identity and violence and disadvantaging 
particular ethnic, livelihood, and geographic communities (Duffield, 2001, pp. 205–20). 
These policy decisions and priorities illustrate “the relations of accommodation and 
complicity with violence” existing within education and peacebuilding processes (p. 
202), through depoliticised, ahistorical resource distribution and policy development.  
Third, ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’ in education (for students in schools or for 
household or community ‘participants’ in resource mobilisation and management) can 
represent forms of oppression and violence. For example, for cattle-keeping 
communities ‘inclusion’ in formal education may be linked to efforts to change 
livelihood practices and separate children from family and community influences. For 
households with limited material resources, ‘participation’ in school management may 
be associated with unsustainable resource and labour contributions. Different narratives 
may be used to advance these processes, including framing ‘responsibility’ in moral 
terms, as ‘care’ for children or responding to ‘basic needs’.  As such, “the very act of 
inclusion, of being drawn in as a participant, can symbolize an exercise of power and 
control”, which may be more difficult to challenge (Kothari, 2001, pp. 142–3). 
Finally, perceived inequalities emerge as critically important for grievances and 
violence. In addition to ‘actual’ inequalities in resources and services, participation 
opportunities, and recognition and relevance, my empirical findings emphasise the 
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significance of people’s perceptions and interpretations of these processes, and to 
elements of experience and emotion. These undermine education’s peacebuilding 
possibilities and contribute to intergroup grievances when tied to perceptions of 
deliberate marginalisation or exclusion (by political and international actors) and 
framed in ‘us and them’ terms. Aspects of perception and interpretation are particularly 
significant in relation to historical experiences and contexts, linked to decades of 
violence, marginalisation, and inequality experienced by different communities. They 
draw attention to the importance of experience and emotion in political peacebuilding 
processes, and can be understood as expressions of agency or ‘resistance’. 
 
9.2 Limitations and Generalisability 
Before exploring the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding 
literature and for policy and practice, I address the limitations of this research as well as 
questions of generalisability. One limitation concerns the focus on inequality as the 
primary ‘lens’ of analysis. While this provides a useful and important entry point for 
exploring relationships between education and peacebuilding, I acknowledge that there 
are other dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding that this thesis does not explicitly 
address. A second limitation concerns the sites and sources of data. When identifying 
research sites in South Sudan, I aimed to represent diverse geographic, demographic, 
and conflict contexts. Due to security restrictions, I was unable to visit opposition-held 
areas, where education service provision and governance, educational inequalities, and 
implications for violence and peacebuilding are different from other parts of the 
country. However, interviews with representatives of NGOs working in opposition-held 
areas provided some insight into these issues. Additionally, the diversity of experiences 
and perspectives across and within communities in South Sudan shapes responses 
provided by research participants. Perceptions, experiences, and expectations of 
education services may differ widely between ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, 
or livelihoods communities, between people who have returned from East Africa, 
Sudan, North America, or Europe, and those who remained in South Sudan prior to and 
after the CPA and independence. This contributes to the richness of the data, but also 
limits to some degree the generalisability of the findings within the country.  
This thesis represents a “contextualised analysis of concrete peacemaking 
practices” (Selby, 2013, p. 59), focusing on education, dynamics of inequality and 
violence, and peacebuilding in South Sudan. Numerous contextual factors influence the 
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implementation and social and political outcomes of peacebuilding interventions 
(Tschirgi, 2010, p. 1; Hameiri, 2011, p. 192; Sending, 2011, p. 62; Sabaratnam, 2013, 
pp. 270–4; Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 864–5; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 174). 
Similarly, education systems are located within complex international, national, and 
‘local’ contexts (Dupuy, 2008a, p. 25; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008, p. 481), and 
the nature and duration of conflict, social and economic environments, and political 
settlements affect education’s peacebuilding role (Smith and Vaux, 2003, p. 19; 
Ishiyama and Breuning, 2012, pp. 65–6; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013, p. 203). When 
considering the implications of inequalities in relation to education and peacebuilding 
processes, numerous factors must be considered: political conditions (e.g. state 
structures and institutions, political accommodations and opportunities, agendas of 
conflict actors), economic conditions (e.g. resource availability), and demographic 
factors (e.g. location and size of group populations, significance of intergroup 
‘differences’) (Cramer, 1997, pp. 8–9; Regan and Norton, 2005, p. 333; Stewart, 2008, 
pp. 19–22; Stewart, Brown and Langer, 2008, pp. 288–96; Brown and Langer, 2010, pp. 
31–2; Østby, 2013, pp. 216–7; Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014, pp. 547–51). 
While not arguing against all forms of generalisation, Mohanty (2003, pp. 501–
2) emphasises the importance of “grounded, particularised analyses” recognising “the 
specificity of difference”. In this thesis, I consider emerging meanings and explanations 
as connected to a particular sociocultural and historical context (Mohanty, 1991, pp. 55, 
69). Numerous contextual and historical factors shape the specific relationships between 
education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South Sudan and affect the generalisability 
of the findings. First, the context of the peace process and settlements influences the 
ways in which ‘post-conflict’ interventions, including education development and 
resource allocation, have unfolded since 2005. The CPA and 2015 Agreement on the 
Resolution of the Conflict, and associated interventions, focus on ‘power sharing’ and 
issues relevant to the two negotiating parties (SPLM/A and GoS in 2005, SPLM/A and 
SPLM-IO in 2015), neglecting ‘internal’ dynamics of conflict and their structural 
dimensions as well as education and other social institutions. As described in Chapter 2, 
South Sudan’s geopolitical context affected support to the SPLM/A by international 
actors such as the UK and US, which shaped subsequent bilateral arrangements, 
including aid to education. 
Second, the nature of the South Sudanese state, as a new state created from a 
period of continuous civil war since independence, affects national and subnational 
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resource management and governance dynamics. SPLM-led governance reflects its 
origins as a military movement, and civilian political and administrative structures 
remain highly militarised (Blunt, 2003, pp. 133–4; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 64, 155–6; 
Knopf, 2013, p. 23; de Waal, 2014, p. 348; Hutton, 2014, p. 16). This has specific 
influences on relations between central and subnational governments and ministries, 
management systems and ‘cultures’ across government institutions and sectors, 
opportunities for (re)distribution of political authority, and budget allocation decisions.  
Third, South Sudan’s specific economic context affects education management 
and associated inequalities. South Sudan’s economy is dependent on oil revenues and as 
a rentier state is heavily affected by fluctuations in production (including due to ongoing 
conflict) and global prices. This affects resources available to the education sector, 
further constrained due to limited economic diversification, budget overspending, and 
theft of public funds (Young, 2012, p. 325; World Bank, 2013b, pp. 3–7; Mamdani, 
2014, pp. 39–40; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). The prioritisation of security and 
military sectors in government budgets (and neglect of ‘social’ sectors) is linked to the 
militarised character of the government and responses to ongoing civil war, and 
education sector allocations are lower than in neighbouring countries (World Bank, 
2013b, p. 10; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). This presents particular challenges to 
addressing inequalities and contributing to peacebuilding through education. 
Fourth, South Sudan’s geographic size affects education ‘development’. 
Geographic distance influences disparities in education resource and service distribution 
and opportunities for accessing forms of education, as well as communication processes 
and opportunities for influencing decision-making on the part of school managers and 
‘local’ government officials. These geographic aspects of distribution and participation 
are affected by historical disparities in ‘development’ and representation during colonial 
and post-independence periods. Geographic disparities reflect intergroup (ethnic, 
socioeconomic) inequalities, mirroring historical inequalities and reflecting their 
particular significance (and implications for conflict) in South Sudan. 
Finally, the history of South Sudan’s education system has had lasting 
influences on dynamics of inequality, conflict, and peace. These include the use of 
education investment (including deliberate ‘underdevelopment’), policies, and content 
(including language and curriculum) by colonial and northern Sudanese authorities as a 
means of exerting control over southern populations, and education as a site of 
resistance in SPLM/A-controlled territories. The development of South Sudan’s 
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education system was also influenced by reliance on ‘international’ actors for education 
provision in the south, including Christian missionaries during the colonial period and 
UN-led OLS services in the 1990s. These factors contributed to existing inequalities in 
education distribution, as well as shaping relations between the current government and 
international partners. They also shape popular perceptions and expectations concerning 
the distribution and nature of education. 
These contextual factors mean that certain findings are accentuated in South 
Sudan: the neglect of the education sector in government budget allocations, 
hierarchical and militarised education sector management (affecting opportunities for 
political participation), geographic challenges to education ‘development’ (and links to 
intergroup and historical disparities), and the highly politicised nature of education as a 
site and mechanism of both control and resistance. My findings do, however, point to 
some issues and implications for wider peacebuilding contexts and debates. Case 
studies are “studies both of something particular and of something more general” 
(Gerring, 2007, p. 76), revealing both ‘unique’ and ‘universal’ insights (Simons, 2009, 
pp. 164–7). Analyses of specific cases can be used to make broader generalisations or 
(theoretical) propositions (Collier, 1999, p. 4; Yin, 2003, pp. 31–3), with certain insights 
and implications transferable to other contexts (Simons, 2009, pp. 164–7). 
First, the ways in which South Sudan’s education policies address questions of 
inequality, and resulting implications for violence and peacebuilding, reflect in some 
ways the intensification of (hegemonic) influences of global education agendas on 
national policy decisions. This includes the ways in which education policies address 
forms of inequality, focusing largely on girls’ education and disability (reflecting 
MDG/SDG and EFA goals) rather than context-specific, conflict-related dimensions of 
inequality. This also includes the promotion of policy reforms such as decentralisation 
and privatisation as part of a wider neoliberal project, the transfer of financing 
responsibility to households and communities, and resulting distributional and 
representational inequalities and implications for state-society relations. This illustrates 
the applicability of my findings to other conflict-affected contexts, given the scale of 
policy commonalities between countries through processes of policy ‘borrowing’, 
harmonisation or standardisation, or imposition associated with donor conditions and 
power relations (Ball, 1998, pp. 125–7; Mundy, 1998, p. 449, 2007, pp. 346–7, Dale, 
1999, pp. 2–6, 2000, p. 428, 2005, pp. 130–2; Phillips and Ochs, 2003, pp. 451–7; 
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Samoff, 2003, pp. 3, 16; Rizvi, 2006, p. 200; Rappleye and Paulson, 2007, pp. 257–67; 
Knutsson and Lindberg, 2012, p. 819; Novelli et al., 2014, pp. 42–55). 
Second, findings concerning colonial legacies reproduced through education 
systems (in terms of the form and content of education, and the use of education as a 
mechanism of control over ‘cultural’ or livelihood communities) are transferable to 
other ‘post-colonial’ contexts. International education interventions and policy agendas 
are widely described as reproducing colonial legacies through definitions of education 
as ‘schooling’ (linked to Eurocentric ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘civilisation’), ‘Western’ 
domination over curriculum policies (including through ‘Western’ donors and 
‘Western’-dominated organisations), and devalorisation of local knowledge, histories, 
and learning (Mundy, 1998, pp. 449, 471, 2007, p. 350; Brock-Utne, 2000, p. xxiii–xxx, 
276-82; Shizha, 2005, pp. 66–72).  
Finally, findings related to the marginalisation or exclusion of education from 
peacebuilding processes can be extended to other conflict-affected contexts. Formal 
peace processes and agreements, and wider international peacebuilding interventions, 
pay little attention to education’s role in peacebuilding (Degu, 2005, p. 130; Novelli and 
Smith, 2011, p. 33). Reviews of peace agreements signed since 1989 report that only 40 
to 60 per cent of agreements include (very general) provisions for education (UNDP and 
Christian Michelsen Institute, 2006; Dupuy, 2008b). This affects the political 
prioritisation of, commitment to, and financing of education development in different 
‘peacebuilding’ contexts. 
 
9.3 Implications for the Critical Peacebuilding Literature 
My empirical findings illustrate the ways in which aspects of resource and 
service distribution, decision-making arrangements, and engagement with identification 
and difference in South Sudan’s education system intersect with and reproduce political, 
economic, and cultural inequalities. These findings provide insight into key issues 
raised in the critical peacebuilding literature, and provide effective entry points for 
contributions to more just, sustainable peacebuilding. In this section, I summarise key 
implications of my empirical findings for these critical discussions, focusing on the 
three key themes identified as central to ‘just’, ‘sustainable’ peacebuilding, building on 
key critiques of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding: the transformation of systems of violence and 
inequality, ‘local’ participation and influence, and engagement with and responses to 
‘everyday’ priorities and concerns. For each of these areas, I explore the implications of 
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my findings for critical analytical dimensions, and normative political (empirical or 
‘real world’) dimensions (Peterson, 2016, p. 513). These discussions illustrate a broader 
argument that education should be brought into peacebuilding analyses and debates. 
The small body of critical peacebuilding literature that considers social 
institutions and services presents three broad explanations of their peacebuilding role, 
focusing on ‘service delivery’ as a form of socioeconomic (re)distribution, response to 
‘everyday’ needs and priorities, and contributor to state-society relations. These 
narratives generally frame education as a ‘good’ or ‘service’ to be delivered rather than 
a social or political system or institution, with limited attention to the links between 
education and wider political and economic systems (including how it is used as part of 
wider political agendas). They also largely reflect an (implicit) assumption that 
education (or ‘social service’) provision is necessarily ‘good’, beneficial, or neutral. A 
growing body of education literature provides a more nuanced understanding of 
education’s complex role in both violence and peace, arguing that education systems 
can contribute to peacebuilding processes but also play a role in fuelling or exacerbating 
conflict (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2005; L. Davies, 2010; Smith, 2010; 
Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015). Education systems reflect and reproduce 
dynamics of violence, inequality, and power, which are neglected in depoliticised 
narratives of ‘service delivery/provision’. Such narratives also pay limited attention to 
education’s role in ‘operationalising’, legitimising, and reproducing broader political 
projects and agendas, including neoliberalisation, pacification, and (neo)colonial 
violence. 
The first broad direction for more transformative, just, and sustainable 
peacebuilding discussed in the critical peacebuilding literature concerns responses to, 
and transformation of, systems of violence and inequality underpinning conflict 
(Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Richmond, 2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2014, 2016, Newman, 2010, 
2013; Sabaratnam, 2013; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). Some suggest that ‘service 
provision’ represents a form of socioeconomic distribution, contributing to 
peacebuilding by addressing social and economic rights and exclusion (Lidén, 2009, p. 
621; Newman, 2011, p. 1750). My findings challenge the implied assumption that 
‘service provision’ addresses exclusion and inequality, illustrating the ways in which 
social institutions such as education reproduce, legitimise, and depoliticise political, 
economic, and cultural inequalities.  
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When discussing the importance of responses to systems of inequality, critical 
peacebuilding scholars focus primarily on the (re)distribution of economic or material 
resources and benefits and of political power and representation (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, 
p. 106; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, pp. 391–6; Richmond, 2008b, p. 290, 2010a, 
p. 30, 2013, pp. 279–82, 2014, pp. 458–63, 2016, pp. 5, 180; Mac Ginty, 2013, pp. 4–5; 
Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 315). Few refer to dimensions of identity, ‘plurality’, 
and boundaries of difference (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Richmond, 2013, p. 282, 
2016, pp. 5, 33). The critical peacebuilding literature generally pays limited attention to 
‘cultural’ dimensions of inequality linked to identification and difference, or associated 
responses and peacebuilding implications (in relation to ‘social services’ or 
peacebuilding processes more broadly). My findings illustrate the importance of these 
issues and the ways in which ‘cultural’ inequalities intersect with socioeconomic 
aspects of resource and service distribution and political aspects of representation.  
My empirical findings illustrate the need to consider not only formal service 
‘provision’ or ‘delivery’, and ‘real’ distributional inequalities, but also how 
communities perceive these processes. Some critical peacebuilding scholars 
acknowledge that the state’s failure to respond to populations’ service expectations can 
affect perceived state legitimacy, state-society relations, and wider peacebuilding 
contributions (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 561–7, 2014, p. 457; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 
2016, pp. 319–20; Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 132). However, aspects of perception and 
experience are largely neglected in this literature. My findings illustrate the need for 
analysis of perceptions, in terms of implications for grievances and conflict as well as 
peacebuilding. This involves locating perceptions in relation to historical contexts and 
experiences, which is not explicitly addressed in critical peacebuilding discussions. 
Efforts to support transformative, ‘just’ peacebuilding should therefore address 
perceptions of inequality through clear, direct communication with ‘local’ authorities 
and communities concerning resource distribution decisions within specific social 
institutions. It also requires critical analysis of ‘conflict sensitive’ allocation criteria that 
legitimise inequalities and shape perceptions of deliberate exclusion. 
These findings have implications for broader critical discussions of the role of 
inequalities in peacebuilding. They illustrate the need for analysis of specific ways in 
which political, economic, and cultural aspects of inequality are reproduced within and 
through education systems (through resource distribution, political representation, and 
recognition of difference) and other social institutions, and links to wider political, 
  
212 
economic, and cultural systems. They also illustrate the importance of analysing 
specific forms and dimensions of ‘inequality’ privileged in social policies, those that are 
obscured or ‘accepted’, and how this intersects with dynamics of conflict and 
peacebuilding. Efforts to promote transformative, ‘just’ peacebuilding therefore ought 
to explicitly address the redistribution of education resources (material, human, etc.) 
and services and opportunities for participation in policy decision-making, in response 
to historical patterns of marginalisation and inequality as well as contemporary 
differences in priorities and preferences across regions and communities. 
My findings confirm critical arguments that (‘liberal’) responses to inequality 
and exclusion largely aim to integrate populations into existing structures rather than 
working for structural transformation (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 566–8, 2010b, p. 667; Mac 
Ginty, 2012, pp. 170–1). While some scholars acknowledge that ‘service provision’ 
may illustrate external influence and control (Richmond, 2008b, p. 299; Lidén, 2009, 
pp. 620–2; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624; Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 269), they do not always 
explicitly consider the ways in which ‘service provision/delivery’ might facilitate these 
processes. My findings illustrate the importance of analysing how education and other 
social institutions reproduce and legitimise existing structures and simultaneously 
(attempt to) integrate populations into these structures. My findings build on critical 
peacebuilding discussions concerning ‘governmentality’ and ‘discipline’ in 
peacebuilding interventions. Education provides a specific, and effective, means of 
shaping the conduct, behaviours, and attitudes of (and thus administering, disciplining, 
and governing) populations that present ‘threats’ to stability (Duffield, 2007b, p. 239, 
2007a, pp. 16–24, 217–8, 2001, p. 42; Jabri, 2010, p. 53), through encounters with 
systems used to meet basic needs (Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1630–1). This occurs through a 
focus on ‘self-reliance’ (Duffield, 2007a, pp. 68–9), illustrated by the transfer of 
financing responsibilities to communities and households, and through policies and 
programmes focused on education’s ‘civilising’ and ‘modernising’ function. 
The second broad direction for transformative, just, and sustainable 
peacebuilding discussed in the critical peacebuilding literature concerns the promotion 
of ‘local’ engagement, participation, representation, and ownership as part of 
peacebuilding processes. The literature frames ‘participation’ in terms of opportunities, 
at all levels of peacebuilding projects, for ‘local’ actors to define peacebuilding needs, 
strategies, and objectives (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 149, 2011b, pp. 47–67, 2015, p. 840; 
Lidén, 2009, p. 628; Autesserre, 2010, pp. 248–70; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012, p. 6; 
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Richmond, 2012, pp. 355–73, 2013, p. 271; Jabri, 2013, p. 5). Some suggest that 
‘service provision’ can contribute to state-society relations by contributing to 
democratic participation and state legitimacy (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158; 
Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 137; Newman, 2011, pp. 1737–50; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416; 
Newman, 2014, p. 193). 
My empirical findings illustrate how ‘participation’ processes play out in a 
specific social institution at multiple ‘local’ scales (e.g. subnational governments, 
schools, households), including who participates and how. This has implications for 
critical peacebuilding analysis, extending the focus beyond ‘service delivery/provision’ 
to decision-making and governance arrangements informing policy processes, resource 
distribution, and management priorities and directions. My findings illustrate the 
importance of considering ‘local’ actors at the ‘border’ between state and community, 
including subnational education officials, school managers, teachers, and school 
management committees. This involves attention to dual roles as community 
representatives and mediators between government and populations, as well as multiple 
loyalties and forms of accountability affecting ‘local’ roles and representation. Critical 
peacebuilding analyses should also examine relations and dynamics of power between 
different ‘local’ actors, as illustrated by findings concerning interactions between 
subnational ministry levels, subnational officials and schools, and so on. 
My findings confirm and advance critical peacebuilding discussions by 
illustrating specific means and practices through which patterns of authority are 
reinforced within a social institution that effectively extends authority and influence 
from global to central (national) to ‘local’ levels. Some critical scholars explain that the 
advancement of a hegemonic (neoliberal) projects require a ‘politics of support’ and a 
‘politics of power’, preventing resistance or discussion of alternatives (Pugh, 2005, p. 
31; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 2–3; Taylor, 2010, pp. 159–67). My findings 
illustrate the means through which this is managed within a particular social institution, 
including specific narratives used to encourage and legitimise neoliberal education 
projects. They also illustrate the need to locate social institutions (or ‘services’) within 
wider political systems and ‘cultures’. These represent entry points for understanding 
how power and influence might be (re)distributed in ‘local’ contexts. Education 
governance arrangements have wider political implications, reflecting and reproducing 
broader political structures and presenting entry points for transformation across 
multiple sectors (Shizha, 2005, p. 75; Dupuy, 2008b, p. 150; Smith, 2010, p. 23; Boak, 
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2011, p. 22; Barakat et al., 2013, p. 127; Ellison, 2014, p. 191; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo 
and Smith, 2015, p. 15). Efforts to support transformative, ‘just’ peacebuilding should 
engage with and aim to strengthen the decision-making opportunities and influence of 
the ‘local’ actors identified above, operating between the state and communities. This 
should also involve attention to the ‘cultures’ of power within these ‘micro’ contexts 
(within school management contexts, subnational ministry contexts, and so on).  
When discussing questions of state-society relations and ‘local’ participation, 
the peacebuilding literature tends to focus on international- or national-level governance 
or the ‘grassroots’ level, with less attention to processes and institutions linking the two. 
My findings illustrate the significance of education as a key site of contact between 
communities, state authority, and international and global influences. For example, 
‘global’ neoliberal projects advanced by international donors are operationalised 
through national ‘decentralisation’ policies, which directly engage communities and 
households through school-based management and financing. This illustrates the 
importance, in critical peacebuilding analyses, of tracing the linkages between scales of 
action and the roles of specific social institutions in ‘operationalising’ particular 
political and economic projects at ‘local’ levels. 
The third broad direction for transformative, just, and sustainable peacebuilding 
discussed in the critical peacebuilding literature concerns responses to ‘everyday’ 
concerns, priorities, expectations, and understandings of peace (Richmond, 2008b, 
2009a, 2009c, 2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Mitchell, 2011; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 
2011b; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). This involves 
attention to individual and collective ‘welfare’ and wellbeing within particular ‘local’ 
environments (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, p. 6; Pugh, 2010, p. 264; Richmond, 
2010b, p. 670, 2016, p. 57; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2005; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 
1624–8; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 412–3, 2012, p. 369; Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 552). Some 
suggest that public service provision addresses people’s ‘everyday’ needs and priorities 
and represents ‘local’ or ’everyday’ forms of peace (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 567–80, 
2009c, p. 158, 2010a, p. 30; Mac Ginty, 2011b, pp. 81, 180; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1626; 
Roberts, 2011b, pp. 414–6; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 6; Newman, 2014, p. 193; 
Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 308–9). My empirical findings challenge the implied 
assumption that education provision necessarily represents or responds to ‘local’, 
‘everyday’ needs. Under the guise of responding to ‘everyday’ needs, education systems 
can reproduce and entrench (neo)colonial discourses and violence and the interests of 
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political elites. In these ways, education systems reflect and reproduce not only ‘global’ 
(e.g. neoliberal) influences, but also national and ‘local’ relations of power.  
Some critical peacebuilding scholars suggest that responses to ‘everyday’ or 
‘welfare’ needs, including service delivery, can serve as mechanisms of external (rather 
than ‘local’) control and influence, advancing hegemonic political and economic 
projects (Taylor, 2007, pp. 556–8, 2010, pp. 154–62; Richmond, 2008b, p. 299; Lidén, 
2009, pp. 620–2; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 84; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1624–40; Roberts, 
2011b, p. 416; Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 269). My findings illustrate specific mechanisms of 
influence within the education sector, including ‘global’ influences on national 
education policies and the advancement of political and economic agendas of 
decentralisation, privatisation, and so on. My findings also illustrate the ways in which 
education advances ‘national’ (not only ‘external’) elite-driven priorities and interests. 
Linked to the notion of ‘local’ engagement, the participation of ‘local’ authorities, 
school managers, and households in education management maintains rather than 
challenges existing structures and relations of power and influence. The framing of 
educational inequalities and education’s peacebuilding contributions in ‘cultural’ terms 
also depoliticises these processes and masks elite dynamics of violence.  
As noted above, the critical peacebuilding literature generally pays limited 
attention to ‘cultural’ dimensions of inequality. Similarly, it pays limited attention to 
aspects of ‘cultural’ identification and difference associated with ‘everyday’ dimensions 
of peacebuilding. Some critical scholars (Chandler, 2010a, p. 369; Jabri, 2010, pp. 43–
7; Richmond, 2010b, p. 668) acknowledge the ways in which discourses of ‘culture’ 
and ‘otherness’ are used to justify and depoliticise inequalities and violence as well as 
‘peacebuilding’ interventions. This is linked to broader critiques of externally-driven 
peacebuilding interventions as (neo)colonial, reproducing historical systems of power 
and domination over ‘non-Western’ populations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 31–2; 
Heathershaw, 2008, p. 620; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 565–8; Darby, 2010, pp. 701–5; 
Jabri, 2010, p. 53, 2013, p. 8; Taylor, 2010, p. 156; Pugh, 2011, p. 314; Richmond and 
Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 176; Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 136–41). However, critical 
peacebuilding discussions of the role of ‘social services’ do not explicitly acknowledge 
the ways in which ‘service provision’ can reproduce such dynamics. 
My empirical findings illustrate specific ways in which these processes occur 
within a specific social/institutional context, through both formal and informal 
discourses and practices. They also suggest that critical analyses ought to explicitly 
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consider the ‘cultural’ dimensions of violence associated with ‘everyday’ engagement. 
This includes attention to specific ways in which social institutions engage with 
questions of identification and difference and reproduce (or challenge) (neo)colonial 
forms of violence, such as the framing of education’s peacebuilding role in terms of 
‘’civilisation’, ‘modernisation’, and pacification. Given their role as central sites and 
mechanisms of colonisation (and other forms of international intervention), education 
systems are particularly relevant to critical analyses of the (neo)colonial dimensions of 
peacebuilding interventions. This includes attention to continuities in colonial processes 
under the guise of ‘inclusion’ and ‘wellbeing’ of communities. Efforts to promote 
transformative, just peacebuilding might therefore explicitly challenge such framings of 
the potential contributions of social institutions and services, and consider mechanisms 
for ‘recognising’ identity and difference in policy and practice (including forms and 
content of education). 
 My empirical findings illustrate the significance of perceptions of inequalities, 
marginalisation, and exclusion. Critical peacebuilding analysis of engagement with 
‘everyday’ priorities and processes, efforts to strengthen ‘local’ participation, and 
responses to systems of inequality should involve a focus on perceptions and 
interpretations in addition to ‘actual’ inequalities in resources and services and formal 
systems of distribution, representation, and recognition. Similarly, critical peacebuilding 
discussions of ‘social services’ generally concentrate on formal policy responses. My 
empirical findings illustrate the need to consider informal discourses as part of critical 
peacebuilding analysis, including as part of broader analysis of engagement with 
‘everyday’ priorities, ‘local’ participation, and responses to systems of inequality, and 
more specific analysis of the roles of social institutions such as education.  
Finally, my empirical findings advance critical peacebuilding discussions by 
exploring some relations between systems of inequality and aspects of the ‘local’ and 
‘everyday’. They illustrate some ways in which efforts to support one dimension of 
justice might undermine another (Fraser, 2008a, pp. 33–5). Some critical peacebuilding 
scholars acknowledge, for example, the ways in which neoliberal interventions focusing 
on ‘productive’ self-reliance can reproduce and widen ‘distributional’ inequalities 
(Duffield, 2001, p. 51, 2010b, pp. 65–6, Richmond, 2008b, p. 295, 2009a, pp. 562–6, 
2012, pp. 359–68, 2014, pp. 450–64, Pugh, 2010, pp. 263–8, 2011, pp. 312–3; Cooper, 
Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2006; Newman, 2011, pp. 1743–4; Howarth, 2014, pp. 261, 
295). Detailed analysis of social institutions such as education provides insight into 
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specific processes and sites through which this occurs. For example, ‘decentralisation’ 
efforts intended to support ‘local’ participation can entrench distributional (geographic) 
inequalities in resources and services when education financing responsibilities are 
transferred to subnational governments, communities, and households. Responses to 
‘everyday’ (‘welfare’) needs through inclusion in formal education might reproduce 
cultural forms of violence against certain communities. This illustrates the complexity 
of education’s potential peacebuilding roles, and the need to consider interactions 
between multiple (political, economic, cultural) forms of inequality and injustice. 
My empirical findings provide insight into the implications of education for 
critical peacebuilding debates concerning responses to systems of inequality and 
engagement with the ‘local’ and ‘everyday’, and for peacebuilding processes and 
outcomes more broadly, as part of wider critiques of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding approaches. 
My findings also draw attention to the need to consider the ways in which these issues 
are reflected in and (re)produced through other ‘social’ institutions and ‘basic’ services, 
such as health systems, housing support, and so on. This requires attention to aspects of 
resource and service distribution, decision-making and management, and engagement 
with identification and difference across a range of social institutions and systems, and 
their implications for both violence and peacebuilding.   
 
9.4 Implications for Policy and Practice 
My empirical findings provide insight into possible entry points (in multiple 
areas and at multiple scales) for political, economic, and ‘cultural’ transformation and 
contributions to more just, sustainable peacebuilding. In this section, I identify 
implications for policy and practice, of potential relevance to UN agencies, donor 
agencies and development organisations, and government institutions in both 
peacebuilding and education sectors. As noted in Chapter 1, education alone cannot 
address peacebuilding challenges. However, engagement with education can play a 
much greater role in supporting peacebuilding processes in South Sudan and other 
conflict-affected contexts. The implications outlined below reflect the assumption that, 
in peacebuilding efforts, inequalities should be “acknowledged as a starting point rather 
than as merely an inconvenient fact at local, state and global levels” (Richmond, 2016, 
p. 56). While inequalities alone do not drive conflict, they do have significant 
implications for reproducing and maintaining dynamics of violence underpinning 
conflict. Responses to inequalities are thus critically important to peacebuilding. 
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Persistent inequalities and structural injustices represent forms of violence that 
reproduce conflict dynamics in ‘post-conflict’ contexts and threaten peacebuilding goals 
(Cramer, 2006, p. 245; Roberts, 2011a, p. 2540; Keen, 2012, p. 771; Newman, 2013, p. 
318; Richmond, 2014, pp. 449–50). Sustainable, ‘positive’ peacebuilding thus involves 
addressing underlying causes of conflict, including structural inequality and injustice 
(Galtung, 1969, p. 183). This requires the promotion of social justice, transforming 
‘institutionalised obstacles’ preventing people’s full participation in social life and 
interaction through the distribution of material resources, representation in political 
processes and decision-making, and ‘cultural’ respect and valorisation (Fraser, 2008a, p. 
17, 2013, pp. 164–7, 193). As indicated by my empirical findings, this requires attention 
to relationships between communities and governments and between groups or 
geographic communities: “Where group differences exist such that some groups as 
privileged while others are oppressed, achieving economic and social justice requires 
explicitly attending to these relationships” (Hill Collins, 1998, p. xiv).  
The policy and practice implications of my empirical findings focus on aspects 
of education resource and service (re)distribution, forms of representation and 
participation in decision-making and management, and engagement with identification 
and difference. In relation to the distribution of education resources and services, 
policy and practice implications include: 
• Considering the revision of resource allocation policies, such as subnational 
budget transfers, to promote equitable allocation (through redistribution) in 
response to existing disparities across geographic communities, rather than 
‘equal’ allocation based on existing resources (e.g. schools, personnel).  
• Considering not only the total amount or budget allocated to the education 
sector, but also how funds are allocated within the sector. This includes a careful 
examination of activities and forms of education that are privileged and 
marginalised (e.g. alternative education), and associated implications for 
inequalities and conflict. 
• Exploring and adopting a more critical concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ in 
relation to resource allocation criteria or guidelines. This includes considering 
and responding to inequalities reproduced and entrenched through the 
implementation of ‘conflict-sensitive’ or ‘transparent’ criteria across geographic 
regions and communities. 
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• Considering and acknowledging continuities/challenges in previous statements 
and (perceived) commitments concerning education (by political authorities such 
as the SPLM/A, for example), moving away from an ahistorical view of 
education and associated expectations. 
• Considering perceptions of resource allocation decisions, explicitly addressing 
resource provision expectations when conducting assessments or evaluations 
involving schools and ‘local’ authorities, and ensuring that decisions (e.g. why 
programmes and resources are provided in some schools, payams, or counties 
and not in others) are clearly communicated to ‘local’ officials, school 
managers, teachers, and students. This can contribute to managing perceptions 
of (deliberate) exclusion from resource allocation, and associated grievances. 
• Addressing more ‘political’ dimensions of inequality in policy and practice, 
moving beyond ‘individualised’ aspects to address geographic, socioeconomic, 
and collective (e.g. ethnic, livelihoods) inequalities linked to conflict dynamics. 
Targeted, systematic, redistributive policy and programme responses to these 
inequalities can contribute to addressing other dimensions of inequality (such as 
the education of girls and students with disabilities).  
In relation to forms of ‘participation’ in decision-making and management, policy 
and practice implications include: 
• Facilitating the participation of county and payam officials and school managers 
in policy and curriculum development and revision processes. Although this 
would require more time and resources, it would facilitate opportunities for 
influence over decision-making as well as recognition and representation of the 
significant diversity within states (ethnic, geographic, livelihood, etc.).  
• Explicitly and formally recognising the central role of communities, through 
PTAs and other school management committees, as crucial ‘local’ actors in both 
peacebuilding and ‘development’ processes. Financial and labour contributions 
to service provision and management ought to be linked to expanded 
opportunities for influence over policy decisions as well as consistent 
communication of policy decisions from central and subnational levels. 
• Considering relations and perceptions of trust and legitimacy between 
MoEST/government levels, rather than focusing only on ‘state-society’ relations. 
This includes relations between national and subnational levels and between 
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different subnational levels (e.g. state, county, payam). This involves attention to 
the ways in which central and state officials engage with county and payam 
officials and school managers, in administration and communication.  
• Considering and avoiding government and international partner (donor, INGO) 
actions that contradict or undermine existing positions and authority of 
subnational government officials (for example, by bypassing county and payam 
offices when approaching schools). 
• Considering horizontal dimensions of participation and influence, in addition to 
vertical relations between communities and government or between levels of 
government. This might involve sharing information, knowledge, experiences, 
struggles, and strategies between school managers, county or payam officials, 
and others. 
• Considering the education system as an entry point for transformative 
approaches to governance across different government institutions and sectors. 
This is of significance for governance and peacebuilding actors, given the role of 
the education system (and education sector actors) as a mediator between the 
state and populations. 
In relation to engagement with identification and difference within and through the 
education sector, policy and practice implications include: 
• Involving members of diverse geographic, ‘cultural’, and livelihood 
communities (including cattle-keeping and rural communities) in the 
development of education policies and curricula. This can support the 
development of policies and curricula that recognise the cultural and economic 
systems, knowledge, and priorities of diverse communities, based on 
communities’ decisions about the ways in which they are represented, as well as 
providing opportunities for representation in decision-making.  
• Considering questions of ‘relevance’ in education forms and curricula, 
responding to different ‘identities’, histories, and ‘cultural’ and livelihood 
systems of communities (e.g. cattle-keeping or rural communities). However, 
the concept of ‘relevance’ should be critically interrogated, to avoid reifying 
dimensions of identification and difference. 
• Critically considering and challenging explanations of education’s peacebuilding 
contributions based on ‘cultural’ or livelihood change in both formal policies 
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and informal discourses. This could contribute to aims of recognition, respect, 
and valorisation of diverse communities and their livelihoods. This is important 
not only for education sector actors, but for security and peacebuilding actors 
engaging with different ‘cultural’ and livelihood communities. 
• Engaging in open discussion of tensions between recognition of difference and 
national ‘unity’ within/through education institutions and content. This might 
include explicit attention to commonalities and differences in historical 
experiences, practices, and expectations, in policy discussions and curriculum 
content. However, the potential for ‘shared’ histories and identities to entrench 
systems of cultural and political marginalisation must also be considered. 
• Incorporating historical analysis into education and peacebuilding policy 
planning and conflict analysis, involving attention to legacies of and continuities 
in colonial and post-independence violence in policies and programmes. This 
challenges ahistorical and apolitical perspectives focusing on interpersonal 
aspects of violence rather than structural or systemic dimensions. 
• Taking seriously the implications of ‘informal’ narratives advanced by 
education-sector authorities. This involves attending to the ways in which 
education and peacebuilding actors, including ministry, donor, and NGO/CSO 
representatives speak about and engage with different communities, and the 
ways in which this reproduces historical (colonial) dynamics of violence. 
My empirical findings suggest that education policy and programme responses 
in South Sudan, as in many other conflict-contexts, are shaped by global, international, 
and national interests and priorities and, in many ways, represent mechanisms of social 
order and control. However, as one of the most widespread public institutions, the 
education system also represents a mechanism through which to address ‘local’ and 
‘everyday’ dimensions of inequality and injustice as part of peacebuilding analysis and 
intervention. Strengthening education’s peacebuilding contributions involves changes to 
organisational or institutional perspectives, assumptions, and practices among donors, 
UN education and security actors, national and international NGOs, and national 
government actors and institutions. As Butler (2004, p. 204) explains, social 
transformation requires “interventions at social and political levels that involve actions, 
sustained labor, and institutionalized practice”. Active engagement with education as a 
contributor to peacebuilding ought to occur both during and after situations of violent 
conflict. Waiting until conflict has ‘ended’ (following a ‘security first’ approach) to 
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consider education’s peacebuilding role leads to the reproduction and exacerbation of 
inequality and violence and misses crucial opportunities for transformative action for a 
more just and sustainable peace.  
As one South Sudanese peacebuilding representative explained, “Education may 
not necessarily be a guarantee to peace”. However, education does provide numerous 
entry points for contributing to peacebuilding. The findings outlined in this thesis 
illustrate the complexity and tensions of education’s peacebuilding role: it is one of the 
key socio-political institutions through which political, economic, and cultural forms of 
violence are reproduced and legitimised, while also one of the most (potentially) 
transformative. This presents valuable insights for the critical peacebuilding literature, 
and for peacebuilding debates and processes more broadly. 
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Appendix 2. Interview and Discussion Guides and Transcript Excerpts 
 
Interview guide for key stakeholders (MoEST, donors, organisations) 
 
Thank you so much for agreeing to help me with this research. These questions are only a 
guide, so we might not cover all of them, and we might talk about other issues as well. I may 
have some follow-up questions depending on your answers. As explained in the Information 
Sheet and Consent Form, you can refuse to answer any of these questions and you can decide to 
end this interview at any time.  
 
1. Could you tell me a little about your role in relation to education in South Sudan?  
 
Peacebuilding organisations: Could you tell me a little about your role in relation to 
peacebuilding in South Sudan? 
 
2. What are some of the main challenges facing the education system?  
 
School managers: What are some of the main challenges facing your school? 
 
3. How do you think the education system is related to the on-going tensions and conflict in 
the country? In your state or county? 
 
4. In what way do you think educational governance systems and practices (for example, 
management or policy reform) are addressing or contributing to tensions and conflict? 
 
5. Which areas of the country or state do you think require most educational attention and 
effort? 
 
Is there sufficient attention to these areas? If not, why do you think that is? 
 
6. Which sectors of the education system do you think require the most attention to address 
inequalities? 
 
Is there sufficient attention to these inequalities? If not, why do you think that is? 
 
7. What role have international actors played in contributing to addressing educational 
inequalities? In contributing to addressing peacebuilding? 
 
8. Education and peacebuilding actors: How do you collaborate with international 
organisations in education development? In peacebuilding 
 
International organisations: How do you collaborate with the Ministry of Education in 
education development? 
 
Subnational ministries: How do you hear about policies and decisions that are made in 
Juba? 
 
9. How do you think education can contribute to peacebuilding in South Sudan? 
 
10. What policies and strategies do you think should be adopted in order to better address 
educational inequalities? To better contribute to peacebuilding? 
 
11. Is there anything else that you wish to share or that you think is important to discuss? 
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Focus group discussion guide (teachers and students) 
 
Thank you so much for agreeing to help me with this research. These questions are only a 
guide, so we might not cover all of them, and we might talk about other issues as well. I may 
have some follow-up questions depending on your answers. As explained in the Information 
Sheet and Consent Form, you can refuse to answer any of these questions and you can decide to 
leave this discussion at any time.  
 
1. What are some of the main challenges facing the education system? Your school? 
 
2. How do you think the education system is related to the on-going tensions and conflict in 
the country? In your state or county? 
 
3. Which areas of the education system do you think require the most attention to address 
inequalities? 
 
4. Is there sufficient attention to these inequalities? If not, why do you think that is? 
 
5. Teachers: How do you collaborate with international organisations? With the Ministry of 
Education? 
 
6. Teachers: How do you hear about policies and decisions that are made by the Ministry of 
Education? 
 
7. How do you think education can contribute to peacebuilding in South Sudan? In your 
community? 
 
8. What strategies do you think can help to better address educational inequalities? To better 
contribute to peacebuilding? 
 
9. Is there anything else that you wish to share or that you think is important to discuss? 
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Transcript excerpts: Interviews with state-level MoEST officials 
 
Interview 1 
 
So first, could you tell me a little bit about your role in the education system? 
 
Yeah, thank you. My role in the education system is that I, I oversee actually all activities of the 
ministry. And in the ministry, there are several directorates and there are directors and deputy 
directors, inspectors, etcetera in every directorate. For instance, we have the directorate of 
secondary schools, primary schools, early childhood development, private schools, vocational 
training schools, alternative education system, even we have administration, and yeah, 
administration and others. So all these fall under me, and I supervise their work. I have to see 
that they that [inaudible] of their plans of work, and they execute the plans and if, at all if there 
is somebody who has not executed his plan, so I need, I need to know why. And then I have to 
know, to collect information about the functionality of the directorates. What are the 
programmes, the difficulties so that, especially at this moment, when the national government 
does not have money to run most of the educational activities, so I have to know their annual 
work plans, so that when, when I have partners coming to ask, then it’s better for me to share 
with the partners where we have the gaps, where the particular partner can give [inaudible], then 
I have to liaise the partner with the particular directorate. Yeah, and then I have to account also 
to give my reports to the minister, all the activities taking place in the ministry on a daily basis, 
monthly, quarterly, and annual, basis. Also, subsequently, forwarding the reports to the national 
government so that the national government can see how far we have gone with the educational 
activities in the state, yeah. And also to coordinate any requisitions from the national 
government, any issues emerging they write to me then I have to, to disseminate to various 
communities. And also, not only the directorates here, we have counties, we have 10 counties 
and about 51 payams. So we, at the county level we have county commission directors, and then 
at payam level we have payam education supervisors, and then we have headmasters in 
secondary schools, head teachers in secondary schools and primary schools. So all those 
network of education supervisors.  
 
That sounds like a lot of coordination, a huge network. 
 
Yeah, yeah. 
 
Okay. And so you mentioned some of the divisions of responsibilities, the collection of 
information from, for example, the county level or directorates, and the transmission of 
information to the minister and to the national level. What are, what are some of the specific 
responsibilities that are, that have been devolved to the state level? What are some the specific 
responsibilities of the state ministry? 
 
Yeah, yeah, of course, as far as the budget, budgeting is concerned, I’m the signatory to the 
accounting, the procedures of the ministry, and then the, the accounting activities are 
coordinated or carried out by the administration unit, whereby this accounting section, etcetera, 
the payments, etcetera. So they prepare, then they will bring to me, I have to go through to 
approve so that the payment is done. And any requisition which is brought to administration is 
also [inaudible] to me, so I am the final person to approve any use, any financial use in the 
ministry. And even when there, in the salaries for example, come from Juba, so the account 
department prepare the [inaudible], I have to sign them, write the requisition, I have to sign all 
of those requisitions, so that the monies are transferred. So for accountability purposes, yeah. 
 
Okay. And is, and that’s money transferred to the county level, or- 
 
Yeah. 
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Okay. And so when you’re talking about the, the salaries that are sent from Juba for example, 
those are the state transfers? 
 
[Nod] 
 
Okay. And are the, how are decisions about the amount and the use of state transfer funds, how 
are those made? Are those decisions made at the level of the state? 
 
No. Actually at the moment, the transfers are just what we call Chapter 1, which is salary 
transfer. And then another transfer is the operating transfer, which goes right to the counties, 
which we have been allocated from the headquarters. Then they come just through the account 
of the ministry and we make the transfer to the counties. Then for salaries, also the same. They 
come, we transfer. The only thing we can decide upon is the operation costs, which is a limited 
amount that we use for running fuel, vehicles, everything, other services that we decide upon. 
And for that one we, when it comes we sit as a, a group, a committee, then we raise, we receive 
requests for services. Then we have to prioritise, and because the money’s not enough, so that’s 
why we have to prioritise, so that we can at least solve issues which are for high priority, and we 
have issues that are not prioritised, we can [inaudible] them for many other months. Yeah. 
 
Okay. What are some examples of issues that are prioritised? 
 
Actually here in the ministry, there are vehicles, of course, running, we need fuel, we need fuel 
for electricity, and then we need services, if there is any, any visit around the [inaudible]. So we 
give priority to that. And the operation of the directorates. So when there is anything, when 
there is communication or [inaudible], we have to communicate with the payam, with the 
counties, etcetera. So we have to prioritise fuel, we have to prioritise car, vehicle maintenance, 
we have to prioritise Internet use, for example, we have to prioritise airtime allocation for every 
directorate, so that if anybody is sent on a mission anywhere, because he is able to communicate 
back. Any time we are able to call from here to the counties and get information, yeah, for 
communication and so on. So those are the things that we prioritise, and also if there is a 
planned visit to a school or schools, etcetera, we also prioritise that, for fuel and maybe 
something for survival, DSA, etcetera. We have to prioritise what activity is for the benefit of 
education. So those are what we actually prioritise. Yeah. 
 
Interview 2 
 
First, could you tell me a little bit about your role in the Ministry of Education? 
 
Yes, yeah, my position? 
 
Yes. What is your role and responsibilities? 
 
Me, I’m here in the ministry, I’m acting director for general education, basic and secondary. 
And of course, my role, I’m the first man in the ministry here, after the Minister and Director 
General and Director for Quality Promotion. My work here is to, to monitor, to monitor how the 
director of basic education or primary education is monitoring or is implementing the policy and 
is implementing the, the ministry plan to run the primary schools, yeah, even secondary schools, 
yeah. So the director of primary schools and secondary schools are under me, and we are always 
sharing all the information and we are implementing the policy of the government together, 
yeah. I don’t interfere in the, in their work unless if there is something very difficult, but they 
are free to, they are free to implement their work, then me, it’s I’m just like I’m just monitoring, 
and if there is any obstacle then I will, I can be a mediator between the director, Directorate of 
General Education and the director for general and the minister. This is my role in the ministry. 
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Okay, all right. And when you talk about the ministry plans for schools, are those the plans that 
are developed at the central ministry in Juba? 
 
Yes, for sure, all the, the government or the national ministry in Juba is always the one who 
plan. After they plan, they plan for the, actually they plan, they give us the final, the plan and 
the information required from us, yeah, at the level of the state. There is a plan at the national 
level and also there’s a plan for the, at the state level to be implemented. And from there we 
came down, used to go down from [the] level of the ministry to the county, payam, up to the 
schools. 
 
Okay, okay. And when the, the plans and the policies are developed in Juba, does the state 
ministry participate in some of that decision-making, have the chance to offer suggestions? 
 
Yes, yeah. Yeah, sometimes they call us. If it is necessary, they call us to go to Juba, all the 
states, all the 10 states. We go there and they share information with us. We used to make a 
workshop together and, and give ideas to, and share them, to share them with the other states, 
together, then this thing will be a government, the national ministry used to adopt these ideas 
and it became disseminated, yeah. But not always. Sometimes they just send us any, they can 
decide and we have to implement. But sometimes they ask us to share with them. 
 
Okay. Do you think that the state ministries are sufficiently involved in the planning and the 
decision-making, so that you can help inform, make sure that policies and plans are relevant for 
all the different states? 
 
Yeah, yeah, the state ministries are involved to make decisions, yeah.  
 
Interview 3 
 
I want to come back to one of the questions I had asked, I had asked earlier about rural areas 
or rural families, isolation. You talked about those being some of the, the major inequalities or 
disparities in the education sector. Are donors or different partners, are there any programmes 
or policies to address some of those inequalities?  
 
Yeah. 
 
So what are some examples of what people are doing to address these disparities? 
 
Okay, now on the side of the government there is, there is gender issue which is addressing the 
issue of specific to the women, both in the rural areas and outside. And then there are policies, 
some [inaudible] supported by partners, and the government policy of the [family?].  
 
Okay. What’s the name of the policy? Which directorate or ministry is supporting that?  
 
Uh, the, the ministry supporting it is uh, Gender and Social Welfare, yeah.  
 
Okay, I see. Okay. But in terms of specifically education in isolated areas or education in rural 
areas, are there any programmes, even donor programmes that are addressing those issues?  
 
I think the other things fit under this broader issue, yeah. When the donors come they, they 
support activities like this, yeah. 
 
Okay, okay. So the donors might support some of those gender- 
 
Yeah, and girls’ education problems, girls’ education movement, and then AIDS, and then also 
now girls’ education movement started with GESS, Girls’ Education South Sudan. So now, if 
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you can see, the capitation grants is the major one that is going to all different communities 
because it is targeting where these schools are, and so it will support uh, going to these 
communities, yeah. And then also WFP, they give uh, something called girls’ incentive, if the 
girl comes to school within 22 days, then they are given some, some incentive for use for the 
food, to girls, to the parents, so that the parents allow them, so they get to come to school, yeah. 
 
All right. Okay. So we’re talking about equality, questions of equality, questions of equity. 
What, for you, what does equality mean, in terms of education?  
 
Okay, in terms of education, equity is, to me it means even this disadvantaged group, like 
women or disabilities, disability people, people with special needs, and then equality, in myself, 
it means giving it to everybody, regardless of, of what status they are. Yeah, yeah.  
 
Okay. So to address different inequalities, disparities in education, you’ve mentioned some of 
the things that the government and the donors are already doing. What else do you think needs 
to be done? What types of policies, what programmes do you think need to be developed in 
order to respond to the main inequalities in education?  
 
One is the decentralisation. That is good decentralisation, not the type of decentralisation that 
you can see and you call someone in your family and say this is decentralised and then 
[inaudible]. So you can involve the community in their own [inaudible] everything. And then 
what the community plus those in that grassroots feel that government should do, then the, then 
this is what the government will do and what donors have to go in to support, yeah. The other 
thing also is to address all these, we have to separate the difference between, because now we 
are using both quality and quantity, because last time there was no education in the whole South 
Sudan, so we need, we are focusing now on access, and to have access, there must be quality. 
So there, we need, as on my point, education has to be prioritised in the [inaudible]. Not just 
saying it is priority one when the funding is not there. If you see donors, donors they think that 
priority should be for other areas, not for education, and they say ‘Education, no, this is a long-
term programme’. So it has to, donors, both donors and the government has to see the issue of 
education.  
 
Interview 4 
 
Before we end, is there anything that you think that is, if we’re talking about education and 
conflict and peacebuilding, do you think there’s anything that anything particularly important 
that you feel I should know or that we might have missed in our conversation? 
 
Yeah, it’s also, to, to have this peace among the people, the community should be also aware, 
the community- There are people, you call the community and the community is not aware, 
there should be workshops, awareness for the communities to, to be aware about the peace and 
all these things. And it’s the life, life skills, yeah, to start in the community to know, and then 
they will also participate in providing peace in the, among themselves in the community. 
 
And what might be some, some ways to engage the community in that type of learning? 
 
So you do workshops, yeah, move the communities through the- In the schools we have what is 
called parent-teacher associations, PTA. Through these PTAs we can build the communities and 
then, then they’re aware, aware about what is going on and all these things, yeah. And then 
something must happen, happening, what can they do when conflict happens, all these things.  
 
And parent-teacher associations, are they active in many schools now, or has that been a 
challenge? 
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Yeah, in many schools they are active, in many schools they are active. Because they are the 
one to monitor also the work of the school, and if there is any problem in the school also, they 
solve the problems, and also if there is need, like we want to have a teacher’s house or 
something like that. So we have to, also to contribute, to construct a house for teacher. If they 
want their children to be, to be taught or to learn, they have to also construct house for the 
teacher, yeah. And also from the school, if we are constructing these temporary learning spaces, 
so they have to also participate in this. Because if you leave them, also you will see that the 
organisation like UNICEF comes, constructs learning spaces and the community is not 
participating. They will say, ‘Ah, this school belong to UNICEF, not belong to the community, 
this school belong to UNICEF or belong to the government there’. This is what the community 
will say now, but if they are participating in constructing, ‘This is our school, this is ours’. Yes, 
yeah. 
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Appendix 4. Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
	
	
Information sheet 
 
Study title: Education, Inequality, and Peacebuilding in South Sudan 
 
Invitation: You are being invited to take part in a research study on education, inequality, and 
peacebuilding. Before you decide to participate in this study, it is important for you to 
understand why this study is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following 
information carefully. You can discuss it with others if you wish, and you should feel free to ask 
the researcher if you have any questions about the study. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? The purpose of this study is to understand how education 
can affect peacebuilding after conflict. This includes studying what different people think about 
education, inequality, and peace, as well as the different roles of government, international 
organisations, and schools. Participants will include government representatives from central, 
state, and county levels; representatives of international and non-government organisations; 
school managers; teachers; and students. This part of the study will last for around 10 months 
and will be completed in August 2015. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? You are being invited to participate in this study 
because of your role in the education system or education development in South Sudan, and the 
ideas that you can share about education and inequality, including policies and programmes, in 
the country / state / county / payam / school / community.  
 
Do I have to take part? Participation in this study is completely voluntary. It is up to you to 
decide if you wish to take part in the study or not. You are free to refuse to participate. Even if 
you decide to participate now, you can refuse to answer certain questions or you can choose to 
withdraw from the study at any time, and there will be no negative consequences. If you wish to 
withdraw from the study, you can simply tell the research that you no longer wish to participate. 
You do not have to give a reason, and you can ask that the information you provided be 
destroyed. 
  
What will happen if I take part? If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to 
take part in a one-on-one interview / focus group discussion. The researcher will ask you to 
share your ideas about how education can affect peacebuilding, and about education policies 
and programmes. This discussion will last around 1 to 1.5 hours, and you can choose where the 
interview will take place. The researcher will take notes, and you will be asked if the discussion 
can be audio-recorded so that it can later be transcribed. The researcher may contact you after 
the interview if there are any additional questions. 
	
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? Participating in this study will 
take around 1 to 1.5 hours of your time. The discussion will take place at a location that you 
choose, to make it as convenient as possible for you. The discussion might cause some feelings 
of stress, if difficult experiences such as conflict, violence, or being excluded are discussed. The 
researcher will not ask any questions about your personal experiences in these areas. These 
experiences will only be discussed if you introduce them and the discussion will continue only 
as long as you decide. If you feel upset at any time you can decide to refuse to answer any 
questions, end the interview, or end your participation in the study.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? Participation in this project will provide an 
opportunity to share your thoughts about education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South 
Sudan. It is important to study these issues in order to have a better understanding of how 
different people are included in education and the possible role of education in building peace. 
The study findings will be shared with representatives from the government and international 
organisations who are involved in the education system. Your ideas will be valuable for 
government ministries and organisations that wish to understand how to address inequalities in 
education and the role that education can play in peacebuilding. 
	
Will my information in this study be kept confidential? Personal information will only be 
collected with your consent. The information that you share will only be identified by a code on 
documents and in the research reports. In reports or presentations, your name, position title, and 
county / payam / school name will never be identified. All of your personal information will be 
kept confidential by the researcher and will not be shared with anyone, except if required by 
law. For focus group discussions: Other group members will hear the responses you share, and 
confidentiality will be requested but cannot be guaranteed for the group discussion.	
 
You can ask the researcher to remove and destroy your information even after the interview. 
You can do this at any time until the written report has been prepared, then the information 
cannot be removed from the report. You can ask the researcher for a copy of the transcript of the 
interview to review and provide comments before it is included in the research report. All of the 
research documents and recordings will be stored and saved in a locked cabinet or on a 
password-protected computer that only the researcher can access. The information that you 
share will only be used for the purposes of the study described in this document. Only the 
researcher and the research supervisors will have access to this information. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? If you have not already scheduled an interview, the 
researcher will call you two days after you have received this information sheet, to ask you if 
you wish to participate in an interview. If yes, you will then decide on a date, time, and location 
for the interview. If you choose to participate, you will also be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? The results of this study will be used for 
the researcher’s PhD thesis project. The results of the study will also be shared during 
presentations with government ministries and international organisations and during academic 
conferences. All of the information that you share will be kept anonymous and confidential in 
the reports and presentations.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? The researcher is a PhD student at the School of 
Global Studies at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom. This research is supported by the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral Fellowship. 
	
Who has approved this study? This study has been approved by the School of the Global 
Studies’ ethical review process and by the Social Sciences Cluster Research Ethics 
Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex. The Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology of South Sudan has given permission for this study to take place.  
 
Contact for further information: If you have any questions or would like more information 
about the study, or if you have any concerns about the way that the study was conducted, you 
can contact the researcher or the research supervisors at the University of Sussex.  
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Researcher:  Gabrielle Daoust  
Telephone (South Sudan): 0926064932  
E-mail: G.Daoust@sussex.ac.uk 
 
Research supervisors (University of Sussex, UK):  
Prof. Jan Selby 
Department of International Relations  
Telephone: +44 12 73 87 66 94  
E-mail: J.Selby@sussex.ac.uk  
Prof. Mario Novelli 
Department of Education 
Telephone: +44 12 73 67 86 39 
E-mail: M.Novelli@sussex.ac.uk  
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet. Please feel free to ask 
the researcher if you have any questions about the information that is provided, or if you have 
any other questions about the study.  
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Interview consent form 
	
Project title: Education, Inequality, and Peacebuilding in South Sudan 
Project approval reference: ER/GD209/1 
 
You should feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about this consent form or if 
you have other questions about the study. Please take the time to read this form carefully before 
signing. You can ask for new information at any time during the study. You will be given a copy 
of the signed form to keep. 
 
I agree to take part in this study. The study has been explained to me and I have 
read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for records. I have 
had the opportunity to ask questions which have been answered by the researcher. 
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
I understand that agreeing to participate in this study means that I am willing to: 
• Participate in a one-on-one interview / group discussion with the 
researcher 
• Be available if the researcher has other questions after the interview  
• Allow the interview to be audio recorded  
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
 
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
 
I understand that any information I share is anonymous and private and that my 
name and personal identifying information will be not included in the report.  
 
I understand that the research will keep my information confidential, except if 
required by law. Focus group discussions: I understand that confidentiality cannot 
be guaranteed for information that I share during the group discussion.		 
 
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
I understand that the information I share will only be used for the purposes of the 
study described in the Information Sheet, and that the data will be stored and saved 
in a secure location. 
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
I understand that I can ask for a copy of the interview transcript to review before it 
is included in the report, and that I can review and approve the study findings 
before the final report is prepared.  
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, that I can choose not to 
participate in the study, that I can choose not to answer certain questions, and that I 
can withdraw from the study at any time without any negative consequences and 
without giving a reason. 
 
Yes___ 
No___ 
I agree to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study. I understand that this information will be kept strictly confidential 
and handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Yes___ 
No___ 
 
Participant name: ______________________ 
Signature: ____________________________ 
Date:  _______________________________ 
Researcher name: ______________________ 
Signature: ____________________________ 
Date:  _______________________________ 
 
